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ABBREVIATIoNs, CITATIoNs,  
TRANslATIoNs, ANd TRANslITERATIoNs 
GP   The Guide of the Perplexed
HD   Hilkhot De’ot 
MnT  moshe ibn Tibbon’s translation of ShM (the base text in 
   Heller’s and Frankel’s editions)
MT   Mishneh Torah
PhM  Perush ha-Mishnayot
SE   “short Enumeration of the Commandments” 
   (Minyan ha Qatsar)
ShM  Sefer ha-Mitsvot
SP   Shemonah Peraqim
p, N  positive, Negative commandment, according to maimonides
pq, Nq  positive, Negative commandment, according to Qayyara
ps, Ns   positive, Negative commandment, according to sa’adiah
M   mishnah 
T   Tosefta
JT   Jerusalem (palestinian) Talmud
BT   Babylonian Talmud
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EdITIoNs usEd
Quotations from Sefer ha-Mitsvot, Nahmanides’ Hasagot, and the 
commentaries Megillat Esther, Qinat Sofrim, and Lev Sameah are cited 
to the Frankel edition of Sefer ha-Mitsvot, either by page or by the 
particular commandment under discussion. There are two Hebrew 
translations of the Sefer ha-Mitsvot, originally written by maimonides 
in Judeo-Arabic, the classical medieval translation of moses ibn Tibbon, 
and a recent translation by Joseph Kafih, based on an extant Arabic 
version. Fragments of a third Hebrew translation, those of Ibn Ayub, 
were recovered by Heller and noted in his critical edition of the Sefer 
ha-Mitsvot. It is obvious to the careful student of the Sefer ha-Mitsvot 
that differences in the translations are not simply due to translational 
techniques, but rather to differences in the vorlage that underlie their 
translations. That is, the Hebrew translations are based on different 
versions of the work and it is impossible at this stage to determine with 
any degree of certainty which of the versions can be said to represent 
the author’s final say. 
I have used Chavel’s English translation of the Sefer ha-Mitsvot, 
itself based on Joseph Kafih’s Hebrew translation and corrected 
where necessary by reference to that Hebrew translation. The Hebrew 
translations of Ibn Tibbon and of Ibn Ayub (when noted by Heller) 
were consulted and noted where differences against Kafih’s translation 
proved relevant. I did not rely exclusively on Kafih’s translation, despite 
the fact that it was based on an extant Arabic version which may appear 
to be more original because it is not obvious that the extant Arabic 
version is as final a draft as the version underlying the Ibn Tibbon or 
Ibn Ayub translations. 
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The Mishneh Torah and its traditional commentaries are cited 
from standard printed editions; references are to treatise, chapter, 
and halakhah� The Eight Chapters of Maimonides on Ethics (Shemonah 
Peraqim) is cited in Ethical Writings of Maimonides, edited by Weiss and 
Butterworth.
The midreshe halakhah are cited from the following editions: 
Mekhilta de-Rabbi Ishmael, edited by H. s. Horowitz and y. Rabin; 
Mekhilta de-Rabbi Simeon b� Yohai, edited by y. N. Epstein and A. s. 
melamed; 
Sifra, edited by I. H. Weiss;
Sifre al Sefer Bamidbar ve-Sifre Zuta (“Sifre Numbers”; “Sifre Zuta”), 
edited by H. s. Horowitz; 
Sifre al-Sefer Devarim (“Sifre Deuteronomy”), edited by l. Finkelstein. 
When possible, I provide page numbers in addition to chapter or 
paragraph numbers for ease of reference. 
References to a particular commandment in Qayyara’s enumeration 
follow Naftali Tsvi Hildesheimer, Haqdamat Sefer Halakhot Gedolot), 
while numerical references to saadia’s commandments follow yeruham 
Fischel perla, Sefer ha-Mitsvot le-RaSaG.
Full citations for all these works can be found in the bibliography.
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ENGlIsH TRANslATIoNs ANd TRANslITERATIoNs
Quotations of lemmas from the “short Enumeration” are from 
moses Hyamson’s translation of the Mishneh Torah. Quotations from 
the Sefer ha-Mitsvot are from C. d. Chavel’s translation (The Book 
of Commandments). Quotations from The Guide of the Perplexed are 
from shlomo pines’ translation, cited by book, chapter, and page 
(in italics). Quotations from the Shemonah Peraqim are from Weiss 
and Butterworth’s English translation. I have followed all of these 
translations quite faithfully; in the rare places where I amend any of 
them, I note my change. In contrast, the English quotations from the 
Mishneh Torah are my own adaptations of the yale university translation 
(multiple editors). 
For scriptural quotations, I used J. H. Hertz’s translation of the 
pentateuch to match Chavel’s use of biblical passages in his own 
translation of the Sefer ha-Mitsvot� There will be instances, however, 
when exegetical derivations will not quite conform to these scriptural 
translations. Any inconsistencies are likely a result of the nuanced 
and ambiguous language of scripture. I did my best to adapt these 
translations so that the reader will follow the interpretation.
By Sages (with a capital “s”), I refer to the authorities of the talmudic 
period. 
The proliferation of transliteration systems found in scholarly 
works is nothing short of bewildering. preferences are often a function 
of the scholar’s academic and geographical background. For example, a 
student from the lithuanian yeshiva tradition would differentiate the 
tav (t) from the spirant variety (th). An Israeli student, accustomed to 
the modern sephardic pronunciation, would not. The field of Biblical 
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studies, because of its emphasis on grammatical and morphological 
features, has tended to use the scientific or academic system. This work, 
however, is less concerned with the morphology of biblical passages as it 
is with idioms of the interpreters, the sages, and medieval rabbis. With 
the exception of commonly used spellings, I have therefore adopted 
what I considered the simplest transliteration system, the “general-
purpose style” of the society of Biblical literature Handbook of style, 
with some slight modifications (ignoring the spirants gh, dh, fh, and 
th in favor of g, d, f, and t). I retain original Hebrew words or sentence 
where the translation may leave doubts as to the precise intention of 
the original rabbinic text.
Throughout the work, I make a clear distinction between the terms 
Mishneh Torah and Halakhot (of the Mishneh Torah). The full work of 
the Mishneh Torah consists of treatises, divided into Introductions, 
Headings, and Halakhot. I use the term Mishneh Torah to refer to this 
full work. When referring only to the text of the Halakhot themselves, 
without their Headings, I use the term Halakhot� I capitalize the term 
“Headings” because I treat them as a separate work, likely composed 
at a different time from the Halakhot. While the Headings likely derive 
from the “short Enumeration” and the Sefer ha-Mitsvot, they contain 
many important differences in formulation, which have legal and 
exegetical implications.
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-----------------  CHApTER I  -----------------
INTRoduCTIoN
The TaRYaG1 count — the traditional enumeration of the 613 
commandments contained in the five mosaic books (Torah) — holds 
a prominent place in Jewish thought. The tradition is based on an 
aggadah (rabbinic homily) found in the Babylonian Talmud and, with 
some variants, in Midrash Tanhuma. No one did more to see this count 
achieve its place of importance than moses maimonides, who used 
his construction of the list to structure his Sefer ha-Mitsvot (ShM) 
and frame the Mishneh Torah (MT), possibly the most important, and 
certainly the most comprehensive, code of law in Jewish history.
The talmudic passage reads:
R. simlai when preaching said: six hundred and thirteen precepts were 
communicated to moses at sinai,2 three hundred and sixty-five negative 
precepts, corresponding to the number of solar days [in the year], and two 
hundred and forty-eight positive precepts, corresponding to the number of 
the members of man’s body. Rav Hamnuna said: What is the [biblical] text 
for this? It is: Moses commanded us torah, an inheritance of the congregation 
of Jacob [deut. 33:4] [the word “torah” equaling six hundred and eleven 
in letter value. The two commandments] I am [Exod. 20:2] and Thou shalt 
have no [other Gods] [Exod. 20:3] [are not included in the count, because] we 
heard [them directly] from the mouth of the mighty [divine].3 
1 . TaRYaG is a mnemonic whose Hebrew letters, when read numerically, stand for 613 
(T=400, R=200, y=10, G=3).
2 . “At sinai” appears in all the principal manuscripts of the Talmud; it is omitted in the 
printed versions.
3 . BT Makkot 23b-24a, soncino translation. When quoting this aggadah, maimonides 
does not give the attribution, as he generally does in his halakhic works, as if to 
underscore unanimity. see Sefer ha-Mitsvot, trans. Ibn Tibbon, n. 51. This, of course, 
is relevant to Nahmanides’ question about the normative character of the aggadah.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------  Chapter I  ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
— 14 —
This aggadah connects the idea of 613 commandments to the word 
torah, using the numerical value of the letters as a touchstone in its 
analysis. As with many aggadot, it is impossible to ascertain which 
came first, the tradition or the exegesis. Were the sages in possession 
of an oral tradition that the Torah contained 613 commandments and 
now merely found a way to connect it homiletically to the word torah? 
or were they looking for a way to exegetically validate a new idea, 
the all-encompassing nature of the law? Regardless of the sources of 
their tradition, we see that this aggadah is not derived by means of 
the normal canons of legal interpretation; it is not a derashah based 
on inferential analysis of the text. Rather, it is based on the playful 
application of a widely-used homiletical technique called gematria, 
which assigns a numerical value to the letters of the Hebrew alphabet. 
R. simlai was a second-generation palestinian amora, a talmudic 
sage who lived around the late third century C.E. Is there any evidence 
that the preceding generations of talmudic scholars engaged in this 
endeavor of counting commandments? There are some mentions of 
such a task, although other tannaim may not have provided a fixed 
total for the entire pentateuch. In other rabbinic works, sages provide 
differing counts and classifications for commandments, systems that 
may complement or may contradict R. simlai’s. An interesting example 
can be found in the following midrash from Pesiqta de-Rav Kahana: 
R. yohanan said in the name of R. shimon b. yohai: moses wrote for us 
three chapters [parashiyyot] in the pentateuch, each containing sixty 
commandments [mitsvot]. These are: parashat Pesahim, parashat Neziqin 
and parashat Qedoshim. R. levi said in the name of R. shila of the city of 
Tamarta: These chapters contain seventy commandments. R. Tanhuma 
said: They do not disagree, for he who proposes seventy commandments 
in parashat Pesahim, includes in it the parashah of phylacteries [tefillin]; he 
who proposes seventy commandments in parashat Neziqin includes in it the 
parashah of the year of remission [shemitah]; and similarly he who proposes 
seventy commandments in parashat Qedoshim includes in it the parashah of 
the fruits of the tree in the first three years of planting [orlah].4 
4 . Pesiqta de-Rav Kahana, ed. Buber, parashat ha-Hodesh, pisqa 5, siman 164, p. 51b. my 
translation. In the printed editions of Leviticus Rabbah 24, the dictum is attributed 
to R. yudan in the name of R. shimon b. yohai. This midrash can also be found in 
---------------------------------------------------------------------  INTRoduCTIoN  --------------------------------------------------------------------
— 15 —
This midrash notes several legalistic sections of the pentateuch where 
many commandments are enumerated, detailing the number of 
commandments that can be found in each of these parashiyyot� Here, 
then, is some evidence that the tannaim counted commandments, 
a partial count that perhaps formed part of a global enumeration. 
However, we have no clear criteria that we could use to reconstruct 
this global count. later commentators advanced a number of ingenious 
theories to identify the proposed number of commandments, but none 
of the solutions came close to finding the sixty commandments that 
were ostensibly embedded in each of these three parashiyyot. moise 
Bloch, who reviewed these solutions, was forced to conclude that the 
statement “moses wrote to us three chapters…each containing sixty 
commandments” could not be taken in a rigorously precise manner.5 
In the end, it was not difficult for Bloch to arrive at this conclusion, 
since the Pesiqta’s midrash postulated a specific and measurable 
claim — sixty commandments within three clearly identified and limited 
pericopes — which Bloch could not corroborate by identification. The 
Pesiqta passage well illustrates the varieties of problems we are likely to 
encounter in identifying specific commandments in larger counts, like 
that of R. simlai’s, which are spread over a much greater amount of text.
the Yalqut Shimoni, Mishpatim, remez 307. Though all manuscripts have the example 
of orlah, mandelbaum suggests that it ought to read forbidden relation (ervah), and 
points to the text of Leviticus Rabbah. see mandelbaum, Pesikta de Rav Kahana, vol. 1, 
99. The context in Leviticus Rabbah suggests that the reason these three parashiyyot 
were given directly and in the presence of the entire congregation of Israel is because 
of the great number of commandments that they contain. The midrash then proceeds 
to discuss the specific number of commandments in each. 
5 . Bloch, “les 613 lois,” 201n2, cites a number of attempts. For example, shlomo b. 
Eliezer ha-levi in his ’Avodat ha-Levi [incorrectly referenced by Bloch as Sefer Huqe 
Eloqim], counts, following the enumeration proposed by maimonides, seventeen 
commandments in parashat Pesahim, forty-one in Neziqin and forty-six in Qedoshim. 
slightly different results were obtained by moses b. Jacob Hagiz in Sefer Eleh ha-
Mitsvot and Gabriel J. polak in Huqe ha-Eloqim. Buber, in his notes to Pesiqta de-Rav 
Kahana, suggested that the word mitsvot stood for verses, a suggestion already made 
by Wolf Heidenheim in his 1876 work on the ritual for passover eve, according to 
mandelbaum. To find the sixty verses, Buber divided the parashiyyot in a totally 
arbitrary fashion, replacing one problem with another. others suggested that the 
midrash refers to details of the laws, a suggestion that runs counter to the definition 
of commandment, as we shall see. 
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To return to R. simlai and his aggadah: did his teaching reflect a 
unanimous tradition? And were the preceding generations of rabbis, the 
mishnaic tannaim, aware of such an enumeration of commandments, 
even if they did not mention it explicitly? Nahmanides, maimonides’ 
most prominent critic and the author of the Hasagot (“Critiques”) to 
the ShM, was one of the first medieval scholars to struggle with these 
questions. pointing out that the tannaim never seemed to take into 
account the number of commandments in their talmudic disputations, 
Nahmanides wondered whether in fact the tannaim cared about 
preserving the count of 613 commandments. perhaps, Nahmanides 
thought at first, R. simlai’s count was the product of his own reckoning, 
and not all tannaim agreed with his exegesis and his count. still, 
Nahmanides was forced to observe that the count had become a part 
of normative rabbinic tradition, as seen from the number of talmudic 
passages and midrashim that cited the number 613 in their arguments. 
He therefore concluded that “because of the widespread nature of this 
count … we will say that it was a tradition handed down from moses at 
sinai.”6 on the other hand, yeruham Fischel perla, while agreeing with 
Nahmanides’ conclusion, found it “somewhat strange” that “nowhere 
do we find mention of the TaRYaG count, not in the mishnah, nor in 
the Tosefta and nor in the sifra…and neither this count nor any other 
count is mentioned in the entire palestinian Talmud.” He reviews some 
of the midrashim cited by Nahmanides as proof of the pervasiveness of 
the count but finds that variant readings of these same midrashim seem 
to make a deliberate point of avoiding the number 613. Nevertheless, 
he too concludes that the tannaim of the mishnah, Tosefta, Sifra, Sifre, 
and Jerusalem Talmud probably did not disagree with the TaRYaG count, 
since no explicit alternative is propounded.7 
Even more emphatically, E. E. urbach declares that “in the tannaitic 
sources this number [613] is unknown, and in the passages where it 
appears in the printed editions it is only an interpolation that is 
wanting in the manuscript.”8 similarly, after a careful review of the 
6 . Nahmanides, Hasagot to Rule 1, Sefer ha-Mitsvot, ed. Frankel, 13-15.
7 . perla, Sefer ha-Mitsvot le-RaSaG, vol. 1, 6.
8 . urbach, The Sages, Their Concepts and Beliefs, 343.
---------------------------------------------------------------------  INTRoduCTIoN  --------------------------------------------------------------------
— 17 —
tannaitic manuscript evidence, david Henshke finds no usage of the 
TaRYaG count, even in places where the printed versions make mention 
of it� From this silence, Henshke concludes that the exercise of counting 
commandments was an amoraic affair (“following perhaps upon their 
systematizing approach”), though he grants that the TaRYaG tradition 
may have traveled orally from earlier times. He adds that one could 
safely conclude that the “TaRYaG idea was not part of the mainstream 
of tannaitic consciousness.”9
The above discussion raises important questions with regard to 
the antiquity, character, and general acceptance of R. simlai’s aggadah 
of the 613 commandments. yet this aggadah prompted the greatest 
halakhic and philosophical authority of the Jewish medieval world to 
write a reasoned treatise on the correct method of enumerating the 
commandments. Why? 
EARly mEdIEVAl EXEGETEs  
ANd THE 613 CommANdmENTs
We saw that Nahmanides resolved his doubts about considering the 
TaRYaG tradition to be normative, and thus a worthy object of study, 
once he had established that the tradition was found, uncontested, in 
a relatively wide number of talmudic aggadot. other medieval scholars 
were not so persuaded. In their estimation, the TaRYaG count was 
inconsistent with an appropriate definition of the term mitsvah and 
how such a list of mitsvot should be presented. 
The great spanish exegete Abraham ibn Ezra (1089-1164), in a book 
whose express purpose is listing and discussing the laws of the Torah, 
gave the following opinion: 
9 . Henshke, “did the Tannaim Reckon with a Fixed Number of Commandments,” 47-58. 
While arguments from silence are generally thought to be demonstratively weak, in 
this case they take on more significance. All these midrashim could have gainfully used 
the TaRYaG count in their arguments; its absence appears to be deliberate, a point 
that perla alluded to when he called their silence “somewhat strange.” Interestingly, in 
his conclusion perla relies on the talmudic principle that “one does not [gratuitously] 
increase disputes.”
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I need to raise a methodological point before I deal with the mitsvot, 
because I saw scholars count 613 mitsvot in many different ways. There 
are those who count the boiling of a kid [in its mother’s milk] as one 
mitsvah, and there are those who count it as three mitsvot on account 
of the fact that it is written in the Torah three times and that our sages 
expounded each of those instances. There are many such instances. 
There are those who count the particulars and the general, sometimes 
the particulars by themselves and sometimes the general by themselves. 
And there are those who count as one mitsvah that which is formulated 
in two ways but whose intent is the same. 
Truly, there is no limit to mitsvot, as the psalmist says, I have seen that all 
things have their limit, but your commandment is broad beyond measure [ps. 
119:96]. on the other hand, if we count only the general, the fundamental 
ones [ve-ha-iqarim] and the commandments that are binding for all time, 
the mitsvot do not add up to [’asuyot, lit. “are not made to be”] 613.10 
Abraham ibn Ezra is one of the earliest exegetes, if not the first, to critically 
raise methodological concerns. For example, how does one define mitsvah? 
Implicit in his commentary lies a rejection of the tradition of TaRYaG; it 
is simply impossible to arrive at R. simlai’s total without first agreeing 
on a definition of the term mitsvah. In Ibn Ezra’s opinion, the number 
of commandments is indefinite; the count could range from fewer than 
613 to many multiples of 613. It appears that Ibn Ezra sees R. simlai’s 
10 . Abraham Ibn Ezra, Yesod Mora ve-Sod Torah, second Gate, pisqa 3-4, 91-92. What did 
Ibn Ezra mean by ha-iqarim, which we translated as “fundamental ones”? one of his 
uses of the term in the Fifth Gate (p. 121) can shed some light on this question. These 
iqarim are fundamental commandments that underpin our reasons for performing 
other commandments, such as creation, which we remember by observing the 
sabbath, and the exodus from Egypt, which we remember by observing passover, 
matzot, and tsitsit. It is those very general commandments that are included in this 
count that does not reach 613. see also the suggestions made by the editors (ad loc.). 
some texts read ‘asirit, “one-tenth,” instead of ’asuyot, “made,” the sense being that 
these commandments do not equal one-tenth of 613, or approximately sixty-one (121, 
notes to line 24). Hanina Ben-menahem has suggested (183n27) that the number 
sixty-one may not be as implausible as it sounds: perhaps this has some relationship 
to maimonides’ list of sixty obligatory positive commandments (which we will discuss 
in chapter 3). But surely this cannot be correct, since it is clear that Ibn Ezra was 
referring to the sum of positive and negative commandments, not just the sixty 
obligatory positive commandments!
---------------------------------------------------------------------  INTRoduCTIoN  --------------------------------------------------------------------
— 19 —
statement as an aggadic flourish without real significance. 
Judah ibn Balaam, another prominent eleventh-century spanish 
exegete, was more explicit. Commenting on a dispute between two 
Babylonian geonim, Hefets b. yatsliah and samuel b. Hofni, on whether 
the verse “And you shall return to the lord, your God” (deuteronomy 30:2) 
commands one to repent or is merely a prediction, Ibn Balaam stated: 
However, Hefets, may his soul rest in Eden, was forced to bring this 
[mitsvah] in the count of mitsvot in order to fill the number mentioned 
by the early scholars in the dictum, “R. simlai when preaching said: six 
hundred and thirteen precepts the Israelites were commanded.” To my 
mind, the dictum was said only as an approximation.11 
Ibn Balaam’s position was also based on a methodological rationale. He 
asserted that there are two basic categories of commandments. one 
category consists of historical or contingent commandments; these 
need not be counted after their time has passed. Examples include the 
commandments associated with the passover lamb offered in Egypt and 
the commandments related to the building of the portable Tabernacle 
in the desert. A second category is made up of commandments that 
are binding for all time. Ibn Balaam argued that the latter total “does 
not reach 613. This is the reason why Hefets was forced to include 
in his count commandments that were not given at sinai [and] 
commandments that were abrogated soon after the time of their 
performance.” He is another exegete who believed that the number of 
binding commandments could not equal R. simlai’s count if they were 
subjected to rational criteria of selection. In his opinion, the number 
of commandments binding for all time did not reach 613 (although we 
do not know how close his count came).12 
11 . Harkavy, “Zikhron ha-Gaon shmuel ben Hofni u-sefarav,” 41-42. Also cited by perla in 
his introduction to Sefer ha-Mitsvot le-RaSaG. 
12 . Two post-maimonidean medieval scholars, levi ben Gershom (RalBaG or Gersonides) 
(1288-1344) and simeon b. Tsemah duran (1361-1444), also doubted the precision of 
R. simlai’s dictum. The latter stated: “we do not rely on his [R. simlai’s] interpretation 
in deciding the halakhah…The reason why this number is mentioned everywhere is that 
we find no other sage who counted them, and so we have accepted his enumeration, 
and even if it misses or exceeds the enumeration, it approximates it [holekh sevivo, 
lit., goes around it]” (duran, Zohar ha-Raqia, 225). For the former’s thoughts, see 
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The opinions of these two exegetes affect our appreciation of 
maimonides’ work. maimonides had a high regard for Ibn Balaam’s 
exegetical abilities, as we gather from a comment he makes in the Essay 
on Resurrection: “I was anticipated by the keen commentators on the 
meaning of the passage, men like … Ibn Balaam.”13 Though we have no 
way of knowing whether maimonides had seen Ibn Balaam’s comment 
regarding the number of countable commandments in the Torah, it is 
possible that he was aware of it.14 With regard to Ibn Ezra, perla has 
suggested that maimonides had seen and adopted some of Ibn Ezra’s 
principles; if so, he also must have been aware of Ibn Ezra’s dismissal 
of R. simlai’s count.15 This tendency among the exegetical predecessors 
of maimonides to dismiss R. simlai’s aggadah makes maimonides’ 
uncritical acceptance of the aggadah all the more puzzling. 
Gersonides, RaLBaG’s Commentary to the Pentateuch, Exodus, Bo, 194, where he points 
out that maimonides went through “great stress” to arrive at the exact count of 613, 
but that this number contains only a “small approximation,” and R. simlai “did not 
care to be precise about his exposition” (lo hashash bo, lit., “was not anxious about it”). 
Also see Braner, “yahaso shel ha-RalBaG le-darko shel ha-RamBam be-minyan ha-
mitsvot,” 228-242.
13 . “Essay on Resurrection,” in Epistles of Maimonides, 222. 
14 . see, for example, Henshke, “le-ofiyah shel parshanut ha-Rambam,” 10. 
15 . perla, Sefer ha-Mitsvot le-RaSaG, 15-16. For a contrasting view, see Twersky, “did Ibn 
Ezra Influence maimonides?” 21-48. Harry Fox argues that maimonides may have 
been familiar with Ibn Ezra’s commentaries, at least in the last years of his life. He 
bases this on the mention of Ibn Ezra’s Torah commentary in a section of a will that 
he believes is authentically maimonides’. Fox, “maimonides on Aging and the Aged,” 
319-383, in particular 341 and nn. 123, 124, and 126. In this book, I show a number 
of examples of the common exegetical methods and outlook that maimonides and 
Ibn Ezra shared, which may simply be a product of their common spanish intellectual 
legacy. It appears that those exegetes who exhibited philological independence and 
were the least beholden to talmudic interpretation also espoused a more systematic 
approach to counting commandments. The incompatibility of R. simlai’s count with 
their systematic thinking and their independent exegetical approaches led them to 
deny normative status to R. simlai’s exposition. It also appears to me that, at least 
according to the account of Ibn Balaam, the gaon samuel b. Hofni also did not see 
R. simlai’s count as normative, since he did not see the need to increase his own 
count to achieve the 613 total. As we shall see, maimonides trimmed commandments 
from the popular geonic count by systematically applying a number of rules, leaving 
him with fewer than 613 commandments. unlike Abraham Ibn Ezra or Judah Ibn 
Balaam, however, maimonides worked to restore R. simlai’s full count by introducing 
innovative commandments. 
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R. simlai’s division of commandments into positive and negative 
was not popular among the early medieval halakhic taxonomists. As 
they saw it, Jewish law contained many legal categories other than the 
unconditional obligations of positive and negative commandments. 
For example, one can find indications of neutral (neither positive nor 
negative), optional, and supererogatory laws, as well as many laws that 
were strictly contingent on circumstances. In fact, Hefets b. yatsliah, 
who used these broader categories, was forced to reinterpret R. simlai’s 
dictum, saying that “both positive and negative [commandments] are 
the more common and the more explicit. We find many like these 
in scripture.”16 In other words, in Hefets’ opinion, R. simlai’s count 
contained more than just positive and negative commandments — those 
understood to be obligatory — and the midrashic dictum was a 
convenient oversimplification. 
Though the 613 total was preserved in all these cases, the two-
part classification of commandments based on the 248 positive 
+ 365 negative metaphor was ignored by the sages in the Geonic 
period, in particular simeon Qayyara, Isaac al-Bargeloni, solomon 
ibn Gabirol and sa‘adiah Gaon. They adopted a four-part classification 
divided into punishments (onshin), negative commandments, positive 
commandments, and sections (parashiyyot, an unclear term). The four-
part classification may have originated in a no-longer-extant amoraic 
or post-amoraic tradition. This can be inferred from a statement that 
Qayyara makes in the homiletic introduction to his list, which begins 
with a statement about parashiyyot. The statement opens with a formula 
typical of extra-tannaitic teachings (baraitot):17 “our sages have taught 
[shanu hakhamim]: sixty-five sections [parashiyyot] are the essence of 
16 . Zucker, “Qetayim hadashim mi-sefer ha-mitsvot of Hafets b. yatsliah,” PAAJR 29 
(1960-1961): 19-20.
17 . It is unlikely, though not impossible, that we are dealing with an actual baraita, since 
baraitot tend to be tannaitic, and there is little evidence that tannaim engaged in a 
detailed commandment count. y. N. Epstein pointed out that the expression “shanu 
hakhamim” also appears in Qayyara’s Halakhot Gedolot in connection with amoraic 
dicta. Epstein, Mavo le-Nusah ha-Mishnah, 769 and n. 1. see perla, Sefer ha-Mitsvot le-
RaSaG, vol. 1, 7, for an allusion to this division in Midrash Tehillim, and see Guttmann, 
Behinat ha-Mitsvot u-Behinat Qiyyum ha-Mitsvot, 22, who points to sources for the use 
of parashiyyot. 
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Torah, and each section was explicated by the sages of Israel.” As we 
shall see (especially in chapter 3), the four-part classification better 
suited many of the types of commandments that came to be included.
In closing, I should note that R. simlai’s derashah about 613 
commandments spawned a remarkably extensive body of TaRYaG lists 
throughout the Jewish world of the ninth through thirteenth centuries, 
many of which have been lost to us. The geonim sa‘adiah Gaon, Hefets 
b. yatsliah, and samuel b. Hofni made systematic attempts to classify 
the commandments, but I am not aware of any serious attempts to 
develop comprehensive criteria on which to construct these lists. 
Abraham ibn Ezra did not use his methodological insights in writing 
his Yesod Mora, which treats commandments loosely, without any sort 
of numerical constraint. It is also hard to discern any sort of halakhic 
significance attached to these types of lists. most of the literary 
creativity associated with the composition of TaRYaG was channeled 
into liturgical poems (piyyutim) called azharot, which were read in 
synagogues on the Festival of Weeks (shavuot). This fact alone may 
account for some of the extraordinary popularity of the TaRYaG count. 
mAImoNIdEs’ AVoWEd puRposE  
IN ENumERATING THE CommANdmENTs 
What occasioned maimonides’ interest in the TaRYaG enumeration? In 
the introduction to the ShM, he writes: 
after having completed our previous well-known work, wherein we 
included a commentary to the whole mishnah [Perush ha-Mishnayot, 
PhM]…I deemed it advisable to compile a compendium which would 
include all the laws of the Torah and its regulations, nothing missing in it.
maimonides then proceeds to tell us that in the new work he would omit 
“differences of opinion and rejected teachings” as well as attributions, 
and that he would compose the compendium in the language of the 
mishnah “so that it would easily be understood by most of the people.” 
He writes further that “brevity with completeness” would be the goal 
of this work: 
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so that the reader thereof might encompass all that is found in the 
mishnah and Talmud, Sifra, Sifre, and Tosefta, and more than that, all 
decrees and ordinances of the later geonim, of blessed memory, as well 
as all that they have explained and commented upon concerning the 
prohibited and permissible, unclean and clean, invalid and valid, liable 
and free, pay and not pay, swear and free from swearing. 
With supreme confidence, he declares, “outside of this work there [is] to 
be no need for another book to learn anything whatsoever that is required 
in the whole Torah, whether it be a law of the scriptures or of the rabbis.” 
After discussing the arrangement of the work that will follow, 
maimonides finally explains why he needs a list of all scriptural 
commandments. He says: 
Now, on account of this plan I deemed it advisable to enumerate first in 
the introduction to that work the number of all commandments, positive 
and negative, so that the scope of the work embraces all of them, not one 
commandment being left without being fully discussed.
The implication here is that maimonides wishes to discuss every one 
of the scriptural commandments and their derivations and can ensure 
this goal only by listing them all. later in his introduction, he writes:
All this [I would do] in order to guard against omitting any topic [emphasis 
added] from discussion, for only by including them in the enumeration 
of the commandments [heading the various treatises] would I insure 
against such omission. 
While the earlier statement appears to say that maimonides wished 
to make sure that he discussed every one of the commandments, 
this statement says that the commandments themselves are to serve 
as a guide for listing all halakhic topics. In other words, the list of 
commandments would serve as a comprehensive writer’s outline. 
Indeed, he uses this list as a sort of outline when writing the Mishneh 
Torah, although he reorders the list commandments topically, placing a 
pertinent group of commandments at the head of each treatise.
It is difficult, however, to countenance the idea that maimonides 
intended the list of scriptural commandments to act as a comprehensive 
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outline for this later treatise. For one thing, the MT has a number of 
treatises that only cover rabbinically-ordained laws, such as Hilkhot 
‘Eruvin and Hilkhot Megillah ve-Hanukkah. No list of scriptural 
commandments could have prevented the omission of these halakhot. 
much the same can be said about three other treatises that deal with 
purely rabbinically-conceived legislation, such as Hilkhot Zekhiyah 
u-Matanah, Hilkhot Shekhenim, and Hilkhot Sheluhin ve-Shutafin. Finally, 
from a practical point of view, the vast scope of the material, most 
of it rabbinically-derived or rabbinically-ordained, should have led 
maimonides to create a far more comprehensive outline if he was truly 
concerned about the possibility of overlooking a topic. 
Even were we to take maimonides at his word that a list of scriptural 
commandments could serve as an outline for a comprehensive 
code of law, the idea of using the tool of TaRYaG to ensure that 
all commandments would be covered does not necessarily follow. 
Neither a list of commandments nor an outline for a code would 
need the constraint of the number 613, or indeed of any number. 
All that maimonides needed to have done was to create a logically 
consistent classification of all the scriptural commandments, to which 
he would have added a number of independent, stand-alone, rabbinic 
commandments. This would have allowed him to proceed with his code 
of law in an organized and methodical manner. Again — and this bears 
repeating — the 613 numerical target presented an unnecessary and 
awkward constraint on his task, one which continually necessitated 
justifications and special explanations.18 
Another surprising element is maimonides’ particular attachment 
to this aggadah, one that was largely dismissed by his intellectual 
forefathers and enjoyed a dubious halakhic status. Indeed, we note that 
maimonides describes how the TaRYaG enumeration flourished among 
poets, in a creative rather than a legal environment:
similarly, whenever I heard the many azharot [lit. “admonitions,” fig. 
“liturgical poems”] which have been composed among us in the land 
18 . see, for example, positive Commandments 74-77 (p74-77), discussed in chapter 4. 
There are many other similar examples throughout the ShM.
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of spain, My pangs have come writhing upon me [dan 10:16], because I 
saw how popular and disseminated these were. True, these authors are 
not to be criticized; they are poets, and not rabbis, and as far as their 
art is concerned — namely, well-balanced expressions and beauty of 
rhyme — they have performed with perfection.
In an attempt to lend some credibility and halakhic weight to this poetic 
activity and thus justify his own incursion into that area, maimonides 
makes the claim that these poets have all followed Qayyara, the tenth-
century Babylonian gaon and author of the Halakhot Gedolot, “and some 
of the later rabbis,” most probably referring to the Babylonian gaon 
Hefets b. yatsliah.19 one understands the implication that although 
these lists are written as poems, they must not be dismissed, since they 
stem from a scholarly tradition. 
Having made the decision to use the fixed count of 613, maimonides 
realizes that he cannot rely on the work of previous scholars to detail 
the precise 613 commandments. When he discusses the multiplicity 
of attempts to enumerate the commandments, maimonides describes 
himself as having a “feeling of distress.” He says, “scholars engaged in 
enumerating the commandments, or in writing anything whatsoever 
on this topic, have all come forward with the strangest of theories that I 
could hardly describe their magnitude.” The more he thinks “about their 
fantasies — counting as they did matters which even on first thought 
would appear that they should not have been included,” the more he 
feels the “ill fortune” that has befallen his people. maimonides further 
complains that 
knowing…how widely accepted is this [Qayyara’s] enumeration among the 
people, I knew that if I were just to list the true and proper enumeration, 
without [advancing] proofs for it, the first person that will chance to 
read it will suppose that this is a mistake — his proof being that this is 
contrary to what some author had written.
19 . In a future work, I plan to briefly survey some of the earlier enumerators and attempt 
to determine which ones were read by maimonides. It is clear, however, from what he 
says here that he cared little about their differences and preferred to group them all 
together as followers of Qayyara. In effect, Qayyara became maimonides’ proverbial 
straw man.
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As a result, he set out to write a special treatise, the Sefer ha-Mitsvot. 
Written in an argumentative form, this treatise would detail the methods 
that could produce a logically correct and consistent enumeration. In 
it, maimonides purports also to identify and document each of the 
commandment claims he was making. Quite clearly, the construction 
of a consistent list of 613 commandments was no simple task.
THE CENTRAl pRoBlEm 
Thus far, I have noted that were he to have been honestly engaged in 
“guard[ing] against omitting any topic from discussion,” maimonides 
could have more easily produced a systematic and complete classifying 
outline without the constraint of a particular number of commandments. 
I have also shown that a number of prominent exegetes and halakhists 
did not see the aggadah as legally binding, scholars who belonged to 
the same intellectual tradition as maimonides and whom he held in 
esteem. moreover, the aggadah’s particular explanation for the number 
613 seems more appropriate for a homily rather than for a midrash 
with halakhic weight. R. simlai compares the negative and positive 
commandments, respectively, to the days of the solar year (365) and the 
number of human limbs and organs (248), a metaphorical expression of 
ideas of constancy and dedication. It need not be said that a homily is 
hardly an appropriate basis for a serious jurisprudential work.20 
20 . It is worth noting R. levi ben Gershom’s comment, following his assertion that R. 
simlai’s count was only an approximation (note 12 above): “Just as the rabbis were 
wont to take a verse out of its context in order to extract from it an ethical lesson 
[mussar tov], so too did this scholar [R. simlai] treat with certain lightness this sum 
[613] so as to be able to extract from it the extraordinary ethical lessons that derive 
from this sum, [the idea] that every limb of a human being, as it were, says ‘perform 
with me a commandment’ and every day of the solar year warns ‘don’t transgress 
[today].’ This being the case, it is clear that if the commandments were only closely to 
resemble this numerical total, it would well serve to derive from it this ethical lesson: 
one need not insist on its exactness [lit., ‘match it without deficiency or excess’].”
 In other words, the two metaphors and their numerical values were the sole basis 
for the claim that there were 613 commandments. In reality, the total number of 
commandments only approximated 613. Nevertheless, equating the number of 
commandments with the sum of the number of days of the year and limbs of the 
body served its intended homiletical purpose: to show that the commandments 
---------------------------------------------------------------------  INTRoduCTIoN  --------------------------------------------------------------------
— 27 —
Furthermore, I note that any such list of commandments would 
require the compiler to fix a set of individuating criteria, rules to 
divide the totality of the Torah’s legal material into separate units. By 
necessity, such individuation is subjective. It cannot justify maimonides’ 
hyperbolic claim that his enumeration is “founded upon clear proof 
beyond a doubt” and that “the reader will see the mistake of all those 
who counted in a way contrary to ours.”21 
Contemporary and later scholars began attacking the methods 
and criteria of maimonides’ ShM as soon as the ink had dried. As I 
mentioned briefly, Nahmanides tackled some of the many problematic 
individuation issues. Though erudite and powerful, Nahmanides’s 
critique is not sufficiently systematic. He leaves unchallenged a great 
many more questionable concepts, essentially preserving maimonides’ 
central scheme.22 maimonides’ four major traditional apologists, Isaac 
de leon (Megillat Esther), Abraham Alegre (Lev Sameah), Hananiah 
Kazis (Qinat Sofrim) and Aryeh-leib segal-Horowitz (Marganita Taba), 
did their best to uphold the scheme in its entirety against the attacks of 
Nahmanides, never once questioning the scheme’s inherent subjectivity.
of the early critics of maimonides’ enumeration, special mention 
should be made of the acerbic and short glosses of RaBad (R. Abraham 
b. david of posquières) that appear alongside the MT and of daniel 
ha-Bavli’s objections, appearing in a collection of queries sent to 
require daily attention and dedication and must be performed with one’s entire being. 
Gersonides, RaLBaG’s Commentary to the Pentateuch, Exodus, 195. 
21 . From the introduction to the ShM, with almost the exact same words in Responsum 
#355, in Responsa of Moses b� Maimon, vol. 2, 631. see also maimonides’ letter to R. 
Efraim of Tyre, in Iggerot ha-RaMBaM, trans. and ed. shailat, vol. 1, 223. 
22 . In his summary at the end of his critique, Nahmanides writes that he removed 26 
entries from maimonides’ list of positive commandments, though not all as a result 
of disagreements on individuation. Rosanes, “derekh mitsvotekha,” 416-417, argues 
that Nahmanides actually subtracted 27 entries and substituted them with 27 new 
positive commandments (Rosanes first states that Nahmanides made 32 subtractions, 
but later only lists 27), with an explanation for the slight inexactitude. At any rate, 
the number of deletions is minor compared with the potential differences that can 
arise from different individuation standards. As an aside, it is worth noting that 
maimonides’ enumeration became the definitive work of this genre. In one way or 
another, all subsequent enumerations either incorporated it in toto, as did the Sefer 
ha-Hinukh (attributed to Aaron of Barcelona), or adopted it with only minor changes, 
as did Sefer Mitsvot ha-Gadol (by moshe b. yaakov mi-Coucy).
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maimonides’ son Abraham. Their critical comments are not numerous 
enough to undo the structure but clearly merit consideration when 
assessing the overall claims. of all scholars after Nahmanides, perla 
best succeeds in raising serious objections against maimonides’ edifice, 
discussing source documentation, interpretation of these sources, and 
logical questions on individuations. Because perla’s main concern is 
justifying and supporting sa‘adiah’s enumeration, his sympathies 
lie with sa‘adiah, against maimonides and other enumerators. His 
frequent criticism of maimonides’ position is extraordinarily erudite, 
lucid, and thorough, though less than systematic. In dissecting the 
scheme maimonides puts forth, we will have ample opportunity to 
discuss the comments of these and other critics.
Finally, returning to the question of individuation, I must not pass 
up an observation of Halbertal’s, who noted that 
the creation of organizing categories is a very complex issue, constrained 
by what scripture as well as what tradition say, and the categorizing 
criteria [itself] ….The demarcation between the particular and the 
organizing commandment is problematic and complex.23 
In chapter 2, we will explore problems in individuation. The examples 
there all show how individuation choices can significantly impact 
the total number of commandments. The idea that one can craft an 
incontrovertibly definitive list of commandments is so absurd that we 
must seriously question whether maimonides truly believed that he 
could compile such a list. Indeed, we must explain why maimonides felt 
compelled to conflate his outline for a proposed code with the concept 
of 613 scriptural commandments. 
THE THEsIs
I argue that maimonides’ interest in TaRYaG was due to one particular 
reason: the need to demonstrate that two fundamental beliefs of the 
Jewish faith were actually enjoined by scripture — that these beliefs 
23 . Halbertal, “maimonides’ Book of Commandments,” 461-462, n. 8.
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constituted scriptural commandments. The first of the two is the belief 
in the existence of a lord of the universe that is defined as the First 
Cause of all existents. For maimonides, such a belief necessitates a 
specific cognitive act; he disagrees with earlier views that the mere 
acceptance of commandments, because of its implications, fulfills the 
requirement to believe in God. The second fundamental belief is the 
belief in God’s oneness. This belief also requires a separate cognitive 
act, aside from the action of proclaiming His oneness. In the next few 
chapters, and in chapter 5 in particular, I will attempt to demonstrate 
this thesis. Note that these two commandments are specifically 
mentioned in R. simlai’s aggadah of the 613 commandments (in R. 
Hamnuna’s exegetical addendum). 
In the ShM, I argue, maimonides wanted to show that he could 
compete with the geonic (Qayyara’s) scheme; he thus disingenuously 
engaged in an enumeration that he knew full well could not be 
incontrovertible. His goal was to displace the reigning geonic scheme 
and replace it with R. simlai’s structure of 613 commandments. 
maimonides is now able to commence his legal magnum opus with the 
unchallenged claim that the beliefs in the First and Necessary Existent 
and the oneness of this Existent are positive commandments (Hilkhot 
Yesode ha-Torah 1:1-1:7).24 
In chapter 2, I define a number of terms that will be used throughout 
the book. These terms and definitions are intended to help the reader 
grasp the tools of enumeration and thus better follow the subsequent 
analysis. In chapter 3, I discuss the types of commandments that are 
contained in maimonides’ enumeration and the assumptions that he 
had to make to include these types under the heading of mitsvot ’aseh. 
In addition to the obligatory commandments normally defined as 
mitsvot ‘aseh, his list includes contingent commandments, procedural 
commandments, and descriptions, categories far from what one might 
24 . It is a sign of maimonides’ extraordinary success that all subsequent halakhic 
authorities found it natural to include these two fundamental beliefs in their 
enumerations. We note that after first strenuously defending Qayyara’s omission of 
the first commandment (in the Hasagot to p1), Nahmanides concedes that the belief 
in the existence of God ought to be enumerated “as opined by the master” (Hasagot to 
N1). 
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reasonably call mitsvot ’aseh. Toward the end of that chapter, I will 
show that maimonides demonstrates the relativity of his enumeration 
with his list of sixty absolutely obligatory commandments that 
he appended to his section on positive commandments. The sixty 
obligatory commandments act as a foil to the larger list of 248 positive 
commandments, which is constructed on a much broader definition 
of the term mitsvot ‘aseh than commonly used. It also provides the 
key to our understanding of the way maimonides presented the 
commandments in the Halakhot of the Mishneh Torah�
In chapter 4, I use competing methods of individuation to evaluate 
some of maimonides’ individuations and conclude that maimonides 
could not have believed that one could create an incontrovertible list of 
commandments. This exercise raises further doubts about the validity 
of maimonides’ project, namely, the idea that there either exists a fixed 
and objective count of commandments or that one can be faithfully 
constructed. 
In chapter 5, I discuss a number of legal innovations that 
maimonides introduces in his work vis-à-vis the previous enumerators. 
I divide these innovations into those for which maimonides provides 
strong rabbinic evidence, such as a midrash that specifically states that 
a particular law is a commandment, and those for which he offers scant 
evidence for his claims. I focus on some of the latter and suggest that 
extra-rabbinic factors — ethical and philosophical considerations — may 
have played a role in their enumeration. 
later in that same chapter, I come to the high point of the thesis, 
namely maimonides’ innovation that beliefs are valid objects of 
command. At first, this might hardly appear to be an innovation: as we 
see from R. Hamnuna’s exegetical addendum to simlai’s dictum, the 
belief in God and the belief in God’s oneness are part of the TaRYaG. 
despite this, neither Qayyara nor any of the composers of the azharot 
include these two articles of faith in their enumeration. To clarify: 
the geonim include in their counts a commandment to proclaim 
God’s oneness through the recitation of the shema, and they count a 
prohibition against having more than one God. What they do not do 
is require that the faithful explicitly cognize His existence and oneness 
through a philosophical and logical process of reasoning. one might 
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assume that these geonim disregarded R. simlai’s aggadah as a homily 
irrelevant to lawmaking. I posit, however, that the geonim’s neglect 
of this aggadah can be attributed to a fundamental doubt whether 
scriptural law can or does command one to believe. Alternately, 
while they may acknowledge that the law does command belief, they 
maintain that the law is content with an implicit belief in God, one that 
would result from undertaking to the fulfillment of commandments: no 
special act of cognition is required. 
In this chapter, I show that prior to maimonides’ time, the 
prevailing opinion was that only actions could be commanded, not 
beliefs. Even during his time, the question of whether dogma could 
be the object of a commandment was a matter of great controversy 
among theologians and jurists. In his works, maimonides defends the 
notion that the acquisition of metaphysical beliefs is a matter that can 
be commanded. He reaches far beyond the plain sense of R. simlai’s 
aggadah when he reinterprets this statement as a declaration of belief 
in a First Cause. I will examine the bold and unexpected transformation 
and the profound theological truth that maimonides saw hidden in R. 
Hamnuna’s explanation of R. simlai’s dictum.25 
FRom THE SEfER HA-MITSvoT  
To THE MISHNEH ToRAH 
The thesis that I develop in the first five chapters of this work, that 
maimonides was not fundamentally attached to a specific commandment 
count,26 comes from an analysis of the commandment enumerations in 
the Sefer ha-Mitsvot� This analysis, in turn, sensitizes us to the language 
that he uses in the Halakhot (legal rulings) of the Mishneh Torah (MT), 
25 . The Babylonian gaon Hefets b. yatsliah was actually the first to propose that belief in 
God’s existence and His unity represent formal commandments. Hefets’ description 
of the first commandment was preserved for us by Judah b. Barzilai in his twelfth-
century commentary on Sefer Yetsirah. Judah ben Barzilai, Perush Sefer Yetsirah, 55-56. 
see chapter 5 for further discussion.
26 . While our interest here lies with the MT, it is worth noting that maimonides never 
once mentions the idea of the 613 commandments in his lengthy survey of the biblical 
laws in the Guide, a work that postdates even the MT. my thanks to Harry Fox for this 
observation.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------  Chapter I  ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
— 32 —
illuminating his changing concept of what constitutes a commandment.
maimonides heads the treatises of the MT with short captions, all 
taken from the list of 613 commandments in the short Enumeration 
(SE) and the ShM. He shuffles the original list, allowing negative and 
positive commandments to mix (as opposed to the positive-negative 
division of the SE and ShM) and groups the commandments topically. 
The Headings to the treatises, in aggregate, constitute exactly 613 
commandments. yet, when we move to the actual Halakhot we find 
that, in a great many cases, maimonides fails to designate a particular 
commandment as such. This discontinuity is the subject of chapter 6. 
We start that chapter by noting that a declaration of commandment 
appears at the beginning of many — but not all — of the commandments 
in the MT. These are formulaically expressed, as “It is a positive 
commandment to do X” or sometimes, “It is a positive commandment 
of [or from] the Torah to do X.” This formula is absent in as many as 
109 discussions of commandments that had been listed in the ShM — a 
surprisingly large number. 
While some scholars, such as masud b. Aaron Hai-Raqah and Joseph 
Kafih, noted some of these formulaic omissions, their investigation was 
incomplete and unsystematic. As a result (as I will demonstrate), their 
proffered solution fails to satisfy. my analysis purports to show that 
one of the keys to understanding these gaps is to see that maimonides 
essentially changed his criteria for what represents a mitsvat ’aseh. 
maimonides designates far fewer commandments as mitsvot ’aseh in the 
Halakhot of the MT than he did in the SE/ShM because he treats mitsvot 
’aseh in the Halakhot as unconditional obligations, or as obligations that 
are contingent on the ordinary life of an ordinary person. I suggest 
that these criteria were already foreshadowed by the list of the sixty 
obligatory commandments discussed earlier. This change in criteria, 
along with some changes in a number of individuations, explains a 
substantial portion of the structural anomalies evident in the Halakhot. 
In chapters 7 and 8, I attempt to solve the remaining failures to 
designate. In the process, I make some innovative suggestions with 
respect to maimonides’ legal theory and scriptural hermeneutics. In 
chapter 7, I propose that writing in the Halakhot, maimonides used a 
new requirement for what constitutes a scriptural commandment: it 
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can only be derived from a scriptural verse that is read in the light of 
its plain meaning (peshateh di-qera). This hermeneutic explains why a 
number of commandments designated in the SE/ShM are no longer 
designated as scriptural commandments; I suggest that maimonides 
quietly reclassified these commandments, moving them from the 
category of de-oraita (scriptural) law into the category of divre sofrim law. 
I briefly discuss the legal status of divre sofrim laws: are they to be treated 
as scriptural laws or as rabbinic laws?27 And in what practical ways 
are commandments classified as divre sofrim distinct from scriptural 
commandments: how would maimonides’ reclassification have affected 
these commandments? Towards the end of chapter 8, I offer a number of 
suggestions for decisive differences between divre sofrim and scriptural 
legislation unrelated to the binding force of such laws. 
In chapter 8, I examine maimonides’ special use of the participle. 
The participle is a common mishnaic grammatical form, one better 
suited to convey “correct practices,” in david daube’s words,28 than 
scriptural obligations. These correct practices probably originate in 
some remote past, impossible precisely to locate along the continuum of 
the oral tradition, often supported by a scriptural passage of uncertain 
meaning. In the Halakhot, maimonides tends to use participles when 
discussing commandments that he presented in the SE/ShM as 
scriptural commandments but that lack support from the peshateh di-
qera. some of the more dramatic examples of “correct practices” are 
the recitation of the shema, the learning and teaching of Torah, the 
binding of phylacteries on the head and on the arm, and the affixing of 
a mezuzah. 
In chapter 9, I discuss commandments previously designated as 
mitsvot ‘aseh in the SE/ShM that are denoted simply as mitsvot (without 
the modifier ‘aseh) in the Halakhot� Whereas the construct phrase 
mitsvat ‘aseh connotes an absolute obligation, the freestanding term 
mitsvah suggests something less demanding, such as a scriptural counsel 
or a non-absolute obligation. In many respects, the freestanding use of 
27 . For an excellent discussion of the differences between these two types of law, see Elon, 
Jewish Law, 212-223.
28 . daube, “Haustafeln,” 295-296.
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the term mitsvah carries its common meaning from rabbinic literature: 
a good deed. I note that behind each of these redefinitions stand one 
or more hermeneutic difficulties that would not permit its designation 
as a mitsvat ’aseh� Among the handful of precepts that maimonides calls 
mitsvah rather than mitsvat ’aseh, are the commands to love God, to 
fear Him, and to imitate His ways. In all these cases, I suggest that 
maimonides has refined the scriptural message, creating a sort of 
ethical or intellectual imperative that falls just short of an obligation. 
WHy posITIVE CommANdmENTs?
As the title suggests, I have chosen to deal exclusively with the positive 
commandments. my interest in the positive commandments arose 
from the fact that it is far more difficult to identify positive than 
negative commandments. Negative commandments can be identified 
by two markers: scriptural language and punishment. maimonides tells 
us that, for the most part, negative commandments can be identified 
linguistically by scripture’s use of four terms: lo, al, pen, and hishamer. 
(The exceptions are fully discussed in one of the Sefer ha-Mitsvot’s 
methodological rules.) Crucially, there are no linguistic markers when 
it comes to positive commandments� For this reason, maimonides must 
lean heavily on rabbinic warrants that demonstrate that a particular 
scriptural sentence denotes an obligation. I discuss these ideas in more 
depth in chapters 2 and 5. 
There is a second marker that enables one to identify and 
individuate negative commandments, and that is the presence of 
a punishment. maimonides identifies an important number of 
negative commandments by bringing rabbinic evidence that state 
that these violations are liable to lashes. Conversely, he eliminates a 
significant number of prohibitions from being considered negative 
commandments because they are not punishable with lashes, thus 
considering these prohibitions as simply reinforcing exhortations. 
Besides lashes, maimonides also asserts that the presence of the 
penalties of excision (karet) and the death penalty imposed by the court 
(mitat bet din) accompanying a prohibition are also markers of negative 
commandments. While some prohibitions are not punishable, such as 
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those that involve no action, the overarching principle that all negative 
commandments are punishable greatly facilitates their identification. 
This explains why, in the Halakhot, maimonides might refer to a 
negative commandment with language such as “one who transgresses 
X scriptural prohibition is to receive lashes” without first stating that 
the transgressor has violated a negative commandment. By contrast, 
no one is punished for failing to fulfill a positive commandment. The 
precise nature of positive commandments must thus be clearly defined.
In sum, the positive commandments allowed me to ask about them 
a number of interesting questions. How did maimonides identify them? 
In the absence of punishments, are there various shades of positive 
commandments? And if there are, can we distinguish these shades from 
maimonides’ formulations? 
one final point: on a number of occasions throughout the book, 
I note that maimonides’ hermeneutical enterprise would be best 
understood if we knew the precise order in which he wrote his various 
legal works, in particular the Rules of the ShM, the body of the ShM, 
the SE, and the Headings. This knowledge would allow us to observe 
his train of thought and perhaps many of the reasons for his shifting 
positions. In the absence of evidence from manuscripts and consistent 
cross-references, I am guided by conjectures and by assumptions about 
the way that maimonides “ought” to have written these treatises. 
While I have drawn some highly tentative conclusions, they remain 
just that — tentative, conjectural, and intuitive. A methodical and 
systematic analysis of these issues of chronology remains an important 
desideratum for those wishing to understand maimonides’ halakhic 
oeuvre and the development of his ideas.
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---------------------------------- CHApTER II  ----------------------------------
ImpoRTANT dEFINITIoNs 
ANd CoNCEpTs
As he writes in the introduction to the Sefer ha-Mitsvot, maimonides 
felt overcome by a “feeling of distress” when evaluating earlier attempts 
to enumerate the commandments. He describes his predecessors’ 
enumerations as being based on the “strangest of theories,” products of 
their “fantasies,” and accuses them of “counting matters that even on first 
thought would appear that they should not have been included.” To replace 
these inconsistent tallies, maimonides pledges to compose a reasoned 
count, one “founded upon clear proof beyond a doubt” that would ensure 
that its “reader [would] see the mistake of all those who counted” differently. 
He intended its composition to use argumentative and interpretative 
techniques based on a reasoned and consistent methodology. At the end 
of this process, maimonides claims to have produced an authoritative 
list — the authoritative list — of all the commandments. 
In his enumeration, maimonides uses formal rhetorical processes 
of argumentation, interpretation, and methodology. To facilitate our 
discussion, this chapter will introduce a number of key terms. some of 
these are expressions that maimonides himself uses, while others are 
rhetorical terms that will be useful for our analysis. These terms are: 
mitsvah (cs. mitsvat, pl. mitsvot), mitsvat ‘aseh, claims, data, warrants, 
entries, and individuation.
mITsVAH 
In a recent article, Jacob Chinitz insightfully states: 
The Torah, for all its emphasis on law and legality, has a surprising lack 
of consistency in legal terminology. If it used just one term for obligation 
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or command, such as mitsvah, and spoke only of such commands and 
the punishments for lack of compliance, it would have been seen as a 
systematic and consistent code of law. But such is not the case. The 
pentateuch uses no fewer than 10 terms for “law,” and there seems to 
be no particular, permanent meaning to these terms, except a degree of 
tendency in one direction or another.1 
Chinitz here notes the multiplicity of biblical terms for law; we similarly 
note that the word mitsvah can have multiple roles and meanings. In 
the pentateuch, mitsvah is used to mean a commandment given by 
God, such as the passover ritual (deut. 6:25), the seventh-year release 
(deut. 15:5), or even all of the commandments together (deut. 8:1). 
It is sometimes used as an injunction, as in the mitsvot that proscribe 
particular actions (lev. 4:2), and sometimes it refers to a related 
group of positive and negative commandments (deut. 7:11, referring 
to deut. 7:2-5). Mitsvot (in the plural form) is used to represent a 
group of commandments, which may or may not be clearly specified 
(Num. 36:13). outside of the pentateuch, mitsvah is also used for a 
commandment issued by a human. In the construct form, we find 
“mitsvat ha-levi’im” (Neh. 13:5) to mean that which is lawfully due to 
the levites (comparable to “mishpat ha-bekhorah,” deut. 21:17).
Though few specific scriptural commandments contain the 
word mitsvah, we generally can identify commandments by their 
grammatical form: either the imperative or the imperfect. despite this 
generalization, their grammar can sometimes vary. In his exploration 
of the taxonomy of commandments, the eleventh-century Babylonian 
gaon samuel b. Hofni struggled with this question. The table of 
contents for his Treatise on the Commandments describes the no-longer-
extant chapters nine and ten accordingly: “Concerning the imperative, 
the words used for expressing an imperative, and that which makes 
an imperative to be an imperative,” and “Concerning the form of the 
prohibition, the words used for expressing a prohibition, and that 
1 . Chinitz, “Ten Terms in the Torah for Teachings, Commandments and laws,” 113-119. 
The ten terms that he lists are din, tsedaqah, davar, mishmeret, mitsvah, torah, mishpat, 
hoq, ‘edut, and ot.
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which makes [a prohibition be a prohibition].”2 In this particular case, 
the gaon’s methodology shows the clear influence of contemporary 
Arab theologians and scholars of jurisprudence, rather than rabbinic 
frameworks.3 Nevertheless, his concerns clearly highlight the difficulty 
of using grammatical modes to identify scriptural commandments. 
The talmudic rabbis, too, differed in their interpretations, not only 
about what constituted a commandment but also (more importantly) 
about how obligatory scripture intended each particular commandment 
to be. A few examples of such disagreements:
[To turn to] the main text: And he be jealous of his wife [Num. 5:14] — this 
is voluntary [reshut, lit. “optional”] in the opinion of R. Ishmael, but R. 
Akiva says it is obligatory. for her he may defile himself [lev. 21:3] — this is 
voluntary in the opinion of R. Ishmael, but R. Akiva says it is obligatory. of 
them shall ye take your bondmen for ever [lev. 25:46] — this is voluntary in the 
opinion of R. Ishmael, but R. Akiva says it is obligatory. (BT Sotah 3a)
In this talmudic passage, R. Ishmael and R. Akiva disagree about the 
Bible’s usage of imperative commands: is a man obligated to suspect 
his possibly unfaithful wife, or merely permitted to suspect her? The 
exegetical distinctions between these readings are far-reaching, as this 
series of disagreements shows. Their disagreement demonstrates that 
scriptural grammar required interpretation; it is not clear whether one 
may perform an action or must perform it.
In our next example, scripture discusses a case where an 
involuntary manslayer leaves his city of refuge. The verse (Num. 35: 
27) states: “And the blood avenger comes upon him outside the limits 
of the city of refuge, and the blood avenger kills [ve-ratsah go’el ha-dam] 
the manslayer, there is no blood-guilt on his account.” This translation 
2 . sklare, Samuel ben Hofni Gaon, 197. In footnote 70, sklare notes that the chapters 
discuss the linguistic forms that express imperatives and prohibitions; what may have 
been included can be inferred from the beginning of question nine of the gaon’s Ten 
Questions, translated on pages 285-294. He further notes that “the question of how 
‘command’ and ‘prohibition’ are expressed in scripture, through the grammatical 
imperatives and other modes, is an important topic in usul al fiqh works.”
3 . sklare, Samuel Ben Hofni Gaon, 52-53 and passim. With respect to the Treatise, see 
177-189.
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has already rendered an interpretation, reading “ve-ratsah go’el ha-dam” 
as “and the blood avenger kills.” But by taking the vav of “ve-ratsah” 
as conversive rather than conjunctive, we can alter the meaning 
significantly to read “the avenger shall kill the manslayer” (emphasis 
added). This difference in interpretation forms the basis for a tannaitic 
dispute (BT Makkot 12a): 
our Rabbis taught: And the avenger of blood shall slay the manslayer, this 
means that it is an obligation [emphasis added] for the blood-avenger [to 
slay the vagrant murderer]; if there be no blood-avenger, it is permissible 
for anyone [to do so]: these are the words of R. yose the Galilean. 
R. Akiva says: [it means] that it is permissible [emphasis added] for 
the blood-avenger [to slay the murderer], and everyone [else] is [not] 
responsible for him. 
our final example stems from the verse: “If your kinsman is in straits 
and has to sell part of his holdings, his nearest redeemer shall come and 
redeem [vega’al] what his kinsman has sold” (lev. 25:25). Again we find 
the same grammatical form, vav prefixed to a perfect tense of the verb “to 
redeem.” This gives rise to another tannaitic dispute (BT Qiddushin 21a): 
For it was taught: [If your kinsman is in straits and has to sell part of his holdings, 
his nearest redeemer shall come] and redeem [ve-ga’al] what his kinsman has 
sold: that is an option. you say, an option: yet perhaps it is not so, but an 
obligation? Hence it is taught: And if a man have no kinsman [lev. 25:26]. But 
is there a man in Israel who has no kinsman? Hence it must refer to him who 
has [a kinsman,] who [however] refuses to repurchase it, [thus showing] 
that he has [merely] an option. These are the words of R. Joshua. R. Eliezer: 
and he [shall] redeem what his kinsman has sold [implies] an obligation. you 
say, an obligation; yet perhaps it is not so, but an option? — Hence it is 
taught: and in all…you shall effect a redemption [lev. 25:24].
These quotations demonstrate the liminality of the grammatical 
imperative form: divine statements can be read as explicit commands 
or as granting permission. 
As we move our focus to rabbinic law, we find there that the term 
mitsvah also has a number of possible meanings:
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1) It can designate an absolute requirement, one that is indispensable 
for the performance of a ritual. This applies primarily to matters related 
to offerings and sacrifices. An example can be found in BT Menahot 9a: 
It was stated: If the meal offering was mixed outside the walls of the 
Temple court, R. yohanan says: It is invalid; Resh laqish says: It is valid. 
“Resh laqish says, it is valid,” for it is written, And he shall pour oil upon it, 
and put frankincense thereon, and then, he shall bring it to Aaron’s sons the 
priests; and he shall take out his handful [lev. 2:1-2]; hence from the taking 
of the handful begins the duty of the priesthood [mitsvat kehunah].
2) Even when contrasted with an indispensable or essential act (le-aqev) 
in sacrificial matters, mitsvah can still connote an obligation, as in BT 
Zevahim 37b. M Zevahim 4:1 discusses the number of blood sprinklings 
required for a sin offering to be effective. The House of shammai (Bet 
shammai) maintains that two sprinklings are required in the case of a 
sin offering, while the House of Hillel (Bet Hillel) maintains that one 
sprinkling is sufficient. The Talmud proceeds to examine their positions: 
Rav Huna said: What is Bet shammai’s reason? The plural form qarnot [horns] 
is written three times, denoting six [applications], [thus intimating that] 
four are prescribed [le-mitsvah] while two [at least] are essential [le-aqev]. 
But Bet Hillel [argues]: [The written forms are] qarnat [singular] twice, and 
qarnot [plural] once, which denotes four, implying that three [applications] 
are prescribed [le-mitsvah], while [only] one is essential [le-aqev]. 
Le-mitsvah does not mean that the sprinkling is merely preferable 
or commendable, as is often the case when the preposition lamed is 
prefixed to the term mitsvah. A later passage (80a) makes it clear that 
failing to apply the necessary number of sprinklings would “take away” 
(alluding to the scriptural prohibition) from the total number of God’s 
positive commandments. In other words, these sprinklings have the 
force of a positive commandment. Therefore, the expression that three 
(or four) sprinklings are “le-mitsvah” simply means that this number 
of sprinklings is obligatory, although only one sprinkling is essential.4 
4 . Entsiklopedyah Talmudit, s.v. “hovah,” n. 93. In this section I have used a number of 
other examples presented in this entry.
--------------------------------------------  ImpoRTANT dEFINITIoNs ANd CoNCEpTs  -------------------------------------------
— 41 —
3) Le-mitsvah can represent a preference (mitsvah le-khathilah) that does 
not interfere with the execution of the commandment. one example 
concerns a betrothed woman who commits adultery. scripture writes: 
“they shall bring out the damsel to the door of her father’s house, and 
the men of her city shall stone her with stones so that she dies” (deut. 
22:21). In a discussion of such cases, M Ketubbot 4:3 states: 
one who had a father but no door to her father’s house, or a door to 
her father’s house but no father, is nevertheless subject to the penalty of 
stoning, [for the regulation stating] the door of her father’s house was 
only intended as an [independent] precept [le-mitsvah].
The door mentioned in the injunction indicates a preferable location, 
one merely “le-mitsvah” rather than an indispensable element of the 
penalty.5 A second example concerns one who is to be killed by stoning 
for having enticed another Jew to practice idolatry. Addressing the 
enticed person, scripture says: “let your hand be the first against him 
to put him to death, and the hand of the rest of the people thereafter” 
(deut. 13:10). As the Sifre expounds: “It is a mitsvah that he be killed 
by the enticed person, thereafter by the rest of the people.” While it is 
preferable that the enticed person be the one to execute the enticer, the 
people can execute the enticer if need be.6 
5 . Note that Tosafot ad loc., s. v. “en la petah,” struggles with the text’s liberal 
interpretation of the explicit stipulation and finds other cases where this is not done. 
6 . Sifre Deuteronomy,  89 (152). Classical rabbinic commentaries have also understood the 
command this way. see RasHI, ad loc�, s. v. “yadkha tihiyeh bo,” who paraphrases the Sifre. 
Compare Hilkhot Sanhedrin 14:8, where maimonides rules that no one is authorized 
to execute the convict before the witnesses do so, to Hilkhot ‘Avodah Zarah 5:4, where 
maimonides states that it is a mitsvah for the enticed to execute the enticer. some 
commentators conclude that maimonides, too, reads the stipulation as a preference. see 
pardo, Sifrei d’vei Rav, 213. ultimately, this is no proof that the Sifre intended to express 
a preference rather than an obligation (which would allow the enticed to refuse to carry 
out the execution). The idea that there could be a mitsvah le-khathilah, a preferred way 
of fulfilling certain commandments, is commonly accepted with respect to qodashim 
(lit. “hallowed things” or sacrificial matters). For the way that some of maimonides’ 
contemporaries understood this idea, see for example Tosafot, BT Niddah 66b, s. v. “kol 
ha-raui le-bilah.” Whether or not the talmudic rabbis saw some scriptural commands as 
desiderata is a matter that requires a great deal of research and would take us too far off 
the scope of this book. I will argue in chapter 9 that maimonides did think that they did 
and introduced this nuance in his legal classification.
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4) M Menahot 10:5 states that after the bringing of the first sheaf of 
barley cut in the harvest (omer), sometime before noon, the new grain 
would be permitted immediately. In connection with this mishnah, the 
Talmud (BT Menahot 68a) makes the following comment: 
R. yohanan and Resh laqish both stated that even when the Temple stood, 
the [arrival of] daybreak [of the sixteenth day] rendered [the new grain] 
permitted. But is it not also written, Until you have brought [the offering 
of your God] [lev. 23:14]? — This is only a recommendation [le-mitsvah]. 
Le-mitsvah here is not understood as a preference (mitsvah le-khathilah) 
but as a supererogatory act (mitsvah min ha-muvhar).7 
5) Mitsvah can refer to a rabbinic obligation, as in BT Shabbat 21a: “our 
rabbis taught: It is a mitsvah to place the Hanukkah lamp by the door of 
one’s house on the outside.” lighting the Hanukkah lamp is a rabbinic 
obligation, as are all stipulations connected to its practice. similarly, see 
BT Gitin 38b: “on one occasion R. Eliezer came into the synagogue and 
did not find [the quorum of] ten there, and he immediately emancipated 
his slave to make up the ten? — Where a mitsvah [has to be performed], 
the rule does not apply.” Here, too, the term mitsvah is used even though 
the obligation to pray with a quorum of ten men is rabbinic.
6) Mitsvah may be interpreted as the performance of a good deed. 
miriam’s act of waiting to watch moses after their mother had deposited 
him in the Nile there is referred to as mitsvah ze’irah (small mitsvah), 
and “for a small deed one will receive a great recompense.”8 similarly, 
BT Hullin 106a, in connection with the rabbinic ordinance of washing 
one’s hands before eating fruit: 
Raba, however, said to them: It is neither a duty [hovah] nor a meritorious 
act [mitsvah] but it is merely optional [reshut]. This opinion [of Raba] 
differs from that of R. Nahman, for R. Nahman said: Whoever washes his 
hands for fruit is of those that are haughty in spirit [gassut ruah].
7 . see Tosafot, BT Menahot 5b, s. v. “heir ha-mizrah matir�” 
8 . Targum Neofiti, Num. 12:16.
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In this hierarchy, mitsvah stands here as something desirable, clearly 
less than obligatory and clearly more than optional. 
Aside from the last definition, no value judgment is attached to 
any of the forms of mitsvah. The vernacular connotation of mitsvah as 
a good deed has created great confusion at times, even among learned 
jurists. An interesting example can be found in the Mishneh Torah, 
Hilkhot Bikkurim 12:1, in connection with the commandment to break 
the neck of the firstling of an ass (positive Commandment 82, hereafter 
p82). maimonides rules that “there is a positive commandment [mitsvat 
‘aseh] for every Israelite to redeem the firstling of an ass with a lamb. 
If one wishes not to redeem it, it is a positive commandment [mitsvat 
‘aseh] to break its neck.” This formulation prompts one of his sharpest 
critics, RaBad, to exclaim: 
on my life, this comes neither from dialectics nor from calm 
reasoning — that this should be considered a mitsvat ‘aseh?!?…It is a 
transgression, and he is called a damager [maziq] and a destroyer of the 
property of a priest.9
In the ShM, maimonides proves that breaking the neck (‘arifah) is a 
commandment by quoting the sages’ expression “mitsvat ‘arifah.” 
RaBad thinks that the Rabbis only used this expression to parallel 
the term “mitsvat pediyah” (“the duty to redeem”), but that they never 
intended to call ‘arifah a mitsvah.10 This is because RaBad understood 
the term mitsvah to mean a good deed. maimonides, on the other 
hand, used the term mitsvat ‘aseh to signify an obligation, and had no 
intention to make a value judgment in this respect. 
MITSvAT ‘ASEH ANd MITSvAT Lo TA‘ASEH
In addition to the use of the plain term mitsvah in rabbinic sources, 
we also find the related terms mitsvat ‘aseh and mitsvat lo ta‘aseh and 
their abbreviated forms ‘aseh and lo ta‘aseh, with the negative particle 
9 . RaBad, Hasagot ha-RaBaD (commentary to the Mishneh Torah), ad loc�
10 . see yosef Qurqus’ interesting rebuttal of RaBad, ad loc. Qurqus, “Commentary,” 
Mishneh Torah, ed. Frankel.
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lav or lo (“no”) also functioning as a shortened form of lo ta‘aseh� These 
terms are commonly translated in English as “positive commandments” 
and “negative commandments.” While I will continue to use this 
translation for reasons of familiarity and elegance, the terms “positive” 
and “negative” do not accurately convey what is behind these rabbinic 
appellations. In effect, mitsvat ‘aseh should literally be rendered as 
a “commandment of ‘do,’” while mitsvat lo ta‘aseh should literally be 
rendered as a “commandment of ‘do not do.’” more idiomatically, one 
ought to translate them as “obligations” and “prohibitions.”
There is a category of positive scriptural injunctions that do not 
instruct a specific action; rather, they are read as implying prohibitions. 
In what seems like a paradox, the sages treated such a prohibition as a 
positive commandment, calling it a “prohibition derived from a positive 
statement [or command],” and labeling it as a mitsvat ‘aseh — “lav ha-
ba mikhlal ‘aseh, ‘aseh.”11 Although these prohibitions are treated as 
positive commandments, transgressors are not liable for lashes, as they 
would have been were the prohibition to have been stated explicitly. 
In the ShM, maimonides makes occasional use of this hermeneutic for 
the purpose of enumerating positive commandments, maintaining that 
such inferred commands should be counted as a positive commandment. 
His main critics, RaBad and Nahmanides, object strenuously, arguing 
that although these commandments are technically called mitsvot ‘aseh, 
they do not represent countable obligations.12 For example, the verse 
about the High priest who is enjoined to marry says: “He shall take a 
11 . It is also called an issur ‘aseh (a positive prohibition) in recognition of its being a 
prohibition derived from an ‘aseh.
12 . see RaBad’s glosses on p7, p60, p146, p149-52, and p198 in the MT, “The Enumeration of 
the Commandments” in the introduction to Sefer ha-Madda‘. While RaBad had access to 
the “short Enumeration of the Commandments” (SE), he did not have access to the ShM 
and thus could only infer the places where maimonides makes use of the lav ha-ba-mikhlal 
‘aseh hermeneutic. In the ShM, we find maimonides using this principle explicitly only in 
p38, p60, p84 (explained at N89), and p92, and implicitly at p149-p152. Nahmanides’ 
strictures first appear in the Hasagot to Rule 1 (pp. 40 and 48) and are given full vent in 
the Hasagot to Rule 4 (p. 111) and to Rule 6 (pp. 131-132). I discuss this issue in a number 
of separate places in this book, for example, in the discussion of p142, p146 and p149-
152 in chapter 5. I state above that maimonides made occasional use of this hermeneutic 
for the purpose of advancing commandment claims. This is true only in the ShM; an 
important shift takes place in the MT, as I discuss in chapters 6-9.
--------------------------------------------  ImpoRTANT dEFINITIoNs ANd CoNCEpTs  -------------------------------------------
— 45 —
wife in her virginity” (lev. 21:13). The sages, however, interpreted the 
verse as a prohibition on the High priest’s marrying a non-virgin. This 
did not deter maimonides from arguing that the law requiring the High 
priest to marry only a virgin is a positive commandment (p38): 
The Talmud says explicitly: “Rabbi Akiva held that even [the offspring of 
a union which was merely] contrary to a positive commandment was a 
bastard.” As an example of a union which is merely contrary to a positive 
commandment they give the case of a High priest who has a connection 
with a woman who is not a virgin. This is so because it is an accepted 
principle that a negative commandment which is derived from a positive 
commandment has the force of a positive commandment. It is thus clear 
that this is a positive commandment. 
There is no positive obligation on the part of the High priest to 
marry a virgin; rather, he is prohibited from marrying a non-virgin. 
Nevertheless, the positively worded command allows maimonides to 
claim that it should be considered a positive commandment. In a sense, 
this is a mitsvat ‘aseh in form but not in substance. 
Can these commandments, positive in name but not in action, be 
counted as regular positive commandments? Nahmanides posits that 
a positive commandment needs to direct an action and not simply be 
a source for inferring a prohibition, basing his reasoning on the very 
same aggadah of the 613 commandments that maimonides used to 
support his project. The full version of this midrash links the number 
of positive commandments to the number of limbs and organs in 
the human body: “It is as if each and every limb says to the person, 
‘perform a commandment with me,’” and links the number of negative 
commandments to the number of days in a solar year: “It is as if each 
and every day says to the person, ‘do not do this day a transgression.’”13 
The implication, argues Nahmanides, is that positive commandments 
must comprise acts of commission. The aforementioned inferred 
prohibitions are simply acts of omission; as such, one ought to 
classify them as negative commandments. Furthermore, to avoid 
13 . Midrash Tanhuma, Ki Tetse and other places, with slight variants. see Sefer ha-Mitsvot, 
ed. Heller, 4n53.
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double counting, Nahmanides suggests that this type of negative 
commandment should only be counted as a mitsvat lo ta‘aseh if we 
find no other commandment that explicitly forbids what this positive 
statement forbids inferentially.14 
Finally, it is useful to note this point that while the term mitsvat 
‘aseh is normally understood as an unconditional obligation, the 
category also applies to a conditional obligation. For example, one is 
under no obligation to acquire a house. If one were to acquire a house, 
however, one would be obligated to build a parapet on its roof. The 
building of a parapet can be called a mitsvat ‘aseh even though it is only 
a conditional or contingent obligation. 
often, scripture uses a case-based formulation to describe such 
contingencies; it uses the particles “when” (ki) or “if” (im) to introduce 
a law. Noting and listing several of these formulations, the Talmud 
declares that “when the mitsvah comes into your hands, you are bound 
to perform it [atah zaquq la-‘asotah], and if it does not [come into your 
hand] you are not bound to perform it.”15 That is, obligations can 
also arise out of contingent situations. This relativity should be kept 
in mind, as it will become an important element in our evaluation of 
maimonides’ enumeration. 
ClAIms, dATA oR EVIdENCE, ANd WARRANTs 
Aside from the term evidence, for which maimonides uses his term 
“proof,” the terms that I am about to discuss are not used in the ShM. 
I bring them here in an effort to facilitate my analysis of maimonides’ 
hermeneutics. We will find these terms useful in parsing his language 
and systems of categorization.
maimonides tells us in the introduction to the ShM that if he were 
to list just “the true and proper enumeration without [advancing] 
14 . Nahmanides, Hasagot, end of Rule 6, supporting Qayyara’s omission of some of these 
entries.
15 . BT Derekh Erets Zuta, pereq ha-shalom, para. 4, cited in the Entsiklopedyah Talmudit, s. v. 
“hovah,” n. 236. daniel sperber’s edition, Masekhet Derekh Erets Zuta,  pereq ha-shalom, 
193, does not have “and if it does not [come into your hand] you are not bound to 
perform it.”
--------------------------------------------  ImpoRTANT dEFINITIoNs ANd CoNCEpTs  -------------------------------------------
— 47 —
proofs for it, the first person that will chance to read it will suppose 
that this is a mistake — his proof being that it is contrary to what some 
author has written.” In a later paragraph, he emphasizes the need to 
provide proof, stating that in order to support his enumeration of the 
commandments, he would “bring proofs from the verses of the Torah 
and from the words of the sages, of blessed memory, concerning their 
interpretation.” 
With the exception of the nineteenth-century scholar moritz peritz, 
who examines the linguistic markers for maimonides’ proofs, most 
commentators have focused on the work’s main agenda as defining 
commandments, ignoring its crucial argumentative and interpretative 
aspects.16 peritz was probably the first scholar to note the close 
connection between maimonides’ proofs and the manner by which 
midrashic and talmudic sources describe scriptural commands.17 He 
details the many ways that maimonides used specific and precise terms 
drawn from talmudic sources to support his claims. For example, peritz 
notes maimonides’ use of the terms mitsvat ‘aseh (p173, 198), ‘aseh (p4, 
22, 31, 60, 204), mitsvah (p29, 37, 90 and p188, “milhemet mitsvah”), 
the pu‘al participle metsuveh (“it is commanded,” p38, p185) and 
mitsvah ‘alenu (“it is incumbent on us,” p157), all referring to positive 
commandments that maimonides adduced from midreshe halakhah 
and Talmud to support his claims. maimonides uses similar terms to 
support negative commandments, such as mitsvot lo ta‘aseh (N66, 154 
and p198), lo ta‘aseh (N229) and lav (N210) by themselves, and over al 
(“transgresses”) in N201. maimonides also makes argumentative use of 
the terms hovah (“obligation”), in p20, 44, 158 and 197; de-oraita (“from 
scripture”), in p175 and 213; and min ha-torah (“from the Torah”), in 
p201 and 203. peritz also notes maimonides’ use of composite terms 
such as mitsvat qiddush yadayim ve-raglayim (p24, the commandment 
of sanctifying of the hands and feet), mitsvat hatavat ha-nerot (p25, the 
16 . In the introduction to the ShM, maimonides writes: “my intention, however, in this 
treatise is by no means to delve into the details of the laws of any of the commandments; 
only to enumerate them…. When a knowledge of the enumeration of the commandments 
will be attained in accordance with the proofs in this treatise, then I shall list them briefly 
at the head of that general work [the MT], as we have mentioned.”
17 . peritz, “das Buch der Gesetze, Nach seiner Anlage un seinem Inhalt untersucht,” 439-474.
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commandment of trimming the lamps) and mitsvat bigde kehunah (p33, 
the commandment regarding the priest’s clothes).18 
peritz points to maimonides’ use of even more remote and indirect 
terminology originally found in the midreshe halakhah, such as the 
expressions al korho (“against his will”; p23) and ke-meqayem gezerat 
ha-melekh (“fulfilling the decree of the king”; p33) to prove that we are 
in the presence of an obligation. He notes that 
from the words “Though the Torah has ordained an appointed time for 
the reading of the shema, the sages have appointed a time for prayer,” 
maimonides concludes that not only the recital of the shema is a 
commandment but that the obligation to pray is of scriptural force (p10), 
though times for prayer are rabbinic. 
Finally, peritz points to two instances (N194 and p9), where, despite 
the lack of any special linguistic marker, maimonides nonetheless draws 
complex inferences to deduce the existence of positive commandments. 
Examination of this use of language is a primary tool through which 
this book will analyze the implications of maimonides’ categorizations.
The ShM is primarily a rhetorical work; in line with his rhetorical 
tradition, maimonides provides justification for his claims, expecting 
them to be challenged. The elements of its justificatory apparatus 
follow the outlines of Toulmin’s basic theory of argumentation,19 whose 
model I primarily use for terminological rather than analytical reasons. 
According to Toulmin, one can discern three elements in any basic 
argument: claim, data, and warrant. In the ShM, maimonides begins 
each section by presenting a claim that a specific command is a Biblical 
commandment.20 
After presenting his commandment claim, maimonides begins his 
defense with a scriptural proof text, what Toulmin calls data or evidence 
18 . These last two terms cannot be found in the talmudic literature.
19 . Toulmin, Uses of Argument, 87-134.
20 . At this point in our discussion, I am not concerned with noting how these claims are 
stated differently in the ShM from how they are enunciated in maimonides’ other 
compositions (the SE, the headings to the treatises of the MT, and the Halakhot of the 
MT). In this section of the book, I focus my analysis on the argumentative apparatus 
surrounding the claims made in the ShM.
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in his model. The scriptural proof text aims to answer the question: 
on what is this claim based? sometimes, the proof text stands alone, 
appearing to offer sufficient proof. That is because the scriptural proof 
text is sufficiently clear, or because there may have been a contemporary 
scholarly consensus on the particular commandment, even if we are no 
longer aware of it now. see, for example, p15, p26, p27, and p39. 
more often, however, the scriptural proof text does not provide 
an unambiguous proof, and maimonides then needs to resort to 
interpretation. He needs to answer the question: how does the scriptural 
proof text lead to the proposed claim? Here we come to the heart of 
the ShM’s argumentative presentation, the warrant. Warrants act as 
a bridge between the data and the claim. In the ShM, warrants take 
the form of rabbinic statements, drawn from midrashim (principally 
midreshe halakhah), the mishnah, the Tosefta, or the Jerusalem or 
Babylonian Talmud. It is crucial to note that maimonides assumes that 
the rabbinic interpretations of scripture accord with the biblical law’s 
intentions, and that his audience accepts this premise.
Although in Toulmin’s model, “data are appealed to explicitly, 
warrants implicitly,”21 this is not always true in the ShM. maimonides 
appeals to warrants both implicitly, as when he cites a general principle 
of rabbinic jurisprudence, such as “a positive commandment overrides 
a negative commandment” (p112), and explicitly, as when he resorts to 
a midrash to support his assertion that a particular verse expresses a 
mitsvat ‘aseh. In this latter instance, his warrant functionally resembles 
data/evidence. Rather than trying to distinguish functionally between 
data and warrant, and where relevant, I have simply adopted the term 
warrant to refer to all rabbinic evidence, while maintaining the term 
proof text for direct scriptural evidence.
ENTRIEs
At this point, I want to make an important and basic distinction 
between maimonides’ work and that of Qayyara (as well as the 
composers of azharot). While maimonides makes explicit claims, 
21 . Toulmin, Uses of Argument, 92.
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defining each commandment and giving a brief evidentiary apparatus, 
Qayyara merely lists commandments as entries listed in the form of 
quotes or paraphrases of scriptural verses. Qayyara and the authors 
of the azharot never articulate the claims that lie behind these quotes. 
While the deciphering of these entries inspired a highly creative genre 
of work,22 these attempts at deciphering are no more than highly 
speculative exercises, with little hope of ever definitively knowing the 
author’s original intention. moreover, these scholars share little or no 
consensus on a large number of entries. Ironically, while maimonides 
himself engaged Qayyara with great zeal, we can never be absolutely 
sure that maimonides understood Qayyara’s true intentions. 
 
INdIVIduATIoN
Individuation is a concept that necessarily lies at the root of every 
attempt to enumerate commandments. As Joseph Raz notes: 
A theory of individuation [in the legal context] proffers a mode of 
dividing the totality of material constituting a legal system into separate 
units. Because of the vast amount of legal material which constitutes one 
legal system, we need to divide it into smaller units called laws in order to 
be able to refer to them. It is for legal philosophers to decide on principles 
of individuation. The division, undertaken by the legal philosopher 
to allow for exposition of the legal order, has prima facie, no practical 
consequences for the addressee of the law. It does not determine how the 
law is to be applied, and is, in essence, purely theoretical.23 
Individuation is the logical process by which a body of law is divided into 
major coherent themes. There is no scientifically precise way of dividing 
such material; laws could logically be assigned to one unit or theme and 
22 . The best known of them are: simeon b. Tsemah duran’s Zohar ha-Raqia, a commentary 
on the azharot of Ibn Gabirol; Abraham s. Traub’s commentary in the introduction to 
Qayyara’s Halakhot Gedolot; shaul Cohen’s Netiv Mitsvotekha, on the azharot of Isaac 
al-Bargeloni and Ibn Gabirol; and yeruham Fischel perla’s monumental commentary 
to sa‘adiah’s Sefer ha-Mitsvot, entitled Sefer ha-Mitsvot le-RaSaG, which also dicusses 
all the extant azharot and maimonides’ works.
23 . Raz, “legal principles and the limits of law,” 831. Cited by Ben-menahem, 
“maimonides’ Fourteen Roots,” 3-4. 
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just as logically assigned to another. An illustrative example: a traffic 
violation that causes the death of a pedestrian could be discussed in 
the section of the law code that covers traffic violations, but it could 
just as well be placed in a section of the code that covers manslaughter. 
Ben-menahem refers to this type of individuation as “meta-legal 
individuation,” and adds that meta-legal individuation “is constrained 
primarily by theoretical and aesthetic considerations.” As he writes, 
“[a]ny metaphysical theory that seeks to classify the components of the 
system and determine their interrelations presupposes a division of the 
whole into distinct units amenable to categorization.”24 
While the subjects of our study are the distinct units called mitsvot, 
commandments, one should note that there exists at least one other 
enumeration whose distinct units were not the commandments but 
the Ten Articles (dibberot, colloquially called the Ten Commandments) 
given at sinai. This is the enumeration system used by sa‘adiah Gaon in 
his azharot.25 His highly stylized poem divides the 613 commandments 
unevenly, using thematic affinities to allocate each to one of the ten 
articles of the decalogue.26 
maimonides was to his material what Aristotle had been to 
biology, a philosopher and logician in the service of taxonomy.27 yet 
unlike Aristotle, maimonides’ taxonomic effort was constrained by his 
efforts to arrive at a predetermined number of distinct units. This led 
maimonides to make at least some individuation decisions that were, 
after a more detailed analysis, less than logically compelling and which 
appear to have been made for the sole purpose of gaming the outcome. 
moreover, while his rules of individuation (which we will soon discuss) 
24 . Ben-menahem, “maimonides’ Fourteen Roots,” 5.
25 . Beginning with the words “a fire consumes and lights more than all lights” (esh okhla 
ve-noheret mi-kol noharot), the azharot are found in the prayer book of sa‘adiah Gaon, 
interposed between the fourth and fifth blessings of the ‘amidah. sa‘adiah Gaon, 
Siddur, 184 and 191-216.
26 . sa‘adiah may not have been the first scholar to have arranged the mitsvot in such a 
manner. see the discussion in Kasher, Torah Shelemah, vol. 16, 203-213. This pattern 
was common among Karaite jurists and exegetes — sa‘adiah may have been polemically 
motivated. His azharot attained semi-canonical status; RasHi and Ibn Ezra cite them 
in their comments to Exodus (24:12 and 20:1, respectively).
27 . I am grateful to david Novak, who pointed me in this direction. 
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were eminently logical, they were not always supported by the way the 
talmudic rabbis categorized the material. In pursuit of his objective, 
maimonides would sometimes impose a logic and teleology on the 
material that was foreign to the rabbinic mind, as his critics note.28 We 
shall discuss some of these instances in later chapters. 
INdIVIduATIoN RulEs
In this section, I review the individuation rules, offering some light 
observations and tentatively raising some fundamental questions 
about the validity of these rules for defining mitsvot. A more sustained 
critique will follow in later chapters.
As defined by maimonides in the introduction to the ShM, the 
individuation rules constitute nine out of the fourteen rules for 
defining mitsvot. According to Ben-menahem’s three-part division, the 
remaining five rules can be divided into rules of identification (Rules 1, 
2 and 3) and rules of interpretation (Rules 5 and 8).29 In a few cases, I 
follow the following descriptions of individuation rules with a few brief 
remarks. I will make frequent references to these Rules when examining 
individual commandment claims. 
Rule 4: “We are not to include commands that cover the whole body 
of the commandments of the Torah.” In other words, a commandment 
must enjoin one to do something specific. maimonides notes that a 
statement like “ye shall be holy” (lev. 19:2) merely orders one to 
28 . In particular, see perla’s sharp criticism of Rules 7 and 11 in his introduction to Sefer 
ha-Mitsvot le-RaSaG (perla, Sefer ha-Mitsvot le-RaSaG, vol. 1, 31-33 and 40-41). and 
his discussions on ps76 and ps101-102 (vol. 1, 581-586 and 680-688, respectively). 
(“ps” stands for “positive commandment” according to sa‘adiah’s enumeration.) For 
the contrary view that teleological thinking (usually assumed to be Aristotelian) can be 
found in the Babylonian Talmud among some of the later amoraim (especially Rava), 
see Novak, Natural Law in Judaism, 95-105. 
29 . I follow here Ben-menahem’s arrangement, with the exception of Rule 10, which I 
prefer to call a rule of individuation. The rules of identification, Ben-menahem says, 
“identify the halakhic material that is to be itemized by specifying which material is 
to be excluded on external grounds, rather than because of the nature of the material 
itself, as in the case of the rules of interpretation, which exclude non-imperative 
material.” Ben-menahem, “maimonides’ Fourteen Roots,” 10.
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become holy by following all the Torah’s laws — no specific action is 
enjoined. As a result, it is incorrect in his view to consider “ye shall be 
holy” a commandment — as some of his predecessors did.
In the ShM, maimonides tells us that to worship God (p5) violates 
this constraint, while I argue in chapter 9 that he must have felt the same 
way, though he did not spell it out, with respect to the commandments 
to fear God (p4). His son, Abraham maimonides, was also asked whether 
the commandment to walk in God’s ways (p8) might be a charge that 
covers the whole of the Torah.30 Abraham ibn Ezra calls this sort of 
inclusive statement a “high principle” (kelal gavoha), but because he did 
not enumerate commandments, we cannot know whether he meant to 
eliminate such “high principles” from consideration.31 
maimonides’ eliminating general commands from the count of 
commandments does not mean that he considers these charges to 
lack any halakhic value. For example, at the end of his discussion of 
Rule 4, maimonides states that neither “And ye shall circumcise the 
foreskin of your heart” (deut. 10:16) nor “and be no more stiffnecked” 
(ibid.) ought to be enumerated, as some of his predecessors thought. 
He explains that the former can be read as an exhortation to “humble 
yourself and listen to all the commandments which He has previously 
mentioned” and the latter as “do not rebel against accepting anything 
I have commanded you, and do not transgress it.” We see these same 
verses in GP III:33: 
To the totality of purposes of the perfect law there belong the 
abandonment, depreciation and restraint of desires in so far as possible, 
so that these should be satisfied only in so far as this is necessary.… 
similarly, to the totality of intentions of the law there belong gentleness 
30 . maimonides, Abraham, “Teshuvot Rabbenu Abraham ben ha-RamBam le-sheelot 
Rabbi daniel ha-Bavli be-Inyane sefer ha-mitsvot,” 218. see the discussion of this 
commandment in chapter 9. 
31 . Abraham ibn Ezra, Yesod Mora, 93. He also uses the expression “inclusive 
commandment” (mitsvah kolelet) on page 112. on page 134, Ibn Ezra calls the verse 
that enjoins one to fear God a “verse that includes all the commandments.” does this 
description carry enumerative implications? I am not sure and thus not confident in 
perla’s claim that “[Abraham ibn Ezra] anticipated him [maimonides] in this type of 
work [methodology for counting commandments] in his book Yesod Mora,” perla, Sefer 
ha-Mitsvot le-RaSaG, 15.
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and docility; man should not be hard and rough, but responsive, obedient, 
acquiescent, and docile. you already know His commandment [mitsvato], 
may He be exalted: Circumcise therefore the foreskin of your heart, and 
be no more stiffnecked [deut. 10:16].
By describing these verses as teaching specific mitsvot, this new reading 
contradicts Rule 4 from the ShM, which states that general charges 
should not be enumerated. This contradiction leads perla to ask why 
maimonides fails to count these injunctions as commandments if they 
enjoin a specific goal, a question perla leaves unresolved.32 From the 
narrow point of view of enumeration, this is a significant question. In 
any case, the GP quote indicates that maimonides did attach a special 
value to these general commands, regardless of whether he thought 
they were commandments to be enumerated. 
As he explicitly states at the start of the discussion, maimonides 
uses the term mitsvah to refer to the law’s greater intentions rather than 
to its particular commandments. In the maimonidean hermeneutics, 
non-specific commands generally denote intentions or goals towards 
which one must strive.33 occasionally, non-specific commands nudge 
or rouse a person to do a commendable action that may not be strictly 
obligatory. This point needs to be kept in mind for when we come to the 
discussion of the solo term mitsvah, in chapter 9. 
 
Rule 6: “Where a commandment contains both a positive and a negative 
injunction, its two parts are to be counted separately, the one among 
the positive commandments, and the other among the negative.”
Rule 7: “The detailed laws of a commandment are not to be counted [as 
separate commandments].” maimonides called Rule 7 “‘a central pillar’ 
to lean on in the subject of our engagement.” Commenting on a fuller 
hierarchy of Torah law, david Novak makes important use of this Rule: 
32 . perla, Sefer ha-Mitsvot le-RaSaG, vol. 2, 98. 
33 . Nachum l. Rabinovitch points out that goals can have halakhic implications. see his 
comments to Hilkhot Qeriyat Shema 1:3, in Mishneh Torah, ed. Rabinovitch, 21, and 
also see Rabinovitch, “Tsivvuyyim, Hiyuvim u-mattarot,” 67-92. 
--------------------------------------------  ImpoRTANT dEFINITIoNs ANd CoNCEpTs  -------------------------------------------
— 55 —
[It refers to] a specific prescription, having a number of particular 
details, which is commanded for the sake of a more general reason. Thus 
the more particular details (diqduqim) are subsumed under a specific 
commandment, and the specific commandment is subsumed under a 
more general reason (ta‘am).34 
Rule 9: “The enumeration is not to be based upon the number of times 
a particular negative or positive injunction is repeated in scripture, 
but instead is to be based upon the nature of the action prohibited or 
enjoined.”
Rule 10: “Acts prescribed as preliminary (to the performance of a 
commandment) are not to be counted.”
Rule 11: “The different elements which go together to form one 
commandment are not to be counted separately.” more precisely: when 
the commandment requires an assemblage of elements, the individual 
elements should not each be considered their own commandments. The 
commandment is defined by its desired purpose and must encompass all 
the elements that fulfill that purpose. For more clarity, note that Rule 7 
deals with details or conditions of a general commandment that may 
not be present in all cases, while Rule 11 deals with the constitutive 
elements of a general commandment. What these rules have in common 
is that neither the details nor the constitutive elements can be counted 
as independent commandments. 
An example of Rule 11: a leper accomplishes his ritual cleansing 
doing six specific prescribed actions. This rule dictates that these six 
actions are subsumed under the single commandment of the cleansing 
of the leper, regardless of the many actions that are required. A second 
example concerns the actions a leper must take to declare his leprosy: 
“His clothes shall be rent, and the hair of his head shall go loose, and 
he shall cover his upper lip, and shall cry: unclean, unclean” (lev. 
13:45). These actions all have the same purpose — to make the leper 
recognizable — and thus are subsumed under one commandment. 
34 . see Novak, Natural Law in Judaism, 96. According to Rule 5, the “more general reason” 
should not be counted as a commandment.
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In cases where the Rabbis say that performing one element 
incorrectly impairs (me‘aqev) the validity of the entire assemblage, 
maimonides says that “it is clear that [the actions] constitute one 
commandment.” similarly, “wherever it will be made clear to you that 
the desired goal [of a commandment] is not obtained by any one of 
its elements, it is also obvious that it is their totality that is to be 
counted.” If the leper were to tear his clothes without performing the 
other three requirements, he would not have accomplished the goal 
of distinguishing himself. There is no rabbinic support for this fine 
teleologically-driven distinction, although I admit that I am not aware 
of any rabbinic opinion that expressly denies this point. 
maimonides acknowledges that there is a point of “great 
difficulty entailed in grasping this rule.” such a difficulty occurs in 
situations “when the sages say concerning the elements of a certain 
commandment that ‘they do not impair the validity of each other.’” The 
example he gives is the commandment of fringes (tsitsit). The sages 
state: “The absence of the blue thread in the tsitsit does not impair the 
validity of the white nor does the [absence of the] white impair the 
validity of the blue.” since the commands to have two types of thread 
are not contingent upon each other, one might then think that the 
requirements to have blue and white threads constitute two separate 
commandments. According to maimonides, however, because the 
commands to have blue and white threads have the same telos, we count 
tsitsit as one overarching commandment (p14). He bases his conclusion 
on the Mekhilta’s exegesis of the verse “And it shall be unto you for a 
fringe,” which he reads as stating that the two types of thread share a 
single purpose.35 
In sum, when a group of commanded elements shares a single 
purpose, that purpose is considered the commandment. No single 
element can be considered a commandment. maimonides’ teleological 
approach to the classification of commandments is quite evident here. 
35 . Nahmanides declares in amazement: “did then the tanna [of the Mekhilta] come now 
to enumerate 248 positive commandments and to teach us that fringes (tsitsit) does 
not count for more than one entry? This is something about which it is not fitting that 
we make a mistake.” Hasagot to Rule 11.
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Rule 12: “The successive stages in the performance of a commandment 
are not to be counted separately.” From a categorizing point of view, this 
rule is eminently logical. For example, the rituals prescribed for the burnt 
offering sacrifice — that the animal be slaughtered, flayed, cut into pieces, 
that its blood be sprinkled in a particular manner, and so forth — constitute 
a totality and can reasonably be counted as one commandment. To 
the best of my knowledge there is no support in the rabbinic sources, 
however, for the idea that the totality of the successive stages of this 
ritual is to be considered one single commandment. Here is an instance 
where the reader can note the lack of meaningful correspondence between 
taxonomic logic and commandment categorization.
maimonides complains that “this principle was unknown” to the 
geonim (or if known, they “paid no attention to it”), since they counted all 
the details of the ritual of the meal offering as separate commandments, 
such as “pourings” (yetziqot), “mixings” (belilot), and “crumblings” 
(petitot). His classificatory logic saw these actions as merely details of 
the ritual. The geonim, however, were following rabbinic categorizations, 
where each of these actions was considered a separate duty (‘avodah)36 on 
a par with the rituals of the decapitation of the heifer, the purification of 
the leper, and the priestly blessings — all of which maimonides also saw 
fit to count as separate positive commandments.
 
Rule 13: “Where a certain commandment has to be performed on more 
days than one, it is not to be counted once for each day.” For example, 
this rule implies that all the musaf (“additional”) sacrifices offered at 
the new moon ought to be counted as one commandment, even though 
they are offered in different months of the year. similarly, all the musaf 
offerings for the sabbath are counted as one commandment, and each 
festival’s musaf offerings are counted as its own commandment — even 
though the same offering may be offered on different festivals. While 
there is some logic to this categorization, one could just as logically 
group all musaf offerings (sabbath, new moon, and festivals) under 
one commandment, as Qayyara did,37 emphasizing their common 
36 . Sifra Tsav, 16:9 (39d)�
37 . see the discussion of p41 in chapter 4.
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characteristic of being musaf offerings and disregarding their specific 
differences. We see here that the individuating criteria are not firmly set 
and can vary almost whimsically, which we will discuss at greater length 
in chapter 4. For now, I ask again the question that I asked with respect 
to Rule 12: what exactly do these categories represent? How do we 
know that mitsvot ‘aseh equate with categories and not with individual 
components — independent offerings, in this case? No rabbinic warrant 
was brought that would designate the elements in these categories as 
individual and separate mitsvot ‘aseh.
Rule 14: “The modes of punishment are to be counted as positive 
commandments (and not each particular punishment).” In other 
words, we count the commandment to punish an offender with lashes 
as a single positive commandment, since it is a mode or category of 
punishment. We do not count as its own commandment each distinct 
instance where one is commanded to give a particular punishment. 
maimonides argues that separately counting as positive commandments 
each instance where punishment is warranted for transgressing a 
negative commandment would result in one positive commandment 
for each negative commandment, resulting in more than four hundred 
positive commandments! 
Nahmanides exposes the potential fallacy of this argument.38 It is 
tradition, rather than the Torah, that stipulates flogging for nearly all 
infractions that involve transgressions of negative commandments. 
In fact, we find only one explicit reference to flogging in the Torah, 
in deuteronomy 25:1-3, punishing the guilty party in litigation (see 
p224, N300). The Torah does stipulate punishments for specific 
other offenses, including stipulating excision and the death penalty. 
In an enumeration driven by textual references rather than logic, it 
would not be unreasonable to treat all these punishments as separate 
commandments, perhaps categorizing them in a slightly different way 
from other positive commandments. This is precisely what Qayyara and 
other geonim did by creating a section of punishments (‘onshin) in their 
TaRYaG enumerations. 
38 . Nahmanides, Hasagot to Rule 14, 194.
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maimonides cites two reasons for breaking with the geonic scheme. 
His first concern is that the geonic scheme could produce confusion when 
it lists some transgressions twice, once as an admonition and once as a 
punishment, such as the prohibition against profaning the sabbath and 
the punishment of death by stoning for one who profanes it. He says:
[it is necessary to point out] that the reason for this error is that in counting 
the punishments as commandments they become entangled: sometimes 
counting them alone, and sometimes counting the punishment and also 
the action for which that punishment is incurred, establishing them all 
as negative commandments without contemplation. 
maimonides insinuates here that the reason is indeed a practical one: 
it would disrupt the outline on which he hopes to construct an ordered 
and systematic code of law. 
The second objection to a logic that he describes as “still more 
perplexing” is that some of the stipulated punishments are meted out 
by God rather than by the human courts. As a result, we cannot count 
them as formal commandments. one of the proponents of including 
punishments in the enumeration was the gaon Hefets b. yatsliah, 
author of his own Sefer ha-Mitsvot. maimonides quotes from the first 
chapter of Hefets’ book, where he describes the section of punishments: 
“Among these are thirty-two subjects39 wherein He informs us that He, 
blessed be He, is in charge of executing, not us.” maimonides thinks 
that it is absurd to believe that heavenly punishments (excision, death 
by the hand of Heaven) can be counted as commandments, since they 
clearly involve no judicial action. 
In the chapters that follow, we shall question the theoretical viability 
of reaching a numerical target like 613. maimonides foreshadows 
such difficulties in his explication of Rule 14. discussing capital 
punishment, he writes: “As for counting them [in the enumeration of 
the commandments] we shall count the four death penalties inflicted 
by the courts as four positive commandments.” To support this claim, 
maimonides cites the following rabbinic warrant: 
39 . Hefets later explains that the 32 cases comprised 23 cases of those liable to excision 
(karet) and nine liable to death by the hand of Heaven (mitah bi-yede shamayim).
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such indeed is the language of the mishnah: “This is the commandment 
of those that are to be stoned [mitsvat ha-nisqalin, lit. ‘the command 
of the stoned ones’].” similarly [the sages of the mishnah] say: “In 
what manner is the commandment of burning performed [mitsvat ha-
nisrafin, lit. ‘the command of the burned ones’]?”; “In what manner is 
the commandment of strangling [performed] [mitsvat ha-nehenaqin, 
lit. ‘the command of the strangled ones’]?”; “In what manner is the 
commandment of beheading [mitsvat ha-neheragin, lit. ‘the command of 
the beheaded ones’] [performed]?”40 
disagreeing with maimonides, Nahmanides argues that the court’s 
obligation to deal out justice and extirpate evil, covered by the scriptural 
injunction “Thus you will sweep out evil from your midst” (deut. 13:6), 
is the more encompassing category, the one that should be the sole 
enumerated commandment. Nahmanides dismisses maimonides’ 
warrant, claiming that the mishnah’s usage of the construct 
chain containing the form mitsvat does not necessarily describe a 
commandment. Rather, it represents a handy rabbinic form that is 
used to refer to a scriptural command in its ideal form of execution� so for 
example mitsvat ha-nisqalin refers to the most correct form of carrying 
out the command to stone one liable for that form of punishment. 
Arguably, this command is itself a detail of a larger, overarching 
commandment to carry out justice.41 similar conclusions can be reached 
by examining a number of such construct chains (as we do below). 
maimonides’ failure to adduce a more persuasive proof for the claim 
that these four punishments can be individuated42 makes Nahmanides’ 
40 . M Sanhedrin 7:1-4. maimonides inverts the order of the last two. In the SE/ShM, these 
punishments are counted as p226-229.
41 . Nahmanides, Hasagot to Rule 14, 198 and 200.
42 . We should note that maimonides makes here a second attempt to individuate each of 
the death penalties. He quotes Mekhilta vayaqhel (347) on the verse “you shall kindle 
no fire throughout your habitations” (Exod. 35:3): “lighting fire, which is included in 
the categories of work prohibited on the sabbath, is singled out for special mention 
to teach us that just as the sabbath laws cannot be disregarded in the specially-
mentioned form of execution by burning [ahat mi-mitot bet din], so they cannot be 
disregarded in the case of the other forms of judicial execution [kol she’ar mitot bet 
din].” While it is true that this passage individuates execution by burning, it does not 
make it an individual mitsvat ‘aseh. Benveniste comes to the same conclusion, but only 
after he emends a passage in the Jerusalem Talmud that at first appears to provide 
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argument appear stronger. Nevertheless, one conclusion that can be 
drawn is that neither individuation nor enumeration can be absolutely 
convincing. on this basis, it would not be unreasonable to conclude 
that behind some of maimonides’ individuations, we can find the logic 
of an outline, a comprehensive and practical classification on which to 
base his code of law, rather than the logic of a commandment. much as 
the mishnah had done earlier, maimonides may simply have wanted to 
separate the various punishments to allow a detailed discussion of each 
of the forms of execution. 
In sum, maimonides appears to be pursuing two objectives at one time: 
a detailed outline for his future code of law, the stated objective of the ShM; 
and a precise numerical reconstruction of R. simlai’s 613 commandments. 
These objectives do not always correspond — indeed, why should 
they? — resulting in strained logical and hermeneutical demonstrations. 
THE CoNsTRuCT MITSvAT  
IN THE ComposITE TERm MITSvAT-X
We saw above that maimonides used phrases such as mitsvat ha-nisqalin 
and mitsvat ha-nisrafin to individuate the four capital punishments 
(p226-229). As we saw, Nahmanides criticized the use of these phrases as 
evidence for individuation, arguing that they were never meant as such. 
The capital punishment case is not the only instance in which 
maimonides makes use of this composite phrase mitsvat-X for purposes 
of individuation. He also does so at p82, to justify the commandment 
of breaking the neck of the firstling of an ass (‘arifah); at p217, to justify 
the commandment that obligates the ritual of removing the shoe 
(halitsah); and at p233, to justify the commandment that one facilitate 
the redemption of a Hebrew maidservant (pediyah).43 For all three cases, 
maimonides brings a proof from M Bekhorot 1:7 that refers to mitsvat 
some support to maimonides’ claim. This passage is not found in our editions of the 
Jerusalem Talmud. Benveniste, Dina de-Hayy, p99, 578. 
43 . Formally made at p234. Both mitsvat yi‘ud and mitsvat pediyah are mentioned in M 
Bekhorot 1:7. Note that scripture prefers pediyah over ‘arifah, yibbum over halitsah, 
and yi‘ud over pediyah, and that the activities named second are only second-best 
alternatives.
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‘arifah, mitsvat halitsah, and mitsvat pediyah. With this warrant, he trumps 
the logic of Rule 7, which would view these commands as details of the 
general commandments of redemption of the firstling (pediyah), levirate 
marriage (yibbum), and marriage to the maidservant (yi‘ud). It is clear 
that the expression mitsvat-X held a special significance for maimonides, 
functioning as a warrant for individuating a commandment. 
It is therefore surprising to find that, across a wide range of rabbinic 
literature, the mitsvat-X expression is used in connection with commands 
that maimonides does not designate as commandments. We see this 
in the very same mishnah (M Bekhorot 1:7) that maimonides used to 
demonstrate the validity of his claims of ‘arifah, halitsah, and pediyah. The 
end of the mishnah states: “The duty of redeeming [mitsvat geulah] [an 
unclean beast that was dedicated to the Temple] falls upon its owner before 
all other men.” Although the phrase mitsvat geulah is used to describe this 
duty, maimonides does not include it in the list of commandments. Would 
this instance not represent a counterfactual example to the thesis that the 
expression mitsvat-X is an individuating marker?44 
Following are some further counterexamples, instances where the 
phrase mitsvat-X is used, yet maimonides does not individuate the 
given command as a positive commandment: 
1) M Sukkah 4:5: “How was the rite of the willow-branch fulfilled?” 
(mitsvat ‘aravah ketsad?)
Comment: In the Halakhot, maimonides calls this rite a halakhah le-
Moshe mi-Sinai rather than a mitsvat ‘aseh� While maimonides clearly 
had this mishnah in mind, given that he uses the mishnaic expression 
“ketsad haytah mitsvatah,” he does not categorize mitsvat ‘aravah as a 
positive commandment (Hilkhot Lulav 7:20-21). 
2) M Menahot 7:2: “If a man removes the sinews of the hip, he must 
remove all of it. R. Judah says: only enough to fulfill the command to 
44 . In Hilkhot ‘Arakhin (5:1, also 5:3), maimonides formulates this halakhah as follows: “In 
the case of one who consecrates an ancestral (ahuzzah) field, it is incumbent (mitsvah) 
on him for him to redeem it, for the owner has priority.” The principle is held valid for 
ancestral fields and unclean beasts according to BT ‘Arakhin 27a. 
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remove it (kede le-qayem bo mitsvat netilah).”
Comment: Here, too, maimonides does not count this as a positive 
commandment, despite R. Judah’s use of the expression mitsvat netilah. 
The only commandment that maimonides enumerates with respect to 
the sinews of an animal is the prohibition (N183) against eating them. 
3) M Nega‘im 14:6: “The command of the cedar wood [mitsvat ‘ets erez]: 
It should be one cubit in length.”
Comment: In p110, maimonides subsumes the command of the cedar 
wood under the general commandment dealing with the purification of 
the leper: the stipulation to set aside cedar wood is treated as a detail 
of the general commandment. That is, although the mishnah refers to 
“mitsvat ‘ets erez,” maimonides does not use the expression as a marker of 
a positive commandment. In the MT, maimonides uses the term mitsvato 
when he refers to the cedar wood rite (Hilkhot Tumat Tsara‘at 11:1), but it 
is used to refer to the correct measure of the wood: “and he takes [a piece] 
of a cedar tree, and the correct way [measure] (mitsvato) is …” 
Two similar expressions of the form mitsvat-X can be found in M 
Parah 11:9 (mitsvat ezov) and Mekhilta de-Rabbi Simeon b� Yohai (on 
Exod. 21:6) (mitsvat retsi‘ah). Neither expression leads maimonides 
to identify these rites as positive commandments. The next and final 
example suggests a different individuation scheme than the one 
maimonides proposes in the ShM.
4) Mekhilta de-Rabbi Ishmael on Exodus 12:16: “From here they said: the 
command of phylacteries (mitsvat tefillin), the four sections [that go] on 
the arm are one bundle, the four sections [that go on, or belong on] the 
head are four divisions (totafot).”
Comment: maimonides counts putting on each tefillin (head and arm) 
as two separate commandments (p12, p13) and provides proof for this 
decision.45 Admittedly, this midrash deals with the making or description 
of the tefillin, not the wearing of them. Nevertheless, it refers to both 
45 . see Nahmanides, Hasagot to Rule 11, who argues that maimonides should have treated 
tefillin as one commandment if he had followed the same logic as the one he used for 
the commandment of fringes.
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tefillin together as mitsvat tefillin. should maimonides have changed his 
individuation and considered tefillin as one commandment? 
In addition to the above, the expression mitsvat-X refers to a 
number of rabbinically-prescribed ordinances, suggesting that the term 
need not refer to scriptural commandments. Examples include mitsvat 
megillah (T Megillah 2:9), mitsvat miun (T Yevamot 13:1), mitsvat ha-ner 
(Avot de-Rabbi Natan B, 9) and mitsvat hanukkah (BT Shabbat 21b). 
In this chapter, I defined a number of important terms and 
began analyzing maimonides’ rules of individuation. I raised some 
early questions about the relationship between classificatory logic 
and commandments, touching upon issues of indeterminacy in 
individuation decisions (to which I will return in chapter 4). Finally, 
I raised the issue of selectivity in using a particular linguistic marker 
as a warrant to support commandment claims. From the foregoing, 
it appeared that the enumeration project was not as hermeneutically 
compelling a project as maimonides professed. These observations 
raise the possibility that some external criteria lay behind many of the 
enumerating decisions, rather than just the obvious linguistic markers 
(a topic I will cover in chapter 5). But I also want to go beyond the 
narrow issue of the selection of the commandment claims. In the 
following two chapters, I shall endeavor to show that the enumeration 
was neither fully consistent with rabbinic terminology nor as logically 
compelling as maimonides might have wanted. The combination of all 
these problems should lead us once again to question the rationale for 
such a project. 
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--------------------------------- CHApTER III  ---------------------------------
TypoloGy oF MITSvoT
In the previous chapter, we saw maimonides use the phrase mitsvat 
‘aseh to describe an unconditional obligation, a command to perform a 
specific action. What gives the term its literal meaning is the imperative 
form ‘aseh (lit. “do!”) appended to the construct form mitsvat. Recall 
also that R. simlai’s midrash referred unequivocally to 248 mitsvot 
‘aseh. According to this definition, we would expect maimonides’ list 
to contain 248 unconditional obligations. surprisingly, the list of 
commandments that maimonides presents in the ShM looks more like 
a catalogue of laws than a list of unconditional obligations. Indeed, the 
so-called positive commandments contain a variety of types of laws: 
unconditional obligations, laws that specify a particular procedure but 
not an obligation, broad laws containing a number of provisions which 
are also not obligations, and descriptive laws which define the referents 
of other commandments.
Because they come from a different tradition of categorizing 
commandments, the geonic enumerations accommodate this 
varied typology somewhat better than does maimonides. positive 
commandments are called mitsvot qum ‘aseh, literally “get up and do’” 
commandments.1 such commandments are generally unconditional 
obligations, although some of them are contingent on particular 
situations. Another of their categories is parashiyyot, literally 
1 . In talmudic literature, this term is quite common: see M Makkot 3:4, T Hullin 10:15, BT 
Sanhedrin 59a. In the Rome manuscript, Qayyara sums up the section thus: “These then are 
two hundred positive commandments (mitsvot qum ‘aseh), that for each one individually 
reward is granted (she-al kol ahat ve-ahat nottlin sekhar).” For a discussion of the structure 
of commandments according to Qayyara and the importance of this mention of reward, 
see Guttmann, Behinat ha-Mitsvot u-Behinat Qiyyum ha-Mitsvot, 36-40.
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“sections,” 65 headings that agglomerate assorted provisions related 
to specific subjects, such as the “section on the Hebrew bondsman 
and bondswoman” or the “section on the Red Heifer.” This scheme 
can accommodate conditional commandments, procedures, and even 
descriptive laws better than R. simlai’s single category of positive 
commandments could.2
In his remarks in the concluding section of positive commandments 
in the Sefer ha-Mitsvot, maimonides takes notice of the broad variety 
of laws that he had included under the name “positive commandment.” 
(For better comprehension, in the quotes that follow, I follow a slightly 
different commandment order than the one he uses.) maimonides 
explains that there are commandments that 
are absolutely obligatory on every man, at all times, everywhere, and 
in all circumstances, as for instance, [those regarding] the fringes,3 
2 . modern commentators differ on what commandments are defined by the term 
parashiyyot. y. m. Guttmann (in Behinat ha-Mitsvot, 23) maintains that parashiyyot 
only catalog obligations for the community, rather than those incumbent upon the 
individual. perla (in Sefer ha-Mitsvot le-RaSaG, vol. 3, 193-208) thinks that the category 
also covers commandments whose practice is enforced by the community or the 
courts. However, these views fail to explain a number of entries. While perla justified 
these questionable entries through a brilliant display of pilpul, such explanations seem 
unnecessarily convoluted. For examples of such forced arguments, see his discussion 
of the beautiful captive (vol. 1, 578), the Nazirite’s obligation to shave after cleansing 
(vol. 1, 680) and shemittah (vol. 1, 554). In all these cases, parashiyyot can better be 
understood as laws that are only applicable under certain conditions, contrasting 
with the unconditional obligations called mitsvot qum ‘aseh. m. Zucker (in Mi-Sefer 
ha-Mitsvot shel Hefets ben Yatsliah, 11-12), suggests a more convincing definition, 
based on his reading of a passage in Hefets’s fragmentary Sefer ha-Mitsvot. These 65 
parashiyyot do not represent commandments that devolve onto the community but 
rather commandments whose applicability depends on the opinion of the courts. It 
is worth noting that neither maimonides nor Nahmanides thought that parashiyyot 
covered communal obligations. In his discussion of Rule 7, maimonides makes some 
comments that approve of Qayyara’s use of parashiyyot, since they resemble his own 
legal formulations. subsequently, he criticizes Qayyara because “this matter was not 
completely clarified or apprehended by him; hence he counted among these sections 
matters he had already enumerated before, without being aware of [the repetition].” 
Nahmanides notes that Qayyara’s “understanding of parashiyyot is not properly 
explained and I will not expand on it” (Hasagot to Rule 10).
3 . Note that maimonides considers here that the commandment of fringes consisted 
of making them (as per p14), not of wearing them, as he would later state in the 
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the phylacteries, and the observance of the sabbath. These we 
call unconditional commandments, because they are of necessity 
incumbent upon every adult Israelite at all times, everywhere, and in all 
circumstances. (ShM, 284) 
I will discuss this category of unconditional commandments later in 
this chapter.
The next (and less obvious) type of positive commandment is the 
contingent commandment. As noted in our earlier discussion of the 
term mitsvah, these commandments consist of precise specifications 
of how to handle particular legal issues. The Hebrew particles ki or im 
specify and introduce the general topic under discussion. For example: 
“When (ki) you build a new house, you shall make a parapet for your 
roof” (deut. 22:8). The circumstance that activates the commandment 
is the building of a new house. such a contingency is introduced by the 
particle ki. In maimonides’ words, such commandments are 
obligatory on the individual who has performed a certain act, or to whom 
something has happened, as for instance the [commandments relating 
to] the sacrifices offered by one who has sinned unintentionally, or 
by a zav; and it is possible for a man to go through life without doing 
or experiencing any of these things. Again, there are among these 
commandments, as we have explained, certain laws, like the law of a 
Hebrew bondsman, of a Hebrew bondsmaid, of a Canaanite bondsman, of 
an unpaid bailee, of a borrower, and others mentioned above, which may 
never be applicable to a particular man, and which he may never be liable 
to carry out, throughout the whole of his life. other commandments are 
binding only during the existence of the Temple.… others are binding 
only on owners of property … and it is possible for a man to be exempt 
from them because he has no property. (ShM, 284)
Contingent commandments are commandments conditional upon 
certain events or circumstances taking place. If the given events or 
circumstances never occur during the person’s life, the person will be 
exempted from the commandment. 
similar to these contingent commandments are procedure-
Halakhot. see my discussion of the commandment to make fringes in chapter 6.
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commandments, those that specify what procedure must be followed 
under certain circumstances. The classic example of such a commandment 
is the law of divorce (p222), which maimonides formulates as follows: 
“We are commanded that divorce of a woman whom we wish to divorce 
must be accomplished by a bill of divorcement, and not otherwise.” The 
first opportunity that he has to discuss procedure-commandments is 
at p95, where he claims: “we are commanded [Ar., al-amar] to apply the 
rules [laid down in scripture] regarding the revocation of vows, that is, 
the rules [Ar. al-tashria] that we were taught to adjudicate these laws.” 
Immediately after, he explains: 
This commandment, however, does not mean that we are bound in all 
cases to revoke vows. you must understand that precisely the same is 
true of every law that I enumerate: it is not necessarily a commandment 
to do a certain thing, but the commandment is that we must deal with 
the matter [in question] in accordance with this law.4 
In his discussion of the commandment of immersing in a ritual bath 
(p109), maimonides explains the logic of procedure-commandments 
once again. The commandment reads: “We are commanded to immerse 
ourselves in the waters of a ritual bath, and thus be cleansed of any of 
the kinds of uncleanness with which we may have been affected.” He 
then explains: 
In treating immersion as a positive commandment we do not mean that 
every unclean person is bound to immerse himself, as anyone who wears 
a garment is bound to put fringes on it, or as anyone who has a house 
4 . maimonides’ notion that a particular law, teaching, or procedure is called a 
commandment “because we must deal with the matter in question in accordance 
with this law” can be seen in the special terminology that he used, al-amar in the 
first explanation of the commandment and al-tashria in the second. Aware that al-
amar generally refers to a command and al-tashria does not, maimonides’ grandson 
yehoshua ha-Nagid suggests that maimonides used the two terms deliberately. Just 
as the annulment of vows is a teaching or instruction, not a direct order, but one that 
has specific parameters that must be followed, so too must one carry out any entries 
that contain the term al-tashria (e.g. p108, 114-5, 117, 145, 149, 190), even though 
they are only teachings. According to yehoshua ha-Nagid, p95’s equation of al-amar 
with al-tashria redefined all other uses of al-tashria. In talmudic jargon, we might say 
that p95 is a binyan av for all similar entries. see yehoshua ha-Nagid, Teshuvot, 49.
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is bound to make a parapet [for its roof]; my meaning is only that by 
the law of immersion anybody who wishes to cleanse himself from his 
uncleanness cannot accomplish this purpose except through immersion 
in water, after which he becomes clean. 
It is unclear why maimonides felt the need to explain the significance 
of this type of commandment again.5 Regardless, we see clearly that 
these types of commandments, be they contingent or procedural, are 
obligatory under certain circumstances: one who owns a Hebrew slave 
must free him after six years, one must give a bill of divorce to one’s 
wife to effect a divorce, one must build a parapet for a house soon after 
acquiring it, and many more. While we may call these commandments 
“contingent,” since they are tied to specific life circumstances, one who 
finds himself in those life circumstances is indeed obligated to fulfill 
these commandments. seen in this light, contingent and procedural 
commandments can be described as obligations, albeit relative ones. 
The fourth and last type of commandment that we find in the ShM’s 
enumeration is best called descriptive, rather than prescriptive. In effect, 
these commandments define the referents of other commandments. 
unlike those previously discussed, this type of commandment 
never imposes an obligation, regardless of circumstance. A total of 
thirteen commandments fall into this category, all concerning types 
of uncleanness (p96-108). They are formulated as describing states of 
being, such as stipulating “that eight species of creeping things defile 
5 . The requirement to immerse in a ritual bath was a matter of contention between the 
Rabbanite and the Karaite communities. In fact, maimonides was forced to issue a 
strong court order to uphold the Rabbanite practice. see Iggerot ha-RaMBaM, trans. 
and ed. shailat, vol. 1, 175-185 for the taqanah and its background. We can detect 
traces of the polemic in the ShM, where maimonides states: “The book of truth 
[scripture] makes it clear that whoever has been unclean and undergoes immersion 
is rendered clean.” Though Karaites rejected the oral law, they followed scripture 
diligently. maimonides’ appeal to the “book of truth” is more rhetorical than actual, 
as the requirement to immerse is not specifically stipulated in scripture. He may have 
wanted to emphasize the point that immersion was a procedure, not an obligation, 
to counter Karaite accusations that the Rabbanites were misconstruing scripture by 
arguing that it was an obligation (as some Rabbanites did). Alternately, maimonides 
may have wanted to emphasize his disagreement with his own coreligionists. For 
example, other enumerators, including Qayyara (pq 171), counted “immersion in the 
proper time” (tevilah bizmanah) as a mitsvat qum ‘aseh. 
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by contact (p97)” or “that a menstruating woman is unclean and 
defiles others (p99).” maimonides introduces them as follows: 
The fact that we count each of the various kinds of uncleanness as 
involving a positive commandment does not mean either that it is an 
obligation, or that it is forbidden, to become unclean in one or other 
of these ways, as though this would entail a [violation of] a negative 
commandment. What we mean is that when the Torah says that one who 
touches this or that kind [of uncleanness] becomes unclean, or that this 
or that object makes one who touches it unclean in a certain way, this 
constitutes a positive commandment: that is to say, this law that we are 
bidden to observe is a [positive] commandment, that is, that which we 
said that one who touches a certain thing when it is in a certain condition 
becomes unclean, but if it is in a different condition, he does not become 
unclean. The actual becoming clean is optional: if a man wants to become 
unclean, he does, and if he does not, he does not. 
The commandment requires us to declare that a person has become 
unclean under a certain set of conditions, or, conversely, clean under 
another set of conditions. We must not think, says maimonides, that 
these laws require one to become clean or unclean. 
In one of his fiercest attacks on maimonides’ claims, Nahmanides 
exclaims that, despite his prolixity, maimonides does not present a 
convincing rationale for including the various kinds of uncleanness in 
his count. These kinds of uncleanness, writes Nahmanides, “are optional 
[reshut] from all angles, they have no connection to mitsvah [ein ba-hem 
inyan mitsvah] that they should deserve to be counted.”6 By “optional 
from all angles,” Nahmanides notes (as I did earlier) that no possible 
circumstance exists that would obligate one to fulfill these directives. As 
maimonides himself put it, “if a man wants to become unclean, he does, 
and if he does not, he does not.” moreover, Nahmanides continues, 
while the Torah does not prohibit one from becoming unclean, the 
Torah does forbid one from entering the sanctuary and/or eating 
sanctified foods while in a state of impurity. In connection with these 
prohibitions, the Torah describes what makes one unclean and what 
does not. This is comparable, he continues, to the prohibitions against 
6 . Nahmanides, Hasagot to p96, 248.
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bringing blemished animals to the altar (p91-95), where knowing 
how to distinguish types of blemishes is a key element of fulfilling 
these commandments. yet, Nahmanides argues, maimonides does 
not enumerate separately all the relevant types of blemishes in those 
commandments. Why, then, does he count the types of uncleanness 
here? Nahmanides concludes that types of uncleanness and blemishes 
are referents of certain types of prohibitions: they cannot themselves 
constitute commandments.
Jacob levinger suggests that these types of commandments are 
specifically intended to establish certain legal concepts. He calls these 
legal concepts the products of lawmaking, concepts which are part 
of the tradition from sinai. These laws are conventions that neither 
have a basis in nature, as does medicine, nor in metaphysics, as does 
the belief in God’s existence. “Certainly,” levinger opines, “it is this 
unique conceptualization of uncleanness that justifies their being 
called commandments.” This is also the reason that a kabbalist like 
Nahmanides would not accept them as commandments; Nahmanides 
has a more ontological approach to uncleanness, even thinking that 
uncleanness has a basis in nature (a sort of spiritual pollution).7
As I understand levinger, our difficulty in reconciling this category 
of commandments lies in our understanding of mitsvah as representing a 
command to do a particular action. levinger argues that just as positive 
law differs from natural law — the former is the product of human 
action, the latter reflects innate beliefs or dispositions (like principles of 
morality) — so too do commandments differ from metaphysical truths 
and nature-based laws in that they are legal constructs. In this sense, 
the term mitsvah stands for divinely constructed positive law. It is this 
characterization that confers the status of commandments on the types 
of uncleanness, even though they command no specific action. Even 
if we agree with levinger’s argument, this reasoning does imply that 
maimonides has changed the conventional meaning of the term mitsvah. 
7 . levinger, Darkhei ha-Mahshavah ha-Hilkhatit shel ha-RaMBaM, 73-74. on the difference 
between kabbalists and maimonides, particularly on the question of whether impurity 
ontologically exists or whether it is merely a legal construct, see Kellner, Maimonides’ 
Confrontation With Mysticism, 133-139.
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other scholars offer solutions to this conundrum — with little 
success. Hurewitz suggests that this group of commandments 
represents a specific goal: to caution the person contaminated by 
uncleanness to consciously avoid entering the sanctuary, eating 
sanctified food, and causing others to become unclean.8 Though 
he admits that maimonides did enumerate a number of explicit 
negative commandments prohibiting the faithful from entering 
into the sanctuary (N77)9 and from eating sanctified food while in a 
state of uncleanness, he maintains that there is room for a positive 
commandment to reinforce a special guardedness. This reading seems 
quite strained. There is no precedent in the ShM for the idea that a 
positive commandment should denote the exact same thing as a 
negative commandment (notwithstanding the paired commandments 
discussed in Rule 6), and this reading would violate the spirit of Rule 
9. more importantly, there is nothing in maimonides’ discussion to 
suggest that he intended this special guardedness; would he not have 
spelled out such an idea? In an attempt to rebut Nahmanides’ objection, 
Hurewitz also argues that blemishes are of a “fixed nature and they do 
not possess such a wide diversity of provisions.” The implication is that 
one is just commanded to recognize blemishes, not to analyze their 
types, while types of uncleanness require specific laws, due to their 
complexity and dependence on special circumstances. In response, 
one could counter that while such an argument may justify a detailed 
treatment of all types of uncleanness in a code of law, subsumed 
under one general heading of uncleanness, it does not justify entirely 
separate commandments�10 
8 . Hurewitz, Sefer ha-Mitsvot im Perush Yad ha-Levi, 117b.
9 . He fails to note that there is an additional positive commandment to remove unclean 
people from the camp (p31).
10 . somewhat similar defenses are offered by de leon, “megillat Esther” and Alegre, “lev 
sameah,” both in Sefer ha-Mitsvot, ed. s. Frankel, 248-250. specifically, they argue 
that the various kinds of uncleanness impose a duty to behave in accord with their 
particular constraints, by secluding oneself, staying away from the sanctuary, neither 
touching nor eating holy objects, and so forth. It is interesting to note that Alegre 
concedes the value of Nahmanides’ argument (“while his words here are good and 
correct”); he seems to lack conviction when he concedes: “it is possible to defend 
maimonides.” In my opinion, Nahmanides’ objection retains its full force.
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Were he to have shared Nahmanides’ concerns, maimonides 
could have included the laws of uncleanness in the section on laws 
of the sanctuary. As Nahmanides points out, while the Torah does 
not prohibit one from becoming unclean, it does prohibit one from 
entering the sanctuary and eating sanctified foods while unclean. The 
laws of cleanness are thus contingent upon the laws of the sanctuary. 
From an organizational point of view, however, the complex laws of 
cleanness would have represented an extremely lengthy addition to the 
section on laws of the sanctuary. maimonides therefore streamlined 
the MT’s structure by dedicating a separate treatise to the laws of 
cleanness: Sefer Taharah. In this respect, maimonides followed the 
arrangement of the mishnah, where the “order of Cleanness” (Seder 
Teharot) is distinguished from the “order of Hallowed Things” (Seder 
Kodashim). I argue that the ShM’s separate enumeration of the types 
of uncleanness foreshadowed this organizational move. maimonides’ 
individuation of the types of uncleanness appears to be influenced 
more by compositional considerations regarding his future code than 
by questions of what constitutes a commandment. 
uNCoNdITIoNAl oBlIGATIoNs
Earlier in the chapter, I broached the subject of unconditional obligations 
and promised to return to them because of their special significance. 
At the very end of his concluding remarks on positive commandments, 
maimonides offers a list of these 60 unconditional commandments. 
levinger highlighted the significance of this list and some of its 
implications in the area of halakhah and jurisprudence.11 
11 . In the early manuscripts, we find that these commandments are simply referred 
to by their numbers in the enumeration, e.g. positive commandment #1, positive 
commandment #2, and so forth. one of the work’s translators supplied brief captions, 
but, over time, mistakes began to enter the printed editions of the ShM. Jacob 
levinger investigated the textual history of this list, diligently compared manuscripts 
and printed editions, and affirmed the accuracy of a certain group of manuscripts. see 
levinger, Ha-RaMBaM ke-filosof u-ke-Poseq, in particular chapter 6, “The Absolutely 
obligatory Commandments (applicable) All the Time,” 67-87. As our discussion 
unfolds, I will show the value of the list in understanding maimonides’ changing 
conception of the term mitsvat ‘aseh�
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This short list of sixty commandments demonstrates the 
relative nature of the term obligatory� maimonides describes these 
commandments as the ones always obligatory upon a man (as opposed 
to a woman) who lives “in normal conditions: that is to say, that he 
lives in a house in a community, eats ordinary food, namely bread 
and meat, pursues a normal occupation, marries and has a family.” 
He calls these commandments “compulsory commandments” (MnT 
and Kafih: mitsvot hekhrehiyot), a term likely synonymous with the 
rabbinic term hovah. He does not call them mitsvot ‘aseh, nor does he 
claim that these commandments count more authentically as mitsvot 
‘aseh than the others enumerated in his list. After the strenuous 
effort to assemble and justify a broad typology of commandments, 
it is surprising to see maimonides attach special value to a different 
enumerating list. 
I posit that this list reveals a degree of unease in maimonides’ 
mind about his system of enumeration, leading to a reaffirmation of 
the conventional understanding of the term mitsvat ‘aseh, literally 
“a command to do,” the requirement to perform a particular action. 
maimonides here itemizes sixty commandments from his list of 248 
that actually fit the conventional understanding of a mitsvat ‘aseh, an 
unconditional commandment of action. These sixty commandments 
are incumbent upon the man who lives in “normal conditions.” 
maimonides is aware that much of the remainder of these 248 positive 
commandments can only be called absolute obligations through 
farfetched logic. Although he calls them mitsvot ‘aseh, maimonides does 
not intend that one must give his wife a writ of divorce, or that one 
must free a bondman, or that one must become unclean so as to become 
clean. The mitsvot hekhrehiyot are a subset of mitsvot ‘aseh, but a subset 
that dovetails neatly with our conventional understanding of mitsvot 
‘aseh. They are not commandments describing a procedure, as is the 
commandment mandating the use of a writ of divorce. And they are 
certainly not descriptive commandments, as are those that detail the 
types of uncleanness. They are, as maimonides says, commandments 
that are “absolutely obligatory on every man, at all times, everywhere, 
and in all circumstances, as for instance, [those regarding] the fringes, 
the phylacteries, and the observance of the sabbath.” 
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A few of the commandments on the list are indeed contingent 
commandments, contingent upon events that occur to ordinary men 
in “normal conditions.” The list of sixty compulsory commandments 
thus contains the commandments of building a parapet to one’s 
house, inspecting the tokens of an animal, and ritually slaughtering 
an animal for consumption. All these commandments are contingent 
upon a normal man’s actions: owning a house and eating meat. The 
“normal conditions” transform a contingent commandment into a 
compulsory one. 
The list of the sixty unconditional obligations will become relevant 
when I explore an important change in terminology between the ShM 
and the MT. I will return to this idea in the second part of the book, 
beginning in chapter 6. 
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--------------------------------- CHApTER IV  ---------------------------------
loGICAlly INCoNClusIVE 
INdIVIduATIoNs
In chapter 1, we briefly discussed the differing schemes that Qayyara 
and maimonides used for their lists of commandments. Although 
maimonides chose a two-part scheme for his list and rejected the four-
part geonic scheme,1 one might have imagined that he would have been 
able to incorporate many of Qayyara’s commandments into his list. 
But even if we posit that maimonides took Qayyara’s list as a starting 
point, the strict methodological procedures enumerated in the Sefer 
ha-Mitsvot’s Rules disqualified many of Qayyara’s claims from being 
accepted as mitsvot. Through analyzing Qayyara’s list, I infer that an 
application of maimonides’ Rules would have reduced Qayyara’s total of 
200 positive commandments by approximately 64 entries.2 maimonides 
would have had to advance 112 new positive commandments, 64 to 
replace the ones eliminated and 48 new ones, to arrive at a total of 248 
positive commandments. How he derived such commandments is the 
subject of the next two chapters of this work.
A note of clarification: I do not wish to imply that maimonides 
drafted his list of commandments by literally revising Qayyara’s list. 
For all we know, he composed his list without reference to Qayyara’s, 
although I suspect that Qayyara’s list did indeed hold maimonides’ 
“center of vision”3 throughout his work. By analyzing his list as if 
Qayyara’s was its basis, we can better understand the differences in 
their methods. 
1 . Recall that Qayyara counted 71 punishments (onshin), 277 negative commandments 
punishable by lashes, 200 positive commandments, and 65 sections (parashiyyot).
2 . see Excursus 1.
3 . This felicitous term, first coined by William James, was suggested to me by Bezalel 
safran. 
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maimonides took three approaches in revising Qayyara’s list to fit his 
needs. First, he converted some of Qayyara’s section (parashah) entries 
into individual positive commandments. For example: “the section 
of the cities of refuge” (parashah 3) became p182, the commandment 
to establish six cities of refuge; “the section of the second passover” 
(parashah 30) became p57, the commandment to slaughter the second 
passover offering; “the section of the priestly blessings” (parashah 32) 
became p26, the commandment for the priests to bless Israel; “the 
section of the trumpets” (parashah 35) became p59, the commandment 
to sound trumpets in the sanctuary; and many others. second, he 
converted other sections into more than one positive commandment 
by applying different individuating criteria. An example examined 
below is maimonides’ treatment of the musafin, the additional 
offerings. While Qayyara listed these as “the section of the additional 
offering (parashah 41),” maimonides moved musafin into the category 
of positive commandments and differentiated the single section into 
eight individual claims. These types of conversions will be the subject 
of this chapter, where I posit that many such individuation decisions 
were not logically convincing. Finally, maimonides introduced entirely 
new commandment claims. Those innovations will be the subject of the 
next chapter.
The reader will note that the number of commandments discussed in 
this chapter and in the next does not total 112. Indeed, I do not intend 
the discussion of the conversion of individual sections into multiple 
commandments to be comprehensive. There are many conversions that 
do not merit special observation, if only because they have little to say 
about the topic of individuating criteria. Also, I do not explore the one-
to-one conversions mentioned in the previous paragraph, since they are 
relatively straightforward. 
In chapter 2, we saw that maimonides used a linguistic marker 
to individuate the commandments obligating the court to carry out 
executions: the composite term mitsvat-x, as in mitsvat ha-nisqalin 
and mitsvat ha-nisrafin. In reviewing rabbinic passages containing this 
formula, I began to question the validity of maimonides’ individuation: 
I saw that the composite term was used on multiple other occasions 
without prompting maimonides to individuate the command as a 
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mitsvat ‘aseh. In this section, I will attempt to demonstrate that many 
of maimonides’ individuation decisions were not as logically conclusive 
as his language implies. This analysis casts doubt on the practical 
feasibility of reaching a firm and definitive commandment count, a 
doubt that maimonides likely shared.
The reader might recognize that even one example should suffice 
to demonstrate this doubt. still, any one example could be explained 
away. The classical apologetic commentaries on the ShM are proof of the 
extraordinary ability of scholars of Talmud to reconcile, harmonize, and 
rationalize even the thorniest problems. I have therefore used multiple 
examples to highlight the problems.
p41-43, p45, p47, p48, p50, p51. MUSAfIN
maimonides enumerates eight commandments comprising the musafin, 
the special offerings for the sabbath, New moons, and festivals, in 
addition to the temidin, the daily offerings. detailed in Numbers 28:9-
29:39, the specific compositions of each of the musafin offerings differ 
only slightly from each other. The section regarding musafin closes 
with the words: “all these you shall offer to the lord at stated times” 
(Num. 29:39). The geonim chose to count all these musafin as one 
commandment: Qayyara lists them as “the section of twenty additional 
offerings.”4 The twenty offerings are given on: sabbath (1), New moon 
(1), sukkot (8), passover (7), shavu‘ot (1), Rosh Hashanah (1), and yom 
Kippur (1), paralleling their description in scripture. 
At the end of Rule 13, maimonides faults the geonim for their 
analysis:
They have committed a most serious and strange mistake in connection 
with this principle: they counted all the musafin [of the entire year] — the 
musafin of the sabbath, of the New moons, and of the festivals — as one 
commandment! By the same token they should have counted resting 
[from work] on all the festivals as one commandment! That they did 
not do. But the lord knows and is witness that they are not to be held 
4 . Qayyara, parashah 41. see also Ibn Gabirol, “Azharot,” positive commandment 187, 
sec. 65, s. v. “musafin twenty.”
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accountable for that, since they have generally not followed one theory in 
their enumeration; instead, They have mounted up to the heaven, they went 
down to the depths [ps107:26]. The clear truth is as I have mentioned it 
to you — that every musaf constitutes a commandment in itself, just as 
resting [from work, shevitah] on every [separate] festival constitutes a 
distinct commandment. This is the correct theory. 
maimonides himself counts eight musaf commandments: one for each 
of the seven occasions listed above, plus a musaf for the eighth day 
of sukkot (shemini ‘Atseret), which he separates from the festival 
of sukkot on the strength of a rabbinic warrant. He connects these 
individuations to the separately counted requirements to rest on each 
festival day. He uses Rule 13 — “we count only the essential nature 
of what we have been commanded, regardless of the time element 
concerning its fulfillment” — to reject the notion of counting the 
separate musaf offerings for each individual sabbath or New moon as 
separate commandments. similarly, he says, for each multi-day festival, 
we count only one commandment to bring musafin on that festival, 
even though these offerings are brought over many days. 
While maimonides’ individuation seems logical, one could use 
his principles equally well to define the commandments differently. 
Invoking this principle of “the essential nature” of the offerings, one 
could argue that the musafin should all be counted as one inclusive 
commandment, as they all share the common nature of being a musaf 
offering. If one were to counter that the musafin for each of the festivals 
should be counted separately because the specific offerings differ (unlike 
the offerings for each of the New moon days), one could respond by 
questioning why maimonides subsumes all the musafin for sukkot 
under one commandment, even though each day’s offering is different.
There are arguments for either method of individuation, and it 
is readily apparent that neither individuation is more definitive than 
the other. maimonides’ decision to count them all separately is not 
justified by his critique of the geonic method: “By the same token they 
should have counted resting on all festivals as one commandment! That 
they did not do.” While Qayyara could be faulted for inconsistency, his 
inconsistency does not justify maimonides’ individuation. Conversely, 
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maimonides’ association between discrete festivals and musafin is not 
airtight. one could easily argue that both the command to rest on all 
festivals and the command to bring musafin should be counted as their 
own overarching commandments, without any further individuation.5 
p63-67. pRIEsTly oFFERINGs 
In this group of commandments, maimonides outlines the procedures 
that the priests follow for their various sacrifices: the burnt offering 
(p63), the sin offering (p64), the guilt offering (p65), the peace offering 
(p66), and the meal offering (p67). He provides no justification for 
his individuation decision. While each offering has its procedures 
explicated in its own separate section in leviticus, maimonides does 
not propose the existence of scriptural pericopes as one of the criteria 
for individuating commandments.
Without a rabbinic warrant to support his individuations, 
maimonides’ position is tenuous. As Nahmanides notes, earlier 
commandments stipulate that certain people must bring offerings 
under certain circumstances; it would be more logical to include the 
specifics of offerings as part of those commandments, rather than 
individuating each offering separately. For example, in p69, we are 
told that one who sins unintentionally must bring a sin offering. There 
should be no need to specify a separate commandment (p64) to tell the 
priest how to perform this duty.6
despite its simplicity, Nahmanides’ proposal does not further the 
goal of creating an outline for a comprehensive code. I postulate that 
one of the main motivations for maimonides’ organizing his list of 
commandments is to provide an outline for the comprehensive code of 
law he intended to write, the Mishneh Torah� In this case, he takes his 
5 . see below, p159. 
6 . Nahmanides admits that one could separate the requirement to bring the sacrifices 
from the priests’ command to offer them, but he thinks that the scriptural pericopes 
do not support this bifurcation. In the end, Nahmanides appears to retract his criticism 
and offers a more general individuation, that all the provisions of the offerings be 
subsumed under: “And ye shall serve; I give you the priesthood as a service of gift” 
(Num. 18:7). Hasagot to Rule 12, 185-186.
-----------------------------------------  loGICAlly INCoNClusIVE INdIVIduATIoNs  ----------------------------------------
— 81 —
inspiration from the mishnah and partially follows its arrangement, 
placing prescriptive material in one section (when and for what reason 
does one bring an offering) and procedural material in another (how 
does one prepare each of the sacrificial offerings), much as M Keritot 
is separated from M Zevahim and M Menahot. Nahmanides’ plan would 
have led to a code that would repeat the laws regarding particular 
offerings throughout the code, rather than grouping them together. 
I submit that maimonides’ need for an outline for the Mishneh Torah 
biased his commandment count and inspired his separating the 
sacrifices into five distinct groups. Here, his particular individuations 
were more concerned with organizing legal material than with 
distinguishing commandments. At the same time, the expansion of the 
list did help him meet his challenge of reaching 248 commandments.7 
p68-9. sIN oFFERINGs
Here we find an example of maimonides modifying a previously 
announced individuation criterion. In Rule 7, he writes, concerning the 
sin offering (hatat): 
scripture has explained in leviticus that he who unintentionally 
transgresses one of the commandments of the lord — provided the error 
be in a matter for which the penalty is excision (karet) when committed 
willfully, and there is some act connected with it and the sin involves 
a negative commandment, as we have explained it in the commentary 
to tractates Horayot and Keritot — must bring a sin offering: this 
constituting a positive commandment. Following this, scripture sets 
forth fully the laws pertaining to this offering, devoting many verses 
7 . Although maimonides was less concerned about upholding a commandment count 
in the Halakhot, he also designated these procedures as positive commandments 
there. In that work, he may have used exegesis to interpret the scriptural pericopes 
of “this is the law of the sin offering” (zot torat ha-hatat), “this is the law of the guilt 
offering” (zot torat ha-asham), and so forth (lev. 1:2-3, 6:7, 6:18, 7:1, and 7:11) as 
ordering the proper execution of these sacrifices. Admittedly, this argument could 
be used to justify maimonides’ stand in the ShM. Nevertheless, the point that I wish 
to emphasize is not that it is impossible to rationalize maimonides’ individuations; 
rather, his individuations can be inconclusive and valid alternatives exist, such as the 
ones proposed by Nahmanides. 
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thereto, stating: if the person who commits the error is one of the 
common people, he is to bring a female sheep or goat; if he be the prince, 
he is to bring a male goat; and if he be the High priest, he is to bring 
a bullock. And if the error committed be only with respect to idolatry, 
the transgressor — regardless of whether he be the prince, or one of the 
common people, or the High priest — is to bring a female goat. Now [it is 
obvious that] changing of the kinds of animals from which the offering is 
brought does not alter the nature of the sacrifice itself — which is namely 
the offering for unintentional sin — into many, so that it may entail 
many commandments.…[I]t is the charge to bring the offering which 
constitutes the positive commandment; that one person brings as his 
offering a female goat, and the other a male goat is merely a condition 
of that offering, and not every condition of a commandment is to be 
considered as a separate commandment. 
one will note that maimonides has grouped together the sin offerings 
of the common people, the prince, and the High priest, because 
“it is the charge to bring the offering which constitutes the positive 
commandment.” In the enumeration, maimonides continues this idea: 
p69 is set as the general commandment prescribing a sin offering, 
regardless of who the sinner might be. 
surprisingly, however, he also enumerates another commandment 
regarding sin offerings: the commandment specifying that the court is 
to bring a sin offering if it gives a wrong decision (p68). This may be 
viewed as an inconsistency; how does the offering brought by the court 
differ from that brought by individuals? maimonides has indicated that 
neither differences in the kind of animal nor in the type of sin would 
differentiate the commandment.8 A subtler individuation criterion is at 
play: p68 covers a sin offering for the community; p69, a sin offering for 
8 . see p72, which contains many different infractions requiring “offering[s] of higher or 
lower value.” This question vexed Kalinberg (Seder ha-Mitsvot, Hilkhot Shegagot, 48b, 
s. v. “yiqshe lan”) who noted that: “It has been many years that I have been baffled by 
this [problem] and could not find a correct solution, one that would be acceptable.” 
Kalinberg was baffled for three reasons: Rule 7 discards the differences in animals as a 
criterion for individuation; p72 discards the differences in transgressions as a criterion 
for individuation; and while the High priest is fined with a sin offering for deciding 
incorrectly in matters of law, just as is the court (Hilkhot Shegagot 15:1-2), such a sin 
offering does not merit a separate entry.
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the individual. Additionally, the court brings an offering for issuing an 
incorrect teaching that leads to sin even if the members of the court did 
not themselves transgress, while the individual brings an offering only 
for personally committing a transgression. The categorical differences 
between p68 and p69 may indeed justify their separation.9 
Regardless, it seems evident that maimonides made many 
individuation choices that were not clear-cut: within his rule system, he 
had the latitude to combine and to separate commandments. By using 
a nuanced and detailed individuation system, he created a more robust 
tool for constructing the later outline. And just as crucially, each added 
individuated mitsvah helps his count creep closer to the goal of 248. 
p74-77. RITuAls oF AToNEmENT 
This group of four commandments covers those needing a ritual 
of atonement (mehusre kapparah) before they are permitted to eat 
sanctified food, even though they have already been cleansed from 
impurity. They are: a man suffering a flux (zav), a woman suffering a 
flux outside of her menstrual period (zavah), a woman who has given 
birth (yoledet), and a leper (metsora).
Commenting on the last of these four commandments, p77, 
maimonides voices the obvious question: why not enumerate them 
under an overarching commandment of “those in need of an atonement 
ritual”? His reply is that indeed this would be the case 
if the offerings incumbent upon those whose atonement is not complete 
were the same in all cases, and never altered….But because of the diversity 
of their offerings we are compelled…to count each offering separately. 
Their offerings do all differ: the zav and zavah must bring two turtledoves 
or two pigeons, one for a sin offering and one for a burnt offering; a 
birthing woman must bring a one-year old lamb for a burnt offering and 
a pigeon or turtledove for a sin offering; and a leper must bring two male 
lambs, one for a guilt offering and one for a burnt offering, as well as 
9 . Hurewitz, Sefer ha-Mitsvot im Perush Yad ha-Levi, ad loc., offers the differentiae but fails 
to note the changing criterion for individuation. 
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an ewe lamb for a sin offering. Indeed, from purely a teleological point 
of view, all four atonement rituals could be subsumed under one genus, 
yielding one commandment claim. In view of the diversity of their 
offerings, however, maimonides chooses to make four separate claims. 
This individuation strategy inspires a number of objections. In 
our earlier discussion of p68/69, we saw that maimonides subsumes 
a number of different offerings10 under the commandment to bring a 
sin offering (p69) because they all fulfill the same function. We also 
saw him explain in Rule 7 that “changing of the kinds of animals from 
which the offering is brought does not alter the nature of the sacrifice 
itself — which is, namely, the offering for unintentional sin — into 
many, so that it entails many commandments.” In light of Rule 7, the 
different offerings required of the four mehusre kapparah should not 
distinguish them as separate commandments; we would expect all 
atonement rituals to be subsumed under one commandment.11 
maimonides’ comments on p75 justify another objection to this 
individuation strategy. While zav and zavah are obligated to bring 
identical offerings, maimonides differentiates these mehusre kapparah 
on physiological grounds. He connects their particular states of 
impurity to their differing discharges: semen from the male, blood from 
the female. semen from the female (if such a thing were possible) or 
blood from the male would not constitute cause for impurity under 
these criteria. In contrast with this logic, he argues that he would only 
count all the mehusre kapparah as one commandment
if the offerings incumbent upon those whose atonement is not complete 
were the same in all cases, and never altered….But because of the diversity 
of their offerings we are compelled…to count each offering separately. 
[emphasis added]
10 . The common people bring a female goat or lamb; the ruler (nasi) brings a male goat; 
and the anointed priest, a young bullock. 
11 . This question is raised by perla in Sefer ha-Mitsvot le-RaSaG, vol. 1, 684. Hurewitz, Sefer 
ha-Mitsvot im Perush Yad ha-Levi, ad loc., also notes this problem but blandly relies on 
the argument that while maimonides might not differentiate modes of punishment, 
he does differentiate cleansing methods (p108, p109, p110). (As a side note, I find it 
interesting that Hurewitz frequently alludes to perla but never mentions him by name 
and always tries to dismiss his questions.)
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The implication is that if their offerings were identical, he would 
combine them under one commandment. We could thus imagine 
another logical arrangement. Taking into account the identical nature 
of the offerings of the zav and zavah, it seems more logical to propose 
three individuations/commandments — zav/zavah, the woman giving 
birth, and the healing leper — rather than the four individuations/
commandments that he ended up proposing. 
In short, there is nothing inherently logical about separating these 
atonement rituals into four commandments. maimonides could have 
easily combined them into one overarching commandment; he also 
could have divided them into three, combining zav and zavah because of 
their identical offerings. This unconvincing individuation does stretch 
the count of commandments, bringing it closer to the desired total. It 
is also clear that four individuations instead of one or three make for a 
more detailed outline on which to base the intended code of law. 
p91. BuRNING THE REmNANTs
The following example shrinks the potential count of positive 
commandments by one; it also shows an inexplicable expansion of the 
list of negative commandments.
p91 is the commandment to burn the remnants of the consecrated 
offerings (notar). There are two scriptural proof texts enjoining such 
action: Exodus 12:10, discussing the passover offering, which states 
that the remnants must be burned by the next morning; and leviticus 
7:17, covering peace offerings (shelamim), which states that the 
remnants must be burned on the third day. despite the two proof texts 
that detail separate offerings with different stipulations, maimonides 
only proposes a single positive commandment covering the burning of 
remnants from the various types of offerings.
The ShM’s exegetical warrant comes from the Mekhilta on Exodus 
12:10, yet the evidence provided in the SE and the Halakhot is the 
leviticus proof text. This single commandment claim contrasts with 
the individuation of the prohibitions against leaving the remnants 
of offerings, which he counts as four separate commandments: the 
remnants of the passover offering (N117), the remnants of the 
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festival offering (hagigah) of the fourteenth of Nisan (N118), the 
remnants of the second passover offering (N119) and the remnants 
of the thanksgiving offering (todah) (N120). duran noted this 
anomalous treatment, wondering why maimonides did not specify 
two positive commandments, one for the notar of the passover 
offering and one for the notar of the peace offerings. Without a good 
explanation, duran was forced to note that the early enumerators 
individuated positive and negative commandments differently. He 
admits failing to understand their method and piously adds that 
“their apprehension is greater than ours.”12 duran’s puzzlement 




This group of laws covers valuations, vows to contribute to the Temple 
that are expressed by the metric of the value of one’s life, someone 
else’s life, cattle, a house, or a field. They follow the form “I vow my 
own valuation.” p114 discusses one who pledges the value of a human 
life; p115, the value of an unclean beast; p116, the value of a house; 
and p117, the value of certain fields. The valuation scales are set by 
scripture. These vows, called ‘arakhin in rabbinic parlance (from the 
word for valuation, ‘arakhah), are sequentially discussed in leviticus 
27:2-25, introduced by the words: “When a person vows to set aside 
[ish ki yafli neder] a votary offering to the lord.”
Qayyara lists only one entry: “The section of valuations [parashat 
‘arakhin]” (parashah 25). maimonides appears to engage Qayyara when 
he says: 
12 . duran, Zohar ha-Raqia, vol. 1, siman 40, p. 42; see also the summary at the end of 
his commentary, 229. see also perla, Sefer ha-Mitsvot le-RaSaG, ps115, pp. 721-
722, who provides a reasonable rationale for the single positive commandment but 
does not explain the four negative commandments. In Hilkhot Pesule ha-Muqdashin, 
maimonides appears to be subsuming all the prohibitions into one. But see Babad, 
Minhat Hinnukh, mitsvah 8, p. 54, s. v. “‘over ‘al lav.” many of our concerns about the 
enumeration of positive commandments are also present in the enumeration of 
negative commandments, which is unfortunately a topic beyond the scope of this work.
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let no one think that these four kinds of valuations have so much in 
common that they should be counted as a single commandment. They 
are four separate commandments, each one with its own distinctive 
regulations, though the name “valuations” [‘arakhin] is common to them 
all.13 Hence it is not appropriate to count all the kinds of valuations as a 
single commandment just as it is not proper to count the kinds of offerings 
as a single commandment.14 This becomes clear on careful consideration.
maimonides compares these votary pledges to sacrificial offerings, each 
of which he lists separately (p63-67). But as we saw earlier, the separate 
individuation of offerings does not necessarily imply that their derivation 
is logical. moreover, one might accept the separate individuation of 
offerings because their laws are discussed in discrete pericopes headed 
by the expression “this is the law of” (zot torat ha-X). With ‘arakhin, 
however, the four pericopes are not only listed sequentially but are also 
linked grammatically by the conjunctive vav and the conditional particle 
im, “and if” (“and if [ve-im] it be of an unclean beast … and if a man shall 
sanctify unto the lord part of the field of his possession …”), or by the 
conjunctive vav by itself. This construction suggests that all the laws 
dealing with valuations are related to each other. 
Indeed, the larger idea that each of these valuations should be counted as 
distinct terms is questionable. In p75, maimonides explained that he might 
have combined zav and zavah under one commandment claim if the nature 
of their emissions were similar. While the words zav and zavah share a root, 
the emissions that give rise to their designations, semen and blood, come 
from pathologically distinct diseases. Then again, the “constituent element 
of the essence of each”15 of the valuation laws is the monetary value of the 
13 . The phrase I translated as “common to them all” is a technical Arabic philosophical 
term (astrakh, translated by Tibbon as shituf ha-shem). often translated in English as 
“homonym,” maimonides defines it as a “likeness in respect to some notion, which 
notion is an accident attached to both of them and not a constituent element of the 
essence of each one of them” (GP I:56, 131). see Efros, Philosophical Terms in the Moreh 
Nebukim, s. v. “shituf,” 119. see also Wolfson, “The Amphibolous Terms in Aristotle, 
Arabic philosophy and maimonides,” 155-173, and Wolfson, “maimonides on divine 
Attributes as Equivocal Terms,” 37-51 (in particular 45).
14 . In his translation, Chavel inexplicably omits the second half of this sentence, from 
“just” to “commandment.”
15 . To use the GP’s definition. see above, n. 13. 
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pledge of the votary. There are indeed sufficient grounds to argue that the 
four commandments of valuation could be subsumed under one heading.
We see the same difficulties here that we saw above with the 
individuation of offerings (p63-67). maimonides stretches his logical 
vocabulary to find ways to individuate commandments, but the results 
remain unconvincing. While the four valuations do form a useful 
outline for their discussion in the MT, they have little to contribute to 
a forcefully compelling list of commandments.16 
p159-160, 162-163, 166-167. FEsTIVAls
These commandments discuss the six festivals, called here “the 
sabbaths of the lord” (lev. 23:38; shabbetot ha-Shem) whose common 
denominator is that “no manner of work is to be done on [these 
festival days] except what is concerned with the preparation of food.” 
These festivals are the first and last days of passover, shavu‘ot, Rosh 
Hashanah, and the first and last days of sukkot. 
maimonides uses complex exegesis to prove that these festival days 
are positive commandments. He interprets the term “holy convocations” 
(miqrae qodesh), which is found in the description of all six festival days, to 
refer to the action of “sanctify[ing] it [the day]” (qadshehu). sanctification 
entails abstaining from work, except for what is needed for food 
preparation.17 The idea that sanctifying the day entails abstaining from 
work stems from the term shabbaton, which derives from a root indicating 
the cessation of work. moreover, the rabbis have stated that “shabbaton 
is a positive commandment.” Finally, maimonides encapsulates all six 
days by noting that “all the days of the ‘appointed seasons’ are called 
‘sabbaths of the lord’ [shabbetot ha-Shem].” The positive commandment 
thus represents the obligation to abstain from work. 
16 . In the Halakhot, maimonides apparently sees no problem in making the laws of 
‘arakhin one commandment: “It is a positive commandment to adjudicate the laws of 
‘arakhin as stipulated in the Torah.” (Hilkhot ‘Arakhin ve-Haramin, 1:2).
17 . The fourth-listed festival day, the first day of Tishre (p163), is also described by 
scripture as a day of “solemn rest” (shabbaton) instead of merely with the term miqrae 
qodesh, creating a convenient second exegetical bridge between the categories of 
miqrae qodesh and shabbaton.
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As an introduction to the laws of festivals (that begin with p159), 
this exegesis is somewhat confusing and hard to follow.18 more 
importantly, the exegesis does not specifically support individuating 
each of the days described as miqrae qodesh. At the end of p167, in 
an attempt to separate these six festivals from the sabbath and yom 
Kippur, maimonides states: 
you must know that the same law applies to each of the six [festival] 
days on which we are enjoined to rest, and none of them is subject to a 
restriction which does not apply to the others. We are also permitted to 
prepare food on each one of them. Hence the same regulations regarding 
“rest” apply to all the festivals.
The principle that “the same law applies to each of the six festival days” is a 
perfectly good rationale for subsuming all the six festival days into one single 
commandment: the commandment to abstain from work on the festivals.
In sum, the individuation of each festival does not follow convincing 
logic. one could argue equally validly that “rest from all work other 
than the preparation of food” should be counted as one positive 
commandment, albeit one that takes place several times during the year. 
Indeed, all the festivals are included under the same directive: “These are 
my fixed times, the fixed times of the lord, which you shall proclaim 
as holy convocations (miqrae qodesh)” (lev. 23:2). one might assume 
that these “holy convocations” would be grouped together, much as the 
requirement to dwell in a sukkah for each of the seven days of sukkot 
counts as a single commandment. maimonides himself notes the 
absurdity of counting the daily offering (tamid) and the daily burning of 
the incense as separate commandments for each day (Rule 13).19 
18 . The confusion stems from a series of conflations and assumptions that maimonides 
makes. First, the term shabbaton appears only in a few, but not in all, of the festival 
descriptions. To be able to substantiate that other festivals are also considered positive 
commandments, maimonides equates the term miqrae qodesh with shabbaton, an 
equation that lacks scriptural basis. Nor is he more successful using the statement 
shabbetot ha-Shem to include all festivals where only some types of work are forbidden, 
because shabbetot ha-Shem includes also the sabbath and the day of Atonement, where 
all kind of work is forbidden. 
19 . To make all these festival days part of one commandment does not mean that one must 
transgress all of them to have transgressed the positive commandment; doing work 
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on previous occasions, I have noted that maimonides often seems 
to derive his enumerations out of a desire to prepare a comprehensive 
outline for the anticipated code of law. I do not think that is the case 
here. In the Mishneh Torah (Hilkhot Yom Tov), maimonides does not 
distinguish between the different festival days: “the same law applies 
to each of the six festival days.” perhaps this section is more evidence 
of the artificial manipulation needed to hit the exact numerical target 
of 248 positive commandments. I tentatively conjecture that, at 
some point in the exercise, maimonides may have needed a few extra 
commandments to reach his target. It is at that point that maimonides 
could have conveniently decided to follow here the practice of the other 
enumerators,20 inflating his count to achieve the required total. 
p191. ANoINTING A pRIEsT FoR BATTlE
In this section, maimonides writes: 
we are commanded to appoint a priest to speak to the people when they go 
forth to battle, and to send back any man who is unfit for battle, whether 
because he is faint-hearted, or because his thoughts are preoccupied with 
some matter that may prevent him from giving his mind to fighting…. 
This priest is called the priest Anointed for Battle.
on any one of these days transgresses the positive commandment to rest from work. 
Conversely, resting on any one day fulfills the positive commandment, irrespective of 
what one does on other festival days. This is the intent of Hilkhot Yom Tov 1:2. one 
does not need to count six different commandments to achieve this result.
20 . solomon ibn Gabirol, in his “Azharot,” clearly counted the festival days separately: 
two in siman 33, three in siman 41, and one in siman 42. It is not clear to me whether 
Qayyara individuated them separately or (as I think more likely) as one. see pq 91-99, 
where we find: “rest [shvut], eight days” followed by a breakdown of the festival days. 
This breakdown may simply be a clarification and not a list of eight commandments, 
as Traub (in Qayyara, Halakhot Gedolot, ed. Traub) assumed. In Rule 13, maimonides 
accused “some [scholars]” of counting the musafin as one commandment, something 
that they did not do with regard to resting on all festivals. The clear implication is that 
these scholars, whoever they were, counted the festivals individually. The fact that 
he speaks of “some scholars” and not the more personal “a certain other [scholar]” 
(as in Rule 2) suggests that he was not referring to Qayyara, contra Traub. perhaps 
maimonides was referring to Ibn Gabirol and his compatriots.
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He further notes that 
all this procedure — the speech of the priest-anointed-for-war and its 
proclamation throughout the lines of battle — is binding only in the case 
of a non-obligatory, or permissible, war [milhemet reshut], to which alone 
this law applies. In the case of an obligatory war [milhemet mitsvah] there 
is no such procedure, neither speech nor proclamation.21 
The appointment of this priest appears to be entirely dependent on 
the advent of war; it was not a permanent office. since p190 permits 
the ruling powers to conduct non-obligatory wars in accord with 
scriptural provisions, one wonders why maimonides did not subsume 
the appointment of this priest under that commandment. Indeed, to 
individuate this law seems to contravene Rule 7, which states that 
the particulars of a specific commandment should not be counted as 
separate commandments. 
maimonides advances this commandment claim uncritically.22 yet 
this claim not only represents an unnecessary individuation but it 
also appears to contravene Rule 7.23 The utility of this enumeration 
is evident, both for serving as a useful reminder in the preparation 
of the future code and for assisting with the commandment count. 
I also wonder whether maimonides may have had some pedagogic 
considerations in individuating this commandment. speaking through 
the mouthpiece of the priest, maimonides proclaims that all Israelites 
must be told “to lay down their lives for the triumph of the faith of the 
lord, and for the punishment of the ignorants of the faith24 who ruin 
the order of the city.”25 The expressions “ignorants of the faith” and “the 
order of the city” come from the Islamic political philosophy lexicon, 
21 . The distinction disappears in the Halakhot (Hilkhot Melakhim 7:1), however, where the 
procedures for conducting war apply to both types of wars. maimonides there states: 
“a priest is appointed to speak to the people at a time of war in both an obligatory war 
and a permissible war [ehad milhemet mitsvah ve-ehad milhemet reshut].” 
22 . Enumerated by Qayyara in “the section of the Anointed priest,” parashah 50 and by Ibn 
Gabirol, “Azharot,” in siman 85 as a qum ‘aseh.
23 . I note that the Halakhot does not designate this requirement as a positive 
commandment. see chapter 6.
24 . Chavel: “ungodly ones.” In MnT: “ha-sikhlin bah.”
25 . Chavel: “social order.” In MnT: “yosher ha-medinot.”
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particularly from the works of Al-Farabi, a ninth-century philosopher 
whom maimonides esteemed.26 maimonides here asserts that one 
must give one’s life to punish those who ruin the order of the good 
polis. Individuating this commandment gives him an opportunity to 
emphasize this important political point. 
p233/234. THE HEBREW mAIdsERVANT
These two commandments itemize the ways in which one can give a 
Hebrew maidservant her freedom: one can either marry her off before 
the end of her period of servitude (p233) or help her buy back her own 
freedom (p234). Arguably, these stipulations offer two alternative 
methods of fulfilling one obligation: to give the maidservant her 
freedom, “espouse … or in the alternative, facilitate.” To meet this 
possible objection, maimonides resorts to a mishnah (M Bekhorot 1:7) 
which states: “The duty of espousal has precedence over the duty of 
redemption” (mitsvat yi’ud qodemet le-mitsvat pediyah). As we showed 
at the end of chapter 2, there is little or no reason to believe that 
construct chains using the term mitsvat denote the idea of positive 
commandment in its overarching sense.27 
p237, 238, 240, 241. dAmAGEs ANd INJuRIEs
maimonides here discusses four claims relating to the damages paid 
when one’s property harms another: the harm caused by an ox to people 
26 . see Al-Farabi, Al-farabi on the Perfect State. For a useful summary, see Fakhry, Al-
farabi: founder of Islamic Neoplatonism, 101-122. on maimonides’ debt to Al-Farabi, 
see Berman, “maimonides, the disciple of Alfarabi,” 154-178. 
27 . maimonides may have thought that he had offered a single commandment in the 
place of these two claims. In his comments on p233, he writes: “you must know that 
the laws concerning a Hebrew bondsman and the law [emphasis added] concerning a 
Hebrew bondsmaid are in force only when the law of the Jubilee is in force.” He again 
mentions “the law of a Hebrew bondsmaid” in his concluding remarks on the positive 
commandments. one can conjecture that at one time, p233 and p234 were united 
under the claim “the law of the bondsmaid,” and only later did maimonides separate 
them, based on his terminological proof. Qayyara, in “the section of the Hebrew 
maidservant,” parashah 2, offers the other logical alternative: “parashat ama ‘ivriyah 
[the section of the maidservant]; parashat ‘eved ‘ivry [the section of the slave].” 
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and to property (p237, based on Exod. 21:28, 35); the harm to animals 
caused by a pit (p238, based on Exod. 21:33); the harm to property caused 
by a beast (p240, based on Exod. 22:4); and the harm to property caused 
by fire (p241, based on Exod. 22:5). Why does maimonides individuate 
these four laws, rather than including them in one overarching law: “the 
law of injuries and damage caused by one’s property”? 
While one might be able to find differences that justify individuating 
these four circumstances, one could just as easily have drawn different 
distinctions. For example, in p237, one could have differentiated between 
damage done to humans and damage done to property. lacking a rabbinic 
warrant explicitly stating that we are in the presence of four commandments, 
we must conclude that this enumeration is not logically compelling.28 
In the Halakhot, maimonides subsumes these commandments 
under the heading of the laws of damage to property (Hilkhot Nizqe 
Mamon), which he then subdivides into these four commandments. 
This is similar to how he treats the laws regulating those who require 
atonement rituals (Hilkhot Mehusre Kapparah): a heading subdivided 
into four commandments (zav, zavah, birthing woman, and leper). 
The code’s outline structure, moving from general law to specific 
enumeration, is foreshadowed here with these four individuated laws.
p242-244. BAIlEEs 
maimonides advances only three claims relating to the laws of bailees. 
According to rabbinic interpretation, scripture describes four kinds of bailees: 
an unpaid bailee (Exod. 22:6-8), a paid bailee (Exod. 22:9), a borrower (Exod. 
22:13), and a hirer (Exod. 22:14). M Shevu‘ot 8:1 lists the four bailees, but BT 
Shevu‘ot 49b explains that these four types of bailees are governed by only three 
principles, with the same principle applying to the paid bailee and to the hirer.
Indeed, maimonides cites BT Shevu‘ot 49b as a warrant for his 
28 . Hurewitz, Sefer ha-Mitsvot im Perush Yad ha-Levi, on p241, defends the arrangement based 
on M Bava Qamma 1:1, which discusses “the four principal causes [avot, lit. “fathers”] of 
damages.” However, maimonides never uses the term avot (unlike mitsvah) as a linguistic 
marker for individuation. moreover, avot is used here in contradistinction to toledot, 
subordinate or derivative causes. Finally, and more importantly, since maimonides does 
not quote this source, one must assume that he did not find it convincing.
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abridging the count to three bailees: the law of an unpaid bailee (p242), 
the law of a paid bailee (p243) and the law of a borrower (p244). despite 
this warrant, these talmudic categories do not necessarily provide the 
most logical individuation rationale on which to base commandments.29 
To complicate matters, we see that maimonides revised his classification 
system in the Halakhot. There, he placed the paid bailee and the hirer in 
Hilkhot Sekhirut, and the unpaid bailee and the borrower in Hilkhot Sheelah 
u-fiqqadon.30 This classification might suggest that the scriptural bailees 
should be seen as representing two rather than three commandments. 
To summarize: while scripture discusses four types of bailees, in the 
ShM, maimonides uses a talmudic passage to turn the four bailees into 
three commandments. later, in the Halakhot, he divides the categories of 
bailees into only two parts. These changing divisions seem almost arbitrary. 
Interestingly, in parashah 4, Qayyara places the laws of bailment into 
a broader category of civil laws (dine mamonot, “the laws of monies”). 
Would this constitute a more logical individuation? 
p245. BuyING ANd sEllING 
With regard to this commandment, maimonides writes: “we are 
29 . Consider, for example, the following baraita (BT Bava Qamma 4b): “Rav oshaia taught: 
There are thirteen principal categories of damage: The unpaid Bailee and the Borrower, 
the paid Bailee and the Hirer, depreciation, pain [suffered], Healing, loss of Time, 
Humiliation, and the four enumerated in the mishnah, thus making [a total of] 
thirteen.” In this tannaitic teaching, we see some of the categories that maimonides 
individuated as independent commandments, such as the paid and unpaid bailees and 
the borrower. yet alongside these individuated commandments, we see other categories 
that seem to be details of the overarching rubrics of damages, such as depreciation, 
pain, healing, loss of time, and humiliation. such tannaitic lists fulfill objectives other 
than counting commandments and cannot be read as shorthand for individuation.
30 . There is some evidence that maimonides originally wanted to separate Hilkhot 
Piqqadon from Sheelah. see Hilkhot Hovel u-Maziq, end of chapter 7, where maimonides 
refers to the treatise Sheelah u-fiqqadon by the name “‘inyan ha-piqqadon,” echoing the 
Sefer ha-Piqqadon monographs written by sa‘adiah Gaon, samuel b. Hofni and Hai 
Gaon. Indeed, based on an autograph fragment of the MT, Assaf shows that before the 
final editing, maimonides had planned to write Sheelah and Piqqadon separately. Assaf, 
“Qeta’im mi-sefer yad ha-Hazaqah,” 150. Regarding the laws of bailees, the original 
arrangement of the Halakhot thus followed the meta-halakhic individuation of the 
ShM, where maimonides individuated three types of bailees. 
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commanded concerning the law of buying and selling; that is to say, 
the procedure by which a sale is to be effected between the vendor and 
the vendee.” maimonides’ argumentation, given in the remainder of 
the explication, proceeds in a roundabout and vague fashion, perhaps 
unsurprising when one notes the lack of explicit scriptural evidence for 
this commandment. He begins by commenting that the talmudic rabbis 
find allusions in scripture to mnemonically support their enactments 
(taqanot). For example, a rabbinically-enacted provision that one 
purchases a movable object by drawing it to himself is supported by this 
scriptural description of a transaction: “And if thou sell aught unto thy 
neighbor, or buy of thy neighbor’s hand” (lev. 25:14). The word “hand,” 
the rabbis assert, alludes to a commodity that is “purchased from 
hand to hand” and acquired when the purchaser draws it to himself. 
maimonides notes that while “it has been shown that by scriptural law, 
the payment of money secures the purchase,”31 rabbinic provisions 
regulate the purchase and sale of movables. He adds that “other modes 
of procedures by which lands and other things are acquired, namely 
writ, and seizing, they base on scriptural verses.” problematically, these 
verses are drawn from extra-pentateuchal sources.32 
maimonides’ exegetical grasping is disconcerting. The scriptural 
verse he quotes bears no relation to laws of buying and selling, 
nor does it allude to such laws; it merely offers an extremely veiled 
hint — since the word “hand” is contextually best understood as 
“control” or “ownership” — that in certain commercial dealings, objects 
would pass from hand to hand. moreover, as we noted, maimonides 
only adduces proof for ways to regulate the acquisition of non-movable 
property from extra-pentateuchal sources, hardly a valid move.33 Given 
31 . As per R. yohanan in BT Bava Metsi‘a 47b (and contra R. simeon b. lakish, who 
maintains that scripture prescribes acquiring an item by drawing it near, rather 
than by using money). While R. yohanan offers no scriptural support for his thesis, 
RasHI (BT Bava Metsi‘a 46b, s. v. “savar la ke-rabi yohanan”) quotes a scriptural verse in 
support (although he cites it inexactly). Also see Tosafot, BT Bekhorot 13b, s. v. “devar 
torah,” for an alternative source. At best, the evidence stems from scripture’s silence 
on the methods by which movables can be acquired, which implies that commerce 
follows the terms of common usage, i.e. money. 
32 . see BT Qiddushin 26a.
33 . When offering exegetical support for this commandment, maimonides does not use 
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this hermeneutical weakness, we conclude that there is no basis for 
believing that the laws of acquisition have a scriptural basis.34 
It is hard to imagine why maimonides would have made such a 
farfetched commandment claim35 other than to fill an important gap in 
his outline of the MT. In effect, I suggest that maimonides created an 
entry on this most tenuous of warrants to provide the proper reference 
to an important treatise in the MT, the laws of Acquisition (Hilkhot 
Mekhirah). The absence of such a commandment from his enumeration 
would have disproved his claim that “all this [enumeration] [I would do] 
in order to guard against omitting any topic from discussion, for only by 
including them in the enumeration of the commandments would I insure 
against such omission.”36 
the typical formula: “this (injunction) is contained in X verse.” Instead, he uses the 
phrase “this procedure has been learned,” implying that the commandment is not 
actually contained in the verse.
34 . see chapter 7 for a discussion of maimonides’ scriptural hermeneutics, one clearly 
grounded on contextual reading. perla (“Introduction,” Sefer ha-Mitsvot le-RaSaG, vol. 
1, sec. 8, 47) also concludes that there is no scriptural passage that may cover the laws 
of acquisition as defined by maimonides.
35 . In discussing this commandment, Hurewitz, in Sefer ha-Mitsvot im Perush Yad ha-
Levi, p245, exclaims that “the words of our master are astounding.” After noting that 
maimonides proved that all the modes of acquisition are only rabbinic ordinances, he asks: 
“What commandment claim did he advance here that can be considered as having been 
given to moses at sinai?” His apologetic answer is also astounding. The Torah, he says, 
did not legislate modes of acquisition, although it was mindful of such modes’ benefits 
to society. The verse “And if thou sell aught unto thy neighbor, or buy of thy neighbor’s 
hand” make it obvious that commercial transactions occurred in early days, although 
the text does not specify the types of transactions. Instead, Hurewitz asserts, the Torah 
suggests (Hurewitz does not explain how) that such standards should be adopted, either 
through rabbinic decrees or through commercial practice. The fallacy of this argument is 
readily exposed. While laws of acquisition can benefit some or most societies, a distance 
remains between seeing the value of such laws and asserting that the Torah wished to see 
such laws prescribed. perhaps the Torah remained silent with regard to civil laws, allowing 
the market to develop its own mechanisms guided by an overall proviso of fairness and 
justice? see also perla, “Introduction,” Sefer ha-Mitsvot le-RaSaG, vol. 1, sec. 8, 47. 
36 . Having said this, I also note that maimonides does not propose a single commandment 
to reference the laws of gifts (Hilkhot Zekhiyah u-Matanah), neighbors (Hilkhot 
Shekhenim), and agencies and partnerships (Hilkhot Sheluhin u-Shutafin). It appears 
that in contrast to the laws of buying and selling, these laws do not have even the most 
minimal connection to scriptural law.
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---------------------------------- CHApTER V  ----------------------------------
INNoVATIVE 
CommANdmENTs 
In the previous chapter, we saw how certain individuation strategies 
helped maimonides partially achieve his goal of enumerating 248 
positive commandments. While he provided substantiations for a large 
number of claims, many of his arguments were not incontrovertible. 
one might say that some of these individuations resembled equations 
with more than one valid solution, with maimonides arbitrarily choosing 
among them. moreover, even when he used these individuation 
strategies to maximize the number of commandments, his total 
remained short. maimonides had to find more commandment claims 
if he wanted to buttress R. simlai’s dictum. The way to accomplish this 
was with innovative claims, positing commandments that Qayyara had 
neither listed on his list of qum ‘aseh nor on his list of parashiyyot.
Before we begin our analysis, I offer a word of caution. Qayyara’s 
list is inconveniently terse, often vague, lacking in punctuation, and 
formatted differently than maimonides’ list. No definitive comparison 
between the two is possible. What we read as a maimonidean 
innovation might indeed have been referenced by Qayyara, either as its 
own commandment or subsumed under a different rubric.1 While this 
difficulty should not be ignored, scholars have come to a consensus on 
how to interpret Qayyara’s list, developed through years of identifying 
1 . A good example is Qayyara’s entry “faith” (pq39), discussed in the second part of 
this chapter: does he use the term to mean belief in God or to mean acting in good 
faith in business? or Qayyara’s entry “to cheer a bride” (pq149): does it refer to the 
rabbinic commandment to gladden a bride on her wedding day (perhaps supported 
by a derashah, as Traub suggests; see Hildesheimer, Haqdamat Sefer Halakhot Gedolot, 
86n387), or to the scriptural commandment to give happiness to a new wife for a full 
year? see my discussion of these ideas in chapter 9. many similar examples exist.
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entries and reconciling lists of azharot. Building on the work of 
generations of scholars, Hildesheimer tabulates 37 innovations in 
maimonides’ list of positive commandments, commandments that do 
not appear as part of Qayyara’s list or on other canonical enumerations.2 
In this chapter, I first examine some of these 37 innovations, assess 
the arguments in their favor, and explore other factors that may have 
led maimonides to posit these claims. The discussion of innovations 
leads directly into a discussion of maimonides’ greatest innovation, the 
introduction of dogma into halakhah. I show the critical role that R. 
simlai’s aggadah and R. Hamnuna’s exegesis play in this new theology. 
This analysis will help the reader gain a more nuanced appreciation of 
the TaRYaG project. In the second part of the chapter, I examine two 
additional innovative claims, assessing maimonides’ arguments in their 
favor and exploring their extraordinary theological significance. 
I preface this endeavor by quoting an insightful observation made 
by one of the most erudite and astute commentators on enumerations, 
yeruham perla. In the introduction to his monumental work on 
sa‘adiah’s Book of Commandments, perla raises an obvious question: 
given that a pious Jew is obligated to keep all commandments, both 
scriptural and rabbinic, why did the early rabbis (the rishonim) spend 
so much time analyzing the list of 613 commandments? Why does 
tradition restrict the number of commandments to 613, subordinating 
individual details under larger commandments and relegating other 
obligations to rabbinic status? What juridical motivations can exist for 
restricting the count to this precise number? He answers: 
These questions come from a basic lack of understanding, for it is clear 
that this enumeration has an important bearing on many of the scriptural 
commandments, according to the various views. In fact, it is clear that 
2 . Hildesheimer, Haqdamat Sefer Halakhot Gedolot, “Introduction,” in particular 37-41. 
The number of innovations identified by Hildesheimer should be viewed as a minimal 
estimate. All major commentators agree that there are 37 innovative commandments; 
thus, I have used it as the focus of my analysis. However, given the commentators’ 
strong propensity to harmonize the lists and their highly imaginative skills, a 
simple reading of Qayyara’s entries would likely produce a much higher estimate. 
my own imprecise estimate yields a number of innovations slightly in excess of 70 
commandments, about twice as many as found by Hildesheimer. 
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there is no explicit evidence in scripture — or even in the Mekhilta, Sifra, 
Sifre, Talmud and other such sources — for many of the positive and 
negative commandments enumerated by the various scholars. These 
commandments depend on the methodological underpinnings on which 
these enumerations were constructed. For it is clear that if, for example, 
following his Rules, maimonides eliminated from Qayyara’s count many 
positive and negative commandments that ought not to be included … 
by necessity he must search for other commandments that respond to 
his criteria so as to be able to complete the count of 613 commandments. 
And it is quite possible that he [maimonides] would not be able to 
draw support from among rabbinic sources for this large number of 
commandments, positive and negative, that would be consistent with 
his own Rules. Therefore, relying on the fundament that the scriptural 
commandments cannot total less than 613, he [maimonides] added 
such commandments from his own opinion, based on some tenuous allusions 
contained in the scriptural text, coupled with his own interpretation, even 
though the evidence is not sufficiently compelling� Were it not for the fact 
that the number [TaRYaG] is fixed and known, he [maimonides] would 
not have innovated these commandments. (emphasis added)3 
perla suggests that because the rabbinic tradition so prized the 
importance of 613 commandments, jurists — maimonides among 
them — had a special impetus to find commandments in the scriptural 
text that were not obvious to the casual reader. It is this creativity that 
is at the heart of the TaRYaG project for maimonides and his fellow 
enumerators. As perla maintains, maimonides’ innovations are most 
original and interesting when he presents claims “based on some tenuous 
allusions in the scriptural text and coupled with his own reasoning.” I 
add one qualification to perla’s thesis: maimonides’ philosophical views, 
both theoretical and politico-ethical, inform his individuations. He 
premises his analyses on the assumption that the Torah is a teaching 
guide whose purpose is to instill in Jews correct and necessary beliefs. 
maimonides’ politico-philosophical views are encapsulated in 
GP III:27. There he suggests that the true law, the “law of moses,” has 
two aims: the welfare of the body as a first aim; and the “indubitably 
greater in nobility” welfare of the soul, achievable only after reaching 
3 . perla, Sefer ha-Mitsvot le-RaSaG, “Introduction,” sec. 10, 56.
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the first aim. The welfare of the body consists of “being healthy and 
in the very best bodily state,” achieved by satisfying one’s needs for 
food, shelter, and other similar needs. But because people are social 
animals, they tend to satisfy their needs through political association. 
Therefore, the law aims to enable “the governance of the city and the 
well-being of the states of all its people according to their capacity,” and 
it accomplishes this “through the abolition of reciprocal wrongdoing 
and through the acquisition of a noble and excellent character.” The 
law’s ultimate aim is to perfect man’s soul through the empirical 
research and metaphysical speculation that enable sound beliefs and 
correct opinions. such beliefs and opinions, maimonides tells us, lead 
to eternal life. 
According to this scheme, all the commandments of the Torah can 
be classified according to one of three categories: practical, moral, or 
intellectual commandments. The former two categories operate on the 
welfare of the body, while the latter operates on the welfare of the soul. 
This scheme leads Twersky to say:
Given these guidelines, established at the beginning of this section 
in chapter 27 of the Moreh [the GP], the remaining task is completely 
deductive. one has to relate each of the 613 commandments to one of the 
three goals: (a) establishment of civilized society — principles of social 
utility and justice; (b) development of the ethical personality — principles 
of goodness and love of fellow man; or (c) intellectual perfection — true 
knowledge and experience of God. Had the remaining chapters of the 
Moreh been lost, we could have undertaken to reconstruct the correlation 
between each commandment and these three goals.4 
As we review some of maimonides’ innovative claims, particularly 
those not supported by conclusive rabbinic warrants, we note that his 
deductive process does not always work in the direction that Twersky 
posits. As Warren Zev Harvey writes: 
What is not explicit in Twersky’s analysis is the extent to which 
maimonides’ legal teleology is prescriptive [Harvey’s italics]. Are 
maimonides’ teleological explanations of the commandments merely 
4 . Twersky, Introduction to the Code of Maimonides, 388.
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descriptive of how he understood the received law, or is it possible to 
detect in the Mishneh Torah an ongoing effort by maimonides to decide 
the law in such a manner as to bring (or keep) it in line with the teloi of 
peace and knowledge? 5 
my analysis leads me to believe that the latter pattern is frequently 
true. maimonides formulates some of his commandments based on his 
underlying goals — and only then finds an appropriate supporting text. 
While he does not state it explicitly, perla implies that this is often 
maimonides’ approach. 
EXAmINING THE EVIdENCE
To identify the most original of maimonides’ contributions, I exclude 
from my analysis all those claims for which maimonides provides strong 
evidentiary support. I contend that the remaining commandments, 
supported by inconclusive evidence, are at least partly driven by his 
philosophical goals. 
Before I begin my analysis, I mention again the work of moritz peritz, 
discussed in some depth in chapter 2. peritz was unusually sensitive 
to maimonides’ use of rabbinic language and evidentiary claims, 
particularly to the types of rabbinic expressions on which maimonides 
relies. He highlights terms such as mitsvat ‘aseh, metsuveh, mitsvah, 
‘over ‘al, hovah, de-oraita, and ‘al korho as examples of tannaitic language 
that maimonides appropriates for his arguments. Indeed, many of the 
inferences that I will draw in this chapter were first noted by peritz.6
sTRoNG EVIdENCE
This category includes those innovative claims supported by strong 
rabbinic proofs for their positive commandments. For the most part, 
these warrants, taken mainly from the midreshe halakhah, describe 
5 . Harvey, Review of Introduction to the Code of Maimonides, 200-203.
6 . peritz’s work can be found in Bacher, “Zum sprachlichen Charakter des mischne 
Thora,” 439-474. see in particular 455-59. see chapter 2 of this book for a more 
detailed explication of his linguistic theories.
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a particular scriptural passage as a mitsvat ‘aseh. A word of caution: 
maimonides understands these midrashim to be designating the 
commandments as scriptural, even though the midrash may not be 
applying maimonidean criteria for designating positive commandments. 
That is, the midrash halakhah might sometimes use the phrase mitsvat 
‘aseh to define a command as obligatory without intending to count it 
as an enumerated commandment. For example, the obligation referred 
to as an ‘aseh may only be a detail or condition (mishpat, in the language 
of Rule 7) of a larger, overarching, commandment. In such a case, it 
would not qualify as an independent and individuated claim according 
to the guidelines of Rules 7 and 10-13. For the purposes of our analysis, 
I assume that maimonides has used his Rules to test the evidence and 
has only enumerated those commandments that passed the required 
criteria. Although the linguistic markers are given prominence, it is 
maimonides’ considered judgment, through the prism of his Rules, 
which enables these commandments to be enumerated. 
I list briefly some of the innovations supported by key linguistic 
markers, providing in parentheses the specific term used: 
p22. To watch over this edifice [bayit, holy house] continually (be-‘aseh); 
p84. To offer all sacrifices in the sanctuary (be-‘aseh);7 
p87. That an exchanged beast [ha-temurah] is [or becomes] sacred 
(‘aseh); 
p90. To burn meat of the holy [sacrifice] that has become unclean 
(‘aseh); 
p142. To exact the debt of an alien (zo mitsvat ‘aseh); 
p146. To slay, according to the ritual, cattle, deer, and fowl, and then 
their flesh may be eaten (nitstaveh); 
p198. To lend to an alien with interest (zo mitsvat ‘aseh). 
As we can see, this list contains commandment claims supported by 
derivatives of the term mitsvat ‘aseh. 
With respect to p142 and p198, the midrash halakhah’s understanding 
that these are obligations is unique and highly controversial. The 
7 . For a lengthier discussion of this commandment, see maimonides’ remarks at N89, 
where the counterpart negative commandment is discussed.
-----------------------------------------------------   INNoVATIVE CommANdmENTs   -----------------------------------------------------
— 103 —
simple meaning of the biblical verses is that while one is permitted to 
exact the debt of an alien and charge an alien interest, these actions 
are not specifically commanded: rather, the verses specify that one is 
prohibited from doing thus to an Israelite. Commentators have also 
pointed out that the Talmud supports the simple interpretation, and 
that the interpretation of the midrash halakhah should be subordinated 
to that of the Talmud.8 maimonides’ use of midrash is highly selective 
and appears to respond to his strong concerns regarding contact with 
idolatrous people and practices. Restricting business dealings with 
pagans can prevent their potential integration into Jewish society.9 
maimonides also used other terms in his evidentiary work. The 
next two innovations use the terms be’al korho, “against his will,” 
implying that one must do an action even when one does not want to, 
and hayav, “obligated to”:
p23. That the levite shall serve in the sanctuary (be’al korho); 
p32. To show honor to a descendant of Aaron, and to give him precedence 
in all things that are holy (be’al korho);
p85. To take trouble to bring sacrifices to the sanctuary from places 
outside the land of Israel (hayav)� 
on a number of occasions, maimonides made novel commandment 
claims based on explicit scriptural verses without invoking a supporting 
rabbinic warrant. This is the case with:
p175. To render the decision according to the majority, when there is a 
difference of opinion among the members of the Sanhedrin as to matters 
of law. This commandment is based on the verse “to incline after many” 
(Exod. 23:2) (despite its being a syntactically awkward clause); 
p179: To examine witnesses thoroughly. This commandment is 
based on the verse, “Then shalt thou enquire and make search and 
ask intelligently” (deut. 13:15), found in a jurisprudential context.
8 . Regarding p142, see di Tolosa, “maggid mishneh” (in standard editions of the 
MT), Hilkhot Malveh ve-Loveh 1:2, reflecting the opinion of post-maimonidean 
commentators. With regard to p198, see Nahmanides, Hasagot to Rule 6; and RaBad 
in his gloss to the SE.
9 . Also see p187, where he says that the aim of destroying the seven Nations is “to 
safeguard us from imitating their apostasy.”
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It is highly unlikely that any jurist preceding maimonides disagreed 
with his contention that these two commandments are biblically 
commanded.10 more likely, those who did not enumerate them did 
not see them as thematically independent laws, laws that needed to 
be individuated.11 Earlier enumerators (such as Qayyara) may have 
subsumed these commandments under more general rubrics, such 
as parashah 1, which includes court law and criminal and monetary 
laws. Indeed, maimonides’ special individuation of these two 
laws calls for an explanation. I submit that maimonides may have 
wanted to exhibit worthy examples of procedural concerns found 
in the Torah.12 A complementary explanation is that these two laws 
could function as intermediate sub-headings in the long exposition on 
the laws of courts and witnesses, included to aid his avowed goal of 
drafting a useful working outline.
Another novel commandment claim based on a scriptural verse 
and lacking a rabbinic warrant is p30, which states that the priests 
are to lift off (le-harim)13 some of the ashes from the altar.14 The removal 
of ashes from the altar is neither an integral part of the sacrificial 
ritual nor a provision of it. It represents an independent cultic service, 
or as the rabbis would call it, the “removal [from the altar] service” 
(‘avodat siluq). The “removal service” sits a notch below the “offering 
[unto the altar] service” (‘avodat matanah) in importance, a distinction 
that carries legal consequences.15 While the commandment is clearly 
biblically obligated, its individuation is somewhat more problematic. 
10 . For example, they appear as ps96 and ps97 in sa‘adiah’s list of commandments. perla, 
Sefer ha-Mitsvot, vol. 1, 648-662.
11 . maimonides could also have subsumed the command to follow majority opinion under 
“In righteousness shalt thou judge thy neighbor” (p177). This is suggested by duran, 
Zohar ha-Raqia, siman 52, 60.
12 . In my article, “Cross Cultural Influences and the possible Role of Competition in the 
selection of some Commandments,” 410-414, I discuss the individuation of p175, 
p178, and p179, suggesting that maimonides may have wanted to show his muslim 
colleagues that, just like muslim jurisprudence, the Torah prioritized matters related 
to procedural law.
13 . Hyamson’s translation gives a correct interpretation of the literal text.
14 . In the ShM, the commandment is stated (less precisely) as “to remove the ashes daily 
from the altar.” see perla, Sefer ha-Mitsvot le-RaSaG, vol. 1, 757.
15 . For more on this distinction see BT Yoma 23b; Hilkhot Biat ha-Miqdash 9:8.
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maimonides could well have subsumed this activity under the general 
heading of ma‘arakhah (lit. layout, array),16 a category which could have 
included feeding a fire on the altar and maintaining a perpetual fire 
(p29), based on leviticus 6:1-6. His outline requirement, however, 
may have necessitated a somewhat more specific claim. Alternatively, 
perhaps he considered the removal of ashes from the altar to be a truly 
independent commandment, expressing a specific telos: decorum and 
cleanliness in the service of the lord.17 
p201 is a novel commandment, one deserving of mention 
for two reasons. The claim states that the hired laborer shall be 
permitted to eat (while he is on hire).18 maimonides begins by 
referencing M Bava Metsi‘a 7:2 to demonstrate the scriptural right 
of a harvesting worker to eat from the produce. The mishnah states: 
“These may eat [of the fruits among which they labor] by virtue of what 
is enjoined in the law [min ha-torah]: he that labors on what is still 
growing after the work is finished.” 
Note that the commandment merely confers on the laborer the 
permission to eat while he is working. There is no obligation on the 
part of the owner to feed the laborer, although we presume he has an 
obligation to acquiesce to the demands of the laborer. In chapter 2, I 
analyzed the various ways in which maimonides uses the term mitsvat 
‘aseh. In this instance, we see maimonides broaden the term mitsvat 
‘aseh to include rights. maimonides might not have individuated such 
law as a commandment if not for his outline in progress; this right 
represents a necessary rubric in his comprehensive outline. laborers’ 
rights while performing farming services are quite complex and 
detailed, covering all of chapter 12 of Hilkhot Sekhirut, 14 halakhot 
in all. The advancement of this claim appears therefore to stem from 
16 . Qayyara, parashah 9 (found only in the oxford manuscript).
17 . Note that in the Halakhot, which does not normally give explanations of a non-halakhic 
nature, maimonides uses this type of reasoning to justify the priest’s changing his 
special clothes in order to remove the ashes, noting that “it is not proper [derekh erets] 
that he [the priest] should pour wine for his master in the same clothes in which he 
cooked his food.” Hilkhot Temidin u-Musafin 2:10, quoting a baraita attributed to R. 
Ishmael, BT Yoma 23b. 
18 . I have followed a more literal translation of the Hebrew text. Hyamson has “of the 
produce which he is reaping.” 
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maimonides’ goal of producing a useful outline rather than from any 
inner logic justifying it. 
I would also like to note that the laborers’ right to eat is 
reformulated in the Halakhot while given a different telos. I will return 
to this discussion in chapter 9. 
The aforementioned innovations all share the common feature of 
formal evidentiary support. maimonides proves his claims adducing 
rabbinic warrants and/or relatively straightforward scriptural proof 
texts. The next group of enumerated commandments, all formulated as 
obligations, are either presented without formal evidence or presented 
with unconvincing evidence. 
I organize the rest of this section by commandment, each followed 
by a very brief comment summing up maimonides’ proof(s). Here and 
throughout the rest of this work, I quote the positive commandments 
as they are formulated in the short Enumeration (SE). 
p34. That, when the ark is carried, it should be carried on the shoulder, as 
it is said, “They shall bear it upon their shoulder” (Num. 7:9).
While the nonspecific language of the SE does not identify who is to 
carry the ark, the ShM clearly identifies the command’s subject: “the 
priests are to bear the ark upon their shoulders” (emphasis added). The 
SE’s ambiguity resurfaces in the tenor and formulation of the Halakhot 
(Hilkhot Kele ha-Miqdash 2:12), which omits the subject of the command.19 
proof: The proof text for this claim is the verse: “But unto the 
sons of Kehat he gave none [of the wagons and animals], because the 
service of holy things belonged unto them: they bore them upon their 
shoulders” (Num. 7:9). Note the lack of evidence of a direct or mediated 
command to the sons of Kehat20 to carry the ark on their shoulders. The 
biblical text recounts that they did so without detailing a reason. 
To prove that carrying the ark was a divine command, maimonides 
quotes two passages from the Hagiographa (Ketuvim). The first refers to 
19 . This may be an indication that the ShM preceded the SE chronologically, and that 
maimonides changed his interpretation of this commandment between these two 
works. see note 53 in this chapter and note 40 in chapter 9. 
20 . The priests were descendants of Kehat.
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david’s commanding the priests and the levites to bring up the ark for 
the second time. Chronicles records: “And the children of the levites [here 
referring to the priests] bore the ark of God on their shoulders with the 
bars thereon as moses commanded according to the word of the lord” (1 
Chr. 15:15). The second passage discusses the division of the priests into 
twenty-four groups: “These were the orderings of them in their service, 
to come into the house of the lord according to the ordinance given unto 
them by the hand of Aaron, their father, as the lord, the God of Israel, had 
commanded him” (1 Chr. 24:19). on this passage, maimonides comments: 
The sages explain this verse as implying that it is the task of the priests 
to perform the service of bearing the ark upon their shoulders, and that 
this is what the lord, the God of Israel commanded. 
The sifre says: According to the ordinance unto them … as the lord, the 
God of Israel, had commanded him: where did He so command him? [In 
the verse,] But unto the sons of Kohat he gave none, because the service of holy 
things belonged unto them: they bore them upon their shoulders [Numbers 
7:9]. (Sifre Numbers 46 (51-52))
The last line of the previous section of Sifre Numbers 45 (52), which 
maimonides did not quote, explains: “Thus the levites did not 
innovate at all: everything was commanded by moses, and moses was 
commanded by the Almighty [God].” This bit of inter-textual citation 
is maimonides’ putative evidence that the priests were commanded to 
carry the ark on their shoulders when it had to be moved. 
p86. To redeem cattle, set apart for sacrifices, that contracted 
disqualifying blemishes, after which they may be eaten by anyone, as 
it is said, “Nevertheless thou mayest kill (and eat flesh in all thy gates) 
whatever thy soul lusteth after” (deut. 12:15). By tradition it is learned 
that this verse refers only to sanctified animals, and teaches us that 
they ought to be redeemed if and when they become unfit.21 
proof: The tradition to which maimonides refers can be found in Sifre 
Deuteronomy 71 (134). He is the only enumerator to name an obligation 
21 . Chavel: “items that must be redeemed” for she-yipadu is interpretative.
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to redeem a blemished animal reserved for sacrifice, selectively using 
sources to support his point. other commentators maintain that 
redemption is voluntary and find other talmudic sources to support 
this view.22 Note that even the midrash quoted by maimonides does 
not necessarily obligate one to redeem the unfit animal; it merely states 
that it should be redeemed, presumably so that one can eat it. 
p157. To discourse concerning the departure from Egypt on the first 
night of the Feast of passover, as it is said, “And thou shalt tell thy son 
on that day, saying . . .” (Exod. 13:8).
proof: maimonides brings two proofs, first citing a well-known rabbinic 
saying (found in the passover Haggadah): “Even if we were all of us 
wise, all of us men of understanding, all of us learned in the law, it is 
a mitsvah to speak of the departure from Egypt.” on closer look, this is 
not a particularly persuasive proof for the obligation to recount those 
events, since mitsvah in rabbinic terminology can represent a good deed 
or a rabbinic obligation, as we saw in chapter 2. 
The second proof is drawn from an exposition found in the Mekhilta 
de-RaSHBY on Exodus 13:3: 
since it is said, And it shall be when thy son asketh thee, etc., one might 
think [yakhol] that you are to tell your son if he asks you, but not 
otherwise. scripture therefore says [talmud lomar], thou shalt tell thy 
son — even though he does not ask you. Again, one might think that [the 
duty rests only on one] who has a son [with him]; whence do we infer 
that it applies also to one who is alone, or among strangers? From the 
words of scripture: Moses said unto the people: Remember [zakhor] this day 
[Exod. 13:3]. 
22 . see di Boton, Lehem Mishneh (in standard editions of the MT), Hilkhot Isure Mizbeah 
1:10. A review of talmudic sources leads perla (Sefer ha-Mitsvot le-RaSaG, vol. 1, 758-
760) to conclude that the redemption of blemished animals is strictly voluntary 
(reshut). In contrast, Hurewitz, Sefer ha-Mitsvot im Perush Yad ha-Levi, ad loc., finds 
sufficient evidence to declare this verse an unconditional obligation. For maimonides’ 
apparent prioritization of midreshe halakhah over Talmud, see Sefer ha-Mitsvot, ed. 
Heller, N72, n. 19. I concede that it is possible to read the ShM as saying that one must 
redeem the animal if and when one wants to eat it, in effect a contingent obligation. 
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The midrash likely means that apart from the specific obligation to 
teach one’s child about the exodus (Exod. 13:3), moses also instructs 
all Israelites to remember the exodus, irrespective of the presence of 
children. maimonides then adds his own23 crucial explanation: “That 
is, moses told the people that God commanded us to remember the 
exodus just as he ordained Remember the Sabbath day, to keep it holy.” 
since the remembrance of sabbath is a positive commandment (p155), 
by analogy, this exhortation is one as well.24 The analogy stretches the 
midrash well beyond its simple meaning. 
It may be more plausible to consider that maimonides turned the 
re-telling of the exodus into an obligation rather than simply into a 
recommendation because he thought that a belief in miracles was a 
necessary opinion.25 The account of the miracles that God performed for 
the Israelites proves to the faithful that God is a volitional, interacting 
deity, a foundational concept in Judaism. The memory of these miracles 
must be perpetuated through constant repetition because, over the 
course of time, miracles can easily be rationalized away.26 
p172. To heed the call of every prophet in each generation, provided 
that he neither adds to nor takes away from the Torah, as it is said, 
“unto him ye shall hearken” (deut. 18:15).
proof: maimonides resorts to a midrash that uniquely inteprets the 
verse “unto him ye shall hearken” (deut. 18:15): “Even if he tells you 
to violate temporarily one of the commandments enjoined in the 
Torah, you must hearken unto him.”27 This commandment includes 
two prohibitions: that a prophet may not disobey his own prophecy 
23 . It does not appear in our text of the Mekhilta; this addition is maimonides’ own. so 
shem Tov ibn Gaon (Migdal oz) understands it. see also Kasher, Ha-RaMBaM ve-ha-
Mekhilta de-RaSHBY, 61.
24 . That maimonides is satisfied with this exegesis is apparent from his repeating it in the 
Halakhot, Hilkhot Hamets u-Matsah, 7:1.
25 . Cf. GP III:43, 572. on the connections between miracles, a willing deity, and religion, 
see “Iggeret Tehiyat ha-metim” in Iggerot ha-Rambam, ed. shailat, 356-357 and 367. 
26 . see GP III:50, 615-16: “all miracles are certain in the opinion of one who has seen them; 
however, at a future time their story becomes a mere traditional narrative, and there is 
a possibility for the hearer to consider it untrue.” Also see the end of that long passage.
27 . Sifre Deuteronomy, Shoftim 175 (221).
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and that a prophet may not suppress a prophetic message. The Talmud 
(BT Sanhedrin 89a) derives these various prohibitions from the verse: 
“Whosoever will not hearken unto my words which he shall speak in 
my name, I will require it of him” (deut. 18:19). maimonides notes 
that, according to the Talmud, the scriptural verse indicates that 
transgressors will receive divine punishment.
No special linguistic marker, similar to the ones we had seen 
earlier, backs up the claim that we are in the presence of a mitsvat ‘aseh. 
Furthermore, it is unclear why this claim should be designated a positive 
commandment rather than a prohibition (i.e. negative commandment) 
against ignoring the prophet’s words. In fact, as maimonides notes at 
the end of his explication, “transgressors will be punished” — which 
implies that this is a negative rather than a positive commandment.28 
maimonides could have based a similar claim on an explicit 
prohibition, “be no more stiffnecked” (deut. 10:16) as sa‘adiah 
did,29 making this a negative rather than a positive commandment. 
I suspect, however, that maimonides needed the Sifre’s explication 
of deuteronomy 18:15 to support his highly original exposition of 
the fundaments of prophecy presented in his “Introduction to the 
mishnah” and in Hilkhot Yesode ha-Torah (chapters 7-10). He makes a 
brief reference to these principles of prophecy in the explication of the 
commandment in the ShM, when he states that the commandment is 
to hearken to any genuine prophet [lit., prophet from among the prophets] 
and to do whatever he bids, even if it be contrary to one or more of the 
[scriptural] commandments, provided that it is only temporary, and does 
not involve a permanent addition to or subtraction from [the law], as we 
have explained in the Introduction to the mishnah. 
28 . In Hilkhot Sanhedrin 19:3, when discussing the punishment applicable to transgressors 
of this injunction, maimonides suggests that “unto him ye shall hearken” is a positive 
statement that yields an inferred prohibition (lav ha-ba-mikhlal ‘aseh). As we saw, this 
principle allows the court to treat the inferred prohibition more leniently (i.e. no 
lashes as punishment) than if it were couched as an outright prohibition. In chapter 2, 
I call these positive statements mitsvot ‘aseh in form rather than in substance because 
they legislate a prohibition rather than a positive act. Though maimonides does not 
mention this hermeneutic in his gloss in the ShM, it is not impossible that he had it 
in mind here. see the further discussion of this commandment in chapter 9.
29 . perla, Sefer ha-Mitsvot le-RaSaG, vol. 2, Ns 49, 97.
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maimonides grounds his discussion of prophecy in the “Introduction 
to the mishnah” on deuteronomy 18:15-19 and on the Sifre’s 
interpretations of that passage. I conjecture that because of their 
fundamental importance, maimonides deigned to craft a commandment 
out of this verse, despite the hermeneutic difficulty.30
p178. That one who possesses evidence shall testify in Court, as it is 
said, “and if one is a witness, and hath seen or known [if he do not 
tell, then he shall bear his iniquity]” (lev. 5:1).
proof: scripture proclaims that anyone who withholds evidence will 
suffer serious consequences: “And if any one sin, in that he heareth 
the voice of adjuration, he being a witness, whether he hath seen or 
known, if he do not utter it, then he shall bear his iniquity” (lev. 5:1). 
The verse does not literally enjoin witnesses to present evidence, but 
rather admonishes and threatens witnesses for withholding evidence. 
Effectively, this appears to be an admonition rather than a precept — a 
negative rather than a positive commandment. maimonides confirms 
this understanding in a little-noticed statement contained in his 
explications to N297, the prohibition against neglecting to save an 
Israelite in danger of losing his life and/or his money. After stating 
that “[t]he sages say31 that this prohibition covers also the case of 
one who withholds evidence,” he adds, “scripture again refers to this 
matter: if he do not utter it, then he shall bear his iniquity [lev. 5:1].” 
In other words, at N297, maimonides construes leviticus 5:1 as 
conveying an admonition, a negative commandment, rather than a 
positive commandment. 
30 . maimonides’ enumeration here follows several other enumerator-jurists, although 
Qayyara is not among them. Although sa’adiah lists this precept in his decalogue-
based azharot (under the third utterance), describing it as “my inheritance listens to 
the words of the prophet of God,” he omits it in the Sefer ha-Mitsvot. perla does a 
reasonable job explaining the omission (perla, Sefer ha-Mitsvot le-RaSaG, vol. 2, Ns49, 
97-99). Hefets b. yatsliah also lists this precept: “It is our duty to listen to the words 
of the prophet” (ninth utterance). see Zucker, “mi-sefer ha-mitsvot shel Hefets b. 
yatsliah,” 34. In note 21, Zucker points out that both sa‘adiah, in his Arabic Sefer ha-
Mitsvot, and samuel b. Hofni counted this obligation. 
31 . maimonides is referring to Sifra Qedoshim 4:8 (89a), on leviticus 19:16, which he 
quotes later.
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Commentators have struggled to read some type of affirmative 
injunction into the text. david b. Zimra (RadBaZ) suggests that we 
ought to read the verse by adding the active verb “must tell” after 
“whether he hath seen or known.” 32 RadBaZ’s solution is self-serving: 
he supplies a non-existent verb to support the claim that this is a 
positive statement. While this type of solution is sometimes offered in 
cases where a clear rabbinic tradition supports such a reading, we have 
no such tradition here.33 Equally unsatisfactory is duran’s solution, 
which conjures a syntactically impossible imperative, interpreting “he 
being witness” to mean that he is obligated to be a witness.34 Nor does 
maimonides cite a rabbinic warrant in support of this claim. 
In the ShM, maimonides states, “sages adduce as proof of this 
obligation to give testimony” the leviticus proof text; however, he fails 
to cite the rabbinic source.35 In sum, there is no evidence of a positive 
commandment urging one to offer testimony, neither in scripture nor 
in rabbinic literature. As maimonides comments at N297, the verse “if 
32 . RadBaZ’s commentary to Hilkhot ‘Edut, 1:1, s.v. “ha-ed metsuveh�”
33 . The best examples are the ones in which maimonides cites tradition in his reading 
of the verse. These are introduced by the formula “tradition taught” (lamdu mi-pi 
ha-shemu’ah), as in p85, p86, p109, p128, and others. Indeed, these interpretations 
involve contextual rather than textual manipulation — giving a novel meaning to the 
verse by providing a new context. Where some textual manipulation is required, where 
words and/or sentences do not appear to bear a clear meaning, maimonides can cite a 
number of traditions to support the difficult reading, as he does in N194, for example.
34 . duran, Zohar ha-Raqia, siman 53, 61. see also perla, Sefer ha-Mitsvot le-RaSaG, vol. 1, 
ps 31-32, 368a. 
35 . The Kesef Mishneh commentary on Hilkhot ‘Edut 1:1 points to BT Bava Qamma 56a, 
but that talmudic passage does not support the existence of an obligation to provide 
testimony. Instead, the passage warrants that the verse, which promises an unspecified 
retribution, concerns the case of two witnesses who withhold evidence, while R. Joshua 
maintains that even one witness who withholds evidence incurs heavenly disfavor. While 
there is a scripturally commanded punishment for withholding evidence, where is the 
command to bring the evidence? Bothered by this lack of direct evidence, yosef b. Habiba, 
in the beginning of his Nimuqe Yosef commentary to the sixth chapter of BT Bava Qamma, 
asserts that the obligation to testify is only a supererogatory act (gemilat hesed). other 
commentators find their source in M Sanhedrin 4:5. The mishnah has the witnesses 
complain about having to testify under strain and admonishments: “And if perchance 
ye would say: Why should we be at these pains? Was it not once written ‘and he being 
a witness, whether he hath seen or known, if he do not utter it, etc.’?” Implicit is the 
obligation to provide testimony, although one could read the retort as articulating the 
gravity of the sin of withholding testimony, rather than implying a positive commandment. 
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he do not utter it, then he shall bear his iniquity” is only a special case 
of the overall prohibition against standing by while an Israelite is in 
danger of losing his life or his money.
This commandment, nonetheless, can be seen as serving as a pillar 
of an effective judicial system. This could explain maimonides’ desire to 
craft a positive commandment out of the verse “if he do not utter it, then 
he shall bear his iniquity” — despite scant scriptural or rabbinic evidence.36 
p187. To exterminate the seven Canaanite nations from the land of 
Israel, as it is said, “But thou shalt utterly destroy them” (deut. 20:17).
proof: maimonides provides no direct rabbinic warrant in support of 
his claim, which he refers to as “an obligatory war” (milhemet mitsvah).37 
At the start of his discussion, he identifies the obvious problem: these 
nations no longer exist. While one might think that this commandment 
is no longer binding (and thus not a positive commandment, as per Rule 
3), maimonides writes that such an idea “will be entertained only by one 
who has not grasped the distinction between commandments that are 
binding for all time and those that are not.” After acknowledging that “no 
trace of [the nations] remains,” he notes that “it does not follow that the 
commandment to exterminate them is not binding for all time, just as 
we cannot say that the war against ‘Amaleq is not binding for all time, 
even after they have been consumed and destroyed.”38 The core of his 
36 . For a possible motivation, see Friedberg, “Cross-Cultural Influences and the possible 
Role of Competition in the selection of some Commandments.” 
37 . According to BT Sotah 44b, the sages and R. Judah agree that the category of obligatory 
wars includes the conquest wars against the seven nations, the war against the 
‘Amaleqites, and all defensive wars, though the sages term an obligatory war milhemet 
mitsvah while R. Judah calls such a war milhemet hovah. (maimonides follows the 
opinion of the sages and calls such a war milhemet mitsvah.) From the fact that tannaim 
disagree about these categories, one can suppose that these categories specify active 
laws and commandments rather than historical events that only hold an antiquarian 
interest — thus maimonides’ warrant for the existence of a commandment to destroy 
the seven Canaanite nation. Nevertheless, it should be noted that maimonides could 
have retained the concept of milhemet mitsvah and applied it only to “a war to deliver 
Israel from the enemy attacking it,” as he does in Hilkhot Melakhim 5:1, without having 
to mention ‘Amaleq and the seven nations. 
38 . The proof from the analogy to ‘Amaleq (p188) is circular, for one may well question the 
validity of that claim since it seems that ‘Amaleq, too, has perished and disappeared.
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argument is that “no special condition of time and place is attached to 
this commandment, as is the case with those commandments specially 
designed for the desert or for Egypt.” This fine distinction is difficult to 
accept, since the biblical command to exterminate the seven Canaanite 
nations also seems to apply to a historically circumscribed period, the 
conquest and settlement of the land of Israel.39 Even if no “condition 
of time and place” were attached to this commandment, maimonides 
would still have to address daniel ha-Bavli’s objection that a precept is not 
incumbent on later generations once the objective of the precept has been 
realized.40 
Regardless of whether this commandment should be counted, its 
practical value seems to be negligible, as the seven nations have long 
since lost their national identities. I believe that maimonides posits 
this claim and defends it vigorously for didactic reasons. The opening 
line of his explication betrays a key concern: these nations had to be 
exterminated “because they constituted the root and very foundation 
of idolatry … the object was to safeguard us from imitating their 
apostasy.” 41 maimonides sees scripture as enjoining Israel to battle 
idolatry and heresy, not a specific people or ethnic group, a theme to 
which he returns throughout his works.42 The abiding value of this 
commandment lies in its theological message: all traces of idolatry 
39 . This plain-sense reading of the text is defended by Tosafot. see BT ‘Avodah Zarah 20a, 
s. v. “de-amar qera.”
40 . daniel ha-Bavli, she’elah 2, in Abraham maimonides, “Teshuvot Rabbenu Abraham ben 
ha-RamBam,” 543. He gives the examples of “thou shalt set thee up great stones … and 
thou shalt write upon them all the words of this law” (deut. 27:2-3) and “thou shalt set 
the blessing upon mount Gerizim and the curse upon mount Eval” (deut. 11:29). 
41 . I note that in his practical code of law, the MT, maimonides sees no need to justify the 
commandment. It suffices there to posit the ever-present possibility that one might be 
able to fulfill this commandment. The underlying rationale for the commandment is 
revealed only in the teleologically-driven ShM, where he posits that the commandment 
is to destroy “the root and very foundation of idolatry.” To maimonides, this 
commandment indeed functioned as an eternal obligation.
42 . Compare N48, for example, which forbids one from making a covenant with the seven 
nations. In the ShM, maimonides ignores the ethnic divisions and writes: “We are forbidden 
to make a covenant with the heretics and leave them undisturbed in their heresy.” see also 
N51, N52, and N58, where the emphasis is on heresy rather than ethnicity. In other words, 
making a peace treaty with the seven nations is a religious problem, not a racial one. 
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must be destroyed, lest they cause Israelites to apostatize.43 
p189. To always keep in remembrance what ‘Amaleq did, as it is said, 
“Remember what ‘Amaleq did unto thee” (deut. 25:17). 
more specifically, he writes in the ShM: 
We are commanded to remember what ‘Amaleq did to us in attacking us 
unprovoked. We are to speak of this at all times, and to arouse the people 
to make war upon him and bid the people to hate them, to the end that 
this matter44 be not forgotten, and that hatred of him be not weakened 
or lessened with the passage of time. 
proof: The scriptural evidence for this obligation and the parallel 
obligation not to forget ‘Amaleq’s deeds is found in deuteronomy 
25:17-19: “Remember what ‘Amaleq did unto thee” (v. 17) and “thou 
43 . stern (in “maimonides on ‘Amaleq”) reaches a similar conclusion with respect to ‘Amaleq 
and the seven nations. In my opinion, however, he misreads an important passage in 
the GP which leads to an unjustified claim regarding maimonides’ interpretation of the 
Torah. on the basis of GP III:50, 614, stern claims that maimonides reads Gen. 36:12 
as introducing a corrective to the obligation to exterminate ‘Amaleq (deut. 25:17): 
because the descendants of Esau were “fully assimilated” with the children of seir, it 
was “impossible ‘today’ to identify the real, authentic, pure ‘Amaleqites as opposed to 
those who are ‘Amaleqites in name only” (364-365). He conjectures that maimonides 
was attempting to restrain individuals living in his time from persecuting Christians 
whom they identified as descendants of ‘Amaleq (369). This conclusion is speculative 
and unwarranted if we read maimonides’ words in their proper context. He writes: 
“Consequently, scripture explained their tribes [i.e., the tribes of Esau] and said that 
those whom you see today in seir and the kingdom of ‘Amaleq are not all of them 
children of ‘Amaleq, but some of them are descendants of this or that individual and are 
only called after ‘Amaleq because the latter’s mother belonged to them.” To prove that 
the corrective did not exempt the Israelites from the obligation to exterminate ‘Amaleq, 
maimonides adds: “All this was an act of justice on the part of God lest a tribe be killed 
indiscriminately in the course of the extermination of another tribe” (emphasis added). 
maimonides states that scripture’s concern was to prevent errors in identification, not 
to state that ‘Amaleq had been assimilated. Nowhere does maimonides say that it had 
become “impossible” to identify ‘Amaleqites or that they had been “fully assimilated” 
in biblical times. Indeed, the Israelites battled the descendants of ‘Amaleq a number of 
times, both in the wilderness and in the time of saul.
44 . By “this matter” he means ‘Amaleq’s unprovoked attack. The MnT reads mitsvah instead 
of davar, which can be interpreted as the commandment to destroy ‘Amaleq or as the 
commandment to remember his misdeeds.
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shalt not forget” (v. 19). To prove that these statements are normative 
and not mere rhetorical flourishes, maimonides quotes two similar 
midreshe halakhah. The first is found in Sifre Deuteronomy: “Remember 
what ‘Amaleq did unto thee means [remembrance] in the spoken word; 
thou shalt not forget means [remembrance] in the heart,”45 to which 
maimonides adds, “That is, you are to speak such things as will ensure 
that the hatred of ‘Amaleq is not removed from men’s hearts.” The 
second is found in the Sifra:46 
Remember what ‘Amaleq did unto thee: one might think that this means 
in thy heart. But thou shalt not forget refers to forgetfulness of the heart: 
how then can one obey the injunction Remember [if that also refers to the 
heart? We must conclude that Remember means:] in the spoken word. 
While the cited midrashim do not label these verses as positive and 
negative commandments (as the Sifre does, for example, when 
commenting on a similarly-structured phrase in deuteronomy 22:847), 
their analysis does buttress the idea that these verses represent formal 
and distinct acts.48 maimonides draws further support from an incident 
related in 1 samuel 15:1-33. Just before sending King saul on a mission 
to slay ‘Amaleq, the prophet samuel formally recounts ‘Amaleq’s wicked 
deeds, likely in order to fulfill the commandment to remember their 
nefarious acts.49 
A further difficulty remains. scripture’s call to recount ‘Amaleq’s 
45 . Sifre Deuteronomy, Ki Tetse 296 (314).
46 . Sifra be-Huqotai 1:3 (110c). some printed versions incorrectly referenced it as the Sifre. 
see Sefer ha-Mitsvot, ed. Heller, ad loc., n. 5.
47 . Sifre Deuteronomy, Ki Tetse 229 (261), states: “Thou shalt make a parapet for thy roof 
[is] a positive commandment, that thou bring not blood upon thy house [is] a negative 
commandment.”
48 . Nahmanides turns maimonides’ evidence against him by arguing that, on the basis of 
this or similar midrashim, maimonides should have enumerated one or two additional 
commands (Nahmanides, Hasagot, “Additions to the positive Commandments,” no. 7, 
288). see also de leon, “megillat Esther,” 289. This is one of the rare instances in which 
the maimonidean apologist de leon agrees with Nahmanides.
49 . so-called proofs adduced from non-pentateuchal books were commonplace among 
Karaite jurists and exegetes, but rare among Rabbanites, who tended to rely on the 
oral tradition for interpretation. see, for example, levi b. yafet, Sefer ha-Mitsvot, 
passim�
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past misdeeds might only represent a motivation or justification for 
the commandment to exterminate the nation, not an independent 
commandment. or, going one step further, one might even understand 
the exhortation to recollect ‘Amaleq’s evil deeds and intentions as merely 
a required step in the act of killing an ‘Amaleqite. The passage from 1 
samuel could be read as teaching that one must verbally announce the 
justification for destroying ‘Amaleq just as one is about to execute a 
member of their nation. Indeed, samuel’s actual words — “Thus said the 
lord of Hosts: I am exacting [paqadeti] the penalty for what ‘Amaleq did 
to Israel” (1 sam. 15:2, Jps translation) — read more like a justification 
for the coming destruction than a daily recounting of ‘Amaleq’s evil. 
As we have seen, under Rules 10, 11, and 12, any command that 
forms part of another commandment or that is a preparation for 
another commandment cannot be enumerated as an independent 
commandment. If recalling ‘Amaleq’s evil deeds is a declaration that 
one makes before destroying him, then remembering his deeds cannot 
be considered an independent positive commandment. 
maimonides avoids this problem in his definition of the obligation: 
“to speak of this at all times, and to arouse the people to make war 
upon him and bid the people to hate them, to the end that this matter 
be not forgotten, and that hatred of him be not weakened or lessened with 
the passage of time” (emphasis added). Accordingly, “Remember” is not 
a declaration that one makes when one exterminates ‘Amaleq. Rather, 
it is a daily reminder of ‘Amaleq’s viciousness, so that “this matter be 
not forgotten, and that hatred of him be not weakened or lessened with 
the passage of time.” Based on this definition, maimonides can posit an 
independent commandment. But whence such an understanding? How 
does maimonides know that the Sifre intended this commandment, 
rather than a justificatory declaration? 
Interestingly, neither Qayyara nor any of the other extant 
enumerators who preceded maimonides include this commandment 
on their TaRYaG lists.50 perhaps these enumerators saw these verses 
50 . In discussing this passage, Abraham ibn Ezra ridicules the baale azharot, charging 
that the enumerators are like those who count the number of blades of grass in their 
books of medicine without recognizing the medicinal utility of these blades. shifting 
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as simple reminders of the obligation to destroy ‘Amaleq. maimonides 
gleans from this verse and midrashim a totally novel concept: the duty 
to remember and to remind others of those who have tried, unprovoked, 
to destroy the Israelite nation, so as to keep hatred of them fresh in 
the communal memory. This is a commandment independent of the 
duty to exterminate ‘Amaleq. This new commandment can be fulfilled 
unconditionally — precisely at a time when the commandment to 
exterminate ‘Amaleq is practically impossible to fulfill. As maimonides 
has already noted (in p187), by post-biblical times, ‘Amaleq could no 
longer be identified.51
pRoBlEmATIC IdENTIFICATIoNs
maimonides is at his most inventive when fashioning the next group of 
obligations. In particular, the claims he advances do not seem to flow from 
the scriptural texts that he brings in support. In many cases, I believe that 
external criteria were involved in the selection of these commandments, 
and I offer some possible suggestions for what those may be. 
I will focus more on this difficulty in later chapters (chapter 7 in 
particular), when I discuss maimonides’ scriptural hermeneutics. 
For now, I ask the reader to accept as correct my assumption that 
maimonides defined commandments by using the plain sense of the 
text, rather than rabbinic exegetical understandings. 
p17. That every person shall write a scroll of the Torah for himself, as it 
to the singular, he then charges that “he thinks that they [“thou shalt not forget” and 
“remember”] are two [commandments].” The shift to the singular suggests that he was 
referring to one paytan in particular. After noting that there are many such mirrored 
phrases in the Torah, Ibn Ezra concludes that these poets do not pay attention to the 
plain sense of the text, preferring to focus on the formal structure of the verse. Abraham 
ibn Ezra, Yesod Mora, 108. The paytan to which he refers remains unknown; I have not 
found an extant geonic work that counts these two commandments separately.
51 . I do not understand why maimonides omits p189 from the list of sixty unconditionally 
obligatory commandments (discussed in chapter 3), especially as he reconfirms its 
obligatory status in Hilkhot Melakhim 5:5. While one could argue that p187 and p188 
(to destroy the seven nations and the seed of ‘Amaleq), should not be enumerated 
because their subjects have disappeared or can no longer be identified, the same 
cannot be said with respect to p189.
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is said, “Write ye for yourselves this song” (deut. 31:19).52 
proof: maimonides offers two textual analyses as proofs for this 
commandment. The first is based on the verse “Write ye for yourselves 
this song” (deut. 31:19). The simple meaning of the verse is that it 
refers to the writing of the song of Ha‘azinu (deut. 32:1-43). yet in BT 
Sanhedrin 21b (quoted below), Rabbah uses this verse as a proof text 
for the individual’s obligation to write a scroll of the Torah, possibly 
taking the word “song” as a metaphor for Torah. Not satisfied with this 
homily, maimonides offers a rational but convoluted and hair-splitting 
interpretation of Rabbah’s dictum: since one is not permitted to write 
individual sections of the Torah,53 the instruction to moses to write 
“this song” must have entailed the writing of an entire scroll of Torah. 
The proof strains the imagination, and the reader might conclude that 
Rabbah’s proof text is but a scriptural hook on which maimonides has 
hung a well-known tradition. 
The second demonstration comes from the same talmudic passage: 
Rabbah said: Even if one’s parents had left him a scroll of the law, he 
is nevertheless commanded to write one of his own, as it is said, Now 
therefore write ye this song for you. Abaye objected: The king is commanded 
to write a scroll of the law for himself, for he should not seek credit for 
52 . In all of the versions of the ShM, this commandment appears as p18. The SE uses a 
more logical arrangement, first listing the commandment for the individual to write a 
scroll, and then the commandment for the king to write a second scroll, “besides the 
one which every individual should write.” Being essentially an argumentative work, the 
ShM may have listed the king’s obligation first because it helped maimonides to derive 
the individual’s obligation. This may be further evidence that maimonides wrote the 
ShM before writing the SE, a matter that I hope to explore in the future. see above, note 
19. In his edition of the MT, Rabinovitch offers a similar explanation for the reversed 
presentation in the ShM, arguing that maimonides proved the individual’s obligation 
from the passage in BT Sanhedrin 21b, which itself is based on the law regarding the 
king’s obligation (Mishneh Torah, ed. Rabinovitch, 112). To preserve the logical order of 
his analysis, maimonides needed to address the obligation of the king before he could 
address the obligation of the individual. While my argument is similar, I argue that the 
only basis for the general commandment is the one found in the king’s pericope. 
53 . Even granting the (questionable) scriptural force of this law, one could believe that 
moses was given a special instruction to write just the song of Ha‘azinu, much as one 
writes individual sections of the Torah in making tefillin. For this and other difficulties 
in maimonides’ argument, see perla, Sefer ha-Mitsvot, vol. 3, sec. 60, 425-426.
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one written by others, and [this surely implies that] it is only a king [who 
is enjoined to write a scroll even if his parents have left him one] and not 
a commoner? To this the reply was: The rule is necessary only to oblige 
the king to write two scrolls, as we have been taught: He [the king] shall 
write him a copy of this law [mishneh ha-torah ha-zot] means that he is to 
write for himself two copies. (BT Sanhedrin 21b)
From this passage, maimonides infers that “the difference between 
the king and a commoner is that every man must write one scroll of 
the Torah, but the king must write two.” The simple meaning of the 
phrase “mishneh ha-torah ha-zot” is “a copy of this Torah”: the king 
is commanded to write himself a copy of the Torah that moses had 
handed down.54 There is no good philological justification for reading 
“mishneh ha-torah” as meaning two copies of the Torah; most likely, this 
interpretation uses this scriptural intimation to support a rabbinic law.55
While maimonides’ proofs are unconvincing, his motivation for 
advancing this commandment is not. The act of writing the Torah 
inculcates a special reverence for its content and disseminates its 
teachings. As maimonides writes in the GP, this commandment brings 
about “useful opinions” — in this case, the wisdom learned from the 
words of the law book itself.56
54 . see, for example, Tg. onqelos, ad loc.
55 . In chapter 7, I will expand on maimonides’ crucial distinction between the plain 
sense of the text and the category of asmakhta, a term that generally covers scriptural 
intimations, hints, and mnemonics that can underpin a rabbinic ordinance, and 
explore the ways that he uses these categories to define his commandments. 
56 . GP III:44. In listing there the commandments included in the ninth class of 
commandments (the equivalent of those listed in Sefer Ahavah of the MT), maimonides 
mentions “acquiring a book of the Torah and reading in it at certain times.” Two 
observations are worth making in this respect. First, the commandment listed here 
is to acquire a book of the Torah, rather than to write such a book, as he had ruled 
in the MT. second, while one could argue that the mention of reading in the book 
of the Torah could be counted as a separate commandment, wholly independent 
of the acquisition of the book, this is unlikely, as we do not find in the MT such a 
commandment. (Note that learning and teaching are included in Sefer ha-Madda‘.) 
more likely, one should understand the sentence to mean that the acquisition of the 
scroll of Torah is for the purpose of reading in it at certain times. Thus it would appear 
that the acquisition is only a preparatory step. No such rationale is given in the MT, 
where writing a scroll of Torah appears to be the primary consideration regardless of 
what one does with it. (But note deut. 17:19: “And it shall be with him, and he shall 
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p36. That the priests shall serve in the sanctuary, in watches [mishmarot], 
but on festivals, they all serve together, as it is said, “And if a levite come 
. . .[then he shall minister in the name of the lord]” (deut. 18:6-8).
proof: In the ShM, maimonides quotes parts of a long passage 
containing three verses: 
And if a levite come [from any of thy gates out of all Israel, where he 
sojourneth,] and come with all the desire of his soul [unto the place 
where the lord shall choose]; then he shall minister in the name of the 
lord his God, as all his brethren the levites do, who stand there before 
the lord. They shall have like portions to eat, beside that which cometh 
of the sale of his patrimony. (deut. 18:6-8)
The Sifre expounds upon these verses:
And come with all the desire of his soul: one might interpret this verse to 
mean that he might come at any time to participate in the service of the 
sanctuary; scripture therefore says from any of thy gates; that is, when all 
Israel is assembled in one gate [i.e. in one city — Jerusalem] during the 
three festivals.57 
maimonides concludes from this interpretation that the visiting levites 
had a right to participate equally with their Jerusalemite brethren at 
the time of the festivals.
The second part of this midrash is critical to his argument that the 
watches (mishmarot) were instituted by scripture: 
one might think that all the divisions [of priests] shared equally in 
the festival offerings, even in these which were not occasioned by the 
festivals themselves [namely, the daily burnt offerings brought in the 
morning and at dusk every day of the year]; scripture therefore says 
beside that which cometh of the sale of his patrimony� What is meant by sale 
of patrimony? [one priestly elder says to another,] “do thou [minister] in 
thy week, and I [will minister] in my week.” 
read therein all the days of his life.”). At any rate, it is clear that, at least in its final 
formulation, the utility of this commandment “is manifest.”
57 . Sifre Deuteronomy, Shoftim 168 (216-217).
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The midrash understands the words “sale of patrimony” to mean “do 
thou [minister] in thy week, and I [will minister] in my week,” implying 
that a rotation was in effect. As maimonides describes it: “they agreed 
on the rotation of the watches; [the priests gave] their consent to the 
whole arrangement of the service into watches, a new watch ministering 
in turn every week.” 
Nahmanides vigorously contests maimonides’ last claim. He argues 
that, in their desire to certify the watches’ scriptural authority after 
they were instituted, the Rabbis searched for an exegetical way to 
authorize the praxis. Thus, claims Nahmanides, the midrash rests on 
an asmakhta, a scriptural hook that the Rabbis used to support their 
own laws, and not a legitimate exegesis.58 The essence of his objections 
is that the watches were instituted by the prophets and were not 
scripturally ordained.59 
Along similar lines, while maimonides does provide some scriptural 
indication that a cooperative rotation system operated in the Temple, 
one fails to find any evidence in his scriptural and rabbinic citations for 
there being a commandment to institute priestly watches. An external 
agenda, however, is suggested by the broader formulation of the 
commandment, given in the ShM: 
We are commanded that the priests are to minister in divisions 
[mishmarot], every division ministering one week, and that all divisions 
are not to minister at the same time,60 except during the festivals when 
58 . To determine when a midrash is a genuine interpretation of scripture and when 
it is merely an asmakhta is critical for the construction of commandment claims. 
disagreements between maimonides and Nahmanides on this topic are the basis of 
some of their many disagreements on what constitutes a scriptural commandment. 
There are no shared and definitive criteria for categorizing such midrashic explications; 
see chapter 7, note 10 for some proposed criteria. 
59 . Hasagot, ad loc. Nahmanides notes that maimonides presented a revised formulation 
in the Halakhot and that “this formulation is more precise than what he presented here 
[in the ShM].” Indeed, the emphasis in the Heading to Hilkhot Kele ha-Miqdash (“That 
all the watches be equal on the festivals”) and in Hilkhot Kele ha-Miqdash 4:4-5 is on the 
equal sharing of the festival service, or, more specifically, that all priests be allowed to 
share equally in the offerings of the festivals. There is no indication in these Halakhot 
that scripture was mandating this institution of watches; the verse simply appears to 
reflect an old and established practice. 
60 . literally, “and that everyone’s hand should not busy itself at the same time (ve-lo tihiye 
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all divisions are to share equally in the service and any [priest] who is 
present may sacrifice. 
We have already seen that maimonides wishes to emphasize the 
decorum and orderliness of the Temple service in order to strengthen 
the “greatness of the sanctuary and the awe felt for it.” perhaps this 
motivation underlies his insistence that the watches should have their 
own individuated mitsvat ‘aseh� 
p37. That the priests defile themselves for their deceased relatives, and 
mourn for them like other Israelites, who are commanded to mourn for 
their relatives, as it is said, “for her, he shall defile himself” (lev. 21:3).
This commandment consists of two parts: the priests must defile 
themselves for deceased relatives, and they must mourn for their 
dead, as must all Israelites. The second part of the claim is intended 
to be inferred from the first, but the inference is difficult to sustain. 
maimonides supports this strained exegesis with a talmudic source 
that assumes that one day of mourning is a scripturally mandated 
commandment, despite no explicit scriptural command to that effect. 
proof: maimonides takes evidence that mourning is a scriptural 
obligation from the talmudic position that one must not mourn during 
a festival. The talmudic passage (BT Moed Qatan 14b) reads as follows: “If 
the mourning begins before the festival, the positive precept affecting 
all Israel [to rejoice in the festival] overrides that affecting only the 
individual commandment enjoining one [to mourn over his deceased 
relative].” maimonides concludes: “It is clear that the obligation of 
mourning is scriptural, but is scripturally obligatory only on the first 
day, while the remaining six days [of mourning are obligatory only by] 
rabbinic ordinance.” The conclusion that the sages consider mourning a 
scriptural obligation follows the opinion of many geonim, in particular, 
maimonides’ principal halakhic authority, Isaac Alfasi.61 
yad ha-kol mitasseqet yahad),” an idiomatic expression that conveys a sense of chaos 
and disorder.
61 . Alfasi’s ruling can be found in his Hilkhot ha-RIf, BT Berakhot 10a and BT Moed Qatan 
11b in the Alfasi pages (Vilna ed.).
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In his search for scriptural evidence for the commandment to 
mourn, maimonides quotes the following midrash in the ShM: “for her 
he shall defile himself is a positive commandment. If he [a priest] does 
not wish to defile himself, he is made to do so against his will.”62 priests 
must defile themselves for their dead relatives — helping to bury the 
dead person, even if they come into contact with the corpse — despite 
the general prohibition that forbids them to defile themselves for the 
dead. maimonides goes on to argue that “this itself is the commandment 
of mourning; that is to say that every Israelite person63 is obligated to 
mourn his relatives, that is, the five64 dead [relatives] for whom there 
is a duty [mete mitsvah].” using an a fortiori inference, maimonides 
explains that
it is to confirm this obligation that He has expressly declared in the case 
of the priest, who is [ordinarily] forbidden to suffer defilement, that [in 
respect of the five relatives] he must defile himself at any rate like all 
other Israelites, so that the law of mourning may not be lightly esteemed.
Towards the end of his comments, maimonides repeats this analysis, 
noting that “even a priest is bound to observe mourning on the first 
day, and to defile himself for his [deceased] relatives. understand this.” 
Aware that the demonstration is forced, he wants the reader to accept 
his reasoning. Karo objects to maimonides’ suggestion: 
This proof is puzzling, for defilement is one matter and mourning 
another. one cannot draw an implication that a priest must mourn 
his relatives from the fact that He commanded that [the priest] defile 
himself for his relatives.65 
maimonides struggles to fill an evidentiary gap in the oral tradition 
that maintains that there is in fact a positive commandment to mourn 
62 . Sifra Emor 1:12 (94a).
63 . In the Arabic, the word shkhts, “person,” is used, but the phrase kol ish, “every man,” is 
used in the MnT translation.
64 . some versions have six; see “Tsiyunim,” Sefer ha-Mitsvot, ad loc., and see Sefer ha-
Mitsvot, ed. Kafih, ad loc., n. 26.
65 . Karo, Kesef Mishneh, Hilkhot Avel 1:1, s. v. “mitsvat ‘aseh le-hitavel�” 
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at least on the first day. surely if there is such a scriptural obligation, 
some proof text ought to be found. As Karo complains, maimonides’ 
attempt does not satisfy. This obvious difficulty forces maimonides 
to make a second, but still unsuccessful, attempt in the MT66 before 
abandoning the connection altogether in the GP (III:47).67 
In my opinion, there is no special politico-philosophical or 
theological motivation behind this claim. Instead, I believe that 
maimonides’ forced attempts to find a scriptural basis for this practice 
stemmed exclusively from his extraordinary respect for the oral 
tradition, which maintained that there was a scriptural obligation to 
mourn at least one day, despite the lack of scriptural evidence. This 
respectful attitude was foreshadowed in Rule 2, where he makes a rare 
concession and states that “if the sages themselves clearly affirm that 
‘it is of the essence of Torah’ or that ‘it is of scriptural authority,’ it is 
proper to count that particular law [among the commandments] even 
though the law is not scripturally explicit.”68 
66 . see Hilkhot Avel 1:1. I say “unsuccessful attempt” because the new proof text, “Had 
I eaten sin offering today, would the lord have approved” (lev. 10:19), can hardly 
be taken as an admonition. (For an interpretation of the reasons for this proof, see 
RadBaZ, ad loc.) 
67 . david Hartman notes (I believe correctly) that “the lack of any explicit biblical text 
dealing with the commandment of mourning may very well explain why maimonides 
in the context of the Guide of the Perplexed does not mention the laws of mourning.” 
lawrence Kaplan believes, however, that he found “the ‘missing’ cross-reference to 
the laws of mourning of the Mishneh Torah” in a section of the Guide dealing with 
“the commandments concerned with the clean and unclean,” GP III:47. maimonides 
there notes: “Every priest in particular was forbidden to expose himself to being made 
unclean by a corpse unless it were a case of strong necessity in which it would be 
difficult for nature to avoid this; I refer to avoiding contact with one’s parents, children 
and brothers.” Kaplan comments: “The rites of mourning, on the biblical level, are not 
self-directed and commanded for the therapeutic benefit of the mourner, but rather 
are other-directed.” They are, he says, “forms of personal kevod ha-met, of honoring 
one’s deceased relatives.” Thus, according to Kaplan, maimonides redefined the 
scriptural concept of mourning in GP and ceased seeking a scriptural reference for 
the traditional concept of mourning. As attractive as this argument is, the passage in 
III:47 does not indicate a qualitatively different, other-directed obligation to mourn; 
the words “unless it were a case of strong necessity in which it would be difficult for 
nature to avoid this” seem to imply, instead, some sort of unavoidable need to waive 
the laws of defilement. Hartman’s view is cited by Kaplan. see Kaplan, “The unity of 
maimonides’ Thought,” 393-412.
68 . much the same can be said with regard to the scriptural prooftext adduced in the 
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p112. That the leper shall be universally recognized as such by the 
prescribed marks: “His garments shall be rent and the hair of his head 
disheveled and he shall cover his upper lip and shall cry ‘unclean, 
unclean’” (lev. 13:45). so too, all other unclean persons should 
declare themselves as such.
proof: The Sifra infers that scripture requires anyone “in whom the 
plague is” to rend his clothes and grow his hair from the redundant 
prepositional phrase in “the leper in whom the plague is” (lev.13:45, 
emphasis added). This requirement, the midrash asserts, includes the 
High priest, despite the prohibition against his normally doing so.69 
maimonides discusses this waived prohibition: 
It is an accepted principle among us that wherever you find a positive 
commandment and a negative commandment [applying at the same 
time] if you can fulfill both, well and good; but if not, the positive 
commandment overrides the negative commandment (yavo ‘aseh ve-
yidhe et lo ta‘aseh) … since we find it laid down [by the sages] that if a 
High priest is leprous he must let his hair go loose and rend his clothes 
[the negative commandment notwithstanding], it follows that this is a 
positive commandment [for every leper to be unkempt].
Building on the midrash, maimonides uses a rabbinic principle to infer 
this commandment. since the midrash teaches that a leprous High 
priest is required to become unkempt, despite the general prohibition, 
and a positive commandment overrides a negative commandment, 
the command for a leper to become unkempt must be a mitsvat ‘aseh� 
maimonides’ inference is not entirely convincing, since the midrash 
MT (see above, note 67). While the commandment could be inferred from the text, 
such an inference would need to follow the exception clause of Rule 2. The ShM and 
MT proof texts assume that mourning was one of those exceptions. However, in a 
celebrated responsum (Responsa, ed. Blau, vol. 2, no. 355, 631-632), maimonides states 
that there were no more than “three or four” such exceptions, and better candidates 
could be found for these few exceptions. see Feintuch, Sefer ha-Mitsvot im Perush 
Pequde Yesharim, vol. 1, 43-45. In his analysis, Feintuch concludes that maimonides 
did not mean that there were only three or four exceptions; rather, he meant that 
the number of exceptions is very small, and thus perhaps this commandment could 
represent a further exception.
69 . Sifra Tazri‘a 12:5 (67d).
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derives the law’s applicability to the High priest from the redundant 
prepositional phrase “in whom the plague is,” rather than by using the 
talmudic principle of “yavo ‘aseh ve-yidhe et lo ta‘aseh.” According to the 
midrash, the talmudic principle is not necessary: scripture provides the 
exception by means of a redundancy.70 
As we noted, the Sifra concludes that even the High priest must 
rend his clothes and grow his hair if he becomes a leper. maimonides 
does not simply subsume this requirement as a particular of the laws of 
the leper71 under p101 (“that a leper is unclean and defiles”). Instead, 
he crafts a new commandment that reflects an original understanding 
of the purpose and essence of the requirement that the leper must 
allow himself to be recognized universally as a leper.72 His insistence 
on individuating such a requirement may well have something to do 
with what he sees as a justification for the disease. 
maimonides avers that a slanderer is miraculously stricken 
70 . see perla, Sefer ha-Mitsvot le-RaSaG, vol. 1, p189, 808-810. While Hurewitz (in Sefer ha-
Mitsvot im Perush Yad ha-Levi, 121n5) acknowledges the problem, he dismisses it by reading 
the midrashic exegesis as based on the hermeneutic principle. This reading, however, does 
not fit the literal text of the midrash, which draws a typical inference from the verse. 
71 . In Hilkhot Tumat Tsara‘at 10:7, maimonides categorizes the requirement that a leper 
be secluded, derived from “he shall dwell apart; his dwelling shall be outside the camp” 
(lev. 13:46), as a specific provision of the commandment (din ha-metsora‘) rather than 
an independent commandment. I assume (although it is not clear) that maimonides 
means this to be a provision of p101 (as does de leon, “megillat Esther,” 291). 
Nahmanides (in Hasagot, “Addenda to the positive Commandments,” no. 14, 290) says 
that maimonides counted “he shall dwell apart; his dwelling shall be outside the camp” 
as an independent commandment. de leon comments in response that while perhaps 
Nahmanides counted it as an independent commandment, maimonides certainly 
did not. duran (in Zohar ha-Raqia, siman 80, 92), proposes to make p112 part of the 
independent commandment of “he shall dwell apart; his dwelling shall be outside the 
camp.” For a short bibliography on authors who take up this point, see 92n469; see 
also ibid., siman 45, 46 and notes. It is possible that both Nahmanides and duran 
understood the leper’s obligation to remain secluded as a more general form of the 
obligation to keep others away from himself. For both of these jurists, the overarching 
commandment was “he shall dwell apart; his dwelling shall be outside the camp,” and 
the requirements to rend clothes, keep his head covered, and such constituted details 
of the commandment. In contrast, maimonides held that the leper’s obligation to 
display his impurity constituted the more general principle while the precept to live 
secluded was a detail.
72 . For a discussion of maimonides’ wider teleologically-driven conclusions, see my 
comments in chapter 2.
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with leprosy because the revolting nature of the disease73 raises two 
natural barriers: one barrier between the slanderer and his wicked 
circle of friends to keep him from continuing to engage “in evil talk, 
which consists of mockery and malicious gossip,” and a second barrier 
between the slanderer and the person wishing to be virtuous. As he 
writes in Hilkhot Tumat Tsara‘at 16:10: “it is fitting for someone who 
wishes to set aright his ways to distance himself from their presence 
and from speaking with them so that he does not become entrapped in 
the net of wicked people and their follies.” maimonides sees leprosy as 
a way to keep society away from the sinner rather than as a punishment 
for the sinner. In this sense, the public voicing of his own uncleanness 
is unrelated to the particulars of his uncleanness and defilement. 
Therefore, this requirement is not subsumed under p101.74
p149. To examine the marks in cattle, as it is said, “these are the 
beasts which ye may eat” (lev. 11:2).
p150. To examine the marks in fowl, so as to distinguish between the 
unclean and the clean, as it is said, “of all clean birds ye may eat” 
(deut. 14:11).
p151. To examine the marks in locusts, so as to distinguish the clean 
from the unclean, as it is said, “(yet these may ye eat of every flying, 
creeping thing that goeth upon all four) which have legs (above their 
feet)” (lev. 11:21).75 
p152. To examine the marks in fishes, as it is said, “These shall ye eat 
of all that are in the waters” (lev. 11:9).
As in other instances where maimonides struggles with formulating 
a commandment or with its supporting hermeneutic, traces of the 
struggle can be found in the linguistic variants of the extant versions 
of the ShM (and the MT). While one cannot assert with certainty which 
of the extant versions represents the final one, all of the versions carry 
a similar message: the conscious act of separating the pure from the 
73 . Cf. GP III:47, 597.
74 . In the gloss to p112, maimonides extends this law to stipulate that all who become 
unclean must make themselves recognizable (not merely the leper).
75 . Note that this verse contains a description of the locusts, not the typical proof text for 
the commandment. see our discussion below.
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impure, separating that which may be consumed from that which may 
not. maimonides pursues this agenda by means of a forced, somewhat 
confusing, but nonetheless creative exegetical exercise. For purposes of 
the ensuing discussion, I follow the formulaic expression “to examine” 
found in all the versions of the SE and assume that it represents 
maimonides’ final viewpoint.76 
proof: After explicitly prohibiting the consumption of living things 
that do not possess the requisite tokens (as detailed in N172–N174), 
scripture further enjoins: “These are the living things which ye may eat 
among all the beasts that are on the earth. Whatsoever parteth…among 
the beasts, that may ye eat” (lev. 11:2-3). As a proof text for p149, 
maimonides cites the opening line of the verse: “these are the living 
things which ye may eat,” together with the Sifra’s exposition on the 
closing statement of verse 3: “That may ye eat: only that may be eaten, 
but not the unclean beast.”77 
maimonides explains that the midrash uses an hermeneutic rule 
that infers a prohibition from the positive statement. This type of 
inferred prohibition, called “a negative commandment that is inferred 
from a ‘do’ statement” (“lav ha-ba-mikhlal ‘aseh,” also “issur ‘aseh”), is 
not punishable as a negative commandment because scripture does not 
articulate the prohibition in the form of an explicit interdiction. The 
positive statement coupled with the fact that the law calls the injunction 
an ‘aseh (“lav ha-ba-mikhlal ‘aseh, ‘aseh”) provides the hermeneutic basis 
for maimonides’ claim that examining for clean animals is a positive 
commandment. maimonides shows himself satisfied with this proof 
(“thus it has been made clear that His words that ye may eat are a 
76 . The ShM versions appear to reflect at least two different literary or compositional 
stages. The MnT translation is similar to the language of the SE. It claims that the 
commandment mandates one to “examine” [livdoq] the tokens of the various animals 
and “[only] then would their consumption be permitted.” The Arabic versions 
(including Kafih’s) and the shlomo ibn Ayub translation cited by Heller in the notes to 
his ShM edition read instead “that we were commanded about [Hebrew al; Arabic b; or 
“concerning”] the tokens” of the various animals. The former version would obligate 
one to examine particular animals for tokens of fitness; the latter, simply to know the 
characteristics of animals that are fit for consumption. The difference in formulation 
is also present in maimonides’ later compositions, as we shall see.
77 . Sifra Shemini 3:1 (48b).
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positive commandment”).78 
But does this exegesis support maimonides’ actual claim? The 
midrash sees leviticus 11:3 as adding a new prohibition against eating 
living things that do not possess the requisite tokens onto the existing 
negative prohibitions, using inference from a positive statement (“that 
ye may eat”). This is at least how maimonides’ critics understood the 
midrash.79 This reading seems to have little to do with examining or 
ascertaining the nature of the tokens.
By assuming, however, that maimonides made a slight mistake in 
failing to match the appropriate proof text with the pertinent midrash, 
we can make some sense out of this exegesis. A close read shows that 
the proof text adduced for his claim “to examine the tokens” is “These 
are the living things which ye may eat” (v. 2, emphasis added). This 
proof text, however, is not the one that the midrash uses to infer a 
prohibition on eating. Rather, the midrash uses verse 3, which contains 
the words “that may ye eat.” It is verse 2 that supports maimonides’ 
commandment — not verse 3, as his critics suppose — although 
maimonides bears responsibility for this confusion by juxtaposing the 
proof text and the midrashic exposition. To maimonides, the deictic 
“these” (zot) conveys an act of choosing or ascertaining, implying the 
need to examine tokens of fitness. Indeed, this is how the Sifra itself 
understands this term. on verse 2, “These are the living things which 
ye may eat,” the midrash expounds: “It teaches us that moses held the 
living thing, and on showing it to the Israelites, would say, ‘this you 
78 . see above, chapter 2, in particular note 12, for further discussion of this hermeneutic.
79 . so for example, daniel ha-Bavli, who infers an additional, non-explicit prohibition 
against eating non-kosher animals (Abraham maimonides, “Teshuvot Rabbenu 
Abraham ben ha-RamBam,” siman 10, 277, s.v. u-le-shitato) from this verse (and fowl 
and fish from similar verses). Nahmanides, too, fails to see here anything other than 
a prohibition against eating non-kosher living things. Furthermore, since an explicit 
prohibition against eating non-kosher living things already exists, Nahmanides sees no 
reason to enumerate this additional injunction and finds Qayyara’s omission justified. 
see Nahmanides, Hasagot, Rule 6, 131, s.v. “ve-ani roeh.” However, what maimonides 
derives from the cited verse is an injunction to examine the tokens of animals before 
eating them and not a prohibition to eat non-kosher animals! While Nahmanides 
could have questioned the relationship between the midrash and the presumed claim, 
he surely would not have misread the claim. I am thus at a loss to understand his 
critique.
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may eat, this you may not eat.’”80 
For whatever reason, maimonides is not fully satisfied with the 
exegetical basis of this group of claims, and we see him changing 
his exegesis towards the end of his explications. There he offers 
a further clarification on these four commandments in the form 
of a restatement — but one that surely represents an entirely new 
explanation:
And that which we said — that it is a positive commandment — is what I 
already mentioned to you:81 we are commanded to decide on the basis of 
these tokens that one fish is permitted food, and another is not permitted, 
as scripture clearly says: Ye shall separate between the clean beast and the 
unclean (and between the unclean fowl and the clean) [lev. 20:25]. 
With this comment, maimonides shifts the weight of the exegetical 
proof away from the earlier proof texts and their accompanying 
hermeneutic principle to an entirely new verse. The new proof text 
explicitly commands one to differentiate a clean animal from an 
unclean one. despite its greater clarity, however, the new proof text is 
not as comprehensive as maimonides indicates; it refers to beasts and 
birds but omits fish and grasshoppers.82 soon thereafter, maimonides 
returns to the earlier-cited midrash to differentiate four separate 
commandments:
The separation can be made only by means of the [prescribed] tokens, 
and therefore [the injunction to search for] the tokens in each of the four 
types [of living creatures] — animals tame and wild, birds, grasshoppers, 
and fish — is a separate and distinct commandment. We have already 
shown that [the sages] regarded each of them as one of the positive 
commandments. 
80 . Sifra Shemini, parshah 2:2 (47d).
81 . In the Hebrew, “ve-ha-inyan be-amrenu she-hi mitsvat ‘aseh, mah she-hizkarti lekhah,” 
is an idiomatic expression of re-statement. on maimonides’ intellectual dynamism 
and his ability to add a new rationale to revitalize a rejected position, see Henshke, 
“maimonides as His own Commentator”, 117-163.
82 . Cf. daniel ha-Bavli, in Abraham maimonides, “Teshuvot Rabbenu Abraham ben ha-
RamBam,” siman 10, 277, s. v. “ve-od hinneh bier.” 
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maimonides does not explain how the particular breakdown of the 
various prohibitions, presumably against eating non-kosher animals, 
can supplement or illuminate the new commandment to examine 
the tokens of these creatures. This is a problematic gap,83 unless one 
was willing to accept the explanation regarding the confused use of 
the midrash. In sum, the various scriptural verses and their rabbinic 
warrants fail to sustain and differentiate these commandments clearly.
Whether the problem is four individuations, loosely based on a 
midrashic interpretation, or one individuation based on an incomplete 
proof text, the basic motivational question remains: what drove 
maimonides to individuate these commandments when the essential 
prohibition against eating the flesh of unclean animals had already 
been individuated? I submit that maimonides’ political views were 
at least partly responsible for this move. maimonides views the law 
as a political instrument for bringing order to society, a notion well 
documented in his philosophic works.84 As with those of contemporary 
Islamic philosophers, maimonides’ political ideas are informed by 
plato’s views of the City and its organization,85 its emphasis on 
social stratification and its use of different metals as symbols for 
the hermeticism of social classes. Consistent with these views, 
maimonides saw the law as drawing clear and categorical boundaries 
between domains: between clean and unclean animals, between states 
of cleanness and uncleanness, between priests and levites, between 
levites and Israelites, and between Israelites and pagan nations.86 
83 . What stands out is maimonides’ desire to preserve four claims for his enumeration, a 
fitting objective if he intended the count to be a detailed outline. see the discussion of 
individuation in chapter 2.
84 . see GP II:39-40 and III:27.
85 . on the platonic influence on maimonides, see strauss, “Quelques remarques sur la 
science politique de maïmonide et de Farabi,” 14: “And because the political science 
that is known and deemed worthy of some attention by maimonides is a platonizing 
form of politics, it will be, in the end, the doctrines of the Republic and the laws that 
will determine the manner according to which maimonides will understand Torah.” 
(Quotation translated by Jean-marc liling and oshrat diane Cohen.)
86 . maimonides calls the fifth book of the MT the “Book of Holiness” (Sefer Qedushah) 
because, as he states in the introduction to the MT, “with these two matters [forbidden 
relations and forbidden foods] God had sanctified us and separated us from the 
nations,” and continues to quote two scriptural verses in support.
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As I conclude this review of maimonides’ innovations, I return for 
a moment to Twersky’s categorical assumption. Recall that Twersky 
understood that maimonides assumed that the 613 commandments 
were fixed. The enumeration was based purely on internal 
considerations, rabbinic exegesis, and individuation methods. only 
after the enumeration was established did the philosopher set out to 
do his task: to ascertain how the commandments relate to the welfare 
of the body and the soul� In other words, maimonides’ explanations 
of the goals of the commandments are after-the-fact justifications. As 
we saw, Harvey doubted that matters were so simple and wondered, 
“can we detect…an ongoing effort by maimonides to decide the law in 
such a manner as to bring (or keep) it in line with the teloi of peace and 
knowledge?” 
I believe that the answer to Harvey’s question must be yes. Based 
on our analysis, at least some of the innovations appear to owe their 
existence to external considerations, to the ethical and political 
themes that maimonides wished to emphasize. When we peruse these 
innovations, we find a number of recurrent themes. maimonides 
appears preoccupied with the needs of a well-ordered state, the concern 
of the political philosophers of his day. This includes the concepts that 
worship and sacrifices should be conducted at only one location (p85). It 
also includes appeals to orderliness (p36) and cleanliness (p30). The law 
must instill reverence towards the “guardians of society,” the priests, 
(p32 and p34), because they are the keepers of the sanctuary and its 
objects; reverence towards the sanctuary is also important so that “man 
should be affected by a sentiment of submission and servitude” upon 
seeing its glory and greatness (p22).87 maimonides’ concerns with 
maintaining clear demarcations are also quite noteworthy, as between 
ritually clean and unclean things (p149-52), and between those who 
have been secluded because of their wicked ways and those who “direct 
their ways aright”88 (p112). We also find that the law is concerned 
87 . GP III:45, 577.
88 . As per Hilkhot Metsora‘ 16:10. maimonides’ concern with demarcations can also be 
seen in his dedicating an entire treatise to concepts of holiness (qedushah), which he 
read as signifying separation. see note 86 above. 
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with a well-functioning judicial system and with the adoption of just 
procedures (p175, p178 and p179), possibly influenced by the muslim 
courts and their interest in procedural matters. useful beliefs and 
necessary opinions are crucial for the proper conduct of the platonic 
society, which fully justifies the acquiring or writing of a scroll of the 
Torah (p17) and the retelling of miracles (p157). similarly, obeying the 
words of the true prophet (p172) brings about a belief in the validity, 
immutability, and eternal nature of mosaic prophecy (p172), itself 
a useful belief since “belief in prophecy precedes belief in the law.”89 
lastly, the masses must be instilled with an unceasing hatred for deceit 
and evil (p189) and for idolatry and paganism (p187), even when their 
perpetrators and practitioners can no longer be located or identified. 
In the next section, we find maimonides introducing a momentous 
idea in Jewish halakhah: dogma. The case for external factors driving 
the composition becomes even more compelling.
THE uNCERTAIN plACE oF doGmA IN HALAKHAH
many of the commandments that maimonides innovated were 
concerned with particular aspects of creating a well-ordered and moral 
society. The laws he delineated were specific actions to be carried out 
in body and form. But what did he believe about commandments for 
the mind — more precisely, could dogma be legislated? maimonides 
includes on his list of positive commandments the obligations to believe 
in the existence of God and to believe that God is one, despite their not 
having a component of physical action. The remainder of this chapter 
will analyze maimonides’ philosophical writings on the rational faculties 
and assess the uncertain place of belief in a world of commanded action.
doGmA ANd CommANdEdNEss
In his introduction to M Avot, referred to as Shemonah Peraqim (SP), 
maimonides posits that the soul is made up of five faculties: the 
nutritive, the sentient, the imaginative, the appetitive, and the 
89 . GP III:45, 576.
-----------------------------------------------------   INNoVATIVE CommANdmENTs   -----------------------------------------------------
— 135 —
rational. These ideas are adaptations of Aristotle’s taxonomy of the 
soul, as expanded and mediated by the Islamic philosopher Al-Farabi.90 
In chapter two of SP, maimonides discusses the faculties in which 
transgressions, observances, virtues, and vices reside. He writes: 
Know that disobedience and obedience of the law are found only in two 
parts of the soul, namely, the sentient part and the appetitive part. All the 
transgressions and the commandments involve these two parts. There is 
no obedience or disobedience in the nutritive or imaginative parts, since 
thought and choice do not act upon them at all. By his thought, man is 
not able to suspend their action or to limit them to a certain action.91 
He posits here that conscious or voluntary acts are connected to the 
sentient and the appetitive parts of the soul; thus these parts of the 
soul can be called the media of transgression and obedience. 
maimonides defines the rational part of the soul as “the power 
found in man by which he perceives intelligibles, deliberates, acquires 
the sciences, and distinguishes between base and noble actions. some 
of these activities are practical and some are theoretical.”92 He then asks 
whether the rational part can transgress or obey, to which he responds:
Although there is perplexity concerning the rational part, I say that this 
power too may bring about obedience and disobedience, namely, belief 
in a false or a true opinion. But there is no act in it to which the terms 
commandment or transgression would apply.93 
90 . The Aphorisms of the Statesman (fusul al-Madani) served as maimonides’ blueprint for 
SP. see davidson, “maimonides’ Shemonah Perakim and Al-Farabi’s fusul al-Madani,” 
33-50.
91 . Ethical Writings of Maimonides, ed. Weiss and Butterworth, 64.
92 . Ibid., 63.
93 . Ibid., 64-65. shailat (in Haqdamot ha-RaMBaM la-Mishnah, ed. shailat, 273) suggests 
that maimonides could have resolved this question by referring to the commandment 
of learning Torah, an activity centered in the mind that also involves the appetitive 
and sensitive faculties. shailat refutes this demonstration by arguing that maimonides 
was seeking an activity that solely and exclusively resided in the mind. I believe, 
however, that one can posit a more fundamental distinction between Torah study 
and doctrinal belief. one studies Torah neither to assert nor to demonstrate the truth 
of its commandments, but rather to acquire sufficient knowledge to perform them. 
However, the truth of beliefs is subject to investigation and demonstration. It is this 
latter activity to which maimonides refers when he discusses commanding the rational 
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maimonides does not tell us what thinkers are behind this “perplexity” or 
why it should even be a matter of doubt. yet there is some evidence that a 
significant number of early medieval rabbinic authorities did not consider 
beliefs to be valid objects of commandments.94 We learn this from remarks 
in the work The Duties of the Heart (al-Hidaya ila faraid al-Qulub, or Hovot 
ha-Levavot in the Hebrew translation). little is known about its author, 
Bahya b. Joseph ibn paquda, other than that he was an eleventh-century 
rabbinic scholar in muslim spain. As its title suggests, Bahya wrote 
this work because he believed that even those most punctilious about 
performing commandments neglected the duties of the heart. 
By all accounts, the work was extremely popular from the moment 
of its appearance and had a profound influence on Jewish pietistic 
practice and literature.95 In his apologia for undertaking this work, 
Bahya offers an interesting classification of the commandments. He 
divides the obligations of the religious person into two parts: the duties 
of the body and its limbs, with which one expresses outward obedience, 
and the duties of the heart, with which one expresses inward obedience. 
duties of the body include
prayer, fasting, almsgiving, learning his book and spreading the 
knowledge of it, fulfilling the commandments concerning the Tabernacle, 
the palm branch, the fringes, the doorpost, the railings on the roof, and 
faculty. I thank my grandson, Tsvi Horowitz, for making this fine distinction. I have 
also noticed that the distinction between the law and wisdom is made very clearly in 
GP III:54, 633.
94 . There are indications, however, that at least some talmudic rabbis held that there was 
room for correct beliefs in halakhah, as in the passage: “[And that ye not go] after your own 
heart [Num. 15:39]: this refers to heresy; and so it says: The fool hath said in his heart, There 
is no God [Eccl. 14:1]” (BT Berakhot 12b). see also Sifre Numbers, Shelakh-Lekha 115 (126), 
on Num. 15:39, which maimonides uses as his proof text for N47. since this violation 
does not involve an act, transgressors are exempt from lashes; nevertheless, it constitutes 
a transgression. scripture thus forbids the denying of the existence of God. Qayyara lists 
“After your own heart” among the negative commandments (Nq117), although, as we 
cautioned earlier, we have no way to know to which prohibition Qayyara was referring, 
since he simply listed scriptural verses or close paraphrases.
95 . The consensus of modern scholars is that maimonides was not only well acquainted 
with Bahya’s work but may have been influenced by it (private communication with 
Haggai ben-shammai). 
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the like, all of which can be wholly performed by man’s physical body.96
Inward obedience, on the other hand, is expressed through the duties 
of the heart. some of the most important active duties of the heart 
include: “to believe in the Creator of the world, who brought the world 
into existence from nothingness; to believe in pure monotheism, free 
from a belief in any other gods; to assent to obeying God in our hearts;” 
and others. Negative duties of the heart consist of emotions such as 
rancor, envy, and vengeance, and by a denial of the theological doctrines 
listed above.97 For Bahya, inward obedience must both precede and 
accompany outward obedience: “Thus I have come to know for certain 
that the duties of the members are of no avail to us unless our hearts 
choose to do them and our soul desires their performance.”98 
Bahya relates a statement relevant to our project in his discussion of 
enumerating the duties of the heart. When he counted the duties of the 
heart, he writes, “I found that their details were very numerous…for the 
duties of the members are limited in number, about 613 commandments 
in all, while the duties of the heart are many and their details innumerable.” 
since the duties of the heart include the belief in the Creator and the belief 
in pure monotheism, it follows that Bahya did not count these two beliefs 
in his TaRYaG count: in his philosophy, commandments include only acts 
“that can be wholly performed by man’s physical body.”99 
Although Bahya separates the duties of the heart from a listing of 
biblical commandments — while giving them priority of knowledge and 
importance — maimonides incorporates two of these beliefs, the belief 
in the existence of a particular God and the belief in pure monotheism, 
96 . Bahya ibn paquda. The Book of Direction to the Duties of the Heart, 89. 
97 . Ibid., 87.
98 . Ibid., 89. or see: “What determines the punishment is the participation of both heart 
and body in the act — the heart in the intention and the body in carrying out the 
heart’s intention …. since now, the foundation and the pillar of action is the intention 
of the heart and conscience, the knowledge of the duties of the heart should come 
before and stand above the knowledge of the duties of the members” (ibid., 91).
99 . Ibid., 89. maimonides clearly alludes to the idea that commandments can only include 
bodily acts when he writes that the rational part “may bring about obedience and 
disobedience, namely belief in a false or a true opinion.” The rational part is thus 
able to be commanded, despite the fact that “there is no act in it to which the terms 
commandment or transgression would apply.”
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into his TaRYaG count. How he accomplishes this feat is the subject of 
the next section.
We appreciate the significance of maimonides’ innovation when we 
notice that these two affirmations are not found in Qayyara’s list of 
commandments. While Hildesheimer places these two commandments 
under the header of Qayyara’s entry pq39, “and belief” (ve-emunah), 
also listed as “and truth” (ve-emet),100 this is almost certainly mistaken. 
pq39 follows immediately after a group of commandments devoted to 
the relationship between man and his fellow man: “to clothe the naked” 
(pq33), “to bury the dead” (pq34), “to console the mourner” (pq35), 
“to visit the sick” (pq36), “to love peace” (pq37), and “and justice” 
(pq38). It seems likely that Qayyara intended this commandment to 
stand for the obligation to conduct business in an honest manner, as in 
the rabbinic expression, “did you carry out transactions with honesty” 
(nasata v-natata be-emunah). If Qayyara had indeed intended to list the 
commandments to believe in the existence of God and His oneness, 
one should have expected to find these entries next to “love of God” 
(pq23) and “fear of God” (pq24), or at the very head of the list, given 
their obvious importance.101 
This observation is confirmed by none other than Nahmanides, 
Qayyara’s principal apologist, who declares: “I saw that the author of 
the Halakhot [Qayyara] did not count this commandment [the existence 
of God] among the 613.”102 According to Nahmanides, Qayyara omits 
the commandment to believe in God’s existence from his count because 
commandments by necessity presuppose His existence. God is the 
“fundament and root” from which all commandments issue. Therefore, 
belief in God cannot be counted among the commandments.
100 . Hildesheimer, Haqdamat Sefer Halakhot Gedolot, 74n335.
101 . The declaration of His oneness, through the recitation of the Shema, is the first entry 
in Qayyara’s list of positive commandments. 
102 . Nahmanides, Hasagot, p1, 206. shelomo ibn Gabirol, who tends to follow Qayyara’s 
enumeration, also omits belief in God from his enumeration. moses ibn Tibbon, 
the first expositor of Gabirol’s Azharot, thought that Gabirol had counted this 
commandment in line 11: “I took you out, I admonished you, I guided you, in righteous 
ways.” This line, however, appears to be a preamble to the list of commandments 
that follows. duran, Zohar ha-Raqia, ad loc., 3-4, disputes Ibn Tibbon’s reading on 
interpretive grounds. 
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on Nahmanides’ explanation, one would have to conclude that a vast 
theological divide exists between jurists like Qayyara, who presuppose 
the existence of a divine lawgiver (and do not need to enumerate the 
commandment to affirm it), and jurists like maimonides, who require 
an explicit, reasoned affirmation of God’s existence. It is reasonable to 
presume that Qayyara would be satisfied with almost any understanding 
of a superior being, even an anthropomorphic one, if that persona could 
form the basis for obedience of the laws. For maimonides, however, 
who incorporates into the commandments a refined philosophical 
definition of God, such a conception of a supreme lawgiver would have 
constituted heresy. An explicit affirmation of God is how maimonides 
ensures that the correct vision of divinity undergirds the foundation 
of commandments.
maimonides was not the first scholar to propose that belief in the 
existence of God is a commandment. That distinction belongs to the 
Babylonian gaon, Hefets b. yatsliah, who writes: 
The first precept enjoins us to unite our mind and thoughts on the truths of 
the matter; to make our Creator exist in our heart, and to consider Him lord 
of all things without a shadow of doubt, and without any other thought; to 
know that He is truth; as it is written: Know therefore this day, and lay it to 
thy heart, that YHWH is Eloqim, there is no-one else besides Him [deut. 4:39].103 
103 . Hefets’ description of the first commandment was preserved for us by Judah b. Barzilai 
in his twelfth-century commentary on the Book of Creation (Sefer Yetsirah) (above 
quotation from Judah b. Barzilai, Perush Sefer Yetsirah, 55-56). Hefets explains the 
two divine terms and references the end of the verse as proof that “He is one and that 
there is no other.” Hefets later adds that he is obliged to explain his proof that God 
exists, “that He is one and that there is no other,” so that one “may be strengthened 
in the belief that He is one, and is the creator of all things.” Hefets, A volume of the 
Book of Precepts, trans. Halper. missing from Hefets’ apparatus is a rabbinic warrant to 
support the commandment claim. davidson notes that maimonides had “precedents…
for viewing belief in, or the knowledge of, the existence of God as a formal 
commandment of the law,” among them Bahya, Hefets, samuel b. Hofni, and Ibn Ezra. 
davidson shows that there is a “modicum of corroboration” for the idea that Hefets’ 
formulation of the first two positive commandments of the law “was a springboard 
for maimonides.” davidson, “The First Two Commandments,” 127-133. Hyman also 
notes: “By the time of maimonides it was accepted at least by philosophers, that belief 
in the existence of God and similar beliefs formed part of the system of mitsvot and 
that their affirmation was a matter of religious observation.” Hyman, “Rabbi simlai’s 
sayings and Beliefs Concerning God,” 52. I must insist, however, that none of these 
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In contrast to Hefets, who adduced only scriptural support, maimonides 
provided a rabbinic warrant to prove this innovative claim (as we 
shall soon see). This lent great halakhic authority to his claim and 
undoubtedly became the main reason for the unquestioning reception 
of his idea in later generations. 
I now return to maimonides and his remarks in the second chapter 
of SP. While other thinkers did not necessarily connect transgression 
and obedience to the rational part of the soul, maimonides did not 
doubt this connection. He does not explain how he knows that the 
rational part can be commanded, but this thesis correlates with his 
ethical-philosophical worldview, with its emphasis on correct notions 
and moral dispositions.104 maimonides sees the law as commanding the 
acquisition of these correct notions. If the law truly aims to enhance 
the welfare of the soul, then the law would necessarily encourage and 
inculcate correct opinions. In his words: 
Among the things to which your attention ought to be directed is that 
you should know that in regard to the correct opinions through which the 
ultimate perfections may be obtained, the law has communicated only 
their end and made a call to believe in them in a summary way — that 
is, to believe in the existence of the deity, may He be exalted, His unity, 
His knowledge, His power, His will, and His eternity. All these points are 
ultimate ends, which can be made clear in detail and through definitions 
only after one knows many opinions (GP III:28, 512). 
In short, to obtain the “ultimate perfections” (which would lead to 
ultimate happiness), man must acquire a correct notion of God and 
His oneness. His innovation is that the “law had made a call to believe 
in them”: it commanded the acquisition of these notions.105 
exegetes cited rabbinic warrants for the formal claim, thus failing to integrate these 
beliefs into the halakhic world of commandments.
104 . In this and related respects, maimonides follows very closely on the footsteps of one of 
his principal philosophical mentors, Al-Farabi. Compare this discussion with Al-Farabi’s 
Aphorisms of the Statesman, fusul, in particular the early paragraphs and para. 49. see 
davidson, “maimonides’ Shemonah Perakim and Al-Farabi’s Fusul al-madani,” 33-50.
105 . At this point, I am short-circuiting the subtle distinction that maimonides makes 
between welfare and perfection, as some scholars have suggested. see Galston, “The 
purpose of law According to maimonides,” 27-51, and Harvey, “political philosophy 
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In the ShM, maimonides gives a proof that these beliefs constitute 
a commandment. In support of his first commandment claim, to know 
God, maimonides references the end of BT Makkot, paraphrasing the 
familiar aggadic passage found there: 
six hundred and thirteen [TaRYaG] commandments were declared unto 
moses at sinai, as the verse says, Moses commanded us a Law [Torah] [deut. 
33:4]; that is, he commanded us to observe as many commandments as are 
signified by the sum of the letter-numbers ToRaH. To this it was objected 
that the letter-numbers of the word ToRaH add up to only six hundred 
and eleven; to which the reply was: “The two commandments I am the 
Lord thy God and Thou shalt have no other gods before Me [Exod. 20:2-3] 
we heard from the Almighty Himself.” That is, the lord commanded 611 
commandments to the Israelites through moses, thus Moses commanded 
a Law, and two commandments directly. 
As we saw earlier, this exegesis is attributed to R. Hamnuna. maimonides 
ends his short comment by stating: “Thus it has been made clear to you 
that the verse I am the Lord thy God is one of the 613 commandments, 
and is that whereby we are commanded to believe in God, as we have 
explained” (emphasis added).
To understand the compelling legal nature of this aggadah, we need 
first to understand the profound truth that maimonides believed lay 
hidden in it. GP II:33 is dedicated to explaining the unique event of the 
revelation at sinai. After offering an interpretation of the text based 
on the “external meaning,” 106 he then proceeds to tell us that the sages 
“also have a dictum formulated in several passages of the midrashim 
and Halakhah in maimonides,” 198-212. This difference may lie at the heart of 
maimonides’ pedagogy. The uninitiated individual accepts the existence of God with 
some minimum rational support, while the enlightened individual seeks perfection 
through a thorough demonstration of His Existence and oneness.
106 . The “external” (zahir) and “internal” (batin) meaning of parables, explained in the 
Introduction to part I of the GP, is a critical tool in understanding the GP’s project. 
maimonides writes that while the external meaning of parables “contains wisdom 
that is useful in many respects, among which is the welfare of human societies,” the 
internal meaning “contains wisdom that is useful for beliefs concerned with the truth 
as it is” (12). For a detailed discussion of this hermeneutic, see stern, Problems and 
Parables of Law� For a critique of stern’s work, see Kaplan, “Review of Josef stern’s 
problems and parables of the law,” 361-364. 
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and also figuring in the Talmud.” 
The dictum to which maimonides refers and which describes 
revelation in allegorical terms is contained in none other than R. 
simlai’s aggadah of the 613 commandments. It reveals the “internal 
meaning” of the fateful events that occurred at sinai by drawing a 
sharp categorical distinction between the first two commandments 
and the rest of the Torah. According to the “external meaning” of the 
verses, moses had relayed all the commandments to the Israelites after 
receiving them directly from God; according to the “internal meaning,” 
moses relays to the Israelites all the commandments except for the first 
two. These first two commandments are apprehended intellectually by 
each member of the entire nation, each in his own way and according 
to his own capacity. This, suggests maimonides, is the true meaning of 
the midrashic dictum “The two commandments I am the Lord thy God 
and Thou shalt have no other gods before Me [Exod. 20:3] we heard from 
the Almighty Himself.” In effect, two different types of commandments 
were “heard” on sinai: those which moses and Israel apprehended 
intellectually — the existence of God and His unity107 — and those which 
moses relayed to the Israelites — all the remaining commandments. The 
first two commandments, maimonides asserts, 
are knowable by human speculation alone.108 Now, with regard to 
everything that can be known by demonstration, the status of the prophet 
and that of everyone else who knows it are equal; there is no superiority 
of one over the other. Thus, these two principles are not known through 
prophecy alone. The text of the Torah says Unto thee it was shown [that 
107 . The plain meaning of “Thou shalt not have other gods before me” is that it represents 
an admonition against believing in other gods — polytheism. Arguably, believing in 
God’s composite unity can be viewed as believing in more than one god. Compare 
Hilkhot Yesode ha-Torah 1:7. 
108 . This statement confirms Efodi’s understanding that maimonides reads the words 
“we heard from the Almighty Himself” in the midrash as referring to human 
speculation; by means of his intellect, man can prove the existence and unity of God. 
The identification of intellectual apprehension with “hearing from the Almighty” is 
admittedly a bit stretched, but maimonides leaves little doubt that that is what he 
thinks the allegory represents. Efodi, in Moreh Nevukhim (with the Commentaries of 
Efodi, Shem Tov, Crescas and Abarbanel), trans. Ibn Tibbon, II:33:70b, s. v. “rotsim be-zeh 
ha-maamar�”
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thou mightest know that the Lord, He is God; there is none else beside Him] 
[deut. 4:35]. As for the other commandments they belong to the class of 
generally-accepted opinions and those adopted in virtue of tradition, not 
the class of the intellecta.109 
As maimonides saw it, there was a profound qualitative difference 
between the first two commandments and the other eight. The first 
two commandments represent demonstrable propositions, the type of 
statements that philosophers and logicians are wont to make. These 
truths do not require the mediation of a prophet. The rest of the 
commandments, on the other hand, represent conventions, the type 
of laws that a wise and rational lawgiver — a prophet being the epitome 
of such a wise lawgiver in maimonides’ political philosophy — would 
promulgate for the benefit of a well-ordered society. 
We should note that this qualitative distinction between the two 
sets of commandments does not hold up in the rabbinic accounts of 
the sinaitic revelation. As recounted in deuteronomy 5:22-24, moses 
mediated God’s message at the behest of the Israelites, frightened 
as they were by the voice of God. In Song of Songs Rabbah, the sages 
disagree as to when this mediation occurred: R. Joshua says it was 
after the second commandment, and the rabbis say after the tenth.110 
Regardless of which interpretation one accepts, neither tradition hints 
at an intrinsic difference between the first two pronouncements and 
109 . The distinction between “the class of the intellecta,” on which demonstrative syllogisms 
are based, and “generally accepted opinions,” on which dialectic syllogisms are built, 
has been ascribed to Aristotle. The term “generally accepted opinions” corresponds 
to the Greek term endoxa, defined as “those which commend themselves to all or 
to the majority or to the wise — that is, to all of the wise or to the majority or to 
the most famous and distinguished of them.” Aristotle, Topica, 1.1, 100b, 21-23, in 
Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, Topica, 275-277. The Arabic term used here, almushhurath 
(mefursamot in the Hebrew rendering), has a slightly different connotation, referring 
to things that are generally known. see Les Guide des Egarés, trans. s. munk, 39n1. 
In GP I:2, “generally accepted opinions” refers to the categories of good and bad (as 
opposed to true and false) and can also refer to the particular notions of certain 
societies. see the short bibliography on this concept in Moreh Nevukhim, ed. schwarz, 
vol. II, 378n5. see also “maimonides’ Treatise on logic [English Translation],” ed. and 
trans. Efros, 47-49. 
110 . song of songs Rabbah 1:2. see also the commentary on the pentateuch by Hizkiyahu 
ben manoah (Hizkuni), Torat Chaim Chumash, Exod. 20:1. 
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the remaining ones. maimonides’ reading of the aggadah, inferring the 
existence of two types of revelations at sinai, is undoubtedly motivated 
and informed by his philosophical worldview.111
We have shown that, as maimonides sees it, the aggadah of the 
613 commandments was interpreted by the rabbis in ways that match 
maimonides’ radical understanding of the difference between the first 
two commandments and the remaining ones. This appears to be sufficient 
cause for maimonides to take this aggadah, or at least a part of it, as more 
than just a pious homily. Furthermore, the aggadah gives maimonides the 
opportunity to prove not only that dogma could be commanded, but also 
that the belief in God’s existence and His oneness are commandments 
that belong in the TaRYaG count: they form part of the halakhic corpus. 
In light of Qayyara’s enumeration and Bahya’s description of what was 
commonly thought to be contained in the 613 commandments, this last 
assertion indeed represented a major halakhic innovation.
THE TWo CommANdmENTs oF BElIEF
In the ShM, maimonides turns the dogmas of God’s existence and His 
unity into commandments. In this section, I shall examine the way 
maimonides formulates these two commandments. 
p1. To know that there is a God, as it is said, “I am the lord, thy God” 
(Exod. 20:2; deut. 5:6).
The ShM states the claim thus: “We are commanded in the belief112 of 
111 . This philosophical reading did not go unnoticed in rabbinic circles. yitzhaq b. sheshet 
(RiBasH; 1326-1408), a prominent halakhist and talmudist, criticized maimonides for 
using Greek “wisdom” to explain certain miracles, among them the sinaitic revelation. 
yitzhaq b. sheshet, Sheelot u-Teshuvot, responsum 45, 26b-27b. I am indebted to marc 
shapiro for this reference.
112 . In place of the SE’s “to know,” the ShM uses the more nuanced Arabic term, itikad, which 
semantically lies somewhere between knowledge and belief, perhaps best translated 
as “firm conviction.” see Hilman, “Tsiyunim,” Sefer ha-Mitsvot, ed. Frankel, ad loc�, s. 
v. “le-ha’amin,” 207. Also see Rawidowicz, “on maimonides’ sefer ha-madda’,” 317. 
moshe ibn Tibbon, one of the translators of the ShM, rendered itikad as “to believe” 
(le-ha’amin). unfortunately, there is no Hebrew word that conveys the nuanced meaning 
of itikad, and translators have had to choose between translating it as “knowledge” and 
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the divinity;113 that is, to believe that there is a cause of causes who 
is the efficient cause114 of everything in existence.” According to this 
formulation, the existence of God is assumed; it is only the nature of this 
deity that we must consider when we affirm His existence.115 Technically, 
as “belief.” Hilman points out that the title of sa‘adiah’s theological treatise, al-Amanat 
ve-al-Itikad, was translated by yehudah ibn Tibbon as Emunot ve-De’ot, showing that 
itikad ought to be translated as de‘ot, “opinions.” Hilman also notes the use of itikad in 
the opening line of GP I:50 as referring to knowledge, as does Kafih, in his note there. 
But see schwarz’s comments in Moreh Nevukhim, ed. schwartz, vol. 1, 10n15, who 
acknowledges Ibn Tibbon’s correct translation of sa‘adiah’s title but believes that the GP 
uses it to mean “belief.” septimus notes: “itikad refers to any firm belief or conviction: 
true, false or heretical, rationally derived or otherwise.” He observes further that this 
true conviction, however, implies nothing with respect to its truth and rationality. 
septimus draws his conclusions from the use that maimonides makes of the term in 
the GP. It follows that maimonides in the ShM would require one to believe in God even 
if such belief was not fully demonstrable. This reading is a bit difficult to entertain in 
the ShM, though perhaps maimonides’ use of the term changed over time, and earlier 
on, he had indeed used the term to refer to knowledge that is rationally demonstrable. 
A not-fully-demonstrable belief in God, however, might fit with the more skeptical tone 
of the GP. septimus, “What did maimonides mean by Madd’a?” 91n42.
113 . more precisely “lordship,” a term denoting power and mastery. Haggai ben-shammai 
indicated to me in a private communication that the Arabic term, al-rububiyya, is 
extremely rare in maimonides’ writings, neither appearing in maimonides’ Arabic 
text of the thirteen principles nor even once in the GP. Based on a number of Islamic 
sources, he suggested that the term can perhaps be rendered “lordship” or “divine 
lordship.” For stylistic purposes, I adopted the term “divinity,” a close parallel to ha-
eloqut, which is how the traditional translators have rendered this term. 
114 . The efficient cause of a house, for example, is the builder, or more exactly, the idealized 
form of the house in the builder’s soul. Chavel has “creator” instead of “cause” (Arabic 
alpaal, Hebrew po‘el). According to Efros (Philosophical Terms, s. v. “po‘el”), the word 
either means “efficient cause” or “doer.” Efros notes that “doer” “was chosen by the 
mutakallimum with reference to the Creator rather than First Cause, which is the 
Aristotelian name, because of their belief in the constant coexistence of the Cause and 
the caused.” Both here and throughout the writing of the MT, maimonides deliberately 
avoids using the simpler and more forthright term “the Creator.” He confirms this 
usage in GP I:71 and in a late gloss to the fourth article of the Thirteen Articles of 
Faith. The surprising implication of this formulation is that one can fulfill this 
commandment without necessarily believing that God created the world.
115 . This is also how Abarbanel explained it in his rebuttal of Crescas, who thought that 
in the ShM, maimonides was simply saying that one must affirm that God caused the 
world to come into existence. don Hasdai Crescas (d.1412?) was a critic of Aristotle’s 
philosophy and one of maimonides’ strongest medieval critics. see Crescas, or 
Adonai, 3; and Abarbanel, Rosh Amanah, 71-72. For an analysis of Crescas’ critique of 
maimonides on this and related matters, see Ben porat, “Emunot ve-de’ot le-mitsvot 
le-da’at ha-RamBam ve-R. Hasdai Crescas,” 216-229.
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it is therefore more correct to say that maimonides believes the first 
commandment to be the obligation to affirm the nature of the existence 
of God. The phrase “the efficient cause of everything in existence” likely 
refers to God in His capacity as prime mover. In Aristotelian terms, 
God is thus defined as First Cause and prime mover. In the second 
commandment, maimonides explicitly unifies these two qualities. 
proof: maimonides’ proof text is the verse from Exodus 20:2-3, “I 
am yHWH your God.” In his explication of the commandment, he goes 
on to say that the proof that this statement represents a commandment 
comes from R. simlai’s aggadah (which he cites verbatim): it reckons 
this verse and the subsequent one, “Thou shalt have no other gods 
before me” (Exod. 20:3), as part of the TaRYaG count. 
maimonides learns two aspects of the deity from the biblical phrase 
“I am yHWH your God [Elohekha]”: First Cause and prime mover.116 yet 
he does not show how the phrase itself connects to these two qualities. 
Which name of God would epitomize the quality of being the First 
Cause, and which the prime mover?117 Not only the exegesis but also 
the definition appears to be incomplete in the ShM, the gloss appearing 
to represent perhaps only maimonides’ first attempt to define this 
important dogma in a philosophically rigorous and complete form.
As it is stated here, the commandment offers very imprecise 
guidelines for action. What actions should one take to acquire this 
belief? In the MT, and certainly in the GP, maimonides urges one 
to study metaphysics in order to learn truths about the universe. If 
one studies but fails to believe in God, would one have fulfilled the 
116 . This reading represents philosophic eisegesis. more plausibly, the author of the aggadah 
likely viewed “I am the lord, your God” as a commandment to believe in the God that 
took the Israelites out of Egypt, the God of History rather than the First Cause. For 
an interesting discussion on this point, see Harvey, “The First Commandment and the 
God of History,” 203-216.
117 . Harvey reads maimonides as parsing this verse to account for both terms: YHWH is 
the name that refers to God as the supreme Cause, and Elohekha refers to His being 
“the cause of everything in existence.” Harvey, “The First Commandment and the God 
of History,” 209. Though his interpretation is entirely plausible, there is no textual 
support for it. I believe that Harvey was simply inserting the Halakhot’s exposition 
into the ShM, as I will discuss later.
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commandment?118 Is one obligated to acquire this strong belief under 
any circumstances? Additionally, maimonides does not define what 
he means by “cause.” Hanna Kasher has observed that throughout his 
works, maimonides uses this term in various ways, all consonant with 
the multiple meanings that the term came to possess in Aristotle’s 
works. In this particular case, the term could indicate final cause as 
well as efficient cause.119
These questions and others are fundamental to a proper 
understanding of the commandment. since maimonides warned in the 
introduction of the ShM that the ShM was not going to be absolutely 
precise nor necessarily complete in its formulations, one is tempted to 
resort to the Halakhot for help in elaborating on and complementing 
some of these inchoate formulations. unfortunately, this strategy 
is methodologically flawed: one must consider the possibility that 
maimonides had altered his views by the time he wrote the Halakhot� It 
cannot thus be assumed that the Halakhot reflects his earlier thinking.120
118 . Abarbanel grapples with Crescas’ objection that commands imply choice, while 
logically demonstrated truths leave no room for choice. If one knows, one must 
believe — and therefore, genuine beliefs cannot be commanded. Abarbanel responds by 
arguing that the command to believe should be understood as a command to prepare 
oneself through studies that will (or might?) eventually lead to belief. one is thus 
commanded to prepare oneself to believe. But does Abarbanel think that maimonides 
maintains that studies will inevitably lead to believing in the nature of His existence? 
And if his studies do not succeed in producing belief, has the faithful fulfilled the 
commandment? Abarbanel does not say. see Abarbanel, Rosh Amana, 118-119.
119 . Kasher, “does ‘ought’ Imply ‘Can’ in maimonides?” 17-18. see also note 114 above. 
The final cause of a house, for example, is its purpose or end (telos): the provision of 
shelter. God may be the final cause of the universe in the sense that the universe is 
moving toward actualization, living completely according to the will of God. 
120 . Two small examples will suffice to make this point. First, on close reading, one 
notes that the definition in the Halakhot varies slightly but meaningfully from the 
one offered in the ShM: “The basic principle of all basic principles …is that there is a 
First Existent who brought every existing thing into being” (emphasis added). In the 
Halakhot, maimonides seems here to posit God’s existence rather than to presuppose 
it. Crescas also thought that there was a difference between the ShM’s formulation and 
the Halakhot’s. Abarbanel did not accept this distinction and attempted to harmonize 
both pronouncements. Abarbanel, Rosh Amanah, 70-72. second, the Halakhot differs 
from the ShM in the way it parses the phrase “I am yHWH your lord”: “YHWH stands 
for Necessary Being” (Hilkhot Yesode ha-Torah 1:1-4), while “Elohekha stands for God 
of the universe and lord of the earth, the one who controls the sphere of the universe, 
the mover” (ibid., 1:5).
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p2. To acknowledge His unity,121 as it is said, “The lord our God, the 
lord is one” (deut. 6:4).
This is the second of the two beliefs that maimonides innovatively 
introduces in the enumeration of commandments. more specifically, 
the ShM reads, “We are commanded in the belief of unity,122 that is to 
say, to believe that the cause of all things in existence and their first 
cause is one.” What was stated only in passing in p1 is now stated 
explicitly: God, the First Cause, is also the prime mover.123 
proof: maimonides maintains that the injunction is contained in 
the phrase “Hear o Israel: the lord our God, the lord is one” (deut. 
6:4). In support of this claim, he writes: 
In most midrashim you will find this explained as meaning that we are 
to declare the unity of God’s name, or the unity of God, or something 
of that kind. The intention of the sages was to teach that God brought 
us out of Egypt and heaped kindness upon us only on condition that we 
121 . literally, “to unify Him” (le-yahado). The Arabic equivalent of unification, tawhid, “is a 
term applied to the belief, or the profession of faith, in one God” (GP, ed. pines, I:35, 
81 n. 4). I used Hyamson’s translation of yihud as “unity” because it matches Efros, 
Philosophical Terms, 57, s. v. “yihud,” although “oneness” may convey a slightly more 
precise philosophical understanding. In general, I have used the words “oneness” and 
“unity” interchangeably in this work. 
122 . Hebrew, be-emunat ha-yihud. Arabic, b-itikad al-tuhid. I have already discussed the 
Arabic term itikad in connection with p1, showing that it represents firm conviction. 
Chavel translated the sentence as “to believe in the unity of God,” but the added words 
are not in the original text.
123 . As he did with respect to p1, maimonides changes this definition in the Halakhot (see 
above, note 122) in this case rather dramatically. In Hilkhot Yesode ha-Torah 1:7, he 
writes: “This God is one … so that none of the things existing in the universe to which 
the term one is applied is like unto His unity; neither such a unit as a species which 
comprises many units, nor such a unit as a physical body which consists of parts and 
dimensions. His unity is such that there is no other unity like it in the world.” He 
does not mention the unity of the First Cause and the prime mover. Harvey asserts 
that while Hilkhot Yesode ha-Torah 1:5 and 1:7 identify the prime mover with God, 2:3 
and 3:1 disprove this identification (and so, he notes, does GP II:4). He claims that 
ultimately, maimonides does not identify the prime mover with God. This position 
is supported by the different definitions of “unity” in the ShM and in the Halakhot. 
Harvey, “The Mishneh Torah as a Key to the secrets of the Guide,” 17-19. I am indebted 
to marc shapiro for helping me refine this point and for referring me to Harvey’s 
article. 
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believe in His unity, which is our bounden duty. The commandment to 
believe in God’s unity [mitsvat yihud] is mentioned in many places, and 
the sages also call this commandment “Kingdom” [malkhut], for they 
speak of the obligation “to take upon oneself the yoke of the Kingdom 
of Heaven [le-qabbel ’alav ol malkhut shamayim],” that is to say, to declare 
God’s unity and to believe in Him.
maimonides struggles to find a source for this independent 
commandment. He introduces the term mitsvat yihud,124 stating 
that the commandment is “mentioned in many places,” and that this 
commandment is the equivalent of taking upon oneself the yoke of the 
Kingdom of Heaven. perla points out that the referenced midrashim 
relate to the declaration of unity made while reciting the shema — a 
commandment separately enumerated as p10. Furthermore, perla 
notes that neither of the cited expressions, mitsvat yihud or mitsvat 
malkhut, which could have been read as commandment markers, are in 
evidence in the midrashim.125 
The expression “to take upon oneself the yoke of the Kingdom of 
Heaven” comes from M Berakhot 2:2, where it serves as justification 
for reciting the shema before reciting the section “And it shall come 
to pass if ye shall hearken” (deut. 11:13-21). one must accept the 
yoke of Heaven, symbolized by the first paragraph of the shema, 
before one accepts the performance of the commandments (meqabbel 
‘alav ‘ol mitsvot), symbolized by the second paragraph� However we 
understand the idea of accepting the yoke of Heaven — and it is often 
read as offering one’s life and possessions for God’s sake (martyrdom, 
qiddush ha-Shem)126 — it is difficult to equate such a pious expression of 
acceptance with a mandate to believe in His unity. Kafih’s explanation, 
124 . We see here again that maimonides uses the term mitsvat-X to prove a commandment 
claim. see the discussion of this marker in chapter 2.
125 . perla, Sefer ha-Mitsvot le-RaSaG, vol. 1, 141-142. see also Sefer ha-Mitsvot, ed. Kafih, 
ad loc., n. 11, regarding mitsvat yihud. Confirming their observations, I conducted a 
quick search of rabbinic literature and did not encounter a single use of the term 
mitsvat yihud in the extant literature. While it may have existed in lost texts, it is hard 
to square an occasional mention with the statement that it is found in “many places.”
126 . Note that the acceptance of the yoke is qualified by the phrase “with all your heart, 
with all your soul and with all your resources.” In BT Berakhot 61b, a tanna interprets 
“with all your soul” to mean “even if he takes your soul.”
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“one cannot adequately accept the yoke of Heaven without first 
recognizing the truth of His unity” does no more than beg the question. 
The talmudic dictum to which maimonides refers states that the 
order of the shema’s sections allows one to “first accept the yoke of 
Heaven and then one can accept the yoke of commandments.” In Hilkhot 
Qeriyat Shema 1:2, maimonides reformulates this dictum, stating that 
one recites the first section of the shema first “because there is in [the 
section] the unity of God, the love for Him, and the study [talmudo] 
of Him. This is the great and essential matter on which all depends.”127 
This reformulation matches his statement in the ShM that to accept the 
yoke of Heaven is to believe in His unity. Regardless which formulation 
of the dictum we use, maimonides clearly maintains that the scriptural 
commandment consists of internalizing the belief in His unity, rather 
than proclaiming it (as the rabbinic sources imply).128 
Conspicuously absent from this commandment’s argumentative 
apparatus is the aggadah about the 613 commandments. As we saw 
earlier, maimonides interprets this aggadah to indicate that the words 
spoken directly by God, “I” and “Thou shalt not have,” conveyed two 
principles: the existence and the unity of God. perhaps he fails to quote 
“Thou shalt not have” as a proof text for this commandment because 
that injunction is negatively phrased. since positive commandments 
must be phrased in the positive, “Thou shalt not have” cannot be used 
as a proof text. Nevertheless, maimonides certainly relies on this 
aggadah to define his commandment, which otherwise finds no echo 
in rabbinic sources. 
maimonides’ ethico-philosophical approach informs the concept 
of God’s unity and compels him to find a place for it in the TaRYaG 
constellation. The goal of the commandment “to unify Him” is to acquire 
127 . At least two commentators struggled to understand maimonides’ reformulation: Isaac 
Almosonino, ’Edut BiYehosef, and david luria, Yad David, both cited by Kafih in his 
commentary. Mishneh Torah, ed. Kafih, Hilkhot Qeriyat Shema 1:2.
128 . Neither Qayyara nor any of the other geonic enumerators understood the 
commandment to declare the unity of God as entailing anything other than the 
recitation of the shema. see Qayyara, pq1; Elijah ha-Zaqen in Sefer Mitsvot he-Arukh, 
184, p29; al-Bargeloni in Sefer Mitsvot he-Arukh, 228, p1-p2; sa‘adiah Gaon, Sefer ha-
Mitsvot, ps3-ps4; Ibn Gabirol, Zohar ha-Raqia, 5, p1, Also see the discussion of the 
commandment to recite the shema below, in chapter 8.
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the basic beliefs for attaining intellectual virtue and “through which 
the ultimate perfection may be obtained.” In his efforts to add this 
commandment to his list, maimonides subtly reinterprets a tannaitic 
statement that more literally concerns praxis, the recitation of the shema, 
rather than doxa, the belief in His unity. He transforms the monotheistic 
affirmation into an obligatory dogma and then moves to add a second 
and related commandment, that of reciting the shema twice daily (p10). 
Would scripture, on maimonides’ reading, have mandated an obligation 
to recite the unity of God, even as it has already mandated the faithful 
to apprehend His unity? In chapter 8, we will resolve this apparent 
superfluity by positing the existence of two distinct legal sources.
* * *
perhaps here is the place to take a small detour and reflect on what it 
means to introduce dogma as a religious duty. When reviewing these 
two commandments of belief, one is struck by how difficult they are to 
understand and thus how impractical they are for the average religious 
practitioner. While the ShM may not be a fully formed halakhic work, 
as we noted earlier and as maimonides had himself admitted, the same 
cannot be said with respect to the MT, which was intended to be not 
only a comprehensive but also a practical legal code. And yet, even 
after reading the MT, one is left wondering how the faithful reader 
is to go about fulfilling these highly sophisticated commandments of 
belief. If one cannot understand the philosophic definitions attached 
to these dogmas, can one still fulfill these two commandments? should 
one conclude that maimonides was an elitist who only addressed the 
cognoscenti? In his introduction to the MT, maimonides states that his 
intention is to make the law accessible to all — “the young and the old.”129 
129 . m. m. schneerson notes that maimonides presents in the Halakhot general 
foundational principles that nevertheless fall short of what the talmudic rabbis called 
“the heads of the topics” (BT Hagigah 13a), since the latter can be communicated only 
to an individual who is “wise and able to draw conclusions independently” (as per 
Hilkhot Yesode ha-Torah 2:12, 4:10-11). At the beginning of studying Torah, everyone 
must know these principles. see schneerson, “mitsvat yedi‘at ha-shem,” vol. 2, siman 
22 (5745), 136 and 145.
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If this statement of intention is only remotely true, one would have to 
conclude that the religious person need not be a philosopher to affirm 
these two theological propositions and consider him or herself to have 
satisfied these commandments. 
Kellner suggests that maimonides writes for a variety of 
audiences simultaneously “without drawing explicit attention to that 
fact.” He writes for talmudists with no background in philosophy, for 
talmudists who aspire to become philosophers, and for philosophers, 
all at once. When talmudists read maimonides’ works, because of 
the context, vocabulary and style, they think “they are reading a 
wholly traditional text, totally unobjectionable, and fully consistent 
with conventional religion as popularly understood.” The more 
philosophically sophisticated reader, however, can read the same 
passage and find in it “statements consistent with some of the more 
daring maimonidean theses expressed (later) in the Guide of the 
Perplexed.”130 The faithful, uninitiated in philosophical matters, would 
gain the basic ideas that the belief in God is a foundational belief, that 
God is characterized as the creator of all things, and that everything 
derives its existence from God and cannot exist without Him.131 They 
would also learn that God’s unity is unlike any other kind of unity, 
and that it necessarily precludes His being corporeal. Finally, they 
would learn that the belief in God’s unity is also foundational, that 
“God brought us out of Egypt and heaped kindness upon us only on 
condition that we believe in His unity.”132 
In the previous section, I referred to a passage in GP II:33 in which 
maimonides reveals the deep secret hidden in the aggadah of R. simlai 
and what it tells us about the revelation at sinai. Embedded in the 
content of the philosophical revelation, however, is a key pedagogical 
130 . Kellner, “The literary Character of the mishneh Torah,” 30-31. This in no way implies 
that maimonides intended to deceive his unsophisticated audience. Rather, as a master 
pedagogue, he allowed the reader to climb the ladder of religious sophistication. 
maimonides does demand a minimum understanding of the foundational beliefs. 
For example, he insists that “children, women, stupid ones, and those of a defective 
natural disposition” be taught basic principles such as the incorporeity of God, despite 
their inability to prove these doctrines (GP I:35, 81).
131 . Kellner, “The literary Character of the mishneh Torah,” 33.
132 . ShM, p2.
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approach. maimonides comments that while all Israel heard the “voice 
of words” (deut. 4:12) at sinai — that same voice through which moses 
and Israel learned the doctrines of “I” and “Thou shalt not have” — not 
everyone understood the message equally. “Know,” he says, “that with 
regard to that voice too, their rank was not equal to the rank of moses 
our master.” Each member of the Israelite nation heard the principles 
as befitted his or her level of philosophical sophistication. Everyone, 
even those totally uninitiated in philosophical matters, heard the two 
principles, and understood them in their own ways.133 
The varying levels of understanding of the heterogeneous crowd at 
sinai offers a working model for the pedagogic presentation of the two 
foundational credos. despite their physical and intellectual constraints, 
with proper training and effort, the philosophically uneducated can 
reach higher levels of understanding of the divine, eventually coming 
to love and fear God. In the MT, maimonides offers a minimum 
definition of what one must believe and affirm to fulfill these two 
commandments.134 As Kellner has shown, however, these definitions 
can be heard and understood in many different, even non-philosophical 
ways. still, as the sinaitic model teaches, the unenlightened faithful 
will no doubt have satisfied the religious obligation. maimonides would 
nevertheless recommend that the person who wishes to fulfill these 
commandments in an optimal manner should read and re-read these 
definitions, while getting a deeper appreciation through a systematic 
study of the sciences of logic and metaphysics. 
 
133 . maimonides states in the GP (III:27, 510) that the welfare of the soul “consists in 
the multitude’s acquiring correct opinions corresponding to their respective capacity” 
(emphasis added). These pedagogic tendencies were not always appreciated. samuel 
ibn Tibbon, his main translator and student, attacked maimonides for presuming 
that the masses could rise to the philosophical heights of attaining a proper 
understanding of divine matters, suggesting instead that they be taught to believe 
in the God who took them out of Egypt, the God of History. see Frankel, “ma‘avar 
le-Talmid Ne‘eman,” 61-82
134 . In this respect, maimonides, the pedagogue, imitated the law, which had presented 
these notions in “a summary way” (GP III:28, 512)� see the discussion of the 
commandment to love God in chapter 9. As we shall see there, the commandments 
to love and fear God are but extensions of the first two commandments, rather than 
separate commandments.
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somE ClosING REFlECTIoNs oN SEfER HA-MITSvoT
Before we move to the second half of this book, which will deal almost 
exclusively with the MT, it might be in order to make a few concluding 
remarks about the focus of our work to this point, the Sefer Ha-Mitsvot. 
The ShM represents maimonides’ first attempt to unravel, identify, and 
interpret the complete corpus of scriptural law.135 This hermeneutic 
interest continued to engage his attention for at least another 25 
years, during which time he composed the MT, the GP, and the Essay 
on Resurrection, among other minor essays and letters. As befits a 
great thinker, maimonides frequently brought new interpretative 
insights to old material, and so we find, for example, that many of the 
ShM’s initial claims were tweaked, changed, or even omitted in the MT 
and the GP� At the same time, he never ceased to make revisions to 
all his literary creations even after he had completed them, witnessed 
by the existence of a number of extant versions of some of his works. 
Nevertheless, it can be said that each of the stages of maimonides’ 
literary activity, always infused with original and creative ideas, 
represents a finality of sorts, each reveals a possibility persuasively 
dressed in conclusive garb, and yet none give the impression of being 
truly conclusive, if only because one senses that maimonides continues 
to find new ways to read texts. That is why the ShM can stand on its 
own, despite later revisions. 
The ShM has a character all of its own. It is distinctively a rhetorical 
work, making bold claims and briefly supporting these claims with 
scriptural and rabbinic texts. It is uniquely a methodological work, 
synthesizing and fitting a vast body of rabbinic material into a 
number of taxonomic principles. And it is a uniquely popular work, 
written in the Judeo-Arabic vernacular, favoring broad and general 
definitions and stating them in a simple and uncomplicated form.136 
135 . I use the phrase “scriptural law” here to contrast with the oral law, to which 
maimonides dedicated the commentary to the mishnah. 
136 . We already saw that while the MT may also be directed to a popular audience, it 
contains language and hints that operate on a highly sophisticated level, often intended 
to accommodate more than one meaning. see Kellner, “The literary Character,” 29-
45. For more on this manner of writing, see Henshke, “on the Question of unity in 
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By maimonides’ own admission, the ShM is often imprecise, as 
if in a hurry to be completed, but for that reason it tends towards 
valuable first impressions, raw ideas that lack the full complexity 
and casuistry of talmudic discussions or the rigours and detainment 
required for harmonizing disparate passages, but which reveal the 
author’s immediate and favorite concerns. In common with some of 
his other works, and despite its avowed brevity, the ShM is didactic, 
presenting a fair number of important and original theological, 
juridical, historiographical, and politico-philosophical ideas. Because 
the ShM is a popular work, it addresses a wide audience. It sets out 
to instruct Rabbanites, to edify readers of scripture unfamiliar with 
rabbinic midrash,137 to polemicize against Karaite sympathizers and 
committed Karaites,138 and to impress enlightened muslims and 
muslim colleagues.139 
The ShM is not only an important work of halakhah, but it is also an 
important work in the history of Jewish thought. In composing the MT, 
maimonides both builds on the TaRYaG framework he had developed 
and revisits many of the views he held in the ShM. In the chapters that 
follow, I shall explore how he reinterprets, redefines and reorders much 
of the earlier material, offering a much more nuanced view of the law. 
I will also analyze a dichotomy that has lain dormant for centuries in 
the subtle crevices of maimonides’ exquisite language: maimonides the 
jurist versus maimonides the legal philosopher. 
maimonides’ Thought,” 37-52. For a philosophical appreciation of the MT, see Twersky, 
Introduction to the Code of Maimonides, 356-507; pines, “The philosophical purport,” 
1-14; and Harvey, “The Mishneh Torah as a Key to the secrets of the Guide,” 11-28.
137 . Replying to a correspondent who questioned maimonides’ interpretation of scripture 
in the matter of one of his commandment claims (p8), Abraham maimonides writes: 
“in this regard, we, the congregation of Rabbanites differ from the way of the Karaites.” 
While the inquirer may or may not have been a Karaite, he was certainly a close reader 
of scripture who appreciated the Rules of the ShM but may have been unfamiliar with 
rabbinic midrash. see Abraham maimonides, “Teshuvot Rabbenu Abraham ben ha-
RamBam,” siman 63. 
138 . For example, see maimonides’ lengthy disquisition at p153, discussed below in chapter 
7. Also see maimonides’ comments at p109 and his reference to the “true book.”
139 . Friedberg, “Cross-Cultural Influences and the possible Role of Competition in the 
selection of some Commandments,” 410-414.
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AppENdIX:
The TaRYaG Count as an outline of Legal Themes in Scripture: 
Evidence from N194
In chapters 3 and 5 of this work, I give examples of my thesis that 
maimonides’ enumeration of commandments in the ShM might be 
more accurately viewed as a classified outline of the legal themes to 
be covered in the upcoming MT than as a precise enumeration of 
scriptural commandments. In this appendix, I wander outside of my 
self-imposed universe of positive commandments and examine the 
claim that prohibits the drinking of libation wine (N194). I shall argue 
that this commandment supports my thesis that the enumeration 
of the commandments is first and foremost an outline of scriptural 
themes. I find implicit support for this view from no less than one of 
the most prominent medieval authorities on matters of enumeration, 
simeon b. Tsemah duran, author of the Zohar ha-Raqia. 
The SE version of N194 reads as follows: “Not to drink libation wine 
[yein nesekh] [of idolaters], as it is said, ‘Which did eat the fat of their 
sacrifices, and drank the wine of their drink-offering’ [deut. 32:38].” 
In the ShM, maimonides, following BT ‘Avodah Zarah 29b, glosses: 
“this shows that the prohibition which applies to sacrifices offered to 
an idol applies likewise to libation-wine.” maimonides’ unusually long 
evidentiary discussion following this gloss evinces a certain degree of 
discomfort with the proposed argument. 
Nahmanides’ critique of the argument deals primarily with 
maimonides’ interpretation of the sources he cites. For the most part, 
the critique is not immediately relevant to our concerns. What draws 
our attention, however, is Nahmanides’ remark that this prohibition 
is already included in N25. That prohibition, as formulated in the SE, 
reads as follows: “Not to make use of an idol, or its accessory objects, or 
its offerings, or its libations, as it is said, ‘Neither shalt thou bring an 
abomination into thy house’ [deut. 7:26].” Nahmanides notes:
It is surprising that he, may his memory be blessed, takes the trouble 
to demonstrate in this gloss that the prohibition to drink libation wine 
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is scriptural, even though, according to him, libation wine is already 
included in the rubric of offerings to an idol, from which even benefit is 
prohibited by scriptural dint.140 
In other words, N194 is redundant.
Nahmanides also rejects the possibility that the claim might be 
justified on the basis of its punishment, namely, that drinking libation 
wine is punishable with a third set of lashes in addition to the two sets of 
lashes for deriving benefit from idolatrous offerings. He argues that even 
if we were to grant that drinking libation wine is prohibited separately 
from deriving benefit from it, and thus punishable with additional 
lashes, maimonides does not provide an adequate scriptural proof text 
for this new prohibition. This is because maimonides disqualified laws 
derived from scripture through the use of hermeneutic rules.141 It is 
true that the Talmud makes an analogy (heqesh) between libation wine 
and sacrifices offered to an idol on the basis of deuteronomy 32:38, 
but such analogies are not valid evidence on which to base a scriptural 
commandment claim, despite maimonides’ quoting it.142 
140 . Hasagot, 352. Note that, at N25, the ShM mentions the prohibition against deriving 
benefit from “anything attributed to idolatry,” but does not mention the prohibition 
on libation wine. Nahmanides identified “anything attributed to idolatry” with 
offerings to idols and then assumed that libation wine was included in the general 
prohibition of offerings. Nevertheless, Nahmanides is aware of and actually cites the 
SE, which mentions libation wine explicitly.
141 . see the discussion of Rule 2 in chapter 7.
142 . While Isaac de leon (in Megillat Esther, ad loc.) argues, contra Nahmanides, that he 
who drinks libation wine incurs an additional set of lashes because the new prohibition 
is unrelated to the prohibition against deriving benefit from idolatrous practices, his 
thesis runs afoul of a serious problem. maimonides never produces a proof text for 
this commandment in the form of an admonition (as Nahmanides argues). Even if 
we follow Rule 14 and grant that one can use a hermeneutically-derived prohibitive 
admonition to justify a commandment when there is evidence that scripture intends 
to punish the transgressor (see applications in N9, N26, N60, N195, N318, N319) — as 
suggested by de leon — this does not appear to be the case here. No punishment is 
prescribed in deuteronomy 32:38 for one who drinks libation wine. The passage 
merely describes the activity attributed to these foreign gods: “they did eat the fat of 
their sacrifices and drank the wine of their drink-offerings.” The absence of an explicit 
punishment for those who drink libation wine as well as the absence of a properly 
formulated admonition leaves us with only one possibility: the passage cited by 
maimonides compares libation wine to idolatrous sacrifices merely to teach that just 
as it is prohibited to derive benefit from the latter (under N25), so too it is prohibited 
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To complement the above argument, Nahmanides takes aim at 
maimonides from yet another direction. He points out that one would 
not escape the charges of redundancy by positing that N194 comes to 
teach that an additional set of lashes is due to one who drinks libation 
wine, even if one could find another admonishing text. This is because 
maimonides had made it clear in a number of cases that no more than 
one set of lashes may be administered, even where scripture enjoins one 
repeatedly from committing the same act.143 since drinking libation wine 
is included in the prohibition against deriving benefit from the wine, 
only one set of lashes can be prescribed, even if we were to find a new 
prohibitive admonition. The redundancy of N194 is once again exposed. 
The simplest answer to this crux is that the prohibition against 
deriving benefit from libation wine, as a sacrifice offered to an idol, 
should be first mentioned in, and traced to, the laws of idolatry. A 
full discussion of it as a forbidden food, however, should be reserved 
for the treatise on forbidden foods.144 If a topical outline is to be 
useful in helping organize a code of law, it would have to deal with the 
prohibition against drinking libation wine separate and apart from the 
to derive benefit from libation wine. But this conclusion itself is problematic: why 
would we need a special analogy to prohibit the use of libation wine if it is no different 
from sacrifices offered to an idol? And if the latter is prohibited under N25, why would 
libation wine not be included in the same admonition? moreover, maimonides also 
includes libation wine in that prohibition, as we saw.
 drawing on the language of the Halakhot, Isaac Gatinio (Bet Ishaq [salonika, 1792], 
36), offers a more plausible suggestion: it is prohibited to derive any benefit from all 
types of sacrifices offered to idols, including libation wine, under penalty of lashes 
(Hilkhot ‘Avodah Zarah 7:2). If and when these sacrifices are edible, however, benefit 
is only derived when one eats (or drinks) them (Maakhalot Asurot 11:1, based on 
Maakhalot Asurot 8:16). Any other form of benefit is not liable for lashes. While this 
explanation has the benefit of a reasonable fit with the language of the Halakhot, it 
still leaves unanswered the ultimate question: why was it necessary for maimonides 
to enumerate the special prohibition of N194? Why was it not a detail of N25? 
143 . “Furthermore, according to the master, multiplicity of prohibitions does not translate 
into multiple lashes.” Hasagot, 352. For this principle, see Rule 9, and his discussion on 
pages 157-159. For one of the applications of this principle, see N179 (last paragraph 
on page 346) where maimonides counts the prohibition against eating swarming 
creatures as a single negative commandment, despite there being many (“even [if He 
warned as many as] one thousand times”) injunctions against eating these creatures.
144 . The importance of libation wine and its derivatives as a forbidden food cannot be 
gainsaid; its laws cover three full chapters in the MT� 
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laws that discuss the basis for its prohibition. Through this lens, N194 
is not a redundant claim.
simeon b. Tsemah duran appears to concur with this conclusion. 
After pointing out that maimonides does not offer a scripturally-based 
admonition for this commandment, but merely gives a cryptic analogy 
to sacrifices, he suggests that: 
It was not the intention of maimonides to count this prohibition as an 
independent prohibition among the 613 commandments; for when he 
counted the commandments [in his Short Enumeration], he included [this 
prohibition] among the rest of the prohibitions related to idolatry, under 
“and there shall cleave naught (of the accurse thing) to thine hand” [N24] 
and “neither shalt thou bring an abomination into thy house” [N25]. 
Rather, he wanted to include this prohibition among the special laws of 
forbidden foods, and [or but] this prohibition is the same prohibition 
that includes all the rest of the prohibitions related to idolatry. Note that 
he did not offer a new proof-text.145 
In the arch-conservative world of rabbinic halakhah, the implications 
of what duran suggests are nothing less than revolutionary: not all 
of the 613 enumerated commandment advanced by maimonides are 
intended as independent commandments. some may simply represent 
organizational notations to help outline his later work. 
145 . That is, duran continues to maintain that the deuteronomy 32:38 passage does not 
qualify as a genuine prohibition, given its form. The quote is from Zohar ha-Raqia, 
siman 29, negative commandment 74, 121.
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--------------------------------- CHApTER VI  ---------------------------------
 REVIsITING THE TERm 
MITSvAT ‘ASEH
In moving from the Sefer HaMitsvot and the accompanying “short 
Enumeration of the Commandments” (SE) to the Halakhot1 of the 
Mishneh Torah, we note the deliberate boldness with which maimonides 
designates a mitsvat ‘aseh. The declaration usually appears at the start of 
his discussion of the commandment, using the formula “it is a positive 
commandment to [do] X,” or sometimes, “it is a positive commandment 
of [or from] the Torah to [do] X.” It is thus surprising that so many 
maimonidean scholars neglect to note the absence of such a formula 
on a significant number of occasions. In this chapter, I explore the 
nature of this formula in greater detail, explaining its relevance and 
compiling a list of commandments in which this formula is absent. I 
offer an explanation of why most commentators do not comment on 
this phenomenon, present the explanations advanced by those who do 
notice it, and thus begin to present a systematic approach to this puzzle. 
 
THE ENumERATIoN ACCoRdING To THE HALAKHoT 
In the Halakhot, maimonides’ topical discussions typically begin with a 
simple and clear statement that the obligation being discussed is a positive 
(or a negative) commandment. These statements almost invariably take 
the form of “it is a positive commandment to [do] X.” Here are a few 
examples, taken from the first two books of the MT, Sefer ha-Madda‘ 
1 . A reminder to the reader: I use the term “Halakhot” instead of the more common and 
general appellation “Mishneh Torah” because I deliberately refer only to the specific 
sections of Halakhot, not to the entire Mishneh Torah� The latter includes the “Headings 
to the Treatises,” which I consider a separate composition.
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(Book of Knowledge) and Sefer Ahavah (Book of love): “It is a positive 
commandment [mitsvat ‘aseh] to adhere to the sages” (Hilkhot De‘ot 6:2); 
“It is a positive commandment to destroy idolatry and its appurtenances” 
(Hilkhot ‘Avodah Zarah 7:1); “It is a positive commandment to pray daily” 
(Hilkhot Tefillah 1:1); “It is a positive commandment on every Israelite 
male to write a scroll of law for himself” (Hilkhot Tefillin u-Mezuzah ve-
Sefer Torah 7:1); and “It is a positive commandment from the Torah2 to 
recite grace after the meal” (Hilkhot Berakhot 1:1). 
We also find slight variations on this formula, such as: “Circumcision 
is a positive commandment for which one incurs excision, as it says...” 
(Hilkhot Milah 1:1); “Abstention from work on the seventh [day] is a 
positive commandment, for scripture says…” (Hilkhot Shabbat 1:1); and 
“The Nazirite is bound by a positive commandment to let the head of 
his hair grow long, for scripture says…” (Hilkhot Nazir 1:1). 
Where the commandment requires an added explanation or where 
it is too complex or subtle to be explained with a simple definition, 
maimonides digresses briefly and then returns to designate the 
commandment as a mitsvat ‘aseh. For example, in Hilkhot Teshuvah 1:1, 
maimonides states that confession is a positive commandment only after 
stating that confession is conditional on the decision to repent. In other 
words, confession can be designated as a positive commandment only if 
and when one is ready to repent. (It falls in the category of contingent 
commandments discussed in chapter 3.) A somewhat lengthier digression 
takes place at the beginning of Hilkhot Yesode ha-Torah: 
(1.1) The basic principle of all basic principles … is to realize that there 
is a First Being…. All existing beings … exist only through His true 
existence….(1:2) If it could be supposed that He did not exist….(1:3) 
If, however, it were supposed that all other things were non-existent.… 
Hence, His real essence.…(1:4) This is what the prophet means….(1:5) 
This being is the God of the universe … a power that is without end or 
limit. (1:6) To acknowledge this truth is a positive commandment.3
2 . The additional phrase “from the Torah” appears on a number of other occasions. I 
believe that the more common expression is a short form of this longer formula. It is 
also possible that the extra emphasis may have been polemically motivated, as I will 
suggest on a number of instances. For an example, see chapter 7, note 56.
3 . These complex formulations can lead to numerous other problems. For example, in this 
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As discussed in the previous chapter, this digression is absolutely 
necessary for a proper understanding of the commandment. A similar 
approach is used with respect to the commandment to know God’s 
unity, where maimonides offers a robust and lengthy definition of the 
meaning of unity and then ends the presentation by adding: “to realize 
this truth is a positive commandment” (1:7). 
All of these declarative designations begin by identifying the 
commandment, presenting the relevant scriptural proof text, and 
reiterating at the end that it is a commandment. I argue that all 
deviations from this pattern are significant and may signal a change in 
maimonides’ paradigm of categorizing positive commandments. In my 
analysis, I call these deviations from the formula “failures to designate,” 
to emphasize that the omissions did not occur by chance but were rather 
the product of design. specifically, by a “failure to designate,” I mean 
a failure to designate a commandment (one previously identified as 
such in the ShM) at the topic’s first introduction in the Halakhot� While 
some deviations from this formula later refer to the commandment as 
a mitsvat ‘aseh, these offhand designations cannot substitute for the 
omitted formula in the commandment’s introduction. 
using this metric, I found in the Halakhot 109 instances of failures to 
designate commandments that were previously claimed in the ShM — a 
surprisingly large number. many of the omissions can be explained 
by reassessing maimonides’ criteria for what constitutes a mitsvah or 
by reassessing the specific individuations. While those two types of 
explanations do not carry exegetical or theological implications, the 
remainder of these 109 failures to designate does carry, as I see it, 
significant jurisprudential significance.
Table 1, below, identifies the 109 failures to designate 
commandments. 
particular case, the clause “to acknowledge this truth” does not have a clear antecedent. 
Faur understands that halakhot 1-4 are not part of the commandment; they simply 
represent theological doctrines. The commandment is only defined in halakhah 5, the 
acceptance of His lordship as a power that ceaselessly causes the sphere to revolve. 
Incidentally, this ambiguity also connects to the concerns regarding the exact definition 
of the belief, as discussed in chapter 5. Faur, “maimonides’ starting precept,” 15-16. For 
a contrary view, see Kasher, “does ‘ought’ Imply ‘Can’ in maimonides?” 18. 
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Table 1
p3. To love Him.
p4. To fear Him.
p8. To imitate His good and upright ways.
p9. To hallow His name.
p10. To read the shema twice daily.
p11. To learn Torah and to teach it.
p12. To bind the phylactery on the head.
p13. To bind the phylactery on the arm.
p14. To make fringes.
p15. To affix a mezuzah�
p18. That the King shall write a scroll of the Torah for himself, besides 
the one which every individual should write, so that he shall 
possess two scrolls of the Torah.
p26. That the priests shall bless Israel.
p34. That, when the ark is carried, it should be carried on the shoulder.
p41. To offer an additional sacrifice every sabbath.
p42. To offer an additional sacrifice every new moon.
p43. To offer an additional sacrifice on passover.
p44. To offer the meal offering of the omer4 on the morrow after the 
first day of passover, together with one lamb.
p45. To offer an additional sacrifice on shavu‘ot.
p46. To bring on shavu‘ot loaves of bread together with the sacrifices 
which are then offered up in connection with the loaves.
p47. To offer an additional sacrifice on Rosh ha-shanah.
p48. To offer an additional sacrifice on the day of the Fast [yom Kippur].
p49. To observe, on the day of the Fast, the service appointed for that day.
p50. To offer an additional sacrifice on sukkot.
p51. To offer an additional sacrifice on shemini ‘Atseret, which is a feast by itself.
p68. That the court of judgment shall bring an offering if it has erred in 
a judicial pronouncement.
p70. That an individual shall bring an offering if he is in doubt as to whether 
he has committed a sin for which one has to bring a sin offering.
p71. That an offering shall be brought by one who has in error committed 
a trespass against sacred things, or robbed, or lain carnally with a 
bondsmaid betrothed to a man, or denied what was deposited with 
him and swore falsely to support his denial.This is called a trespass 
offering for a known trespass.
4 . First fruits of barley harvest.
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p72. To offer a sacrifice of varying value in accordance with one’s means.
p74. That a man having an issue shall bring a sacrifice, after he is 
cleansed of his issue.
p75. That a woman having an issue shall bring a sacrifice, after she is 
cleansed of her issue.
p76. That a woman after childbirth shall bring an offering when she is clean.
p77. That the leper shall bring a sacrifice, after he is cleansed.
p87. That an exchanged beast [a beast that is exchanged for one that 
had been set apart as an offering] is sacred.
p95. To decide in cases of annulment of vows, according to the rules set 
forth in the Torah.
p96. That anyone who touches the carcass of a beast that died of itself 
shall be unclean.
p97. That eight species of creeping things defile by contact.
p98. That foods become defiled (by contact with unclean things).
p99. That a menstruating woman is unclean and defiles others.
p100. That a new mother in confinement is unclean like a menstruating 
woman.
p101. That a leper is unclean and defiles.
p102. That a leprous garment is unclean and defiles.
p103. That a leprous house defiles.
p104. That a man, having a running issue, defiles.
p105. That the seed of copulation defiles.
p106. That a woman, having a running issue, defiles.
p107. That a corpse defiles.
p108. That the waters of sprinkling defile one who is clean, and cleanse 
[the unclean] from pollution by a dead body.
p109. That purification from all kinds of defilement shall be effected by 
immersion in the waters of a miqveh�
p113. To carry out the ordinance of the red heifer so that its ashes shall 
be always available.
p114. That one who vows to the lord the monetary value of a person 
shall pay the amount appointed in the scriptural passage.
p115. That one who vows to the lord the monetary value of an unclean 
beast shall pay its value.
p116. That one who vows the value of his house shall pay according to the 
appraisal of the priest.
p117. That one who sanctifies to the lord a portion of his field shall pay 
according to the estimation appointed in the scriptural passage.
p119. That the fruit of fruit-bearing trees in the fourth year of their 
planting shall be sacred.
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p127. To set apart the tithe of the corn for the levites.
p128. To set apart the second tithe to be eaten by its owner in Jerusalem.
p129. That the levites shall set apart a tithe of the tithes, which they had 
received from the Israelites, and give it to the priests.
p130. To set apart in the third and sixth year the tithe for the poor, 
instead of the second tithe.
p139. That houses sold within a walled city may be redeemed within a year.
p145. To decide, in regard to dedicated property, which is sacred to the 
lord, and which belongs to the priest.
p148. To set the mother bird free when taking the nest.
p149. To examine the marks in cattle.
p150. To examine the marks in fowl, so as to distinguish between the 
unclean and the clean.
p151. To examine the marks in locusts, so as to distinguish the clean 
from the unclean.
p152. To examine the marks in fish.
p159. To rest on the first day of passover.
p160. To rest on the seventh day of that feast [passover].
p162. To rest on the fiftieth day (from the time of cutting the omer)�
p163. To rest on the first day of the seventh month.
p166. To rest on the first day of sukkot.
p167. To rest on the eighth day of that feast [sukkot].
p168. To dwell in booths seven days.
p169. To take on that feast a palm branch and the other three plants.
p172. To heed the call of every prophet in each generation, provided that 
he neither adds to, nor takes away from, the Torah.
p173. To appoint a king.
p178. That one who possesses evidence shall testify in court.
p181. To decapitate the heifer in the manner prescribed.
p183. To give the levites cities to dwell in that also serve as cities of refuge.
p190. In an optional war, to observe the procedure prescribed in the Torah.
p191. To anoint a special priest [to address the soldiers] in a war.
p199. To return a pledge to its owner.
p201. That the hired laborer shall be permitted to eat [of the produce 
which he is reaping].
p205. To rebuke the sinner.
p209. To honor the wise.
p214. That the newly-married husband shall give happiness to his wife.
p221. To deal with a beautiful woman taken captive in war in the manner 
prescribed in the Torah.
p222. To divorce by a formal written document.
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p223. That the woman suspected of adultery be dealt with as prescribed 
in the Torah.
p226. That the court shall execute [sentences of death] by decapitation 
with the sword.
p227. That the court shall execute [sentences of death] by strangulation.
p228. That the court shall execute [sentences of death] by burning with fire.
p229. That the court shall execute [sentences of death] by stoning.
p232. To deal judicially with the Hebrew bondsman, in accordance with 
the laws pertaining to him.
p233. To espouse a Hebrew maidservant.
p234. To redeem her [the Hebrew maidservant].
p235. To keep the Canaanite slave forever.
p236. That he who inflicts a bodily injury shall pay monetary compensation.
p237. To judge cases of injuries caused by beasts.
p238. To judge cases of damage caused by an uncovered pit.
p239. To adjudge a thief to pay compensation, or [in certain cases] suffer death.
p240. To adjudicate cases of damage caused by trespass of cattle.
p241. To adjudicate cases of damage caused by fire.
p242. To adjudicate cases of damage by a gratuitous depositary.
p243. To judge cases of damage of a paid depositary and a hirer.
p244. To adjudicate cases of damage of a gratuitous borrower.
p245. To adjudicate cases of purchase and sale.
p246. To adjudicate other cases between a plaintiff and a defendant.
p247. To save the pursued even at the cost of the life of the pursuer.
p248. To adjudicate cases of inheritances.
There are various ways to account for this surprisingly large number 
of failures to designate laws as positive commandments which had 
been designated thus in the ShM. one could posit that maimonides 
was careless in drafting the Halakhot, and that he erred in failing 
to indicate that certain commandments were mitsvot ‘aseh. less 
dramatically, perhaps he decided that it was not necessary to state 
in every case that the command was a positive commandment. If we 
assume that maimonides did change his mind about whether these 
laws should be considered mitsvot ‘aseh, we could posit that he used the 
Rules from the ShM to revisit his analyses, concluding that only 139 
of the commandments were defensible. Finally, we might posit that 
maimonides changed the criteria for defining a mitsvat ’aseh, modifying 
or rejecting the Rules of the ShM. 
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Can maimonides be accused of slipshod writing? medieval and 
modern rabbis praise the language of his rulings for its precision and 
nuance, as capable of shouldering inferences as is talmudic language.5 
Rabbinic literature teems with observations, indications, and rulings 
that are derived from the nuances of maimonides’ formulations — from 
his commissions as well as from his omissions. As Twersky posits in a 
lengthy discussion, modern Jewish law has been built on the back of 
the MT.6 on the basis of the subjective appreciation of hundreds of 
scholars, one might be tempted to conclude that the failure to designate 
commandments with a standard form cannot be seen as mere oversight. 
But there are two additional factors that make this conclusion a near 
certainty, factors intimately related to the very essence of maimonides’ 
project. First, he displays an extraordinary interest — one might call it an 
5 . see malachi ben yaaqov ha-Kohen, Yad Malachi, “Kelale ha-Rambam,” 182, para. 3, 
citing Mishpete Shmuel, no. 120, and Migdal oz “in many places.” levinger (in Darkhe 
ha-Mahshavah, ch 1, 13-33) attempts to demonstrate that this reputation for extreme 
precision is somewhat overstated. He attributes this imprecision to the popular 
nature of the work — the MT, as maimonides writes in the introduction, is addressed 
to “young and old.” Words and phrases are sometimes used that lack precise values, 
and one can conclude that they are to be read synonymously. Examples include the 
side-by-side use of the words matar and geshamim throughout Hilkhot Ta‘anit, yom 
ha-kippurim and yom ha-tsom in Hilkhot Kele ha-Miqdash 8:3-5, and qibbets and tsiref 
in Hilkhot Maakhalot Asurot 4:17. levinger also discusses other types of imprecision, 
such as internal contradictions. I would add other oddities to his list. For example, 
new terms appear suddenly in discussions without prior definition (such as iggeret in 
Hilkhot Sotah 4:8); often, cases that are cited almost verbatim from talmudic passages 
fail to provide necessary context, making it difficult if not impossible to understand 
the ruling; inconsistent classification for identical indications (such as in Hilkhot 
Ishut 15:17, “hovah” vs. Hilkhot Sotah 4:18, “mitsvat hakhamim”); and others. For an 
extremely interesting and well-documented monograph arguing that maimonides was 
indeed “all too human” — he made errors, forgot things, contradicted himself, and used 
imprecise language — see shapiro, Principles of Interpretation in Maimonidean Halakhah. 
I do not dispute these criticisms. Rather, I argue that the very nature of this massive 
project, to organize, categorize, and clearly present the totality of the Jewish law, 
required standard and unambiguous statements formulating the scope and nature of 
each commandment. To say that maimonides forgot to provide such statements on 
many occasions impugns the character of the work. To put maimonides’ errors in his 
own philosophic language, one could say that the many mistakes that he made were 
all of an “accidental” nature. Failures to designate, on the other hand, would represent 
errors of an “essential” nature. 
6 . see Twersky, Introduction to the Code of Maimonides, 517.
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obsession — in clearly demarcating between commandments of scriptural 
origin and those of rabbinic origin. This is as true in his commentary 
to the mishnah as it is in the MT and the ShM.7 In all these writings, 
maimonides continuously reminds the reader of the sources of the law: 
which commandments are scriptural and which are not. scriptural laws 
must be identified because they are more strictly enforced than rabbinic 
ones and can never be repealed, unlike rabbinic laws.8 scriptural laws 
occupy a privileged position not only in maimonides’ jurisprudence but 
also in his theology. He dedicates an important part of the GP to justifying 
the great majority of the mosaic laws, since in his opinion, unlike man-
made laws (nomos), these laws are deemed to be perfect.9 The statement 
“it is a positive commandment to do X” — usually accompanied and 
supported by a scriptural proof text — is as simple as it is unequivocal, and 
functions well as an effective demarcation of such laws. maimonides has 
good reason to consistently use this formula to designate commandments. 
second, the formula “it is a positive commandment to do X” 
is not only a rhetorically powerful and dramatic statement; it also 
bespeaks authority. maimonides identifies more than 140 positive 
commandments throughout the entire MT with this formula, or with 
a slight variant. It is unlikely that an author so attuned to rhetorical 
effect and so intent on establishing authority would have forgotten to 
use this formula on as many as 109 occasions.10 
7 . other scholars also note this interest. For example, Feldblum states that “maimonides 
is unique among the codifiers of Jewish law in his careful and systematic assignment 
of laws to … specific categories.… such categories are significant both halakhically 
and historically.” Feldblum, “Criteria for designating laws: derivations from Biblical 
Exegesis, and legislative Enactments,” 45.
8 . on the immutability of scriptural law, see Hilkhot Yesode ha-Torah 9:1 and Hilkhot 
Mamrim 2:9. on the difference in the strictness of their enforcement, see Hilkhot 
Mamrim 1:5.
9 . GP II:39, 40.
10 . on the author’s high self-evaluation of his work and on his expectations that “in 
coming days…all of Israel will fill all its needs with this [the MT],” see maimonides’ 
letter to his disciple yosef b. yehudah, in Iggerot ha-RaMBaM, ed. shailat, vol. 1, 300-
301. maimonides’ high expectations were realized quickly because of the quality and 
authoritativeness of the work. on the rapid dissemination of the MT, even during 
maimonides’ lifetime, see Twersky, Introduction to the Code of Maimonides, 518. on the 
nature of his expectations for the MT, see Halbertal, “What is Mishneh Torah?” 81-111. 
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on a handful of occasions, maimonides does apply the label 
mitsvat ‘aseh to a particular command, but he does so outside of the 
main discussion of the commandment (its locus classicus), which I do 
not see as equivalent to designating the commandment as a mitsvat 
‘aseh in its section. It is highly unlikely that the failure to designate 
these commandments in their proper places is a lapsus calami, given 
maimonides’ organizational skills and the routine nature of the 
formulation. Indeed, naming these commands mitsvot ‘aseh outside of 
their loci classici also requires analysis and explanation. 
A clarifying example: maimonides does not designate the wearing 
of phylacteries (tefillin), the dwelling in booths (sukkah) and the 
taking of a branch (lulav) as mitsvot ‘aseh when he introduces these 
commandments in their sections of the Halakhot� However, when 
he discusses these commandments in Hilkhot Berakhot 11:2, he does 
refer to them as mitsvot ‘aseh. Can these out-of-place designations 
compensate for the lack of designation in the main treatments of these 
commandments, perhaps making up for the earlier omission? And 
despite maimonides’ failure to designate in the introduction to these 
commandments, does the later usage of the term mitsvat ‘aseh indicate 
that they are nevertheless obligatory and enjoy scriptural force? 
I answer both of these questions with a categorical no. First, the 
primary sections for two of the named commandments (the dwelling 
in booths and the taking of a branch) are placed after Hilkhot Berakhot. 
There was no need for maimonides to compensate in Berakhot for an 
earlier slip; he could have named these commandments mitsvot ‘aseh in 
their proper place. 
second, I argue that the imprecision actually occurred in Hilkhot 
Berakhot, where the scriptural nature of the commands was not 
the main concern, rather than in the sections that discuss those 
commandments in detail. The key focus of Hilkhot Berakhot 11:2, 
which discusses blessing formulas, is not whether a particular 
commandment is of scriptural or rabbinic authority, but rather 
whether or not the injunction is a hovah, a commandment that “one 
must strain to do and run after them to fulfill them.” depending on its 
degree of obligation, maimonides assigns a specific blessing formula 
to each commandment. In this halakhah, maimonides contrasts 
 I I I  M Sv  ‘ASEH
---------------------------------------------------------------------------  Chapter VI  --------------------------------------------------------------------------
— 170 —
obligatory commandments, like tefillin, sukkah and lulav, with non-
obligatory commandments, like building a parapet on the roof and 
affixing a mezuzah to the door of a house. The first group is called 
mitsvot ‘aseh, and the second group is simply called mitsvot, which 
maimonides describes as “akin to the permissible [optional]” (domeh 
le-reshut). The term mitsvat ‘aseh is here used as equivalent to the 
term hovah, obligatory, in much the same sense as the latter term is 
generally used — it does not indicate that these commandments are 
commanded explicitly in the Torah.11 Thus the question still remains: 
why does maimonides fail to designate tefillin, sukkah, and lulav as 
mitsvot ‘aseh in their main sections? 
I posit that maimonides’ failure to designate these 109 
commandment claims previously identified in the ShM is deliberate, 
and that analyzing the omissions can provide useful information. 
In attempting to resolve the problem, I will avoid providing 109 ad 
hoc, fit-to-order solutions, which lack an underlying coherence. my 
approach will be guided by ockham’s Razor, the rule that the most 
likely philosophical theory is the one that accounts for the most 
variables.12 All else being equal, I will accept the principle that is 
likely to explain the greatest number of failures to designate, even at 
the risk of overturning long-running conventions. I ask the reader 
to judge my effort on its logic and not on its radical implications. 
At the very least, my explanations can be read as a first attempt at a 
better understanding of maimonides’ complex exegetical, legal, and 
theological creation. 
11 . Note that maimonides here calls the parapet commandment a mitsvah rather than 
a mitsvat ‘aseh, even though he designates it as a mitsvat ‘aseh in its locus classicus, 
Hilkhot Rotseah 11:1. Clearly, in Hilkhot Berakhot, he is not being precise with his 
terms: the difference between mitsvat ‘aseh and mitsvah here is the level of obligation. 
one can counter that maimonides used these two terms interchangeably. I discuss this 
issue in later chapters, where I will posit that these terms stand for different categories 
of commandments.
12 . The exact formulation, attributed to William of occam (c. 1285-1349), reads: Entia 
non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem, meaning “entities are not to be multiplied 
beyond what is necessary.” martin mosse notes that Aristotle already had written 
that “other things being equal, that proof is the better which proceeds from the fewer 
postulates,” and Euclid evidently subscribed to the same principle. mosse, The Three 
Gospels, xxi.
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THE RolE oF THE HEAdINGs To THE MISHNEH ToRAH
As noted at the beginning of this chapter, one might have expected 
maimonides’ failure to designate positive commandments to have 
attracted considerable attention from scores of commentators over 
the past eight hundred years. That this is not the case is nothing less 
than astonishing. What may have misled commentators is the fact that 
maimonides headed each treatise of the MT with a list of the positive 
and negative commandments that he was about to explicate, a list that 
parallels the SE (in theme, though not in formulation)� This seemed to 
confirm not only the enumerative scheme but also the definitional work 
done previously in the ShM and SE, even when he failed to designate 
the commandments as such in the Halakhot. This argument falters, 
however, when we note that, in over 140 cases, maimonides did explicitly 
designate positive commandments in the text of the Halakhot, despite 
the fact that their Headings described them as such. Either the Headings 
serve as sufficient evidence that the commandments are mitsvot ‘aseh, 
in which case he need not have designated them explicitly in the text, 
or the Headings should not be considered sufficient evidence, in which 
case he should have designated every commandment explicitly in the 
body of the Halakhot. 
The notion that there is a seamless continuity between the SE/ShM, 
the Headings, and the Halakhot is demonstrably false. The Halakhot do 
not always reflect the thinking of the Headings, and the Headings do 
not always reflect the thinking of the SE/ShM, as evidenced by their 
differences in formulation.13 But the discontinuity and incongruence 
13 . We find several examples of such incongruence in the MT. The Heading to Hilkhot Talmud 
Torah lists two positive commandments. The first, “to study the Torah,” is formulated 
significantly differently from how it is formulated in both the SE and the ShM (“to study 
the Torah and to teach it”). more importantly, the opening lines of the Halakhot omit 
any reference to studying Torah and simply discuss teaching Torah (without stating 
that it is a positive commandment — see chapter 8). A more subtle difference exists 
in the second entry of the Heading: “to honor its [Torah’s] teachers and those versed 
in it.” This law is formulated in the Halakhot as “it is a duty to glorify (le-hadro) every 
scholar (talmid hakhamim)” (Hilkhot Talmud Torah 6:1). If “scholar” is a term equivalent 
to “teachers and those versed in the Torah,” then the Heading is unnecessarily wordy. 
If it is not equivalent, then a substantive difference exists between the formulations. 
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is more significant than mere differences in formulations for the same 
commandments. on occasion, a commandment posited in the earlier 
works and clearly signaled in the Headings cannot even be found in the 
Halakhot. At the end of this chapter, we examine extreme examples of 
such incongruence: two commandments mentioned in the Headings 
but omitted in the Halakhot. These examples should persuade the still-
skeptical reader that the Headings do not necessarily represent the 
thinking of the Halakhot. 
A more likely answer to why commentators did not notice 
maimonides’ failure to designate positive commandments is that they 
were subject to a form of cognitive dissonance. maimonides’ TarYaG 
count was and still is viewed as the definitive count of Torah-legislated 
commandments. In a sense, he was too successful in persuading 
generations of scholars that this count produced the unique and 
incontrovertible list of commandments. It was inconceivable to the 
vast majority of maimonides’ students that the master would have 
changed his mind on such a canonical belief. If, however, we view 
the enumeration project in the light in which it ought to be seen, we 
can begin to understand the divergences between the Headings and 
the Halakhot. As I argue in the first half of this book, maimonides’ 
enumeration was intended to function primarily as an outline for 
the Mishneh Torah. There is then no reason why the commandments 
defined in the Halakhot should match the outline of the work, the 
simple list of topics and themes that may or may not represent specific 
commandments. Therefore, the Headings should not be seen as proxy 
for what does and does not constitute a positive commandment. 
moreover, one wonders why the Heading (composed in Hebrew, I might add) uses the 
word “respect” (kabed) instead of the scripturally-indicated “glorify” (hadar) used by 
the Halakhot. similarly, the Heading to Hilkhot ‘Avodah Zarah lists “not to make use 
of an idol or of an article subsidiary to it” but omits the two categories that follow 
in the text of the Halakhot: “sacrifices offered to it, and anything made for its sake” 
(Hilkhot ‘Avodah Zarah 7:2). We also find that the Heading to Hilkhot Teshuvah lists 
one positive commandment: “that the sinner shall repent of his sin before the lord 
and make confession.” The text of the Halakhot is substantively different: “if a person 
transgressed …either willfully or in error, and repents and turns away from his sin, he 
is under a duty to confess before God” (Hilkhot Teshuvah 1:1), implying that repentance 
may be optional. There are many examples of such divergences throughout the MT.
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HAI-RAQAH ANd KAFIH’s THEsIs 
At least two commentators did notice this problem of the failure to 
designate positive commandments in the Halakhot.14 The first to 
notice it was masud b. Aaron Hai-Raqah (1690-1768), the author of 
the commentary Ma‘aseh Roqeah. unfortunately, Hai-Raqah did not 
pursue this anomaly systematically and, as a result, came to the wrong 
conclusions. In his opening comment to Hilkhot Tefillah, Hai-Raqah notes: 
one needs to investigate the holy ways of our master, his memory be 
blessed, in this composition, the reason why, with regard to some 
commandments, he wrote “it is a mitsvat ‘aseh to do so-and-so” and at 
other times he totally failed to mention it, as in the case of the recitation 
of the shema and others similar, and sometimes he says ”this thing 
[davar zeh] is a mitsvat ‘aseh,” as with respect to sabbath where he writes 
“rest from work on the seventh is a mitsvat ‘aseh, etc.”
Hai-Raqah then offers an explanation that fits only a limited number of 
observations, asking the reader to apply the explanation throughout. 
Joseph Kafih revisits Hai-Raqah’s observation and suggestion, applying 
them to a larger (but still limited) number of instances, all of them 
occurring in Sefer Ahavah (Book of love) and Sefer Zemanim (Book of 
seasons). He concludes by acknowledging that “the Ma‘aseh Roqeah 
wrote something similar to [what I have offered].”15
These two commentators argue that maimonides felt no need 
to designate a commandment as a mitsvat ‘aseh if it was absolutely 
explicit in scripture (mefureshet le-gamre ba-torah). This criterion 
explains why maimonides did not immediately designate as positive 
commandments the obligation to dwell in booths (sukkah) on the 
fifteenth of Tishre, the obligation to take a palm branch (lulav) on 
sukkot, and the obligation to study Torah. Conversely, they argued, 
maimonides felt compelled to offer the designation mitsvat ’aseh when 
14 . david ibn Zimra (RadBaZ) examines every one of these introductory formulations, 
searching for variants and trying to explain them. While RadBaZ’s solutions are ingenious 
(though at times unintelligible), they are ad hoc and offer little of relevance to our inquiry. 
david ibn Zimra, Sheelot u-Teshuvot ha-RaDvaZ, vol. 8, orah Hayyim, no. 1. 
15 . Comments on Mishneh Torah, ed. Kafih, Hilkhot Qeriyat Shema 1:1, 13-14.
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the commandment was not explicitly stated in scripture, as with 
the obligations to pray (tefillah) and to consecrate the lunar month 
(qiddush ha-hodesh). While he only analyzes a handful of cases, Hai-
Raqah suggests that the student may want to apply this method to 
other cases “if it is possible.” To Hai-Raqah’s first category — those 
commandments explicitly formulated in scripture — Kafih adds the 
priestly blessings, phylacteries (tefillin), mezuzah, tsitsit and milah. To 
the second category — those commandments not explicitly formulated 
and thus requiring a designation — he adds the obligations to write a 
book of law and to blow a horn on the New year. 
This thesis runs into difficulty almost immediately. The Halakhot 
designates several commandments as positive commandments, 
despite the fact that they are all explicitly mandated by scripture: to 
recite grace after a meal (Hilkhot Berakhot 1:1); to rest from work on 
the sabbath (Hilkhot Shabbat 1:1); to rest from work on yom Kippur 
(Hilkhot Shevitat ‘Asor 1:1); to eat matzah on the fifteenth of Nisan 
(Hilkhot Hamets u-Matsah 6:1); to discuss the departure from Egypt on 
the first night of the feast of passover (ibid. 7:1); to give half a sheqel 
every year (Hilkhot Sheqalim 1:1); and to sound the trumpets in times of 
trouble (Hilkhot Ta‘anit 1:1). Faced with counterexamples, Kafih applies 
talmudic casuistry to dismiss each case on an ad hoc basis.
But the counterfactual evidence does not end there. moving 
beyond Sefer Ahavah and Sefer Zemanim, we find more commandments 
explicitly mandated in scripture and yet designated as positive 
commandments. A few examples from Sefer ‘Avodah (The Book of 
Temple service): the commandments to build the sanctuary (Hilkhot 
Bet ha-Behirah 1:1); to revere the sanctuary (ibid., 7:1); to make the 
oil of anointment (Hilkhot Kele ha-Miqdash 1:1); to send the unclean 
out of the sanctuary (Hilkhot Biat ha-Miqdash 3:1); to offer the regular 
daily sacrifices (Hilkhot Temidin u-Musafin 1:1); to keep fire always 
burning on the altar (ibid., 2:1); to offer incense twice a day (ibid., 
3:1); that the High priest shall give a meal offering daily (ibid., 3:18); 
and to count 49 days from the time of cutting the omer (ibid., 7:22). 
I have chosen these examples because they are counted by other 
enumerators and can therefore be deemed to be uncontroversial. This 
list of counterexamples could be expanded greatly. 
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It is more difficult to test their complementary hypothesis, namely, 
that commandments that scripture does not explicitly mandate are 
always designated as positive commandments. This is because in some 
way, most commandments are midrashic interpretations of scriptural 
texts. The line between what is absolutely explicit and what is an 
interpretation is not always clear. Indeed, this distinction may be too 
subjective to confidently test the hypothesis.
With this caveat, I have found two counterexamples to the second 
criterion, commandments that seem to be products of interpretation 
which maimonides does not refer to as mitsvot ‘aseh. The first 
counterexample is the commandment that when the ark is carried, it 
should be carried on the priests’ shoulders (p34 in the SE/ShM; Hilkhot 
Kele ha-Miqdash 2:12). In the ShM, maimonides cites Numbers 7:9 as a 
proof text for this commandment. That verse, as we saw in chapter 5, 
does not indicate a clear commandment, and it is only through midrashic 
interpretation that maimonides can craft it into a commandment 
claim. According to the reasoning of Hai-Raqah and Kafih, maimonides 
should have designated this midrashically-supported claim as a positive 
commandment — yet he does not. The second counterexample is the 
commandment to honor the wise (p209 in the SE/ShM; Hilkhot Talmud 
Torah 6:1). The scriptural verse (lev. 19:32) mandates honoring an old 
man (zaqen); building on this language, a rabbinic midrash uses the 
letters of zaqen as an acronym, standing for someone who has acquired 
wisdom (zeh she-qanah hokhmah), a sage. since the command to honor 
the wise is only based on this midrash, maimonides should have 
designated this claim a positive commandment if Hai-Raqah and Kafih 
were right; yet he did not. 
In sum, maimonides’ deliberate omissions of a significant number 
of declarative statements in his main legal work continue to beg for 
a consistent and more systematic explanation. The Hai-Raqah/Kafih 
hypothesis advanced to account for these omissions does not withstand 
close scrutiny. While one might be able to explain every counterfactual 
piece of evidence, as Kafih did with the counterexamples in Sefer Ahavah 
and Sefer Zemanim, presenting numerous and thin justifications greatly 
weakens their case. more generally, the convoluted explanations run 
counter to maimonides’ stated objectives in writing the MT — to make 
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the layout of the law clear to everyone, “young and old,” the learned and 
the ignorant. on this basis, it is inconceivable that maimonides would 
have left the reader to determine the origin, force, and status of each 
of the commandments.
I offer below an explanation that I hope is as parsimonious as it 
is consistent. It consists of a redefinition of the term mitsvat ‘aseh as 
understood in the ShM and a tightening of the individuation criteria 
utilized there. I also posit that a more mature and restrained analysis 
led maimonides to change his mind on a small number of previous 
claims, in keeping with the more conservative and sophisticated nature 
of the full code of law. 
A REdEFINITIoN oF MITSvAT ‘ASEH
In chapter 3, I discuss the various definitions of mitsvat ‘aseh used in 
the ShM. I conclude that some of the commandment types, specifically 
the procedural commandments and the descriptive commandments, 
would be better characterized as laws than as formal mitsvot, since they 
are not consistent with the literal meaning of the term mitsvat ‘aseh, 
literally the “commandment of ‘do,’” much less with the equivalent term, 
qum ‘aseh, literally, “arise, do!” Because procedural commandments and 
descriptive commandments lack the properties of being performative 
and absolute obligations, it is hard to categorize them as mitsvot ‘aseh. 
maimonides was aware of this problem, and, in an excursus at the end 
of the section on positive commandments, he acknowledges that “it is 
possible for a man to go through life without doing or experiencing” 
many commandments, such as those relating to the offering of special 
sacrifices. He also acknowledges that many laws, such as those regarding 
a Hebrew bondsman, a Canaanite bondsman, or an unpaid bailee, 
“may never be applicable to a particular man, and which he may never 
be liable to carry out, throughout the whole of his life.” After these 
acknowledgements, maimonides presents the reader with a new type 
of mitsvat ‘aseh, the compulsory commandments (mitsvot hekhrehiyot), 
and states that there are only sixty of this type. As discussed earlier, 
compulsory commandments, often referred to by the term hovah, 
better fit the literal meaning of mitsvot ‘aseh� In rabbinic semantics, a 
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hovah is an absolute and unconditional obligation that one must strive 
assiduously to fulfill.16 
maimonides structures this list of compulsory commandments 
around a number of lifestyle conditions, assuming that “the man whom 
we regard as bound by these 60 unconditional commandments is living 
in normal conditions.” When a commanded man lives under “normal 
conditions,” owning a house and eating meat, for example, he becomes 
necessarily obligated to perform commandments that are otherwise 
contingent, such as mezuzah, ritual slaughter, and building a parapet to 
his roof. As a contrasting example, the law that governs the revocation 
of vows (p95) is not enumerated here because a husband is not obligated 
to revoke his wife’s vows when she utters a vow.17 Finally, maimonides 
does not include commandments applicable to a particular caste, such 
as priests and levites, nor does he include commandments binding only 
when the Temple stands, such as the commandments of the assembly 
during sukkot (haqhel, p16) and the tithing of cattle (p78).
I submit that this list of sixty compulsory commandments is critical 
to a correct understanding of the term mitsvat ‘aseh in the Halakhot. As 
I discuss in the first half of this book, to achieve the self-imposed target 
of 248 positive commandments in the ShM, maimonides had to resort to 
some imaginative but questionable interpretations of what constitutes 
a positive commandment. This category includes a wide and varied 
array of so-called commandments: some obligatory, some contingent, 
some prescriptive procedures, some descriptive laws. once he turned 
his attention to writing a full-fledged code of law, the MT, maimonides 
no longer felt compelled to preserve this artificial delineation of 613 
biblical commandments. Henceforth, he tacitly redefined the term 
mitsvat ‘aseh to refer to compulsory or unconditional obligations. 
A word of caution: because the list of sixty is a subset of the 248 
positive commandments that maimonides already enumerated, it 
follows that the shorter list also reflects maimonides’ early exegetical 
16 . Cf. Hilkhot Berakhot 11:2.
17 . maimonides calls this commandment a din or “law,” counting it as a commandment 
because we are obligated to act according to this law. see above, chapter 3, note 4.
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thinking.18 As I will demonstrate later, maimonides reversed his 
thinking on some of these designations. Nevertheless, the conceptual 
basis upon which this list is constructed still serves as a useful paradigm 
for understanding the definition of mitsvat ‘aseh used in the Halakhot. 
We are now in a position to explain a substantial portion of the 
failures to designate appearing in Table 1. The following commandments 
are either contingent and do not occur under “normal conditions,” or 
are not obligatory if one does not wish to change one’s status, as when 
one wishes to remain unclean or does not want to obtain atonement. 
As a result, they fail to meet the revised criteria of mitsvat ‘aseh as an 
absolute, unconditional, obligation: 
p70. That an individual shall bring an offering, if he is in doubt as to 
whether he has committed a sin for which one has to bring a sin 
offering.
p71. That an offering shall be brought by one who has in error committed 
a trespass against sacred things, or robbed, or lain carnally with a 
bondsmaid betrothed to a man, or denied what was deposited with 
him and swore falsely to support his denial. This is called a trespass 
offering for a known trespass.
p72. To offer a sacrifice of varying value in accordance with one’s means.
p74. That a man having an issue shall bring a sacrifice, after he is 
cleansed of his issue.
p75. That a woman having an issue shall bring a sacrifice, after she is 
cleansed of her issue. 
p76. That a woman after childbirth shall bring an offering when she is 
clean.
p77. That the leper shall bring a sacrifice, after he is cleansed. 
18 . For example, the list of 60 does not make the finer distinction between mitsvot de-
oraita and mitsvot mi-divre sofrim that I believe maimonides ultimately makes in the 
Halakhot. Additionally, the list does not distinguish between commandments that 
constitute absolute obligations and those better placed in the category of counsels. I 
will argue that this second distinction is a late innovation of the Halakhot. The popular 
nature of this list is evident by the playful manner by which maimonides explains 
the numbers 60 (commandments incumbent on all males) and 46 (incumbent on all 
females): “A mnemonic for the number of unconditional commandments is: ‘There are 
threescore queens’ (song 6:8), and the mnemonic for the 14 of those [commandments] 
taken away for women may be remembered by the expression ‘their stay (yad) is gone’ 
(deut. 32:36) [the numerical value of yad being 14].”
-----------------------------------------------   REVIsITING THE TERm mITsVAT ‘AsEH  ----------------------------------------------
— 179 —
p95. To decide in cases of annulment of vows, according to the rules set 
forth in the Torah. 
p148. To set the mother bird free when taking the nest. 
p199. To return a pledge to its owner. 
p247. To save the pursued even at the cost of the life of the pursuer.19 
Also omitted from the list of unconditional commandments are the few 
descriptive commandments, commandments that define or stipulate 
legal consequences but do not entail action, such as: 
p87. That an exchanged beast [a beast that is exchanged for one that 
had been set apart as an offering] is sacred.
p96. That anyone who touches the carcass of a beast that died of itself 
shall be unclean.
p97. That eight species of creeping things defile by contact.
p98. That foods become defiled (by contact with unclean things).
p99. That a menstruating woman is unclean and defiles others.
p100. That a new mother in confinement is unclean like a menstruating 
woman.
p101. That a leper is unclean and defiles.
p102. That a leprous garment is unclean and defiles.
p103. That a leprous house defiles.
p104. That a man, having a running issue, defiles.
p105. That the seed of copulation defiles.
19 . Here is an example of how maimonides treats a contingent commandment. He begins 
discussing the laws of saving the pursued in Hilkhot Rotseah 1:6.yet it is not until 
Halakhah 15 that he posits that saving the pursued is a positive commandment: “If 
one sees someone pursuing another in order to kill him, or sees someone pursuing a 
woman forbidden to him in order to ravish her, and although able to save them does 
not do so, he thereby disregards [bitel] the positive commandment Then thou shalt cut 
off her hand and transgresses two negative commandments.” Having avoided at the 
outset the outright declaration that saving the pursued is a positive commandment, 
maimonides carefully returns to the topic, affirming that under certain specific 
circumstances, saving the pursued is an unconditional obligation. By this artifice, he 
avoids positing an outright obligation to save a pursued person, which might lead 
to the ingenuous belief that a person is obligated to live in an area where crime is 
common, for example. I submit that maimonides did not include this commandment 
in the list of the sixty unconditional obligations for precisely the same reason: there is 
no obligation to find a rapist or murderer so that one can save the pursued. In effect, 
to save the pursued is a contingent obligation, when and if such a circumstance occurs, 
rather than an unconditional obligation.
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p106. That a woman, having a running issue, defiles.
p107. That a corpse defiles.
p108. That the waters of sprinkling defile one who is clean, and cleanse 
[the unclean] from pollution by a dead body.
p119. That the fruit of fruit-bearing trees in the fourth year of their 
planting shall be sacred.
 
Recall that most of these commandment claims caused Nahmanides to 
vehemently declare that “they are optional [reshut] from every angle, 
they have no connection to mitsvah [ein ba-hem inyan mitsvah] that they 
should deserve to be counted.” 
Finally, maimonides fails to designate as positive commandments 
the types of commandments that are technical laws and procedures, 
because they do not imply active obligation. In this group we find: 
p109. That purification from all kinds of defilement shall be effected by 
immersion in the waters of a miqveh�
p139. That houses sold within a walled city may be redeemed within a 
year.
p145. To decide, in regard to dedicated property, which is sacred to the 
lord, and which belongs to the priest.
p181. To decapitate the heifer in the manner prescribed.
p190. In an optional war, to observe the procedure prescribed in the 
Torah.
p221. To deal with a beautiful woman taken captive in war in the manner 
prescribed in the Torah.
p222. To divorce by a formal written document.
p223. That the woman suspected of adultery be dealt with as prescribed 
in the Torah.
p232. To deal judicially with the Hebrew bondsman, in accordance with 
the laws appertaining to him.
p233. To espouse a Hebrew maidservant.
p234. To redeem her [the Hebrew maidservant].
p235. To keep the Canaanite slave forever.20 
20 . I assume that the commandment claim should be understood as expressed in the ShM: 
“We are commanded concerning the law of a Canaanite bondman; that he is to remain 
a bondman forever,” which parallels the ShM’s formula in p232: “We are commanded 
concerning the law of a Hebrew bondman.” see also Yad ha-Levi, 165n5. This way 
of formulating the commandment turns p235 into a law rather than a command. 
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p236. That he who inflicts a bodily injury shall pay monetary 
compensation.
p237. To judge cases of injuries caused by beasts.
p238. To judge cases of damage caused by an uncovered pit.
p239. To adjudge a thief to pay compensation, or [in certain cases] suffer 
death.
p240. To adjudicate cases of damage caused by trespass of cattle.
p241. To adjudicate cases of damage caused by fire.
p242. To adjudicate cases of damage by a gratuitous depositary.
p243. To judge cases of damage of a paid depositary and a hirer.
p244. To adjudicate cases of damage of a gratuitous borrower.
p245. To adjudicate cases of purchase and sale.
p246. To adjudicate other cases between a plaintiff and a defendant.
p248. To adjudicate cases of inheritances.
 
In sum, none of the above claims meet the Halakhot’s revised criteria 
for positive commandments when we define them as unconditional 
obligations. Thus have we explained 50 of the 109 failures to designate 
that were listed in Table 1. 
The full implications of the thesis — that the Halakhot used 
criteria narrower and more conventional than the ones assumed in 
the ShM — now become clear: when writing the MT, maimonides did 
not genuinely subscribe to the notion that there were 248 positive 
commandments.21 By this point in my analysis, this implication should 
not be surprising. In fact, it is fully consistent with the conclusions 
Note that in the Halakhot, maimonides retracts the claim made in the SE that there 
is an unconditional obligation to keep the Canaanite slave forever. In Hilkhot ‘Avadim 
9:6, maimonides states: “It is not permitted (assur) for a person to free a Canaanite 
slave; whoever frees him, transgresses (‘over) an ‘aseh, as it says, of them may ye take 
your bondmen forever (lev. 25:46).” Both the injunction itself, couched as a prohibition, 
and the use of the verb “transgress” (‘over) instead of “abrogate” (bitel) indicate that 
this is a prohibition derived from a positive statement (issur ‘aseh), rather than a true 
positive commandment. see above for the discussion of issur ‘aseh in chapter 2. on the 
distinction between ‘over and bitel, see perla, Sefer ha-Mitsvot le-RaSaG, vol.1, 693-694. 
In sum, this failure to designate is well justified: either the command should be 
considered a law, or it is a prohibition inferred from a positive statement rather than 
a positive commandment.
21 . While the same is almost certainly true with respect to the 365 negative commandments, 
given the logical problems that one would encounter in composing such a list, analyzing 
this claim would require a separate investigation.
 I I I  M Sv  ‘ASEH
---------------------------------------------------------------------------  Chapter VI  --------------------------------------------------------------------------
— 182 —
reached in chapter 4: there is no conceivable way to defend a single, 
logically compelling, fixed number of commandments.
 
THREE REVERsAls FRom THE lIsT oF 60 
uNCoNdITIoNAl oBlIGATIoNs 
our current revised theory of how the Halakhot defines a mitsvat 
‘aseh follows the one proposed as the basis for the ShM’s list of sixty 
compulsory commandments: unconditional obligations, operative 
under a specific set of circumstances. These circumstances are that “the 
man … is living in normal conditions, that is to say, that he lives in 
a house in a community, eats ordinary food, namely bread and meat, 
pursues a normal occupation, marries and has a family.” maimonides 
fails to define three of the commandments included on this list as 
positive commandments in their respective sections of the Halakhot: 
p9, “To hallow His name”; p14, “Fringes”; and p26, “That the priests 
shall bless Israel.” I argue that when he wrote the Halakhot, maimonides 
did indeed reverse himself; because he had reclassified these 
commandments as contingent rather than unconditional obligations, 
he deliberately avoided designating them as mitsvot ‘aseh� I examine 
these three commandment claims below. 
P9� To hallow His name, as it is said, “And I will be sanctified in the 
midst of the children of Israel” (Lev� 22:32)�
While Qayyara enumerates “sanctifying the Name” (qiddush ha-Shem) 
in his list of qum ‘aseh (pq28), maimonides may not have agreed with 
this definition. In Rule 4, maimonides stipulates that charges that 
cover the whole of the Torah and do not contain specific actions ought 
not to be counted as commandments. one might argue that “And I 
will be sanctified in the midst of the children of Israel” describes the 
result of the Israelites fulfilling all the commandments, rather than 
commanding a specific action. perhaps this concern drives maimonides 
to find a rabbinic justification for the positive commandment of 
sanctifying the name. As he quotes BT Sanhedrin 74b: “Is a Noahide 
commanded to sanctify His Name or not? listen to this: ‘The Noahides 
were commanded to observe seven commandments; but if they were 
-----------------------------------------------   REVIsITING THE TERm mITsVAT ‘AsEH  ----------------------------------------------
— 183 —
[also] commanded to sanctify His Name, there are eight.’” “Thus,” 
maimonides concludes, 
it has been made clear to you that this is one of the commandments that 
are obligatory upon Israel, the sages having deduced this commandment 
from the words I will be hallowed among the children of Israel [lev. 22:32].22 
But while maimonides demonstrates that the verse points to a positive 
commandment, the requirements of the commandment itself are 
not defined in this talmudic passage. specifically, what must one do 
to sanctify God’s name? In the opening lines of his gloss to the ShM, 
maimonides is bold and poetic:
The purport of this commandment is that we are duty-bound to proclaim 
this true religion to the world, undeterred by fear of injury from any 
source. Even if a tyrant tries to compel us by force to deny Him, we must 
not obey, but must positively rather submit to death; and we must not 
even mislead the tyrant into supposing that we have denied Him while in 
our hearts we continue to believe in Him.
The primary requirement of this commandment is the unconditional 
obligation to proclaim monotheism to the world. moreover, this 
obligation must be carried out even in the face of danger.23 
maimonides’ accompanying exegesis does not quite support the 
missionary aspect of this claim. He cites an incident in the book of daniel, 
22 . In the talmudic text, Rava responds to this argument by stating that the obligation 
to sanctify the divine Name by observing the seven Noahide laws is included in 
those seven laws. This argument would nullify the proof upon which maimonides’ 
argument rests, as observed by the commentary Mishneh le-Melekh (on Hilkhot 
Melakhim 10:2). ultimately, it may well be the case that the difference between these 
amoraic opinions rests on the same matter that concerned maimonides: is qiddush 
ha-Shem an independent commandment or merely an outcome of performing all the 
commandments?
23 . Because levinger did not realize that the qiddush ha-Shem mentioned in the list of 
60 unconditional commandments followed the ShM’s definition of qiddush ha-Shem 
(the unconditional obligation to proclaim the true religion), rather than the multiple 
definitions given in the Halakhot, he was forced to offer an unsatisfactory answer to 
how qiddush ha-Shem could be an unconditional obligation. levinger, Ha-RaMBaM ke-
filosof, 81-83. 
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which describes how Hananiah, mishael, and Azariah were ready to die by 
Nebuchadnezzar’s hand, “when he forced people to prostrate themselves 
before the idol, and all did so, the Israelites included and there was none 
there to sanctify the Name of Heaven, all being in terror.” Note, however, 
that we are never told that these three martyrs proclaimed the “true 
religion” of their own volition. Rather, the three martyrs were forced to 
proclaim God’s greatness as a direct result of Nebuchadnezzar’s decree. 
maimonides confirms this nuanced understanding: “This commandment 
applies only in circumstances such as those of that great occasion when 
the whole world was in terror, and it was a duty to declare His unity 
publicly at that time.” In other words, these martyrs sanctified God’s 
name only after being pressed to do so. This scenario differs slightly 
from the idea that “we are in duty bound to proclaim this true religion 
to the world,” implying that this commandment is carried out on one’s 
own initiative and as an unconditional obligation. 
In the space of a few sentences, maimonides wavers between the 
conflicting claims that the commandment requires one to go to all lengths 
to proclaim the true religion and that one is only obligated to sanctify God’s 
Name during a “great occasion” when the world is forced to deny God’s 
existence. Even within the ShM itself, this commandment changes from 
representing an unconditional obligation fit for the list of 60 unconditional 
commandments to representing a contingent commandment — which 
should not be designated as a mitsvat ‘aseh in the Halakhot.24 
maimonides continues in support of the public aspect of this 
commandment by quoting a revealing midrash from the Sifra: “on this 
condition I brought you out of the land of Egypt, that ye sanctify My 
name publicly” (emphasis added).25 maimonides’ statement that “this 
commandment applies only in circumstances such as those of that great 
24 . The subtle contradiction that we noted may be the result of an unintended conflation 
of two literary layers. likely the older layer is the one that defines this as an 
unconditional commandment, which may be why it is included in the list of sixty 
unconditional obligations. 
25 . Sifra Emor 9:6 (99d). The critical word be-rabbim (publicly) is missing in our edition of 
the midrash. In his edition of the ShM, Heller quotes the midrash in full as we have it in 
our editions, showing that he is aware of the fact that maimonides’ version contained 
the critical extra word be-rabbim. yet, he does not comment on the extraordinary 
significance that this extra word has for the definition of the commandment.
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occasion” (emphasis added) is highly innovative, as it stipulates that qiddush 
ha-Shem can only be fulfilled under very special and unique circumstances: 
when the entire world is being forced to abandon monotheism. The 
implication is that anything less public or less dramatic than the worldwide 
rejection of monotheism would not constitute grounds for qiddush ha-
Shem.26 It is this latter thread that the Halakhot explores. 
maimonides discusses the positive commandment of qiddush ha-
Shem and the correlating prohibition against hillul ha-Shem (desecration 
of God’s name) in the Mishneh Torah, in Hilkhot Yesode ha-Torah 5. As 
I noted in Table 1, he does not declare in the opening lines of that 
passage that qiddush ha-Shem is a positive commandment. In Halakhot 
5:1-4, maimonides stipulates the conditions under which one should 
transgress rather than be killed, and the converse conditions under 
which one must die rather than transgress. In 5:4, he differentiates 
between a private and a public act of sanctification: 
When one is enjoined to die rather than transgress, and suffers death so 
as to not transgress, he sanctifies the name of God. If he does so in the 
presence of ten Israelites, he sanctifies the name of God publicly, like 
daniel, Hananiah, mishael and Azariah, Rabbi Akiva and his colleagues. 
These are martyrs, than whom none ranks higher.
While the ShM only focuses on the public sanctification of God’s name, in 
the Halakhot, maimonides explicitly discusses two types of sanctification, 
a private act and a public one. But as he writes in the ShM, public 
sanctification is the only type that can fulfill the positive commandment. 
He makes this clear in the continuation of the same halakhah: 
26 . Heller’s edition of the ShM, which reads “this commandment was only commanded 
for that great occasion” instead of “this commandment applies only in circumstances 
such as those of that great occasion,” clearly has a different meaning. In note 9, Heller 
offers, instead, three supporting witnesses for our reading, including the text of the 
first edition of the ShM (Constantinople 1516), Ibn Ayub’s translation, and one of 
his Arabic manuscripts (which, incidentally, reads the same as Kafih’s manuscript). 
Hurewitz, Sefer ha-Mitsvot im Perush Yad ha-Levi, ad loc., glosses that there was no 
better opportunity to publicly sanctify God’s name than at the time of Hananiah, 
mishael, and Azariah. This comment is surprising, given that his edition is based on 
the Constantinople edition and reads as I have quoted above. 
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When one is enjoined to suffer death rather than transgress, and commits 
a transgression and so escapes death, he has profaned the name of God. 
If the transgression was committed in the presence of ten Israelites, he 
has profaned the name of God in public, failed [bitel] to observe a positive 
commandment — to sanctify the name of God — and violated a negative 
commandment — not to profane His name. 
According to this technical definition, qiddush ha-Shem can be considered 
a mitsvat ‘aseh only when one is coerced to transgress a serious 
injunction in the presence of ten Israelites and chooses martyrdom 
instead.27 Whether one can define qiddush ha-Shem as an unconditional 
obligation depends on whether one uses the definition from the ShM or 
from the Halakhot. If qiddush ha-Shem translates into an obligation to 
“proclaim this true religion to the world, undeterred by fear of injury 
from any source,” as is formulated in the ShM, then it can be considered 
an unconditional obligation. If, on the other hand, qiddush ha-Shem 
is defined only as the obligation to accept martyrdom were one to be 
forced to transgress one of the few fundamental sins as defined by the 
Halakhot, then it should be considered a contingent obligation. In such 
a case, the Halakhot can justifiably omit the declaratory statement that 
qiddush ha-Shem is a positive commandment. 
 
27 . In the Halakhot, maimonides handles the dichotomy between public and private acts with 
a certain amount of ambivalence. on the one hand, he treats private acts of sanctification/
profanation with the utmost gravity. For example, in halakhah 3, maimonides rules that 
in a time of religious persecution (sha‘at ha-shemad) when the authorities attempt to 
abolish the Israelites’ religion or any of its precepts, the Israelite is obligated to die rather 
than profane God’s name, even if the coercion takes place in the private domain. His 
source for this is the uncontested statement of R. dimi in the name of R. yohanan (BT 
Sanhedrin 74a), who asserted that in a time of persecution, one must suffer death rather 
than transgress even a minor commandment. When one couples this statement with 
the one that follows, it appears that this severity applies even in the private domain. on 
the other hand, maimonides rules that one only deems a transgression to be a scriptural 
violation if the action is publicly performed in the presence of ten Israelites. In halakhah 
4, it seems that the violations of these commandments apply only in the public domain, 
not in the private one. maimonides appears to be emphasizing the essential message of 
the scriptural verse, as the Sifra articulates it: “ye sanctify my name in public.” While it 
might be hard to read the severe stance of halakhah 3 as intending a rabbinic ordinance, 
the scriptural commandment clearly intends to refer to public acts. 
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P14� To make fringes� 
In the SE, the ShM, and the Heading to Hilkhot Tsitsit, maimonides 
states that there exists a positive commandment to make fringes 
(tsitsit),28 stemming from the scriptural command “that they make 
them … fringes in the corners of their garments” (Num. 15:38). In 
the Halakhot, however, there is no introductory statement that “it is a 
mitvsat ‘aseh to make tsitsit,” merely a statement that “one who wears 
a cloak [tallit] having white or azure or both together has fulfilled one 
positive commandment” (Hilkhot Tsitsit 1:5).29 The delayed positioning 
of the declaration and its soft, almost incidental tone alert us to the 
subtle change in the nature of the commandment and confirms the care 
with which maimonides crafts introductory declarations to his Halakhot. 
In fact, there is no obligation to affix fringes to a cloak — as the 
formulation “to make tsitsit” implies — or even to wear a cloak with 
fringes attached, but only the instruction that if one were to wear a cloak 
with such fringes attached, one would fulfill a positive commandment. 
As formulated by the Halakhot, this is a contingent commandment: 
if one wears a four-cornered garment, one must put tsitsit on it. This 
revised view is confirmed in Hilkhot Tsitsit 3:10:
When is one obligated to fulfill the commandment of fringes? Anyone 
obligated by this commandment30 who covers himself with a garment 
fit31 for fringes must first affix fringes to it, and only then cover himself 
with it. If he has covered himself with it without fringes, he has nullified 
a positive commandment.
As noted earlier, the list of sixty compulsory commandments comes from 
the ShM and SE. In both of these compositions, maimonides formulates 
the commandment to imply that there is an unconditional obligation 
28 . Kafih reads the ShM as “we are commanded in the work (Arab., b’ml; Heb., be-maaseh) 
of the tsitsit.”
29 . This follows the thesis already developed in the ShM that the white tassel and the 
azure thread are to be considered one commandment, not two, despite the fact that 
the absence of either the white tassel or the azure thread does not invalidate the other.
30 . see Hilkhot Tsitsit 3:9 for those who are exempt from this commandment.
31 . see Hilkhot Tsitsit 3:1-2 for a discussion of the type of garment to which one must 
attach fringes.
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to affix fringes on every garment in one’s possession.32 In the Halakhot, 
however, maimonides follows the normative rabbinic opinion that 
“the point of the commandment is to wrap oneself with them [fringed 
garments],” as he rules in Hilkhot Tsitsit 3:8,33 rather than to affix the 
fringes on one’s garments. According to this rabbinic interpretation, the 
commandment to attach fringes is only applicable when one wears a 
four-cornered garment — in essence, a contingent commandment. 
Even in light of this revision, we might still ask why maimonides 
did not formulate his commandment more strongly in the Halakhot: he 
could have stated that it is a positive commandment to affix fringes to 
a garment that requires it. The simple answer may be that wrapping 
oneself in such a garment is not part of the “normal condition” that 
maimonides views as transforming a contingent commandment 
into an obligation. He may have had a subtler reason for deliberately 
omitting such a formulation, however: declaring that “it is a positive 
commandment to affix fringes to a garment that requires it” could have 
misled his readers into thinking that they are required to own a tallit to 
fulfill the commandment. Rather: 
Even though one is not obligated to purchase a tallit and wrap himself in 
it, so that he has to affix fringes to it, it is not fitting for a person who is 
pious [hasid] to exempt himself from this commandment; rather, such a 
one should always endeavor to be wrapped in a garment which requires 
fringes so that he fulfills this commandment. (3:11)
While one is not obligated to wear a garment with fringes, it is a point of 
piety for one to own such a garment and thus fulfill the commandment 
to attach fringes.
P 26� That the priests shall bless Israel�
In the previous two examples, we saw that in the Halakhot, maimonides 
characterizes the commandments differently from the way he had 
32 . This is the opinion of one of the amoraim in BT Menahot 42b. see chapter 7 for a discussion 
of maimonides’ views on the plain sense of the scriptural text (peshateh di-qera). 
33 . This is the reason why one does not pronounce a blessing over the affixing of the fringes.
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characterized them in the ShM and SE. These new definitions affect 
how he categorizes these commandments in the Halakhot. While such 
a redefinition of the commandment for the priests to bless Israel may 
be one of the reasons this commandment is not designated as a mitsvat 
‘aseh in the Halakhot, this rationale may not be a sufficient explanation. 
The laws of the priestly blessings (Hilkhot Nesiyat Kapayim) are 
appended to the end of Hilkhot Tefillah (ch. 14 -15), because the priestly 
blessings form an organic part of the ‘Amidah prayer. maimonides 
introduces Hilkhot Nesiyat Kapayim as follows: “The priests bless the 
congregation [ha-kohanim nosim et kapehem, lit., “the priests raise 
their hands”] during the morning, additional [musaf], and ne‘ilah 
prayers” (14:1). Notably absent from the introductory statement is a 
declaration that the priestly blessings are a positive commandment. 
other unusual features include the absence of a scriptural proof 
text for the obligation and the use of the participial rather than the 
infinitival form to describe the commandment. While we might infer 
that maimonides no longer believes that this is a mitsvat ‘aseh, he 
elaborates his position in the next chapter. He writes that no priest 
should be prevented from blessing the community, 
even if he is neither wise nor punctilious in the observance of the 
commandments, or even if people speak slightingly of him, or even if 
his business dealings are not just…since it is a positive commandment 
[mitsvat ‘aseh] incumbent on every single priest to bless the community, 
and we do not tell a wicked man to be more wicked, and refrain from 
fulfilling commandments. (Hilkhot Nesiyat Kapayim 15:6)
Furthermore, at the very end of chapter 15, maimonides writes: 
“Even though a priest who fails to ascend the platform has violated 
only one positive commandment [bitel mitsvat ‘aseh], it is as if he had 
transgressed three positive commandments.”34 These rulings make it 
34 . The source for the statement that a priest who fails to ascend to the platform transgresses 
three positive commandments is BT Menahot 44a. For maimonides, this statement 
does not appear to carry legal force; it serves as a way for the rabbis to emphasize the 
importance of this duty. see Rule 9, ShM, ed. Frankel, 161. on the other hand, the 
expression bitel, translated as “cancelled,” “abrogated,” or “nullified,” applies to genuine 
positive commandments, as opposed to inferred prohibitions. see above, note 20. 
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clear that maimonides continues to maintain that the priestly blessing 
constitutes a positive commandment.
so how can we account for the Halakhot’s failure to designate this 
commandment as a mitsvat ‘aseh in its opening lines? The simplest 
explanation holds that maimonides had changed his mind on whether 
this was an absolute or contingent obligation. While in the ShM, he 
defines this commandment as an absolute obligation, he now maintains 
that the obligation is only contingent:35 the priest transgresses a positive 
commandment only if and when he fails to bless the congregation 
during communal services when asked to do so.36 While this explanation 
is consistent with my earlier thesis, it is still not entirely satisfactory. 
maimonides could have begun the exposition noting that this is a 
contingent commandment: he could have stated that “it is a mitsvat ‘aseh 
to bless the congregation whenever the priest is called upon to do so,” 
similar to his formulation of repentance at the start of Hilkhot Teshuvah.37 
Why does maimonides wait until nearly the end of the exposition to 
state that blessing the congregation is a mitsvat ‘aseh? 
I wish to suggest here a highly speculative solution, one for which 
I cannot offer talmudic or midrashic support. I argue that the literary 
ambiguity of the Halakhot is a product of maimonides’ doubt as to 
whether the commandment, as performed in daily prayer, meets the 
exacting strictures of scripture and the interpretations of the oral law.38 
In Hilkhot Nesiyat Kapayim 14:11, maimonides offers an exegetical basis 
for the commandment: 
35 . The biblical verse only discusses the form and manner by which the priests must bless 
the congregation: “on this wise ye shall bless the children of Israel.” The text does not 
require such a blessing.
36 . This sense may be inferred from Hilkhot Nesiyat Kapayim, 15:11-12. see JT Berakhot 
5:4 and Arba‘ah Turim, orah Hayyim, sec. 128 on his reading of Tg� onqelos.
37 . “With regard to all the precepts of the Torah … if a person transgressed … when he 
decides to repent he has a duty to confess” (Hilkhot Teshuvah 1:1).
38 . In chapter 9, I propose other examples of literary ambiguity in maimonides’ legal 
writings. maimonides’ ambiguities can be detected in subtle changes in formulations. 
They may incorporate two contradictory opinions, omit a talmudic source, or quote 
a source without an explanation, leaving the reader to make assumptions about the 
circumstances of the case. This phenomenon was noted by early commentators. see 
shapiro, Studies in Maimonides and His Interpreters, 8-9 and n. 37. 
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The priestly blessing is never recited in any language but Hebrew, as it 
says, And the lord spoke unto moses, saying: Speak unto Aaron and unto 
his sons, saying: on this wise [in this way] ye shall bless the children of Israel 
[Num. 6:22-3], and thus they learned from the oral tradition [kakh lamdu 
mi-pi ha-shemu‘ah] from moses: on this wise ye shall bless — standing; on 
this wise ye shall bless — with raised hands; on this wise ye shall bless — in 
Hebrew; on this wise ye shall bless — face to face; on this wise ye shall 
bless — aloud; on this wise ye shall bless — with the explicit Name, if they 
are in the Temple, as we said.39 
The oral tradition defined the priestly blessings as invoking the 
explicit or articulated Name. This could only be done in the Temple, as 
maimonides explains: 
They recite the divine name as it is written, that is the letters yod, heh, 
vav, and heh are pronounced. This is what is universally called “the explicit 
name.” outside the Temple, they use its appellation, that is, alef dalet, 
since the name is expressed as it is written only in the Temple…. The 
early sages taught it to their worthy students and sons only once every 
seven years. All this out of esteem for the great and awesome name.40 
(Hilkhot Nesiyat Kapayim 14:10)
Because of the oral tradition’s insistence that the priestly blessings use 
the explicit name, which could only be done in the Temple, maimonides 
may have inferred that the priestly blessings conducted outside of the 
Temple do not conform to the dictates of the scriptural commandment.41 
He may have conjectured that these blessings were the product of a formal 
39 . maimonides here summarizes a lengthier exposition found in BT Sotah 38a. mishnaic 
sages deduce each interpretation of “on this wise ye shall bless” independently by various 
textual and analogical means. He likely viewed these halakhot as the product of an oral 
tradition “from moses” rather than implausible textual and analogical derivations.
40 . In the GP, maimonides discusses this topic at length, arguing that the articulated 
name alone, the tetragrammaton, “is indicative of the essence without associating any 
other notion with it.” GP I:61, 149. see also I:62, 150-151.
41 . The blessings conducted in the Temple were clearly of a different order of gravitas than 
the ones conducted outside of it. Compare BT Hagigah 16a, discussing those who lose 
their sight: “(he who looks on) the priests when the Temple stood, as they rose to bless 
the people.” RasHI, s. v. “u-mevarhin et ha-‘am,” explains “because the shekhinah rested 
on their fingers.” Apparently, the shekhinah does not rest on the fingers of the priests 
when they bless the people outside of the Temple.
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rabbinical enactment (taqanah) or an informal popular practice sanctioned 
by the rabbis. If the scripturally-commanded priestly blessing were only 
applicable in the Temple, maimonides would have had to further qualify 
his opening statement. since he was uncertain of the commandment’s 
bounds, he simply stated that “the priests bless the congregation during 
the morning, additional, and ne‘ilah prayers” (14:1). As I will discuss 
in chapter 8, the use of the participle (“the priests bless”) to describe a 
commandment conveys a weak sense of obligation. such obligations can 
often be traced to rabbinic ordinance or custom. With this language, 
maimonides may have wished to convey his tentative opinion to the 
careful reader: the priestly blessing, as practiced outside of the Temple, 
is non-scriptural. Towards the end of his exposition, however, he implies 
that the blessing outside the Temple is scriptural, stating: “even though 
a priest who fails to ascend the platform has violated only one positive 
commandment [bitel mitsvat ‘aseh], it is as if he had transgressed three 
positive commandments.”42 still, to defend this interpretation, one could 
argue that the mitsvat ‘aseh designation here applies solely to the scriptural 
paradigm, the priestly blessing conducted in the Temple. 
In sum, I submit that the unusual literary presentation of this 
commandment in the Halakhot reflects maimonides’ ambivalence 
regarding the exact status of the commandment. By using a participle 
to describe the commandment in the introduction, and by moving the 
expected designation and the proof text to the end of the exposition, 
the Halakhot allows for two possible readings. The priestly blessings are 
a scriptural obligation when practiced in the Temple, but only a custom 
when practiced in a synagogue. Alternately, the priestly blessings are 
always a scriptural obligation; outside of the Temple, however, the 
priests may not use the articulated Name. 
REVIsITING INdIVIduATIoN
As I discussed in chapter 4, many of the individuations in the ShM 
do not seem to be logically unique commandments. In the Halakhot, 
many of these less-logical individuations are either subsumed under 
42 . BT Sotah 38b, in the name of R. Joshua b. levi.
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larger headings or no longer designated as mitsvot ‘aseh� I revisit those 
problematic cases here.
moving from the simpler to the more complex cases, p68 (sacrifices 
brought by the court) is now subsumed in the Halakhot under p69 
(sacrifices brought by individuals), while p114-p117, the laws of 
valuations (‘arakhin), are now condensed into one commandment: “It is a 
positive commandment to adjudge the laws of ‘arakhin as stipulated in the 
Torah” (Hilkhot ‘Arakhin 1:2).43 Commandments p149-152 are subsumed 
in Hilkhot Maakhalot Asurot 1:1 under one positive commandment: 
“Concerning the tokens with which one can differentiate between those 
domesticated and wild animals, owls, fishes and grasshoppers, that may 
be eaten and those that may not be eaten.”44 
Another individuation scheme that is revisited is the series of 
commandments about resting from work on the festival days (p159-
60, p162-63, p166-67). In the Halakhot, maimonides collapses these 
six commandments into one, stating: 
Anyone who rests from work [melekhet ‘avodah, a term that the rabbis 
understood as referring to the kind of work unrelated to the preparation 
of food] on any of these [six festival days] has fulfilled a positive 
commandment.45 (Hilkhot Shevitat Yom Tov 1:2)
43 . The reader may object that the law of ‘arakhin should not be designated a positive 
commandment because it does not command one to perform a certain act; it merely 
describes the financial consequences of undertaking certain types of vows. It is best 
defined as a “law” rather than as a “commandment.” I do not have a satisfactory 
answer to this objection, and I believe that this case represents an exception to 
the rule. This odd formulation also caught the attention of a commentator who 
wondered why maimonides did not designate the adjudication of personal vows 
(nedarim) as a positive commandment in the same way as he had designated the 
adjudication of ‘arakhin as a positive commandment: see Epstein, Arukh ha-Shulhan 
he-Atid, sec. 33, no. 8.
44 . maimonides created four positive commandments in the SE/ShM based on positive 
statements that make up four individual inferred prohibitions (lav ha-ba-mikhlal ‘aseh). 
see the earlier discussion of p149-152 in chapter 5.
45 . Here maimonides invokes their common requirement to rest from “the kind of work 
unrelated to the preparation of food” as criteria for grouping all the festivals under one 
roof. maimonides did not follow the same logical scheme regarding the obligation of 
absolute rest prescribed for the sabbath and the day of Atonement because these two 
days of rest require separate treatises to deal with their particular sets of scriptural 
and rabbinic commandments and ordinances. In other words, the rest-from-work 
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In the Halakhot, maimonides omits the positive commandment 
to appoint a special priest to address the soldiers in war (p191). In 
chapter 4, I question the justification for individuating this claim, since 
it represents a single element of the laws of waging war.46 
In chapter 2, I note maimonides’ unconvincing individuation of the 
four modes of capital punishment. In the Halakhot, he resolves this 
issue in an elegant fashion. After describing the four modes of capital 
punishment, he states: “[With reference to] each one of these deaths [kol 
mitah me-hen], it is a positive commandment for the court to execute, 
by means of it, those who are liable to it” (Hilkhot Sanhedrin 14:1-2). 
maimonides’ formulation is ambiguous. He could mean that all four 
forms of execution collectively count as one positive commandment; 
alternately, he could mean that each one of them singly is its own 
positive commandment. The ambiguous formulation allows us either to 
claim that maimonides indeed designated the four types of executions 
individually and explicitly, or that he changed his mind and posited 
that all four executions should be individuated as one commandment. 
To summarize: in this section, I found that certain groups of 
related commandments were subsumed under one of their own group 
of commandments or under a different commandment claim, to yield a 
more generic formulation. This was the case with:
individuation was dictated by topical considerations, particular to the drafting of a 
code of law, rather than by theoretical considerations. Note, too, that the punishment 
for transgressing the prohibition to work is different for the sabbath (stoning) than 
for the day of Atonement (excision). see Hilkhot Shevitat ‘Asor 1:2. 
46 . In chapter 4, I suggest that didactic considerations may have influenced maimonides’ 
decision. despite the commandment’s omission in the Halakhot, the special educational 
message that he wishes to convey does make its appearance. In Hilkhot Melakhim 
7:2-3, he details the preparations for war and cites the particulars of the address of 
the special priest as recounted in the scriptural passage. In a special and seemingly 
redundant peroration at 7:15, maimonides tells us that once “the man who is fearful 
and fainthearted” (deut. 20:8) has “joined the ranks of battle, he should put his reliance 
upon Him who is the hope of Israel, their savior in time of trouble. He should note that 
he is fighting for the oneness of God, risk his life, and neither fear nor be affrighted. 
Nor should he think of his wife or children, but forgetting them and all else, concentrate 
on the war.” This addition appears to be gratuitous but it is not: These eloquent and 
stirring words are designed to instill in the faithful a special zeal to combat heresy, the 
very same objective that I suspect led maimonides to individuate p191. 
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p68. That the court of judgment shall bring an offering if it has erred in 
a judicial pronouncement
 (now subsumed under the general positive commandment to bring 
a sin offering for sinning in error by committing a transgression, as 
per Hilkhot Shegagot 1:1);47
p114. That one who vows to the lord the monetary value of a person 
shall pay the amount appointed in the scriptural passage;
p115. That one who vows to the lord the monetary value of an unclean 
beast shall pay its value; 
p116. That one who vows the value of his house shall pay according to the 
appraisal of the priest;
p117. That one who sanctifies to the lord a portion of his field shall pay 
according to the estimation appointed in the scriptural passage
 (now subsumed under a general law of valuations, as per Hilkhot 
‘Arakhin va-Haramin 1:2); 
p149. To examine the marks in cattle;
p150. To examine the marks in fowl, so as to distinguish between the 
unclean and the clean;
p151. To examine the marks in locusts, so as to distinguish the clean 
from the unclean;
p152. To examine the marks in fish
 (now subsumed under a general law to differentiate all edible 
animals, as per Hilkhot Maakhalot Asurot 1:1); 
p159. To rest on the first day of passover;
p160. To rest on the seventh day of that feast [passover];
p162. To rest on the fiftieth day (from the time of cutting the omer);
p163. To rest on the first day of the seventh month;
p166. To rest on the first day of sukkot;
p167. To rest on the eighth day of that feast [sukkot]
 (now subsumed under a general rule to rest on festivals, as per 
Hilkhot Shevitat Yom Tov 1:2);
p191. To anoint a special priest (to address the soldiers) in a war 
 (now subsumed under the commandment that governs the conduct 
of obligatory and permissible wars, as per Hilkhot Melakhim 7:1);
 p226. That the court shall execute [sentences of death] by decapitation 
with the sword;
p227. That the court shall execute [sentences of death] by strangulation;
p228. That the court shall execute [sentences of death] by burning with 
fire;
47 . see comments to p68-69 in chapter 4.
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p229. That the court shall execute [sentences of death] by stoning (now 
subsumed under a general rule mandating the great court to execute 
all those liable by various methods, as per Hilkhot Sanhedrin 14:1-2).
The above list totals sixteen redundant individuations. The overall 
number of claims is not reduced precisely by sixteen, since the 
Halakhot re-categorizes rather than eliminates some of them. These 
revised individuations present few conceptual difficulties. For the 
next group of failures to designate, however, I take a somewhat more 
speculative approach. 
P41-51� Musafin (additional offerings)
In chapter 4, we saw that maimonides listed separate positive 
commandments for each of the additional offerings (musafin) brought 
on festivals. I note there that maimonides’ individuation was not 
logically definitive; he could easily have followed Qayyara’s scheme of 
categorizing all the musafin under one commandment. 
surprisingly, we find no mention anywhere in the Halakhot that 
any of the musafin are positive commandments. maimonides opens 
Hilkhot Temidin u-Musafin with a characteristically bold statement: 
“It is a positive commandment to offer two lambs as burnt offerings 
every day. They are called daily offerings [temidin].” This designation 
corresponds to p39, the commandment to offer a burnt offering twice a 
day. one would expect a similar statement with respect to the additional 
offerings but none is found. The additional offering for the sabbath 
(p41) is mentioned only in passing — tucked away in a mundane chapter 
that deals with the priestly method of arbitration. In a discussion of 
how the various sabbath sacrifices are brought, maimonides explains 
that the priests cast a special lot (payis) to choose which priest offers 
the sacrifices, and that the priest who brings the daily offering also 
brings the additional offering. In this understated way, maimonides 
introduces us to the additional offering of the sabbath (Hilkhot Temidin 
u-Musafin 4:9). 
section 7:1 discusses the musaf of the new moon, detailing the 
time of sacrifice, the number and types of animals to be offered and the 
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types of offering (burnt offerings, sin offering). No mention is made of 
it being a mitsvat ‘aseh. The passover musaf (7:3), the musaf of shavu‘ot 
(8:1), the musaf of the first day of Tishre (9:1), the musaf of yom 
Kippur (10:1), the musaf of sukkot (10:3) and the musaf of shemini 
‘Atseret (10:5) are all handled in similar fashions. maimonides does not 
designate any of these as positive commandments.
In similar fashion, maimonides describes the meal offering of 
barley (omer) that is brought on the second day of passover together 
with the musaf (7:3), as well as the loaves of bread that are brought 
with the musafin on shavu‘ot (8:1), without designating any of them 
as mitsvot ‘aseh. Finally, maimonides dedicates an entire treatise to the 
rituals of yom Kippur, Hilkhot Yom ha-Kippurim, without once stating 
that the entire ritual of the day — considered one commandment in the 
ShM (p49) — is a mitsvat ‘aseh.
To justify these extraordinary failures to designate, I propose that 
maimonides came to see all the services and sacrifices of each day, 
bounded by the twice-daily burnt offering (temidin), as representing one 
overarching commandment. This position follows the manner in which 
scripture introduces temidin and musafin: “Command the children of 
Israel, and say unto them: my food which is presented unto me for 
offerings made by fire, of a sweet savour unto me, shall ye observe 
to offer unto me in its due season” (Num. 28:2). The verses continue 
to describe the musafin applicable to each festival, each with its own 
temidin. In each mention of musafin, the verses remind the officiating 
priests: “ye shall offer these [the musafin] beside the burnt offering 
of the morning, which is for a continual burnt offering … it shall be 
offered beside the continual burnt offering” (Num. 28:23-24). 
In p49, the ShM offers an important clue in support of this hypothesis: 
the elements of a ritual that follow a certain order are to be considered 
as one commandment.48 maimonides writes: “We are commanded to 
48 . It should not be surprising that maimonides does not make use of this individuating 
criterion in the ShM to define the musafin� As I discussed in chapter 4, no particular 
individuating criterion is logically compelling. When composing the ShM, maimonides 
likely juggled a number of different criteria. We also recall that in the ShM, maimonides 
needed to hit a fixed numerical target, and he may have subordinated criteria to this 
objective.
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perform the service of the day, that is to say, all the sacrifices and the 
confessions ordained by scripture for yom Kippur, to atone for all our sins” 
(emphasis added). Immediately thereafter, he adds: 
The proof that the whole of this service in its totality constitutes only 
one commandment is found at the end of the fifth chapter of Yoma: 
“Concerning every ministration of the day of Atonement mentioned in 
the prescribed order, if one service is done out of order before another 
one, it is as if it had not been done at all.” 
By analogy, since the order of the day’s service is bound by the morning 
and evening temidin, it suffices for maimonides to designate the temidin 
as a positive commandment and ignore the musafin.49 
P169� Lulav
In Hilkhot Shofar, Sukkah ve-Lulav, maimonides discusses at length 
the details of the taking of the four species (ch. 7-8). In 7:5, he 
states that the four species are “one mitsvah…and together [lit., “all 
of them”] they are called mitsvat lulav.” In 7:13, when describing the 
obligation, maimonides employs a rare passive voice: “mitsvat lulav 
[the combination of the four species] is to be taken [le-hinatel] on 
the first day of the festival only — anywhere and at any time, even 
if this happens to be a sabbath.” The use of the active verb “to take” 
(li-tol, as in the SE) would certainly have forced maimonides into the 
standard introductory formula — “it is a positive commandment to 
take” — something I surmise he wished to avoid. The omission of the 
declarative statement is patently obvious. I contrast this formulation 
with the way he introduces the commandment to blow the shofar: “It 
is a positive commandment of the Torah to listen to the sound of the 
shofar on Rosh Hashanah” (Hilkhot Shofar, Sukkah ve-Lulav 1:1). 
49 . The correct order of sacrifices: temidin first, followed by musafin and other offerings, 
and temidin again to end the day’s service. While the order of the temidin and musafin 
is stipulated, the service is valid even if the musafin are brought first (Hilkhot Temidin 
u-Musafin 8:20). Indeed, the fact that an improper order does not invalidate the 
sacrifices and that the lambs can be consecrated for either sacrifices supports my 
reasoning that these offerings essentially fulfill one purpose. 
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In Rule 11, maimonides specifies that in situations where the 
Torah requires an assemblage of elements to fulfill a single goal, the 
commandment is defined as the unitary telos behind the individual 
activities. No single element of the assemblage is to be considered its 
own commandment. By way of example, maimonides states that “we 
have been commanded to rejoice before the lord on the first day of 
Tabernacles,50 and then He explains that the rejoicing be by taking 
[unto the hand] certain objects.” In other words, the “taking of the 
four kinds” is an aspect of the commandment to rejoice before the 
lord. In short, instead of individuating mitsvat lulav, maimonides may 
have thought it more appropriate to subsume the action under the 
commandment to rejoice on the festivals (p54).51 
P113� Red Heifer 
In the ShM, this commandment is formulated as follows: “To prepare 
the red heifer, so that [its ashes] will be available for what has to be 
done in order to remove impurity [contracted because of] a dead body.” 
By defining these acts as “the law of the red heifer” (din parah addumah), 
the Heading to Hilkhot Parah Addumah avoids the active formulation of 
the SE/ShM. In the main text, the Halakhot also fails to designate the 
preparation of the red heifer as a positive commandment. 
The claim of the SE/ShM appears to contradict Rule 10, which 
states that one does not count acts that are preparatory to a final 
goal. since making the ashes from the red heifer is only a preparation 
to making water for sprinkling (mey niddah), maimonides’ logic of 
individuation should subsume this commandment under p108, 
50 . The verse (lev. 23:40) commands one to take the four kinds on the first day and to 
rejoice before the lord seven days. The sages interpreted this to mean that the taking 
of the four kinds for seven days was obligatory only in the sanctuary; outside of the 
sanctuary, the taking of the four kinds was obligatory only for one day. At p169, 
maimonides states: “we are commanded to take a palm-branch, and rejoice with it 
before the lord seven days.” 
51 . JT Sukkah 3:11 reports a dispute regarding the command to rejoice: does it refer 
to peace offerings (shelamim) or to lulav? see also BT Sukkah 43b, RasHi, s. v. “lulav 
nami.” According to one opinion, mitsvat lulav was a way to fulfill the commandment 
to rejoice during the festival. 
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which discusses the purifying and defiling properties of the waters 
of sprinkling. Furthermore, the text on which maimonides based the 
positive commandment in the SE/ShM, namely “it shall be kept for the 
congregation of the children of Israel [for a water of sprinkling]” (Num. 
19:9), becomes the proof text for a detail of the overall preparation 
of the ashes of the red heifer (Hilkhot Parah 3:4). one-third of the 
ashes was to be used to consecrate high priests who worked on other 
heifers, one-third was to be used to purify those who became defiled 
through contact with a corpse, and the final third was to be set aside. 
maimonides grounds the disposition of the final third on the above 
proof text, although it seems that the practice of dividing the ashes into 
thirds is non-scriptural.52 
While the surface meaning of the verse may have given maimonides 
justification for individuating the preparation of the ashes as a 
commandment in the SE/ShM, the talmudic rabbis attached no 
independent meaning to the act. Instead, they used it to support a 
detail of the overall preparation.53 As a result, the Halakhot reclassifies 
the verse “[the ashes] shall be kept for the congregation” from being an 
injunction deserving of individuation to being a detail of the greater 
law of the waters of sprinkling (p108). The Heading to Hilkhot Parah 
Addumah already moves in this direction by calling this rubric “the law of 
the red heifer” (din parah addumah), a law rather than a commandment. 
p108 itself is not individuated in the Halakhot, as I discussed earlier, 
because it is a law rather than a mitsvat ‘aseh. 
52 . so noted mizrahi in his super-commentary on RasHi, Numbers 19:9. MParah, at the 
end of third chapter, discusses the tripartite division without adducing any proof-
texts; TParah also discusses the tripartite division but adduces support only for the 
third that was set aside, from our verse (19:9). The lack of proof-texts for the other 
two-thirds strengthens the view that the verse at 19:9 was merely an asmakhta, and 
that the three-way division was only a rabbinic practice.
53 . Sifre Numbers, Hukkat 124 (158), expounds on the words “shall be kept [ve-haytah … 
le-mishmeret] for the congregation,” teaching that the waters, while still not mixed 
with the ashes, can be disqualified by distraction. maimonides adopted the legal ruling 
of the Sifre (see Hilkhot Parah 7:1) but resisted the far-fetched exegesis, preferring 
instead to treat this conclusion as a tradition (u-devarim elu divre qabbalah hen) rather 
than a reading of the verse. 
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Two commandments that go missing: P183 and P214
In this section, I examine two positive commandments that appear 
on the SE, ShM, and Headings lists, and yet are not discussed in the 
Halakhot at all. I offer some suggestions to explain why maimonides 
may have reclassified these commandments. 
P183� To give the Levites cities to dwell in
In the SE, maimonides states that particular cities in the land of Israel 
are to serve as cities of refuge. The ShM adds that the levites are to 
receive these cities “because they received no portion in the land.” This 
rationale for receiving cities of refuge as compensation for not receiving a 
portion of the land is stated explicitly in the Heading to Hilkhot Shemitah 
ve-Yovel: “That the entire tribe of levites must not take possession in the 
land of Israel; instead, they are granted cities that they may dwell in 
them in the form of gifts.”54 
one problem exists with individuating this commandment: the 
biblical directive to give the levites these cities is only binding during 
the time of the conquest of the land, and under Rule 3, commandments 
that are not binding for all time must not be enumerated.55 In the 
Halakhot, maimonides seems to have come to this conclusion. He 
writes in Hilkhot Shemitah ve-Yovel 13:1: “Even though the tribe of 
levi has no portion in the land, the Israelites were already commanded 
[kvar nitstavu] to give them cities to dwell” (emphasis added). Besides 
the lack of a declarative statement, I also note the use of the past 
tense in the brief historical explanation. The giving of these cities 
of refuge clearly represents a one-time historical event; it does not 
54 . Note that deuteronomy 18:1-3 prohibits the levitical priests from owning territory 
in the land of Israel but makes no mention of their being given cities of refuge. The 
compensatory aspect of the gift is maimonides’ original insight.
55 . In an attempt to circumvent this problem, Hurewitz (in Sefer ha-Mitsvot im Perush 
Yad ha-Levi, ad loc.) speculates that cities other than the cities of refuge would also be 
given to the levites as their population increased. I could find no indication of this in 
any of maimonides’ writings. perla (in Sefer ha-Mitsvot le-RaSaG, vol. 3, 423) suggests 
that neither Ibn Gabirol nor Eliyahu ha-Zaqen counted this commandment because 
they did not see it as binding for all time.
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constitute a commandment binding for all time. This explains the lack 
of a declarative statement.56 
P214� That the newly married husband shall give happiness to his wife
The claim in the ShM is “that a bridegroom is to devote himself to his 
wife for a full year, in the course of which he is not to go on a journey,57 
or on a war abroad, or to undertake any obligation of a like nature.” 
The commandment undergoes a substantial revision in the Headings to 
Hilkhot Melakhim, where it appears as follows: “That those who betroth 
a woman, or build a house, or plant a vineyard be happy with their 
acquisition a full year and they are returned from the war [front].” 
To appreciate this change, one needs to look more closely at 
two scriptural sections: deuteronomy 20:1-9, which discusses the 
anointed priest (p191), and deuteronomy 24:5, which discusses the 
new husband’s deferral from military service. In the anointed priest 
section, we are told that a man is sent back from the battlefront 
under any one of three circumstances: he has built a house but not yet 
dedicated it, he has planted a vineyard but not yet gleaned it, or he has 
56 . maimonides’ revisions do not always consist of erasures from the original TaRYaG list. 
At least once, maimonides’ revision consisted of adding a new positive commandment: 
in Hilkhot Rotseah 11:4, he writes: “similarly, regarding any obstacle which is dangerous 
to life, there is a positive commandment (mitsvat ‘aseh) to remove it and to be beware of 
it, and to be particularly careful in this matter, for scripture says, Take heed unto thyself 
and take care of thy life [deut. 4:9].” This commandment seems to stand independently 
of “Then thou shalt make a parapet for thy roof” (deut. 22:8), enumerated in the sE/
ShM as p184 and presented in Hilkhot Rotseah 11:1. I hesitatingly suggest that the 
ShM could have accommodated this injunction under a broader and more figurative 
understanding of “Then thou shalt make a parapet for thy roof.” In the current 
version, p184 is narrowly defined as an injunction related only to physical structures. 
It is not so clear, however, that maimonides is adding a new positive commandment 
here. He may have intended to include the more general injunction of 11:4 under 
the positive commandment “Then thou shalt make a parapet for thy roof” already 
described in Hilkhot Rotseah 11:1. supporting this position is the fact that he does 
not cite a proper proof text for the more general injunction — “take heed” and “take 
care” indicate negative commandments! While Babad (Minhat Hinnukh, mitsvah 546, 
para. 11) struggles to find maimonides’ source, he does believe that “take heed” is an 
independent commandment. For another possible exception, see Hilkhot Avel 2:6.
57 . MnT reads here “not to go outside the city.”
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betrothed a woman but not yet married her. The text does not discuss 
any timeframe for the commandment. deuteronomy 24:5, however, 
stipulates that a new husband is exempt from military service for one 
full year: “and [he] shall give happiness [instead of cheer; Heb. ve-
simah] to his wife whom he hath taken.” 
In the SE/ShM, maimonides treats these two verses separately. 
The commandment to send particular individuals home from the 
battlefront is subsumed under p191, and the commandment to exempt 
a new husband from military service to “give happiness to his wife” for 
one year becomes p214. In the Heading to Hilkhot Melakhim, however, 
maimonides conflates these two sections. on the basis of tradition, 
he expands the one-year timeframe to include those who have built 
a house and/or have planted a vineyard, and he reiterates the three 
categories of returnees from the battlefront. This formulation is not 
entirely precise58 and can probably be attributed to considerations of 
brevity and the strains of the conflation. The Heading is noncommittal 
with respect to the command to actively entertain the new wife; it is 
content with stating that he who betroths a woman, builds a house, or 
plants a vineyard “be happy with [his] acquisition a full year.” 
In the Halakhot, maimonides introduces two correctives to the 
Heading’s formula and omits any reference to a positive commandment 
to give happiness to the new wife. Hilkhot Melakhim 7:3 discusses 
the battlefield return of men in the three above-noted categories. 
maimonides quotes verbatim the speech that scripture puts in the 
mouth of the specially-anointed priest: a house that has “not [yet] been 
dedicated,” a vineyard that has “not [yet] been eaten [lit., “not been 
treated as non-sacred”],” a woman whom a man has betrothed “but not 
married.” The halakhah is silent about these men taking one year to 
rest and rejoice at home, as the Heading claims that they should do. on 
the contrary, when they leave the battlefield, they return to logistical 
support, providing water and food for the troops and repairing the 
roads (ibid. 7:9). 
58 . While it is true that the bridegroom (arus) is sent home from the battlefront, only 
married men are enjoined to make their wives happy for the first year (ha-nose et 
arusato) according to M Sotah 8:3. The Halakhot corrects this imprecision.
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Halakhah 10 discusses the responsibilities of those who do not go 
out to the battlefield “at all and are not inconvenienced for anything 
in the world.” This category includes one who, within the past year, 
has built a house and “dedicated it,” one who has “married the woman 
whom he had betrothed,” or one who “has eaten from his vineyard.” 
Note that the one-year reprieve is not for he who has betrothed a 
woman, as stated in the Heading, but for “one who married the woman 
whom he had betrothed” (emphasis added). Halakhah 11 fleshes out 
this exemption, which runs for an entire year: 
He neither provides water and food [to the troops], nor does he repair the 
roads, guard the walls of the city or contribute to the pillars of the city, 
nor is he charged with any business at all anywhere, as it says, He shall not 
go out in the host, neither shall he be charged with any business [deut� 24:5], 
[this teaches that he may] transgress on two prohibitions, regarding the 
needs of the city and regarding the needs of the troops [lit., “not the 
needs of the city and not the needs of the troops”].
This law, or rather this exemption, is stated in the negative, “and these 
men do not go out…they are not inconvenienced…he neither provides 
water,” in keeping with the adduced proof-text. In 7:10-11, maimonides 
only discusses the prohibition formulated as N311 in the ShM (N310 
in the SE). Crucially, the positive commandment of “he shall give 
happiness to his wife” is never articulated� 
There is another interesting difference between the ShM and the Halakhot. 
While the former clearly states, as part of the positive commandment (p214), 
that the new husband shall not undertake any type of obligation but “shall 
rejoice with his wife for a full year,” the latter only orders that he shall be 
“free [naqi] to deal with his new house, his new wife and his new vineyard.” 
No mention is made of him having to rejoice with his wife, even though the 
adduced proof text states quite clearly that “he shall be free at home one year 
and shall give happiness to his wife.”59 While it is assumed that he will rejoice 
with his wife, the obligation is not explicitly stated.
59 . As noted, the proof text “he shall be free at home one year and shall give happiness 
to his wife” is adduced in 7:10. However, it is only cited to undergird the traditional 
exposition, which parses this text to show that the one-year exemption also applies to 
one who has bought a house and one who has eaten from a new vineyard.
-----------------------------------------------   REVIsITING THE TERm mITsVAT ‘AsEH  ----------------------------------------------
— 205 —
The commandments obligating certain soldiers to return from the 
battlefront and the newly married man to give happiness to his wife 
underwent complex development and revision through maimonides’ 
various compositions. In the commandment’s final iteration, the Halakhot 
has no reference or allusion to an obligation to make a newly married wife 
happy or any implication of impropriety in the new husband’s traveling. 
I note that in the ShM, maimonides’ only support for the commandment 
is the scriptural proof text itself, which could be read merely as stating a 
fact: husbands make their new wives happy in their first year of marriage. 
Alternatively, “and [he] shall give happiness to his wife” could be read 
as granting the husband the opportunity to gratify his wife, rather than 
obligating him to do so. Regardless of the reason for maimonides’ reversal, 
it remains significant that p214 is not discussed in the Halakhot, neither 
as a mitsvat ‘aseh nor as a non-scriptural obligation.60 
These two discontinuities between the Headings and the Halakhot 
are further evidence that the Headings were not intended to represent 
a comprehensive or precise count of commandments. Rather, the 
Headings were simply an initial draft of an outline that helped 
maimonides organize the enormous mass of material that was to be 
included in the MT. 
In this chapter, I have offered explanations for 82 out of a total of 
109 failures to designate. Fifty-three commandments are re-categorized 
60 . In a recent article, Henshke also concludes that the Halakhot omits the supposed 
commandment. Henshke ascribes the reason for this change to a number of technical 
factors, among them Alfasi’s silence on the matter and the municipal tax exemptions 
stipulated in the Tosefta and in the Jerusalem Talmud. These exemptions imply that 
the one-year holiday cannot be for the purpose of giving happiness to the wife since 
the need to pay taxes would not force the new husband to absent himself from the 
home. As an aside, Henshke notes that the ShM follows Qayyara’s lead in claiming 
that there is a positive commandment to give happiness to a new wife. Qayyara’s entry 
reads: “to cheer a bride” (le-sameah kallah; pq149). In note 26, Henshke explains that 
this interpretation of Qayyara’s entry is not definitive, referring the reader to perla 
and to Hildesheimer (Haqdamat Sefer Halakhot Gedolot, n. 387). Although Henshke 
acknowledges those who disagree with his interpretation of pq149, he maintains 
his position. Alternately, it is possible that “le-sameah kallah” indicates the rabbinic 
obligation imposed on the public to entertain a bride on her wedding day, supported 
by Qayyara’s use of the word “bride” (kallah) instead of “his wife” (ishto) (Henshke, 
“Ve-simah et Ishto,” 22-30).
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as claims that did not meet the new definition of mitsvat ‘aseh as 
an unconditional obligation. Instead, they function as contingent 
obligations, procedures, and laws. Three of the commandments are 
reformulated in the Halakhot and can no longer be categorized as 
unconditional obligations. Twenty-seven other commandments are 
re-individuated in the Halakhot, subsumed under broader themes. 
Finally, in two instances, maimonides reversed himself in the Halakhot 
by eliminating two commandment claims made in the earlier works. 
To explain the remainder of the failures to designate, we shall need 
to examine maimonides’ approach to reading legal material in scripture 
and the implications that it holds for categorizing the law according to 
its various biblical and rabbinic sources.
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-------------------------------- CHApTER VII  --------------------------------
PESHATEH DI-QERA 
In the preceding chapters, we saw how maimonides built his TaRYaG 
enumeration following a systematic and original set of rules, which we 
called rules of individuation (Rules 4, 6-7, and 9-14). While these rules 
are sensible and do not appear to violate rabbinic tenets, they do not 
always accord with talmudic notions of what constitutes a mitsvah. one 
might say that for the most part, these rules run parallel to theories 
of rabbinic jurisprudence. These rules did generate disagreement 
among other enumerators. However, such disagreement should not be 
entirely unexpected, since one can always individuate commandments 
in a somewhat different manner, just as one can formulate different 
purposes and rationales for commandments. 
Rules 1, 2, and 3, the rules of identification, were far more 
controversial, however: they challenged a nearly unanimous geonic 
consensus. I paraphrase these rules here for clarity:
Rule 1: It is not proper to enumerate commandments resting only on 
rabbinic authority.
Rule 2: It is not proper to enumerate every exegetical derivation 
known through one of the thirteen middot by which the Torah 
is expounded or through the rule of inclusion (ribbuy).1 
* please see postscript on page 337.
1 . my own translation. The inference is that some derivations may be included. In 
Responsa, ed. Blau, no. 355, 631-633, maimonides alludes to “three or four” such 
instances. Chavel’s translation leaves no room for exceptions: “We are not to include 
in this enumeration [laws] derived from scripture by any of the thirteen exegetical 
principles by which the Torah is expounded, or by [the principle of] inclusion” 
(emphasis added). Neither Nahmanides nor the other translations interpret this rule 
so absolutely.
*
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Rule 3: It is not proper to enumerate commandments that are not 
binding for all time.
Rule 1 eliminates rabbinic laws, since they postdate the giving 
of the written law at sinai. Conceptually, this rule did not present a 
major challenge to rabbinic understanding. The Talmud was very aware 
of the difference in status and force between Torah law and rabbinic 
law,2 despite the occasional self-serving admonitions regarding the 
gravitas of rabbinic law.3 Rule 3 eliminated temporal commandments, 
i.e. commandments given for specific occasions, as they were generally 
associated with the Israelites’ sojourn through the wilderness. Geonim 
are found on both sides of the divide regarding the counting of temporal 
commandments.4 
Rule 2, on the other hand, shook the very grounds of rabbinic 
tradition. Traditionally, legislation derived from scribal hermeneutics 
was seen as equivalent to what the Torah explicitly orders. maimonides 
2 . For example, doubts concerning the applicability of a particular rabbinic enactment 
were treated leniently, favoring the easier practice. The opposite was true with regard 
to scriptural law. see e.g. BT Betsah 3b.
3 . such rare statements of rabbinic law’s superiority over biblical law can be seen in BT 
‘Eruvin 21b: “Raba made the following exposition: What is the purport of the scriptural 
text: And, furthermore my son, be admonished: of making many books etc.? my son, be 
more careful in [the observance of] the words of the scribes than in the words of the 
Torah, for in the laws of the Torah there are positive and negative precepts; but, as 
to the laws of the scribes, whoever transgresses any of the enactments of the scribes 
incurs the penalty of death. In case you should object: If they are of real value why 
were they not recorded [in the Torah]? scripture stated: of making many books there is 
no end�” see also song of songs Rabbah 1:2, s. v. “ki tovim dodekhah mi-yayin”: “[It was 
said in the name of the] friends of Rabbi yohanan: the words of the scribes are more 
desirable than the words of the Torah.” 
4 . Ibn Balaam argues that temporal commandments should not be included in the 
TaRYaG. According to Ibn Balaam, Hefets did count temporal commandments (as we 
discussed in chapter 1). Ibn Ezra sharply questions the value of enumerating temporal 
commandments, although some of the commandments that he lists as examples of 
temporal commandments are surprising and were not considered as such by maimonides 
(and others). see Ibn Ezra, Yesod Mora, sha’ar 2, para. 7, 95-96, editors’ notes. Though 
maimonides accuses Qayyara of counting temporal commandments, Nahmanides 
(Hasagot, 106) defends Qayyara’s position by redefining those commandments as not 
of a temporal nature. His apology, however, runs into some difficulties when he tries 
to explain away terumat ha-mekhes (dues offered from the spoils of war) and tahanunim 
(special pleadings in time of anguish), which Qayyara included in his parashiyyot.
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distinguishes sharply between interpretations of the scriptural text 
(including divinely revealed interpretations) and legal inferences or 
derivations from the text.5 Borrowing terms from Arabic jurisprudence, 
maimonides called the former “roots” (Arab., usul) and the latter 
“branches” (Arab., furu’), arguing that hermeneutically-derived laws 
should not be counted because they were mere “branches from the 
root.”6 In the more familiar rabbinic terms, the “roots” are called de-
oraita laws (the Aramaic word for Torah) and the branches divre sofrim 
laws (the words of the scribes). What exactly constitutes de-oraita and 
divre sofrim laws and how they are to be identified is the subject of most 
of this chapter.
maimonides’ rule was so foreign to the rabbinic mindset that it 
managed to mislead even one of his sharpest critics. daniel ha-Bavli 
could not imagine that maimonides intended to disqualify hermeneutic 
derivations from the category of de-oraita. He interprets maimonides 
as suggesting that hermeneutic derivations should only be counted 
as mitsvot ‘aseh if the rabbis had designated them as coming from the 
Torah, but that the derivations should still be considered de-oraita, even 
without such designation.7  
unlike daniel ha-Bavli, Nahmanides fully understands this 
rule — and criticizes it harshly. In multiple examples, Nahmanides 
argues that talmudic tradition does not draw such a demarcation and 
that it treats hermeneutic derivations with the same deference and 
force as the explicit injunctions of the Torah. Nahmanides ends his 
critique of Rule 2 with a fulminating indictment: 
[F]or this book of the master, its content is delightful, full of love [based 
on song 5:16] except for this principle, which uproots great mountains 
of the Talmud and throws down fortified walls of the Gemara. For the 
students of the Gemara, this notion is evil and bitter. let it be forgotten 
and not said. 
5 . For a good discussion of this distinction, see Halbertal, “maimonides’ Book of 
Commandments,” 457-480.
6 . ShM, Rule 2, 56. 
7 . Abraham maimonides, “Teshuvot Rabbenu Abraham ben ha-RamBam,” question 1, 541. 
perla is correct to say that daniel ha-Bavli anticipates duran in this respect. see below.
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This is not the place to review the complexities and ramifications of 
maimonides’ position, and how it can be reconciled with the numerous 
talmudic passages that contradict it. maimonides’ apologists and 
interlocutors explore these concerns in their commentaries to the 
ShM. I do believe, however, that the full implications of this powerful 
salvo have not been totally appreciated. In this chapter, I will argue 
that reasonable explanations can be found for a number of failures to 
designate commandments as mitsvot ‘aseh if one follows Rule 2 to its 
ultimate and radical conclusions. 
RulE 2 ANd THE BRoAd mEANING oF DIvRE SofRIM
With its circuitous wording — “it is not proper to enumerate every 
exegetical derivation” (emphasis added) — Rule 2 allows an opening for 
some rabbinically derived laws to enter the scripturally based count. 
In addressing these exceptions at the outset of the discussion of this 
rule, maimonides argues that certain hermeneutically derived laws 
only appear to be derived rabbinically; in such cases, the hermeneutic 
derivation represents an act of discovery rather than of creation. These 
laws, maimonides claims, are known to have originated at sinai, a fact 
communicated by the tradition’s tradents (transmitters), who label the 
derivations “itself Torah” (guf torah) or “from the Torah” (mi-de-oraita). 
Thus he permits the enumeration of some commandments whose 
derivation appears to stem from the thirteen hermeneutic rules.
later in his analysis, maimonides discusses another sort of 
scriptural analysis employed in identifying commandments, showing 
where such analysis can lead to error. In his words: 
Their [i.e. Qayyara and his followers’] lack of knowledge has already 
brought them to this more serious mistake: If they found [in the Talmud] 
an interpretation of a certain verse, the interpretation requiring the 
performance or the prohibition of a certain act — duties which are no doubt 
of rabbinic authority — they count them among the commandments, even 
though the plain meaning of the verse [peshateh di-qera] indicates in no 
way any of these things. This is contrary to the principle which [the sages] 
of blessed memory, teach us: “A scriptural verse never loses its literal 
sense” [ein miqra yotse mi-yede peshuto]. It is also contrary to the process of 
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reasoning throughout the Talmud, as is evidenced from the fact that when 
the sages speak of a verse from which many topics are derived by way of 
interpretation and various proofs — they ask [in conclusion]: “But what is 
the verse itself about [gufe di-qera be-mai qa-medabber]?”
These [authors], however, depending as they do upon baseless 
comparisons, count among the positive Commandments visiting the 
sick, consoling mourners, and the burying of the dead — all because of 
the following interpretation mentioned in connection with His words, 
exalted be He: And thou shalt show them the way wherein they must walk, 
and the deeds they must do [Exod. 18:20] — the way refers to deeds of loving 
kindness; they must walk refers to visiting the sick; wherein has reference 
to the burying of the dead; and the deeds, this refers to the laws; they must 
do, this has reference to more than the strict requirement of the law. on 
the basis of this text, these authors thought that each and every duty 
mentioned constituted a commandment in itself, but they were unaware 
that all these and similar duties are embraced within the terms of one of 
the Commandments explicitly stated in the Torah, as contained in His 
words, exalted be He, And thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.8 
maimonides attacks his geonic predecessors for grounding 
commandments on a type of reading that bore little relation to the 
true import of the text, a sort of playful exegesis. maimonides sets off 
gufe di-qera (“the text itself”) from this type of playful exegesis where 
“many topics are derived by way of interpretation and various proofs.” 
Although he does not use the term here, I infer that he considered the 
scriptural text underlying this type of exposition to be no more than a 
mnemonic device, a type of para-textual support that the rabbis called 
an asmakhta (discussed below). 
A brief digression to explain this critique: In his “Introduction 
to the mishnah,” in discussing laws transmitted through tradition 
without a difference of opinion, maimonides writes: “It is possible for 
us to derive these explanations from the wisdom of the Torah given 
to us, through one of the types of deductive reasoning [Arab. Qyas, 
Heb. heqesh, referring to the 13 hermeneutic rules] or through supports 
[asmakhtot], or from allusions or suggestions that may be found in the 
8 . ShM, 53-55.
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scriptural text.”9 This second type of textual “supports” comes in two 
forms. some provide a weak but nonetheless supportive basis for an 
exegesis, while others provide nothing but a memory hook, a playful 
connection to the text that does not stand up to analysis. maimonides 
writes that the Talmud calls the latter kind of proof a “mere support” 
(asmakhta be-’alma). As he puts it, these “mere supports” are a literary 
device to help one “observe and remember” the law in question: 
“they are not the meaning intended by the text.” The text serves as a 
mnemonic device, rather than as a genuine proof text. For maimonides, 
an important difference between the oral traditions that are textually-
based (those using substantive supports, allusions, and suggestions) 
and those mnemonically linked to a text is that only the latter type 
of support can serve as justification for a halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai� 
Indeed, the term halakhot le-Moshe mi-Sinai refers to oral traditions that 
enjoy no substantive textual grounding�10 
9 . Haqdamot Ha-Rambam la-Mishnah, ed. shailat, 39. 
10 . This is not to say that every halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai is linked to a text, even if only 
mnemonically; some are not linked to any text. While on the subject of asmakhtot, I 
note that Jay Harris makes an observation relevant to our later discussion. By claiming 
that in the Talmud, “an asmakhta represents an exegesis marshaled in support of a 
rabbinic law,” Harris may be explicating maimonides’ rationale for believing that para-
textual or weak textual indications underlying traditions indicate rabbinic or scribal 
laws (divre sofrim legislation). some caution is in order, however, since we do not know 
exactly to what type of asmakhtot Harris (and the Talmud) was referring: the more 
substantive textual ones, the mnemonic ones, or both (see Harris, How Do We Know 
This? 78). medieval rabbinic authorities frequently consider certain exegeses asmakhtot, 
even without specific talmudic statements to that effect, to support their contentions 
that the particular law was rabbinic. A good example can be found in Nahmanides’ 
Hasagot to p5. After citing a number of talmudic passages supporting the rabbinic 
origin of prayer, Nahmanides questions the nature of maimonides’ midrashic exegesis 
that supports his commandment claim, suggesting that it is merely an asmakhta, “and 
thus a rabbinic ordinance. In maimonides’ defense, at least one commentator (de leon, 
“megillat Esther,” 211) notes that characterizing the nature of a midrash is a difficult 
enterprise and that one can infer that a given midrash stems from a tradition from 
sinai, as long as it is not contradicted by the final authority of the Talmud. According 
to such commentators, the determination that a certain exegesis is an asmakhta is 
based on factors extraneous to the midrash itself, such as its agreement with talmudic 
conclusions, rather than on the ability of the midrash to correctly convey the meaning 
of the biblical text. In general, Nahmanides reads midreshe halakhah as asmakhtot if they 
do not agree with talmudic exegesis. This has more to do with his epistemological views 
than with his reading strategies. For a similar difference, see Hasagot to p36, N353. 
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maimonides considered counting commandments based on 
asmakhtot to be an even graver error than counting commandments 
that were derived via the use of the 13 hermeneutic rules (analogical 
derivations), for he writes: 
Now if they had counted matters which are even clearer than that 
[asmakhtot], and more conceivable that they be enumerated [among 
the commandments] — these being, namely, the laws which are derived 
through one of the Thirteen [Exegetical] principles by which the Torah 
is expounded — the number of the commandments would then reach 
many thousands!
 The inference is that asmakhtot are even further removed from 
genuinely representing the biblical text than hermeneutic derivations. 
Implicit in maimonides’ critique of his geonic predecessors is that, 
for him, only philologically grounded readings, what he calls the “plain 
readings of the verse,” can yield the scriptural laws that he enumerates. 
We shall explore this category in the next section. Analogical 
derivations and asmakhtot, however, only yield non-scriptural laws, 
commandments that maimonides would designate as mitsvot mi-divre 
sofrim. With regard to the last two categories, maimonides writes, more 
generally: “Whatever they did not explicitly hear at sinai is considered 
as coming from the ‘words of the scribes’ [mi-divre sofrim].” 
In contrast, maimonides seems to characterize interpretations on the basis of their 
internal exegetical logic. That is, if the interpretation stems from the plain sense of the 
text, it can be considered a genuine derashah; otherwise, it is considered an allusion or 
an intimation. For the purpose of this determination, it mattered little if the source of 
the interpretation was one of the midreshe halakah or the Talmud. For general criteria 
for the divergence of views in the matter of asmakhta, see Hurewitz, Sefer ha-Mitsvot im 
Perush Yad ha-Levi, comments to Rule 2. For a brief but excellent discussion on asmakhtot 
and their place in rabbinic exegesis, see Elon, Jewish Law,  300-305. Quoting Guttmann’s 
comprehensive study on asmakhtot, Elon concludes that “the term asmakhta does not 
imply … that the law in question cannot be connected with the verse in a logical and 
rational manner. It indicates rather that the halakhic authorities knew that the creative 
source of the particular law was not interpretation but one of the other legal sources, such 
as tradition or legislation.” As a fitting conclusion to this complex issue of asmakhtot, I 
quote a wise remark made by Harris with which I wholeheartedly agree: “No matter what 
is said here, there will be many scholars, possessing far greater expertise than I, who will 
disagree. stepping into this issue is to step into a raging controversy” (47).
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scholars are divided on how to understand the status of mitsvot mi-
divre sofrim in maimonides’ jurisprudence. It should be noted that in 
the ShM, maimonides refers to these laws as de-rabbanan, a technical 
term that represents rabbinic laws in talmudic literature, standing 
in opposition to de-oraita laws. According to this interpretation, 
mitsvot mi-divre sofrim are rabbinic in status. others have argued that 
maimonides had designated these laws as de-rabbanan not because 
of their legal status, but simply because they represent the product 
of rabbinic exegetical activity. Therefore, these commandments 
could still command a scriptural status of sorts.11 No consensus has 
emerged among scholars.12 The maximalist interpretation, espoused by 
Nahmanides, maintains that maimonides effectively gives divre sofrim 
legislation a status equivalent to rabbinic enactments. At the other 
extreme, scholars such as simeon b. Tsemah duran take the view that 
while maimonides excludes hermeneutically derived divre sofrim from 
his enumeration, he agrees that they all carry the weight of Torah law.13 
As I noted earlier, maimonides stipulates that whatever was not heard 
explicitly on sinai is considered as coming from the “words of the scribes” 
(mi-divre sofrim). This includes rabbinic decrees and ordinances14 and oral 
11 . The term “divre sofrim” can refer to two distinct types of rabbinic laws. In my analysis, 
I use the term to refer only to the type of legislation deeply rooted in scriptural law, 
in the spirit of “‘iqqaro min ha-torah ve-shiuro mi-divre sofrim” (“its essence is from the 
Torah and its boundaries are from the scribes”). see maimonides’ comments to M 
Kelim 17:12. There are other cases where the term “divre sofrim” refers to pure rabbinic 
laws, like ordinances. The status of the latter legislation is never in doubt: it is always 
rabbinic. When I discuss mitsvot mi-divre sofrim, I refer to the former category, “‘iqqaro 
min ha-torah ve-shiuro mi-divre sofrim�” see below, note 13. 
12 . see Neubauer, Ha-RaMBaM al Divre Sofrim, for an extensive survey.
13 . duran, Zohar ha-Raqia, 11. This is also the position of daniel ha-Bavli (as we have seen) 
as well as that of the two most prominent commentators on the MT, Joseph Karo and 
Vidal di Tolosa, who believed that divre sofrim enjoyed the status of scriptural law; see 
their comments to Hilkhot Ishut, 1:2. As I have noted, modern scholars have also not 
reached a consensus. levinger (Darkhe ha-Mahshavah, 46-50) concludes with a fair 
degree of confidence that mitsvot mi-divre sofrim should be considered of rabbinic force 
and Henshke argues strenuously for this view (Henshke, “le-Havhanat ha-RamBam 
bein de-oraita le-de-Rabbanan, ” 205n2). Contrarily, shailat concludes that they have 
scriptural force (Iggerot ha-RaMBaM, ed. shailat, vol. 2, 451-452). see also, more 
recently, Rabinovitch, “Al divre sofrim she-Toqfam de-oraita,” 93-111.
14 . This is, in fact, the typical usage of the term in the mishnah. see, for example, M Teharot 4:7, 
11 and M Yadayim 3:2, where divre sofrim refer to rabbinic ordinances. see also note 11 above.
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traditions,15 some of which are lightly attached to verses by hints and 
allusions, and some of which bear no explicit connections to the text, such 
as halakhot le-Moshe mi-Sinai� It should be noted that this latter group of 
laws carry special significance in the rabbinic tradition because they were 
viewed as laws given orally to moses at sinai. many jurists conferred on 
them a special status, equal in force to scriptural law. 
Confirming what maimonides says in the ShM, we find the following 
statement in his commentary (PhM) to M Miqva’ot 6:7: 
I already explained that this expression [“measurements are mi-divre 
sofrim”] does not contradict what they said, namely, that measurements 
are a halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai, because everything that is not explicitly 
stated in scripture is called “the words of scribes” [divre sofrim].16 
And again in PhM, M Kelim 17:12: 
don’t let their dictum “measures are from the words of the scribes” 
[shiurim mi-divre sofrim] confuse you when you consider their principle 
that all measures are halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai, because in effect 
anything that is not explicitly stated in scripture is called mi-divre sofrim, 
even things that are halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai. When they said mi-
divre sofrim, they meant to say that the matter is a tradition from the 
scribes, like all explanations and authoritative halakhot from moses, 
or the “reforms of the scribes” (tiqqun sofrim), like all enactments and 
ordinances. Remember this.17 
maimonides’ views with respect to halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai also 
engendered a great deal of controversy — a controversy second only to 
15 . see note 16 below.
16 . some caution is in order, however. Henshke (in “le-Havhanat ha-RamBam”, 205n2) has 
suggested that in the PhM, maimonides may have been referring to the way the mishnah 
and Talmud understood that term, not necessarily to the way he himself understood it.
17 . The word “explanations” is puzzling in this context, because maimonides often 
interprets scriptural texts with the aid of these explanations and yet considers them 
de-oraita� In the ShM, he calls these traditional explanations perushim mequbbalim, 
and in the Halakhot he refers to these interpretations with the phrase “as it was 
learned from tradition” (lamdu mi-pi ha-shemu’ah). For an example, see p198 and the 
corresponding Hilkhot Malveh ve-Loveh 5:1. Also see my discussion of the phrase mi-pi 
ha-shemu’ah later in the chapter.
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the one aroused by his theory on analogically derived commandments. 
Nahmanides seems to have understood maimonides as maintaining 
that halakhot le-Moshe mi-Sinai are mitsvot mi-divre sofrim. since 
Nahmanides held that, in maimonides’ legal system, mitsvot mi-divre 
sofrim were of rabbinic force only, then halakhot le-Moshe mi-Sinai would 
equally have the legal status of rabbinic laws.18 
maimonides uses a number of terms in addition to halakhah le-Moshe 
mi-Sinai to describe the variety of oral traditions, terms such as mi-pi ha-
qabbalah, halakhah mi-pi ha-qabbalah, mi-pi ha-shemu‘ah, and halakhah mi-pi 
ha-shemu‘ah. While the terms “qabbalah” and “shemu‘ah” stand loosely for 
“reception” and “teaching,” maimonides never defines these terms. Their 
approximate meanings can only be inferred from the context in which they 
are found. It should be noted that previous scholars’ attempts to achieve 
some semantic precision have not been extremely successful. With this 
caveat, we must nonetheless attempt to define these terms before we can 
categorize these traditions as de-oraita or as divre sofrim. In general, and 
as a good approximation, we can say that maimonides categorizes the oral 
traditions that elucidate how we read certain scriptural words, phrases, or 
passages as de-oraita, while scribal traditions that innovate laws, such as 
hermeneutical derivations or halakhot le-Moshe mi-Sinai, he categorizes as 
divre sofrim. In the next section, I examine the tools maimonides uses to 
determine what can be categorized as scriptural law. 
 
“EIN MIQRA YoTSE MI-YEDE PESHUTo”: A sCRIpTuRAl 
VERsE NEVER losEs ITs PESHAT sENsE
We saw earlier that maimonides approvingly cites the talmudic 
principle: “A scriptural verse never loses its literal sense” (ein miqra 
yotse mi-yede peshuto). What is the meaning of the term peshat, and 
how does maimonides use it? 
18 . Nahmanides disagrees forcefully with that categorization. Nahmanides, Hasagot to 
Rule 2, 78. He bases his understanding of maimonides’ position on a responsum 
written to pinhas ha-dayan (Responsa, ed. Blau, no. 355, pp. 631-632). For an 
inquiry into the status of halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai in maimonides’ legal system, see 
levinger, Darkhe ha-Mahshavah, 50-65 and 190-205; Kahana, Heqer ve-’Iyyun, 9-18; 
and Henshke, “le-yesode Tefisat ha-Halakhah shel ha-RamBam,” 144.
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The Aramaic peshateh and the Hebrew peshuto derive from the same 
root, p�sh�t. In biblical Hebrew, this root means “to strip off” or “to 
flatten” a garment, later evolving to encompass “extend” and “stretch 
out.” over time, peshat became an exegetical term understood as 
representing the plain or literal sense; it is often contrasted with the 
term derash, representing fanciful homiletics. 
In recent years, scholars have examined the role of this term in 
talmudic literature. In his classic study on peshat in talmudic literature, 
Raphael loewe notes that the word peshat means different things to 
different amoraim. In at least one instance (attributed to the third-
century amora Rava), the expression “ein miqra yotse mi-yede peshuto” 
means “the natural and explicit meaning of the text, at any rate within 
the context of this formula.”19 He concludes that, on the whole, peshat 
does not represent a particular way of reading a text; it rather seems to 
be shorthand for saying that a given reading has achieved authoritative 
status.20
In another classic study of exegetical terms, m. Gertner finds that 
in the Talmud, the Hebrew form of the noun (peshut) occurs only in 
the phrase “ein miqra yotse mi-yede peshuto,” and that phrase, only three 
times. Each time, the term correlates with the idea that “the ordinary 
sense of the phrase in question should not be ignored.” Gertner concludes 
that the Hebrew noun peshut represents “the simple straightforward 
explanation, i.e. ‘unfolding’ of the text (explanation).”21 He emphasizes 
that the ordinary meaning should not be confused with an extreme 
literal interpretation; sometimes, an allegorical interpretation better 
reflects context than an overly literalist reading. He finds, however, 
that while the Aramaic term peshat has the same dictionary meaning 
as Hebrew peshut, it is not used in the same way. studying the context 
in which peshateh di-qera appears, Gertner concludes that this term 
designates a midrashic interpretation; rather than “simple” or “plain,” 
the Aramaic term peshat meant “widespread” and “widely accepted” by 
custom or tradition. This parallels loewe’s conclusion. 
19 . loewe, “The ‘plain’ meaning of scripture in Early Jewish Exegesis,” 165.
20 . Ibid., 181-182.
21 . Gertner, “Terms of scriptural Interpretation,” 20.
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sarah Kamin is not satisfied with the conclusions of the scholarly 
studies that she reviews, including loewe’s and Gertner’s. Instead, 
she suggests that the terms peshateh di-qera and peshuto shel miqra 
parallel the terms “verse” or “text”; they are simply another way of 
referring to the words of the text under consideration. In contrast, the 
question “in what is it written?” (be-mai ketiv) seeks to find the literal 
meaning of the text. since the terms peshateh di-qera and peshuto shel 
miqra do not imply a specific method of interpretation, but rather the 
object of interpretation, the responses to queries with these terms 
can accommodate any number of interpretations, including literary 
and homiletic ones. While we can diagram their functional use in a 
sentence, these terms derived from the root peshat do not reflect a well-
defined concept that fits into a discernable hermeneutic category.22 
A few years after Kamin’s work, david Weiss Halivni made a 
valiant attempt to find a uniform meaning for terms related to peshat 
throughout the rabbinic corpus. Examining the different iterations of 
peshuto and peshateh, he concludes, contra Gertner, that there is no 
semantic distinction between the Hebrew and the Aramaic nouns. 
Instead, he concludes that the word peshat continually yields a uniform 
meaning of “extension, continuation, and derivatively, context.”23 
Weiss Halivni resorts to a great deal of tortured logic (pilpul) to 
prove his point. He works under the assumption that the principle 
of contextual reading has always been acknowledged and rejects any 
suggestion that some talmudic rabbis did not use this reading strategy, 
even when the passage implies otherwise.24 Nevertheless, Weiss Halivni 
22 . she does acknowledge that, with respect to the expression “ein miqra yotse mi-yede 
peshuto,” the talmudic exegetes were referring to a literal reading. Kamin, RaSHi’s 
Exegetical Categorization in Respect to the Distinction Between Peshat and Derash, 31-48.
23 . Weiss Halivni, Peshat and Derash, 54. 
24 . For example, “ein miqra yotse mi-yede peshuto” in BT Shabbat 63a means that the verse 
must also have a simple, plain meaning. There is no reason for one to read the exchange 
between mar bar R. Huna and R. Kahana in any other manner. Weiss Halivni creates 
a difficulty — for which he then has to offer a complicated and stretched answer — by 
saying that “it is extremely unlikely that R. Kahana had not heard of the many derashot 
where biblical verses (or words) were metaphorically or allegorically exposited while 
at the same time retained their simple meaning” (59). In other words, he creates a 
difficulty by assuming that Rav Kahana must have known that texts can be read for 
their plain sense. But it is quite clear that R. Kahana did not know that verses can be 
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acknowledges in the end that the dictum “no text can be deprived of 
its context” only emerges clearly by the third century, and that even 
by then it was not universally accepted. He concludes: “the dictum 
was either not too well known or not honored by all scholars.”25 I 
note that if the formal rabbinic exegetical tool of peshat was neither 
uniformly understood nor even widely known, one gathers that it could 
not have played a major role in rabbinic interpretation. This theory is 
corroborated by the relatively sporadic appearance of terms derived 
from peshat in the talmudic and midrashic literature. 
None of the proposed definitions for the talmudic usage of the 
term peshat that I reviewed — plain or literal sense, straightforward 
sense, or contextual sense — seem to fit the totality of the talmudic 
data consistently, however sparse the data may be. I thus return to 
Kamin’s assessment that peshat simply refers to the words of the text 
in their context, to the object of the inquiry rather than to a method 
of interpretation. While this understanding seems to be the best 
objective interpretation of how the term was used in the Talmud, it is 
not necessarily the way that medieval scholars, including maimonides, 
understood the term.
pre-twelfth-century Andalusian scholars likely understood the 
term peshat as Weiss Halivni explicated it: the sense of a word or 
phrase in its context. These scholars, which include the grammarians 
menahem b. saruq, Hayyuj, and Ibn Janah, as well as the exegetes 
moses b. Chiquitilla, Judah Ibn Balaam, and Abraham ibn Ezra, adopt 
this contextual method and marry it with grammatical and philological 
insights. As m. Cohen has noted: “The use of the term peshat in the 
medieval tradition as the basis of the philological-contextual method … 
represents an appropriation of talmudic terminology, recast to support 
an essentially novel exegetical approach.”26 maimonides appears to 
interpreted according to their plain sense, as he says: “I was eighteen years old and I 
had already studied the entire Talmud, yet I did not know that a text cannot be deprived 
of its peshat” (emphasis added). It is only after the exchange with mar bar Rav Huna 
that he was able to acknowledge this fact. 
25 . Weiss Halivni, Peshat and Derash, 63. 
26 . A few months after I had completed my dissertation, mordechai Z. Cohen presented 
a paper on maimonides’ hermeneutics at the 2008 Association of Jewish studies 
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have drawn from this rich exegetical heritage. It is only within this 
Andalusian context that one can understand his sharp criticism of 
his adversaries’ exegetical methods as well as his appeal to follow the 
dictates of peshat: 
This is contrary to the principle which [the sages] of blessed memory, 
teach us: “A scriptural verse never loses its literal sense” [ein miqra yotse 
mi-yede peshuto]. It is also contrary to the process of reasoning throughout 
the Talmud. 
despite his protestation that we find this “reasoning throughout the 
Talmud,” maimonides reads scripture with a method that was relatively 
foreign to the early amoraic rabbis. His reading strategy, which he terms 
peshateh di-qera, is an adaptation of the Andalusian theory of peshat. In 
the next section, I explore maimonides’ particular understanding of 
this category of terms.27 
mAImoNIdEs’ uNdERsTANdING oF PESHATEH DI-QERA 
From the way maimonides groups them together in Rule 2, peshateh 
di-qera and gufe di-qera appear to be interchangeable terms. moreover, 
maimonides references the hermeneutic peshateh di-qera in the 
explication of Rule 828 and gufe di-qera in the explication to N45, both 
times to justify his exhortation against reading the verse “That he be 
convention. The paper discussed many of the same issues that I discuss in this 
chapter. At my request, he was very gracious and sent me a much longer version of 
this presentation in an 83-page draft (dated december 13, 2008) titled “A Talmudist’s 
Halakhic Hermeneutics: maimonides on ‘scripture does not leave the Hand of its 
Peshat.’” As he notes in the draft: “This essay is one part of a series of studies of mine 
…that aim to reveal and assess maimonides’ contributions to the so-called “peshat 
school” of Jewish exegesis. This subject will be addressed comprehensively in my 
forthcoming monograph, opening the Gates of Interpretation: Maimonides’ Biblical 
Exegesis in Light of His Geonic-Andalusian Heritage and Muslim Milieu” (5). Cohen’s 
mastery of the subject, in both breadth and depth, is quite impressive. To my great 
pleasure and relief, I found that we arrived at essentially the same conclusion. 
27 . on the Andalusian peshat school, see Cohen, “The Best of poetry,” 15-57, and literature 
cited there. 
28 . Rule 8 states: “A mere negative statement excluding a particular case from the scope 
of a commandment is not to be included among the negative commandments.” 
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not [ve-lo] as Korah and as his company” (Num. 17:5) as a prohibition 
(despite the presence of the negative particle lo), thus further 
demonstrating that these two hermeneutical strategies are identical. 
since maimonides never explains what he means by peshateh di-
qera/gufe di-qera, one must deduce the terms’ meaning by examining 
how they are used throughout the ShM. I begin by noting that 
words described by these terms must convey a discrete idea. As a 
counterexample, the midrashic exposition on the verse “And thou shalt 
show them the way wherein they must walk, and the deeds they must 
do” (Exod. 18:20), cited in the discussion of Rule 2, states: 
The way, refers to deeds of loving kindness; they must walk, refers to 
visiting the sick; wherein, has reference to the burying of the dead; and 
the deeds, this refers to the laws; they must do, this has reference to more 
than the strict requirement of the law. 
maimonides describes this as an exposition that does not satisfy the 
principle of peshateh di-qera. The referenced words and phrases do not 
convey the specific and discrete ideas that the midrash infers. 
A more subtle deviation from peshateh di-qera is noted in p94. While 
the underlying text does provide support for the exegesis, the text is 
unnaturally split to accommodate additional legal implications. In BT 
Rosh Hashanah 6a, the sages parse the verse “That which is gone out of 
thy lips thou shalt observe and do” (deut. 23:24) as follows: “That which 
is gone out of thy lips: this is an affirmative precept. Thou shalt observe: 
this is a negative precept. And do: this is an injunction to the Bet din to 
make thee do.” maimonides comments: 
Although the sages have minutely analyzed this verse, and explained each 
word in it separately, the general purport of all that they say amounts to 
this: that it is a positive commandment to fulfill any obligation which a 
man has taken upon himself.
After quoting the midrash, he adds: 
Now you know that no [commandment] can be derived from the mere 
words That which is gone out of thy lips and hence the sense of it must be 
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what I have mentioned as the plain meaning of scripture [peshateh di-qera], 
namely that a man is obliged to carry out whatever his lips have uttered. 
In other words, the text must literally unfold its meaning, as in the 
original definition of the term peshat. 
Context helps us understand the plain sense of the text. The rabbis 
derive a prohibition to eat and/or drink filthy things from the words 
“ye shall not make yourselves detestable” in the verse “ye shall not 
make yourselves detestable with any swarming thing that swarmeth” 
(lev�11:43). maimonides notes, however, in N179, that “one is not 
liable to whipping for [these violations] since the plain sense of the 
text [peshateh di-qera] refers solely to creeping things.”29 
much the same can be understood from what he says in N45, 
the admonition against self-mutilation. In support of the claim, 
maimonides cites the verse “ye shall not cut yourselves [lo titgodedu], 
nor make any baldness between your eyes for the dead” (deut. 14:1). 
He continues by saying that the sages (BT Yevamot 13b) interpret this 
verse “to [also] forbid dividing the people and causing faction and 
strife, understanding lo titgodedu as ‘you shall not form yourselves into 
factions [agudot].’” This interpretation is the product of wordplay that 
solely uses the first two words of the verse and ignores the context. 
maimonides rejects this interpretation by invoking his peshateh di-
qera reading strategy. He writes: “The gemara in Yevamot [13b] explains 
that lo titgodedu is required for its own context [gufe di-qera], the All-
merciful having said, ‘you shall not inflict upon yourselves any bruises 
for the dead.’” In other words, the intention of the text (gufe di-qera) 
29 . At first glance, maimonides’ scripturalism appears to resemble the reading strategies 
employed by the Karaites. on closer examination, however, the differences are much 
greater than the similarities. maimonides’ exegeses were bound by the dictates of 
the oral law. For example, he quotes this verse as evidence for the claim that one 
is forbidden to eat a creature that swarms in the water, even though there is no 
mention of water-borne creeping things in the verse (though they are included in the 
general prohibition). most probably, maimonides’ warrant is a midrash. For a possible 
source, see Kasher, Torah Shelemah, ad loc., n. 269. on Karaite scripturalism, see, inter 
alia, polliack, “major Trends in Karaite Biblical Exegesis in the Tenth and Eleventh 
Centuries,” 363-413. on how tradition caught up with some plain sense readings, 
however, see Frank, Search Scripture Well, 33-94. 
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must be discovered from its context; any other reading results in a non-
legally binding interpretation — in essence, a homily. While the Talmud 
accommodates both interpretations, maimonides argues that only the 
plain sense of the text can convey a scriptural commandment. 
In his discussion of Rule 3, maimonides contrasts an intimation or 
allusion (remez) with peshateh di-qera. He writes: 
Again has a certain other scholar [Qayyara] erred in respect of this principle 
[i.e. not to count laws that are not binding for all time] and counted 
[among the commandments the injunctions applying to the levites:] And 
they shall not go in to see the holy things as they are being covered [ke-vala’] 
[Num. 4:20]….Now although [the sages] do say: “An intimation [remez] 
against stealing a holy vessel [is found in the verse], And they shall not go 
in to see, etc.” — the term “an intimation” is sufficient evidence that this is 
not the plain sense [Chavel: “literal sense”] [peshateh di-qera] of the verse.
The verb vala’ is a pi’el infinitive in the construct state meaning “to swallow 
up” or “to cover.” The unusual expression prompts the sages to suggest 
that the verse alludes to one who steals a holy vessel from the sanctuary. 
Neither the grammar of the verse nor its context (the dismantling 
and transport of the holy vessels in the wilderness) supports such an 
interpretation. Thus maimonides observes that this interpretation is 
merely an intimation (remez), rather than the peshat meaning. 
maimonides’ identification of peshat with contextual reading is 
also demonstrated in N165, where he reads the verse “ye shall not go 
out from the door of the Tent of meeting” (lev.10:7) in its context 
as conveying a prohibition against the priests’ taking leave from the 
Temple services while ministering. He labels this interpretation gufeh di-
qera, and by doing so, he draws a distinction between gufeh di-qera and a 
more basic peshat reading (Ar. zahir al-nass) advanced in the early part of 
the gloss to this negative commandment, one that yielded a prohibition 
against the high priest’s following the funeral bier of a relative.30 
30 . As Cohen notes, zahir al-nass can also connote the obvious and correct sense of the 
biblical text; however, “in many cases, it has a very different connotation, namely 
the apparent sense, which is ultimately incorrect.” Cohen, “A Talmudist’s Halakhic 
Hermeneutics,” 69. see note 26 in this chapter. I now harbor some doubts about Cohen’s 
distinction. I hope to address the nature of zahir al-nass more fully at a future time. 
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In this next example, maimonides criticizes Qayyara and his 
followers for not reading a verse in its context. maimonides notes in Rule 
2 that they (Qayyara and his followers) base the obligation to reckon 
seasons on the verse: “For this is your wisdom and understanding in 
the sight of the peoples” (deut. 4:6), taking the “sight of the peoples” 
as literally referring to the activity of studying the heavenly bodies. 
“Wisdom and understanding” would therefore represent the calendrical 
sciences. maimonides assumes that their warrant is the rabbinic homily: 
“Which branch of wisdom and understanding is in the sight of the 
peoples? I must say, this is the reckoning of seasons and constellations” 
(BT Shabbat 75a). While he does not explain here how one should 
understand the words “wisdom and understanding,” we know from his 
other writings that he reads this verse as referring to all statutes and 
ordinances (huqim u-mishpatim), in accord with the opening line of the 
paragraph, “Behold I have taught you statutes and ordinances.”31 
For maimonides, context is the natural arbiter of peshat, even if 
the text must be stretched a bit. This is what he does in N4 with the 
verse “ye shall not make with me gods of silver, or gods of gold, ye 
shall not make unto you” (Exod. 20:20), where he uses the syntactically 
awkward sentence to support the claim that one is forbidden to craft 
representative figures of living things out of any substance, even when 
not for purposes of worship. This last unexpected condition is inferred 
from the second half of the verse. maimonides quotes the words of the 
Mekhilta: “lest you should say: I am going to make them merely for 
ornaments, as others do in various countries, scripture says: ye shall 
31 . see the immediately preceding verse, deuteronomy 4:5. In GP III:31:524, maimonides 
cites this earlier verse to buttress the idea that both laws and statutes have reasons 
that support them: “And it says Which shall hear all these statutes [huqim] and say: surely 
this great community is a wise and understanding people [end of verse 6]. Thus it states 
explicitly that even all the statutes [huqim] will show to all the nations that they have 
been given with wisdom and understanding.” Interestingly, Ibn Ezra uses this verse 
in a similar way: “And moses our lord said with reference to all the commandments 
surely this great community is a wise and understanding people [deut. 4:6]. If they [the 
commandments] do not have reasons that we could comprehend, how would the 
nations say that these are righteous statutes [deut. 4:8] and we, who adhere to them, 
wise?” Ibn Ezra, Yesod Mora, sha’ar 8, 150.
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not make unto you.”32 The midrash understands the phrase “unto you” 
as referring to one’s personal use rather than for worship, a stretch 
of the plain meaning. maimonides makes reference to other exegetical 
derivations from this verse, noting that the verse also contains “other 
matters that go beyond the scope of this commandment, but the plain 
sense of the text [peshateh di-qera] is what we have set out, as explained 
in the Mekhilta.” maimonides adopts the Mekhilta’s reading, despite 
the fact that the Mekhilta’s reading is only one of several philologically 
acceptable possibilities, and certainly not the most compelling one.33 
In a similar vein, maimonides uses peshateh di-qera in N299 to 
claim that the verse “Nor shalt thou put a stumbling-block before the 
blind” (lev. 19:14) prohibits one from offering misleading advice. He 
bases this reading on the Sifra, which comments: “If one is ‘blind’ in a 
[certain] matter, and asks you for advice, do not give him advice which 
is not suitable for him.”34 maimonides contrasts this interpretation 
with other rabbinic interpretations, concluding that: “the peshateh 
di-qera is as we have stated above [the Sifra’s reading].” He makes no 
mention of the possibility of an alternative literal reading, even though 
the context does not eliminate such a possibility.35 As in the previous 
case, maimonides gives priority to the midrash halakhah, although in 
this instance, he may have thought that the midrashic interpretation 
also represents the best plain reading of the verse.36 
32 . Mekhilta Yitro 10 (241).
33 . Among rabbinic commentaries, the most plausible reading is given by sa’adiah Gaon 
(also offered by Ibn Ezra and cited by Abraham maimonides), who argues that the 
two halves of the verse convey two separate ideas: the prohibition against imagining 
a second deity and the prohibition against making physical representations of the 
divinity. maimonides’ adoption of the Mekhilta’s reading recalls an expression used 
by the medieval parshanim with respect to rabbinic midrash: “Their understanding is 
deeper [lit., wider] than ours” (da’atam rehavah mi-da’atenu). see Ibn Ezra’s commentary 
on the pentateuch, passim� see also david Qimhi’s commentaries on Joshua 4:11 and 2 
Chronicles 5:9. perhaps maimonides prefers to defer to rabbinic interpretations — so 
long as context is respected — because he sees their authors, being closer in time and 
mindset to the text, as showing a superior understanding.
34 . Sifra Qedoshim, parshah 2:14 (88d).
35 . By contrast, Ibn Ezra appears to read the verse as prohibiting the literal placing of a 
stumbling block in the way of a blind man. see his comments to the pentateuch, ad 
loc., and in Ibn Ezra, Yesod Mora, sha’ar 9, 161, and the helpful note on line 30.
36 . The fact that maimonides neither labeled this interpretation an accepted tradition (perush 
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An emphasis on contextual reading coupled with a fine historical 
perspective allows maimonides to offer a remarkably daring and 
likely original interpretation of the verse “An altar of earth thou 
shalt make unto me” (Exod. 20:21). Not only does this command 
stand apart from the general commandment to build a sanctuary 
and its vessels, appurtenances, and parts that begins at Exodus 25:8, 
but it also flagrantly contradicts an explicit commandment to build 
an altar made of stone.37 maimonides resolves the contradiction by 
giving us a peshateh di-qera reading at p20 that places the verse in an 
historical context. He writes: “The peshateh di-qera refers to the time 
when outside altars (bamot) were permitted to us, and we were allowed 
to make an altar of earth in any place.” Following this explanation, 
however, maimonides notes that the sages read the words “an altar of 
earth thou shalt make unto me” to mean “an altar attached to earth.” 
Thus the verse no longer requires that the altar be made of earth, 
contradicting other scriptural indications, but rather that the altar will 
need to be attached to the (earthly) ground. In this way, the rabbis 
manage to harmonize the verse with the traditional view that the altar 
is to be made of stone.38 
ha-mequbbal) in the ShM, in the SE, nor in the MT suggests that he thought that the 
figurative interpretation of the midrash was actually the more valid of the readings. Cohen 
finds the omission “surprising,” especially in view of the fact that maimonides interpreted 
the first half of the verse, “Thou shalt not curse the deaf,” literally. Consequently, he 
argues that the context would have justified a literal interpretation. Cohen, “A Talmudist’s 
Halakhic Hermeneutics,” n. 267. However, the negative commandment based on this 
verse (N317) indicates that maimonides also did not interpret the first half of the verse 
literally, since he read it as a prohibition against cursing “any Israelite,” not just the deaf. 
see the intricate rationale used by maimonides in his gloss to N317. 
37 . deut. 27:6. paradoxically, the oral tradition derives this teaching from the words “And 
if thou make me an altar of stone” (Exod. 20:22), reading the word “if” as meaning 
hovah (obligation) rather than reshut (optional). Mekhilta de Rabbi Ishmael, ad loc.
38 . Interestingly, in the MT, Hilkhot Bet ha-Behirah 1:13, maimonides takes what 
appears to be a more conservative position and labels this rabbinic exposition a 
teaching mi-pi ha-shemu’ah� This is an interpretation suggested by the oral tradition 
from sinai; it has some textual plausibility but clearly does not represent the best 
contextual reading. Note that while this particular exegesis may not quite be 
“philologically defensible,” in meyer Feldblum’s words, it still represents Torah law. 
In his otherwise excellent article, Feldblum clumps together philologically defensible 
laws and laws derived by the 13 hermeneutic principles for interpreting the Torah. 
This conglomeration is inexact. According to maimonides, the hermeneutical 
-----------------------------------------------------------------  pEsHATEH dI-QERA   ----------------------------------------------------------------
— 227 —
In sum, according to maimonides, the term peshat refers to 
a reading of scripture that adheres to the rules of grammar and 
language, that reads a verse contextually within a longer passage, 
and that is consistent with the historical reality. It is important to 
note that this strategy does not assume either a literal or a figurative 
reading: sometimes one and sometimes the other will offer the 
sought-after plain sense. In this respect, maimonides’ term peshateh 
di-qera comes quite close to our modern conception of the plain sense 
of the text. When re-reading Rule 2 in light of this conclusion, we 
understand that scriptural commandments must be grounded in the 
plain sense of scripture, as opposed to the type of fanciful homiletic 
readings that one most commonly finds in the aggadic midrashim. 
When more than one interpretation is offered, maimonides gives 
precedence to the reading that comes closest to reading the verse 
in context. In some cases where multiple contextual interpretations 
are possible, maimonides defers to rabbinic midrash. If we were to 
assume that he does so because he genuinely believes in the early 
rabbis’ superior linguistic skills and their familiarity with the sitz im 
leben of the period, we are still able to affirm that maimonides values 
contextual interpretations above all else.39 
As an aside, I note that maimonides’ interest in reading contextually 
spawned two Rules, the discussion of which I do not see as relevant 
to our present inquiry — specifically, Rule 5 (“The reason given for a 
commandment is not to be counted as a separate commandment”) and 
activity of the scribes is analytical and inferential rather than philological, as I 
argued earlier. I agree wholeheartedly with Feldblum’s conclusion: “I wish to 
emphasize that maimonides’ care in assigning laws to their respective categories is 
uniquely intertwined with his philosophy and perception of the halakhic process. 
maimonides’ criteria for classification are based on a careful philological and 
literary analysis of the underlying sources in each given case.” Feldblum, “Criteria 
for designating laws,” 45-49.
39 . on the superior linguistic skills of the earlier scholars, see maimonides’ interesting 
comments to M orlah 3:2. Navigating close to the surface of the text, eschewing 
fanciful midrashic interpretations and analytic derivations, maimonides can declare 
in the GP that his purpose “is to give reasons for the [biblical] texts and not for 
the pronouncements of the legal science” (GP III:41:558). The intent of the divine 
lawgiver can only be properly understood by attuning oneself to the “plainness” of 
the text. 
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Rule 8 (“A mere negative statement excluding a particular case from 
the scope of a commandment is not to be included among the negative 
commandments”).40 
“THEy lEARNEd IT FRom THE oRAl TRAdITIoN” 
(MI-PI HA-SHEMU’AH LAMDU)
In maimonides’ works, the overwhelming majority of positive 
commandments (as well as negative commandments) are identified and 
interpreted according to the plain sense of the scriptural text (peshateh 
di-qera). In a handful of cases, maimonides adopts a traditional reading, 
which he believes to carry a unique force of authority in cases where 
the tradition is not impugned by rabbinic objections or alternative 
views. By the very absence of dispute, incontrovertible traditions 
reflect consensus, a powerful source of legal authority in talmudic, pre-
Islamic and Islamic jurisprudence.41 The consensus surrounding this 
type of tradition, he argues in the introduction to his commentary to 
the mishnah, guarantees its sinaitic origin.42 
40 . Nahmanides, Hasagot, Rules 5 and 8, shows that the talmudic rabbis did not always 
make these distinctions. These Rules are good examples of the type of “Greek” logic 
(linguistic logic in this case) that maimonides tried to impose on the creative but 
unsystematic and unyielding corpus of rabbinic exegeses. Herbert davidson (in Moses 
Maimonides, 98n124) notes that in Rule 8, maimonides quotes the “words” of the 
“students of the art of logic” with a quotation taken verbatim from Al-Farabi’s epitome 
of Aristotle’s De Intepretatione.
41 . In talmudic literature, divre ha-kol (the opinion of all scholars) is a phrase that 
denotes legal finality. A computer search reveals that this term occurs 402 times 
in the Babylonian Talmud and 279 times in the Jerusalem Talmud. maimonides’ 
commentators often corroborate his rulings by citing a talmudic use of divre ha-kol. 
see, e.g., Migdal oz on Hilkhot Shofar, Sukkah, ve-Lulav 4:11, s.v. “ve-ani omer,” last line; 
Maggid Mishneh, Hilkhot ‘Eruvin 7:2 and passim. For the principle of consensus (ijma) 
in Islamic jurisprudence, see note 42 below. 
42 . Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. shailat, 38: “and, lo, this principle must be known, that 
is, that the explanations received from moses are without controversy whatsoever.” 
see also 40, where maimonides discusses the five epistemological bases for the oral 
law, in particular the first two. Besides the oral interpretation that accompanied the 
commandments, the received explanations include the famous textually ungrounded 
traditions called halakhot le-Moshe mi-Sinai. scholarly analysis has shown that not 
all halakhot le-Moshe mi-Sinai are incontrovertible. see Bacharach, Sheelot u-Teshuvot 
Havvot Yair, no. 192. For an example from the enumeration of the commandments, 
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We find occasional divergences from this rule, instances in which 
maimonides interprets according to the “incontrovertible” tradition 
while leaving behind evidence that he upholds the plain sense of the 
text (or at least upheld it at one time). I offer a number of possible 
explanations for these rare occurrences, including that maimonides 
forgot to erase the earlier view; he is deliberately ambiguous, because 
he does not know which meaning is correct; or he continues to 
maintain somehow that “a text cannot be deprived of its peshat 
meaning,” even when tradition says otherwise. The following example, 
found at Hilkhot ‘Edut 13:1, is consistent with the third explanation. 
After citing the verse “parents shall not be put to death for children 
nor children be put to death for parents” (deut. 24:16), maimonides 
comments: “It is taught by the oral tradition that included in this 
negative commandment is the exhortation not to condemn fathers 
to death on the testimony of their sons, nor sons on the testimony 
of their fathers.” This oral tradition contradicts the plain sense of the 
verse, namely, that of vicarious punishment — parents cannot be put 
to death for their children’s crimes and vice-versa — an idea reinforced 
by the second half of the verse: “a person shall be put to death only 
for his own crime.” No allusion to testimony is present in the verse. 
Note maimonides’ subtle hint, however, to the secondary nature of 
the tradition in the words “included in this negative commandment.”43 
see p5, where maimonides disregards that a cited rabbinic source gives two mutually 
exclusive definitions for “worship of the heart,” defining it both as prayer and 
as study. Not only is the tradition under dispute, but maimonides presents the 
tradition as if it is consensual! Also see p173, p198, p199, N198, and N199, none 
of which represents unanimous views. At very least, we can say that with respect to 
commandments, maimonides only resorts to this principle occasionally. He appears 
to have enunciated this principle more as a polemic against the Karaites than as an 
authentic epistemological principle. maimonides was presumably also taking issue 
with sa’adiah, “one who thought that even laws that are disputed are part of the 
tradition from moses,” because sa’adiah had left the Rabbanite side exposed to the 
Karaite attack on tradition. on sa’adiah’s view, see Zucker, Perush Rav Sa’adiah Gaon 
le-Bereshit, 187-188. The principle of consensus (ijma) — in its many forms — as an 
authoritative source of the law, was a well-known principle of Islamic (and even pre-
Islamic) jurisprudence. see schacht, origins of Muslim Jurisprudence, 82-97, and more 
recently Hallaq, History of Islamic Legal Theories, 75-81.
43 . This literal understanding is also how Amatsiah, king of Judah, understood the verse, 
as we find in a rare piece of inter-textual interpretation (2 Kgs 14:5-6). Amatsiah puts 
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This reading of maimonides’ intentions is consistent with the rabbinic 
dictum of Rule 2: “a text cannot be deprived of its plain sense (ein miqra 
yotse mi-yede peshuto).” The traditional interpretation does not uproot 
the plain sense of the text. 
In the following example, we see the degree to which peshateh di-qera 
is ingrained in maimonides’ exegesis and how he struggles to maintain 
these readings even when accepting the traditional interpretation. 
leviticus 25:32-34 teaches that the levites’ city dwellings may be sold and 
redeemed in perpetuity, but never the unenclosed lands (migrash) around 
their assigned cities. In Hilkhot Shemitah ve-Yovel 13:5, maimonides writes: 
“The sages have learnt by tradition that [the fields of the open lands about 
their cities] may not be sold [lev. 25:34] means ‘may not be changed’ — the 
field, the open space, and the city space, each one of the three must remain 
as it is forever after.” The non-philological reading that lo yimakher means 
“may not be able to change” rather than “may not be able to sell” forms 
the basis of N228 in the ShM and in the SE, prefaced there by the words “it 
was taught by the oral tradition.” yet, in the Heading to Hilkhot Shemitah 
ve-Yovel, maimonides defines the law as follows: “That one may not make 
a permanent sale of the open lands about their cities; these open lands 
can be redeemed at any time, before the Jubilee or after,” which is exactly 
in line with the plain sense of the text. We see here traces of maimonides’ 
current or former attachment to peshateh di-qera� 
The traditional readings that maimonides invokes when interpreting 
certain verses in support of commandment claims do not represent the 
text’s best or plainest sense. In these admittedly few cases, maimonides 
makes a highly visible effort to keep these traditional readings within 
acceptable grammatical, syntactical, contextual and logical bounds. 
maimonides does not appear as insistent on applying plain sense 
canons and justifying traditional readings when it comes to details and 
particulars of commandments. In fact, in some of these cases, tradition 
can offer an interpretation contrary to plain sense.44
to death the courtiers who had assassinated his father, “but he did not put to death the 
children of the assassins, in accordance with what is written in the Book of Teaching 
of moses, where the lord commanded, Parents shall not be put to death for children nor 
children be put to death for parents; a person shall be put to death only for his own crime�”
44 . Here are three egregious examples of interpretations that are not contextually, 
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maimonides employs many terms to denote the presence of an oral 
tradition, but only one term to indicate its use in support of a scriptural 
commandment claim. The term is “mi-pi ha-shemu’ah lamdu,” which can 
loosely be rendered as “they learned it from the oral tradition.” It is 
only found in the SE and in the Halakhot�45 According to maimonides, 
these uncontroverted traditions, which bear some semblance to 
the plain sense of the text but which may not be identical with the 
peshateh di-qera,46 enjoy a sinaitic status. By this measure, maimonides 
considered these traditions authentic interpretations of the text and 
infused them with scriptural authority. Because the SE only comprises 
a list of commandments, when this phrase makes its appearance in 
this list, it is intimately and exclusively associated with delineating a 
particular commandment. In the Halakhot, by contrast, the term is also 
associated with particulars of the law.47 As a result, in such cases, I am 
less confident in asserting that when maimonides used the expression 
mi-pi ha-shemu’ah lamdu when accompanying a verse, he intended to 
signal that these particulars also enjoy scriptural authority (de-oraita).48 
syntactically or logically plausible: Hilkhot Yibbum 2:6, “If a man dies and is survived by 
several brothers, it is the eldest brother’s religious duty to marry the widow, as it says, 
And it shall be that the first-born that she beareth [shall succeed in the name of his brother 
that is dead]. The oral tradition taught that here first-born signifies the first-born of the 
brothers,” offers an interpretation contrary to the plain sense of the verse. similarly, 
in Hilkhot Na’arah Betulah 3:6, tradition reads the claims and counter-claims about a 
maiden’s virginity as being proffered by witnesses rather than on physical evidence 
(i.e. blood stains), which contradicts the sense of the text. Finally, in Hilkhot Isure Biah 
16:10, “Even though it is said, Neither shall ye do thus in your land [lev. 22:24], the oral 
tradition taught that this prohibition [against castrating a male of any species] applies 
everywhere, the purport of scripture here being, ‘This shall not be done among the 
people of Israel whether upon their own bodies or upon the body of others.’” The plain-
sense meaning of the verse forbids castration only in the land of Israel, while tradition 
extends this prohibition anywhere Jews live. Note maimonides’ (weak) attempt to 
reconcile tradition with plain sense. In Hilkhot Sanhedrin 3:3 and 3:8, maimonides 
allows tradition to read the texts totally out of context. 
45 . In the Arabic PhM and ShM, maimonides refers to this notion in a less precise and 
inconsistent fashion, using expressions such as “it came via tradition” and “the 
received interpretation.”
46 . see my discussion of meyer Feldblum’s work in note 38, above. 
47 . For example, in Hilkhot Talmud Torah 1:2, Hilkhot Qiddush ha-Hodesh 8:1, Hilkhot Hovel 
u-Maziq 1:2, Hilkhot Sanhedrin 3:3, 3:8.
48 . Hilkhot Yibbum 2:6 is an interesting case in point. maimonides uses the expression mi-
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matters become confusing when maimonides uses mi-pi ha-shemu’ah 
lamdu without an accompanying scriptural proof text. In such cases, the 
term may simply be referring to an ancient tradition; most likely, no 
scriptural authority is ascribed to it.49 The situation is further confused 
by the fact that in the Halakhot, maimonides uses other terms associated 
with the oral law, such as mi-pi ha-qabbalah, halakhah mi-pi ha-qabbalah, 
halakhah mi-pi ha-shemu’ah, and a few other variants of these expressions. 
scholars have conducted systematic terminological investigations into 
these terms for at least a century, starting with Adolf schwarz in 190550 
and continuing to this day. Recently, Joseph Kafih surveyed all the 
instances where these terms appeared in the MT without coming to a 
consistent conclusion.51 While mi-pi ha-shemu’ah can signify particulars 
pi ha-shemu’ah lamdu in connection with the verse “And it shall be that the first-born 
that she beareth” (deut. 25:5) to indicate that the verse is referring to the first-born 
of the mother of the brothers, and thus that the commandment requires the elder of 
the brothers to perform the levirate marriage, a problematic reading (as I noted above 
in note 44). later, in Hilkhot Yibbum 6:8, maimonides quotes the very same verse to 
teach that a barren woman (aylonit) is exempt from levirate marriage, since the verse 
teaches that the widow shall bear a child. The two exegeses reflect diametrically opposed 
conceptions of the verse — it can either refer to the mother or to the wife, but not to 
both. Which exegesis did maimonides believe conveyed a scriptural law, and which 
merely a divre sofrim law? y. Horowitz (in “le-mishneh Torah u-le-perush ha-mishnayot 
shel ha-RamBam,” sinai 15, 279-288) thinks that the former exegesis is an asmakhta 
(and thus divre sofrim) and the latter a genuine scriptural reading (and thus a scriptural 
law). I am not convinced that the former exegesis should be considered divre sofrim, 
even though it seems stretched. maimonides’ philological attempt to justify the exegesis, 
both here and in the PhM (M Yevamot 2:6), shows that he considered this implausible 
exegesis to be within the range of acceptable readings according to the plain sense. 
49 . see, for example, Hilkhot Sotah 2:12, Hilkhot Isure Biah 4:1, and Hilkhot Maakhalot 
Asurot 1:10 and passim. 
50 . schwarz, Der Mischneh Thorah� 
51 . see Kafih’s commentary to the MT, Sefer Mishpatim, end of vol. 21. While on the 
surface, his attempt appears to be systematic, it is actually far from being so. Kafih 
offers individual, ad hoc explanations for each entry without summarizing his 
findings. His reasoning throughout is vague and inconsistent. In example no. 19 and 
referring to Hilkhot Hamets u-Matsah 1:8, he points out that maimonides signals that 
the transgressor is liable for lashes because we are in the presence of an interpretation 
of the verse (lamdu mi-pi ha-shemu’ah) rather than of the norm itself (etsem din), 
leaving the reader wondering what he meant by that distinction. In speaking about the 
term mi-pi ha-qabbalah, he infers, at no.18 (p. 277), that the expression divre qabbalah 
means that the tradition comes from moses himself, as opposed to the term mi-pi ha-
shemu’ah� But divre qabbalah is unlikely to mean the same thing as mi-pi ha-qabbalah; 
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of laws that are not of scriptural authority, and while maimonides uses 
a number of hard-to-define terms to convey the manner and form of 
diverse oral traditions, this much is certain: mi-pi ha-shemu‘ah is the only 
expression of the oral tradition that introduces an interpretation of the 
scriptural text in the presentation of a commandment.52 
In total, the number of positive commandments that draw their 
authority from a traditional interpretation (rather than from a reading 
that is informed by the plain sense of the verse) is very small — five in 
the SE and 10 in the Halakhot — out of a total of 248 commandments. The 
Halakhot repeats the SE’s hermeneutic in four places: p85 is paralleled at 
Hilkhot Ma‘aseh ha-Qorbanot 18:1, p86 at Hilkhot Isure Mizbeah 1:10, p109 
at Hilkhot Miqvaot 1:2, and p198 at Hilkhot Malveh ve-Loveh 5:1. There is 
more likely, it means that it is derived from the non-pentateuchal sections. Nor does 
he explain how he comes to that particular distinction. At no. 17 (p. 256), Kafih points 
out that by citing mi-pi ha-shemu’ah to elucidate the meaning of affliction (‘inuy) used 
in connection with the day of Atonement, maimonides signifies that it is a halakhah 
accepted by the people (halakhah she-nitqablah be-ummah), and, for that reason, it is 
intrinsically a Torah law (guf torah). Its authority comes from the people’s acceptance 
of this law (which, I presume, has no linguistic basis), rather than the fact that moses 
informed the meaning of the term “affliction.” While this interpretation is interesting, 
it is unclear how Kafih substantiates this hypothesis, and how consistently he uses 
that explanation. Note the contrast with what he proposes at no. 12 (p. 256). There, 
Kafih states that mi-pi ha-shemu’ah is not the equivalent of inferences arrived via the 
use of the 13 hermeneutic rules, nor does it represent a tradition from moses at sinai. 
Rather, it indicates linguistic inferences that the sages have drawn from the text 
and that have been accepted by succeeding generations of sages. Kafih does make 
a few interesting comments, however, as in nos. 140 and 144, where he indicates 
that while mi-pi ha-shemu’ah may not necessarily be the best interpretation, it does 
not contradict the plain sense of the text. more recently, Henshke revisited this issue 
and convincingly demonstrated that the expression mi-pi ha-shemu’ah is a marker 
of sinaitic authority if and only if it is accompanied by a proof text. Cf. Henshke, 
“le-yesode Tefisat ha-Halakhah,” in particular the appendix, 138-144. see also the 
systematic and careful analysis of these special terms by shohetman, “Halakhah mi-
pi ha-Qabbalah ve-Halakhah le-moshe mi-sinai.” shohetman notes that when citing 
a proof text, maimonides uses the term “as it says” to signify that the plain reading 
supports the claim, and uses mi-pi ha-shemu’ah or hen mi-pi ha-qabbalah to signify a 
rabbinic interpretation that is not in accordance with the plain meaning. I would add 
only that maimonides tolerates such rabbinic interpretations because the scriptural 
text is ambiguous and the rabbinic interpretations do not conflict with the context.
52 . The expression mi-pi ha-qabbalah is sometimes used in connection with a scriptural 
text to explain a detail of the commandment. see, for example, Hilkhot ‘Edut 20:2, 
Hilkhot Melakhim 7:10.
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no parallel in the Halakhot for the reliance on tradition as the source for 
the commandment to set aside the second tithe (p128); I will comment 
later on the implications of this apparent reversal. The Halakhot references 
tradition as the interpretive authority for six additional commandment 
claims: Hilkhot Tefillah 1:1, Hilkhot Hamets u-Matsah 2:1, Hilkhot Shofar 
1:1, Hilkhot Shevitat ‘Asor 1:4, Hilkhot Malveh ve-Loveh 1:2, and Hilkhot 
Melakhim 5:5. 
let us examine the 10 instances from the Halakhot in more detail:
1) Hilkhot Tefillah 1:1: 
It is a positive commandment to pray every day, as it is said, Ye shall 
serve the Lord your God [Exodus 23:25]. The oral tradition said [mi-pi 
ha-shemu‘ah amru] that this “service” is prayer. And it is written, serving 
Him with all your heart and soul [deut. 11:13], about which the sages said, 
“What is service of the heart? prayer.”
maimonides clearly struggles with this commandment claim. The 
unique expression mi-pi ha-shemu‘ah amru, which appears in the good 
manuscripts53 (instead of the common expression from the printed 
editions, lamdu mi-pi ha-shemu‘ah) and its immediate linguistic and 
hermeneutic link with the sages’ comment (amru hakhamim), shows 
that maimonides does not have a firm authority for this tradition.54 The 
interpretation that maimonides offers is both plausible and reasonable 
in view of the sages’ comments but certainly not as authoritative 
as it had seemed in the ShM.55 By marshalling a rabbinic tradition, 
maimonides attempts to strengthen the idea that prayer is the 
53 . see Rambam Meduyaq, ed. shailat, Hilkhot Tefillah, 20n2. Note that the base of 
shailat’s text is the version of the MT carrying maimonides’ own signature, attesting 
that the book was proofread against his own copy, and which contains also some of 
maimonides’ own corrections, ms oxford 577 (Huntington 80).
54 . A similar though not identical deviation from the standard formula mi-pi ha-shemu’ah 
lamdu takes place in Hilkhot Lulav. see my comments regarding the commandment to 
take the four species, chapter 8, note 47. 
55 . In the ShM (p5), however, his argument turns confusing, after he cites a second 
opinion of the Sifre that equates service with the study of the law. This is further 
evidence that maimonides lacked a clear authoritative tradition that prayer was a 
scriptural obligation. see also Nahmanides’ powerful critique, Hasagot, ad loc., 210.
-----------------------------------------------------------------  pEsHATEH dI-QERA   ----------------------------------------------------------------
— 235 —
authoritative interpretation of a vague and very general formulation. 
2) Hilkhot Hamets u-Matsah 2:1: 
It is a positive commandment from scripture56 to put away leaven before 
the time when one is forbidden to eat it, as it says, Howbeit the first day ye 
shall put away leaven out of your houses [Exod. 12:15]; they learned from 
the oral tradition [u-mi-pi ha-shemu‘ah lamdu] that this first day is the 
fourteenth of Nissan. This is corroborated by the verse, Thou shalt not 
offer the blood of My sacrifice with leavened bread [Exod. 23:18; 34:25], 
which means: “Thou shalt not slaughter the paschal lamb while leavened 
bread is still in existence,” and the time for slaughtering the paschal lamb 
is after midday on the fourteenth of Nissan.
Counter-intuitively, the oral tradition identifies “the first day” with the 
fourteenth day of Nissan, rather than with the more logical first day of 
the festival of passover, the fifteenth of Nissan. Here is a good example of 
what we had suggested earlier: maimonides goes out of his way to defend 
traditional readings that do not seem to reflect the plainest sense. 
3) Hilkhot Shofar 1:1: 
It is a positive commandment from scripture57 to hear the blast of a horn 
[shofar] at New year, as it is said: It is a day of blowing unto you [Num. 
29:1].…Although scripture does not expressly stipulate the blast of a 
horn in the case of New year, it does say of the Jubilee year: Then shalt 
thou make proclamation with the blast of the horn on the tenth day of the 
seventh month; in the Day of Atonement shall ye make proclamation with 
the horn [lev. 25:9], and they learned from the oral tradition [u-mi-pi ha-
shemu‘ah lamdu] that just as the blast of a Jubilee year must be blown on 
a horn, so must the blast of New year be blown on a horn. 
56 . did maimonides purposefully add the phrase “from scripture” (min ha-torah), a rare 
addition, as a polemic directed at his Karaite adversaries who held that leaven could be 
kept until the beginning of the first day of the festival? For the Karaite interpretation, 
see the commentary of Aaron ben Elijah of Nicomedia, Sefer Keter Torah, 62, who 
wrote in the first half of the fourteenth century.
57 . see note 56 above. Here, too, the Karaites rejected the rabbinic law and taught that the 
word teru’ah commands shouting, not blowing a horn. see miller, “Karaite perspectives 
in yom Teru’ah,” 537-541.
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The oral tradition explains that “a day of blowing” refers to a day when a 
horn is blown. A baraita in BT Rosh Hashanah 33b-34a derives this point 
from an analogy (heqesh): the verse mentions blowing the horn on yom 
Kippur (of the Jubilee year) “in the seventh month.” since we already 
know that yom Kippur is in the seventh month, the mention of the 
seventh month is redundant. The redundancy comes to inform that all 
the blowings of the seventh month should be on the same horn — which 
includes the blowing of Rosh Hashanah. While maimonides does appear 
to adopt this analogy, he does not make the hermeneutic explicit, 
leaving the reader in doubt as to whether he had really intended the 
somewhat convoluted analogy offered by the baraita.58 By adding the 
analogizing phrase, “just as…so must,” maimonides attempts to bring 
the traditional interpretation closer to a plain reading of the text.
4) Hilkhot Ma‘aseh ha-Qorbanot 18:1: 
likewise, it is a positive commandment that every person take care of 
and bring from outside the land [of Israel] to the Holy Temple the animal 
sacrifices that he was obliged to offer. For it is said: only thy holy things 
which thou hast, and thy vows, thou shalt take and go unto the place which the 
Lord shall choose [deut. 12:26]; they learned from the oral tradition [mi-
58 . The baraita’s exegetical presentation is equivocal. While it begins by using a heqesh, it 
switches to using a gezerah shavah, a different form of analogy. The Talmud notes the 
equivocation and concludes that the ruling could have been derived from the heqesh; 
once a gezerah shavah is found, however, the baraita preferred to use the latter method 
of interpretation. Kesef Mishneh (ad loc.) argues that maimonides adopted the gezerah 
shavah, and this is the reason maimonides used the term mi-pi ha-shemu‘ah, since 
according to Karo’s understanding of maimonides’ position, a gezerah shavah signals 
a sinaitic tradition and not a divre sofrim derivation. This analysis contradicts Rule 2, 
where maimonides groups together all 13 hermeneutic rules, a group that includes the 
gezerah shavah. Had maimonides believed that the linchpin of this tradition was a gezerah 
shavah, he would have considered blowing a horn to be a divre sofrim commandment, 
and would not have used the term mi-pi ha-shemu‘ah. more likely, the very ambiguity 
(and insufficiency) of the baraita’s complex hermeneutic led maimonides to believe that 
an authentic sinaitic tradition was at work, rather than a full-fledged scribal derivation. 
For the unusual way the term heqesh is used in the baraita, see Ayyash, Lehem Yehudah, 
ad loc. It should be noted that a heqesh analogy is not one of the 13 hermeneutic rules, 
thus allowing maimonides to label this obligation a scriptural mitsvat ‘aseh. The Talmud, 
however, appears to give primacy to the gezerah shava, as noted above, and that would 
indeed present a problem for maimonides. 
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pi ha-shemu‘ah lamdu] that this verse speaks only with reference to the 
hallowed offerings of outside the land; that they were to be taken care of 
until they were brought up to the Holy Temple.
The verse could be read as only requiring one to bring one’s domestic 
offerings to the Temple, rather than those offerings from outside of the 
land of Israel. The oral tradition reads the verse as imposing a further 
requirement to look after and bring offerings to the Holy Temple from 
outside the land of Israel. 
5) Hilkhot Miqvaot 1:2: 
Wherever “washing of the flesh” or “cleansing of the garments” from 
uncleanness is spoken of in scripture, it means nothing else but the 
immersion of the whole person or object in an immersion pool….And 
although all these things are learned only from the oral tradition [she-hem 
mi-pi ha-shemu’ah], it is nevertheless said, It must be put into water and it shall 
be unclean until the even; then shall it be clean [lev. 11:32] — a basic principle 
applying to all that are unclean, that they should enter into water.
The oral tradition understands that the words “washing of the 
flesh” refer to a full body immersion in water. Here again, to defend 
this reading and uphold the oral tradition, maimonides resorts to new 
textual support, introduced by the words “it is nevertheless said.” 
6) Hilkhot Isure Mizbeah 1:10: 
It is a positive commandment to redeem an offering which had incurred 
a blemish, so that it would become profane and be eaten. For it is said: 
Notwithstanding thou mayest kill and eat flesh after all the desire of thy soul 
[deut. 12:15]; they learned from the oral tradition [mi-pi ha-shemu‘ah 
lamdu] that scripture speaks here of hallowed offerings that became 
unfit and were redeemed.
The oral tradition understands this verse as referring to a hallowed 
animal that became ritually unfit, commanding59 one to redeem it so 
59 . It seems odd for maimonides to designate the redemption of offerings that have 
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that its flesh can become available to eat. In this case, maimonides 
makes no attempt to justify the oral tradition.60 
7) Hilkhot Malveh ve-Loveh 1:2: 
It is a positive commandment to exact payment from a heathen debtor. 
For it is written of a foreigner thou mayest exact it [but that which is 
thine with thy brother, thine hand shall release] [deut. 15:3]. They have 
learned from the oral tradition [mi-pi ha-shemu‘ah lamdu] that this is a 
positive commandment.
The oral tradition eschews the more plausible reading that scripture 
permits one to press the foreigner for repayment of a loan in favor of 
a less plausible reading that obligates one to exact that repayment. No 
attempt is made here to justify this reading.61 
8) Hilkhot Malveh ve-Loveh 5:1: 
It is a positive commandment to lend money at interest to a heathen. 
For it is written, of a foreigner thou mayest exact it [but that which is 
thine with thy brother, thine hand shall release] [deut. 23:21]. They 
learned from the oral tradition [mi-pi ha-shemu‘ah lamdu] that this is to 
be construed as a positive commandment and this is scriptural law.
The oral tradition makes it a positive commandment to lend at 
interest to a heathen. A more plausible reading is that one may lend 
money at interest to a heathen but one may not lend with interest to an 
Israelite — in effect, an implicit prohibition. This prohibition is explicitly 
incurred a blemish as a positive commandment, meaning an obligation. perla raises 
serious and important objections to this view. perla, Sefer ha-Mitsvot le-RaSaG, vol.1, 
ps 131, s. v. “ve-nirah,” 380-383. 
60 . The scriptural context suggests the possibility that this passage concerns offerings, in 
contrast to the sections that immediately follow (vv. 20-22), which appear to discuss 
non-sacrificial meat. (Cf. RasHI ad loc.) The word “notwithstanding” implies that 
some event had just occurred to block the animal from being offered on the altar. The 
“notwithstanding” clause thus comes to offer a remedy: that the animal be redeemed. 
once it is redeemed, it can then be consumed.
61 . see my comments to p142 in chapter 5.
-----------------------------------------------------------------  pEsHATEH dI-QERA   ----------------------------------------------------------------
— 239 —
stated at the end of the verse.62 still, the text can easily accommodate 
the oral tradition, and no justification is necessary.
9) Hilkhot Melakhim 5:5: 
It is a positive commandment always to bear in mind [‘Amaleq’s] evil deeds, 
the waylaying [he resorted to], so that we keep fresh in others [kede le-orer 
evato] the memory of the hatred manifested by him, as it is said: Remember 
what ‘Amaleq did unto thee [deut. 25:17]. They learned from the oral 
tradition [mi-pi ha-shemu‘ah], Remember, by way of mouth; do not forget, 
out of mind, because it is forbidden to forget his hatred and enmity.63 
In what might seem like no more than an emphatic exhortation, the 
oral tradition sees a positive commandment: that one must remember 
‘Amaleq with words. The traditional interpretation is plausible and 
requires little justification.
10) Hilkhot Shevitat ’Asor 1:4: 
Another positive commandment concerning the day of Atonement 
requires abstention from eating and drinking on that day. For scripture 
says, Ye shall afflict your souls [lev. 16:29]. They learned from the oral 
tradition [mi-pi ha-shemu‘ah lamdu] that the term “affliction” when 
applied to the soul means “fasting.”
The oral tradition understands “affliction” to mean fasting from foods. 
None of the standard exegetes disagree with the notion that the term 
“affliction of the soul” refers to fasting. It is possible the term may have 
once enjoyed a broader meaning, and maimonides may have resorted 
to tradition to restrict the punishment of excision exclusively to one 
who does not fast.64
62 . see my comments to p198 in chapter 5.
63 . I read the claim as follows: “Remember ‘Amaleq’s hatred for the purpose of keeping it 
fresh in the minds of other members of the nation.” “Remember” here is used in the 
sense of “remind,” which is why the activity of remembering is carried out “by way of 
mouth.” see my earlier comments to p189 in chapter 5.
64 . The next halakhah, 1:5, states: “it is similarly known by tradition [mi-pi ha-
shemu‘ah] that one is forbidden to wash, anoint himself, wear shoes, or have sexual 
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In summary: in order to identify and frame commandment 
claims, maimonides follows a peshateh di-qera hermeneutic, a plain-
sense reading of scripture that considers phrases and clauses in their 
grammatical, linguistic, literary, and historical context. In as few as 
five and up to ten cases (out of 248), maimonides relies on certain 
interpretative traditions that appear to enjoy unanimous consent and 
are thus held to be of sinaitic origin, even when these interpretations 
fail to offer the most contextual, and therefore plainest, readings. 
These traditions are grouped under the rubric mi-pi ha-shemu‘ah lamdu� 
despite the undisputed authority of these interpretations, maimonides 
nonetheless attempts in almost every case to justify exegetically the 
bona fides of the tradition. 
THE pREsENTATIoN oF A posITIVE  
CommANdmENT IN THE HALAKHoT
one notable aspect of maimonides’ rhetorical presentation of 
commandments in the Halakhot is the basic sentence that forcefully 
and unequivocally designates the commandment to be discussed: “It 
is a positive commandment to do X.” I refer to these introductory 
presentations as declaratory statements. After declaring the 
commandment’s presence, maimonides cites the relevant scriptural 
proof text, as he does in the ShM and the SE. By citing a proof text, 
maimonides follows the basic tenets of rhetorical argument, as well 
as adhering to the format of the midreshe halakhah, the fundamental 
cornerstones of the oral law.65
For the overwhelming majority of commandments, the scriptural 
intercourse on that day.” maimonides then adds: “Nevertheless, one becomes liable 
for excision or a sin offering only for eating or drinking; if one washes, anoints 
himself, wears shoes, or has sexual intercourse, he is liable to a disciplinary flogging 
[makkat mardut].” only fasting is scripturally enjoined and only eating and drinking 
are scripturally prohibited, not the broader activities possibly implied by the phrase 
“affliction of the soul.” As we saw earlier, when not accompanied by a proof text, 
mi-pi ha-shemu‘ah may simply represent an ancient tradition of rabbinic authority; 
thus, the law prescribes “disciplinary flogging,” a rabbinic punishment, rather than 
the scriptural flogging. 
65 . I am indebted to Tirzah meacham for this insight.
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proof text itself is sufficient evidence of the claim’s validity. maimonides 
had already demonstrated in the ShM that the evidence was well 
warranted, a work familiar to most readers of the MT. Additionally, 
even a casual reader who had not studied the ShM would recognize 
the natural relation of the claim to the scriptural verse being cited. 
The peshateh di-qera, the contextual, plain reading of the verse, assures 
this recognition. In the few cases where maimonides allows tradition 
to override the plain sense, he cites the verse and follows it with the 
traditional interpretation. It is critical that the proof text be an integral 
part of the initial presentation of the commandment. 
Where neither a designation nor a proof text is found in the 
presentation of what the ShM/SE had already identified as a positive 
commandment, one wonders whether maimonides had changed his 
mind. I argue that he did indeed change his mind: the peshateh di-qera 
does not validate the claim, and no rabbinic warrant can convincingly 
connect a verse to the claim. The commandment thus passes from 
the category of de-oraita to divre sofrim, revealing the unsuspected 
significance and ramifications of Rule 2. In the next section, I discuss the 
literary artifice that maimonides uses to convey this changed perception.
PES D  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------   Chapter VIII  -------------------------------------------------------------------------
— 242 —
-------------------------------- CHApTER VIII  -------------------------------
THE pARTICIpIAl FoRm 
ANd oTHER pECulIARITIEs
In many places in the Halakhot, maimonides deviates from his standard 
formula. He neglects to declare that a given commandment is a mitsvat ‘aseh 
and fails to produce a scriptural proof text. In some of these cases, he uses 
the participial form to describe the commandment, a formula such as “the 
shema is recited” rather than “it is a positive commandment to recite the 
shema.” While the participle is a common mishnaic grammatical form, it 
is not one particularly well suited to articulating imperatives.1 What is the 
significance of this grammatical form, and why does maimonides use it?
In an article curiously entitled “Haustafeln,”2 david daube points out 
that a large majority of tannaitic rulings use this form, and suggests that 
perhaps it reflects the less categorical or less authoritative standing of 
rabbinic legislation. daube notes that the Hebrew participle “stands for 
our present tense as referring to a habitual event, action or omission…. 
it is in this function, as an expression of the course to be taken in 
accordance with proper interpretation and custom, that the participle 
became the typically rabbinic form of legislation.” He concludes: “[i]f 
we want to give it a name, we should call it, not imperatival participle 
or participial imperative, but rather advisory, didactic participle or 
perhaps best, participle stating the correct practice.”3 
1 . The standard imperative form that maimonides uses to indicate commandments is 
the infinitive of the verb, preceded by the preposition lamed. see, e.g., Hilkhot Hamets 
u-Matsah 2:1, 6:1, 7:1, and passim�
2 . daube, “Haustafeln,” 295-306. The term haustafeln literally means “house panels,” and it 
commonly refers to the domestic code of the first century C.E., as discussed in the New 
Testament. It centers on how the various members of the family (wife, children, slaves) 
were to relate to the dominating male (husband/father/master) of the household.
3 . Ibid., 295-296.
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I raised this issue in chapter 6 in discussing the commandment of 
the priestly blessings, where maimonides uses this odd participial form. 
In this chapter, I will show that the use of the participial form is more 
frequent than an isolated instance. I now suggest that maimonides 
deliberately utilizes these participles to describe what daube called 
“habitual events” or “correct practices” in places where we may have 
expected scriptural commandments. While not explicitly commanded 
by scripture, those rituals are ancient and generally accepted, and 
would logically be categorized as scribal interpretations, divre sofrim, 
rather than as scriptural commandments. 
At this point, a clarification is in order. In the next few pages, I will 
argue that a number of commandments that are commonly thought 
to be scriptural, and which the ShM deems to be scriptural, are not 
categorized as scriptural (de-oraita) in the Halakhot. In effect, I will 
ascribe to maimonides notions that some might be inclined to label 
scandalous, if not downright heretical. But one need not view these 
notions in such an extreme fashion. I am not arguing that these 
commandments are not obligatory — they most clearly are. Nor do I 
even imply that these commandments lack scriptural force. Indeed, 
some of maimonides’ most prominent commentators maintain that 
maimonides viewed certain divre sofrim enablements as enjoying the 
force of scriptural law.4 What is at issue here is not praxis but doxa, 
theory. specifically, we see here how maimonides (qua legal theorist 
rather than qua decisor) categorizes certain commandments that he did 
not find present in the plain sense of scripture. 
4 . one such law categorized as divre sofrim but ostensibly enjoying the force of scriptural 
law is qiddushe kesef (betrothal by means of money); a marriage effected by money 
grants the woman the full legal status of a married woman, making her, for example, 
liable for the death penalty in case of adultery. see both Karo, Kesef Mishneh, and di 
Tolosa, Maggid Mishneh, on Hilkhot Ishut, 1:2, s.v. “u-be-ehad.” Analyzing a well known 
responsum of maimonides’ on the legal status of qiddushe kesef, duran interprets him 
as saying that anything not explicitly written in scripture — such as qiddushe kesef — “is 
not scriptural but rabbinic (mi-de-rabbanan).” duran interprets this statement as 
excluding hermeneutically derived laws from the enumeration of the commandments. 
He concludes, however, that maimonides would certainly agree that such laws carry 
scriptural force. duran, Zohar ha-Raqia, 11. our version of the responsum does not 
contain the word mi-de-rabbanan and instead contrasts scriptural laws with divre 
sofrim laws. Responsa, ed. Blau, no. 355, 631-633. 
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In chapter 7, I argued that maimonides used the tool of peshateh 
di-qera to examine scripture for commandments, interpreting the text 
plainly and contextually. I analyzed a few exceptional places where 
maimonides deferred to traditional readings — when those readings 
could be said to lie within the limits of the plain sense of the text. 
For maimonides, exegetical readings that deviate from context could 
not serve as bases for identifying scriptural commandments. In this 
chapter, I shall explore how the participial form functions in lieu of a 
declarative statement, informing us in a subtle but precise way that 
the specific commandment may not quite follow the canons of peshateh 
di-qera� This ambiguity is reinforced by the lack of a quoted proof text, 
effectively disconnecting the practice from the text. While most of the 
examples include use of the participial form, some of them reveal, if 
ever so subtly, an ambivalent stance through different sorts of literary 
artifices. These, too, we shall explore. 
Following is an analysis of commandments in the Halakhot that, 
for the most part, use the participial form in their definition while 
also showing other deviations from the usual declarative introductory 
formula. I argue that these anomalies point to a subtle re-assignment of 
the commandment to another legal category, following the exigencies 
and implications of the peshateh di-qera hermeneutic.
 
p10. THE RECITATIoN oF THE sHEmA
In the Halakhot, maimonides opens discussion of this commandment thus: 
The shema is recited [qorim] twice every day, once in the evening and once 
in the morning, as it is said: when thou sittest in thy house, and when thou 
walkest by the way, and when thou liest down, and when thou risest up [deut. 
6:7]. The time when people customarily lie down is evening and the time 
when people customarily get up is morning. (Hilkhot Qeriyat Shema 1:1) 
Note, first and foremost, that maimonides does not explicitly designate 
the recitation of the shema a positive commandment, neither here 
nor anywhere else in this section. He does not say, “[it is a positive 
commandment] to read the shema,” as he does with regard to prayer, 
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for example: “It is a positive commandment to pray every day” (Hilkhot 
Tefillah 1:1). Instead, he uses the participle qorim, idiomatically 
translated as “is recited” (literally, “we/you/they recite”). 
In the SE/ShM, the words “and thou shalt talk of them [when thou 
sittest in thy house, and when thou walkest by the way, and when thou 
liest down, and when thou risest up]” (deut. 6:7, emphasis added) are 
cited as evidence for the obligation to recite the shema. surprisingly, 
this proof text is entirely omitted in the Halakhot. It appears that in the 
Halakhot, maimonides is only concerned with proving that the shema is 
recited twice daily — night and morning, as the expression “when thou 
liest down, and when thou risest up” implies — rather than proving that 
there exists a scriptural requirement to recite it. While such a literalist 
reading is plausible, it does not meet the criterion of plain sense. As 
Tigay observes, “these pairs of contrasting phrases are merisms. 
Accordingly, our verse means: speak of these words wherever you are, 
and at all times.”5 What makes the metaphorical interpretation more 
philologically compelling is that a very similar expression is used in 
proverbs 6:21-226 in a wisdom, non-legal, context, where the expressions 
“lying down” and “rising up” are clearly not intended to signify day and 
night. Rather, they are intended to signify continuous, round-the-clock, 
engagement. This may explain the reason maimonides fails to adduce a 
proof text in the Halakhot for the recitation of the shema and employs 
the participial form to express the obligation to recite it. 
What type of obligation, then, is the recitation of the shema? Note 
that the enumerative works (SE/ShM) contain one commandment to 
“unify Him” (le-yahado), listed as p2, and a second commandment, 
to recite the shema, listed as p10, making it appear as if there are 
two independent scriptural commandments. A noticeably different 
path is taken by the Halakhot. After describing God’s particular type 
of oneness in Hilkhot Yesode ha-Torah 1:7, maimonides concludes: “to 
5 . The JPS Torah Commentary, deut. 6:7. see also the medieval commentator Joseph 
Bekhor shor, Perushe R� Yosef Bekhor Shor, ad loc.
6 . Referring to “your father’s commandment” and “your mother’s teaching,” proverbs 
(6:21-22) says: “Tie them over your heart always; bind them around your throat. When 
you walk it will lead you; when you lie down it will watch over you; and when you are 
awake it will talk to you.” 
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know this truth is a positive commandment, as it says, Hear, o Israel: 
The Lord our God, the Lord is one.” The formulation is as forceful as 
it is unequivocal; the intellectual act of cognizing God’s oneness is a 
positive commandment. This clarity is sorely missing when it comes to 
the recitation of the shema. Here, the shema “is recited,” and no proof 
text is offered. I submit that maimonides no longer puts the recitation 
of the shema on a par with the cognitive act, as he had ostensibly done 
in the ShM/SE. Instead, the recitation is simply a “correct practice,” in 
daube’s words. This formulation places the recitation of the shema 
in the category of mitsvot divre sofrim rather than in the category of 
mitsvot de-oraita� For the legal theorist and philosopher, the oneness 
of God is not something that is recited but rather something that is 
acknowledged and understood; it is not a formula to be recited twice 
a day, but rather a fundamental truth that must be assimilated and 
affirmed at all times. 
I believe that this ambivalence with respect to the recitation of 
the shema can already be detected in the ShM. The argument there, 
which I review immediately below, proceeds confusedly to discuss times 
rather than recitation and digresses unnecessarily and excessively 
beyond qeriyat shema. As mentioned above, maimonides’ evidence for 
the obligation to recite the shema twice daily comes from the verse: 
“and thou shalt talk of them when thou sittest in thy house, and when 
thou walkest by the way, and when thou liest down, and when thou 
risest up.” In the ShM, maimonides adduces two rabbinic warrants, the 
first from BT Berakhot 21a, “where it is shown that the reading of the 
shema is ordained by the Torah,” and the second from T Berakhot 3:1. 
In context, the talmudic passage is not as definitive as maimonides 
implies, for it also contains an amoraic opinion maintaining that the 
recitation of shema is rabbinic. moreover, the passage reaches no firm 
conclusion on this question. 
The Tosefta reads: “Just as the Torah has ordained an appointed time 
[qeva’]7 for the reading of shema, even so have the sages appointed a 
7 . our edition of the Tosefta (ed. Zuckermandel) has here “just as an appointed time 
has been ordained,” omitting the reference to the Torah. This omission bears on the 
question of whether the daily reading of shema is a scriptural or a rabbinic precept. 
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time [zeman] for prayer.”8 The ostensible value of the passage is to show 
by inference that appointing times for reading shema is a scriptural 
requirement, while appointing times for other prayers is a rabbinic 
ordinance. oddly, maimonides does not make this inference explicit; 
instead, he proceeds to discuss prayer in more general terms. In effect, 
he uses this warrant to show that it is the rabbis who appointed 
times for prayers, although the activity of prayer itself is scripturally 
prescribed. This distinction appears unnecessary, since maimonides 
already explained in p5 that prayer is scripturally mandated. It is 
surprising that maimonides does not use this text to emphasize the 
scriptural character of the recitation of the shema, perhaps implying 
that while he accepted the second half of the dictum (that times for 
prayer are rabbinically ordained), he was not convinced of the first (that 
times for the shema are biblically ordained). He may have, for example, 
thought it possible to read the Tosefta passage as indicating that the 
Torah merely hinted at the appropriate times for the shema — thus 
reading the verse as an asmakhta rather than as a genuine proof. As I 
have noted on a number of previous occasions, asmakhtot are not valid 
hermeneutics on which to base scriptural claims. By way of contrast, 
the Tosefta suggests that when it came to appointing times for prayers, 
the Rabbis were left to their own ingenuity. 
This interpretation dovetails well with what appears to be another 
seemingly redundant statement immediately following maimonides’ 
interpretation of the second half of the dictum: 
This is what the sages mean when they say: “[The men of the Great 
Assembly] appointed prayers to correspond with the daily burnt 
offerings”; that is to say, they fixed the times of prayer to correspond 
with the times at which [the daily burnt offerings] were brought. 
Note that in this text, the term qeva’ is set in apposition to zeman (time), perhaps 
bearing the meaning of “fixed form” rather than “appointed time.” The phrase could 
thus mean that just as the Torah has set a fixed form, the shema, for the affirmation of 
God’s unity, so too have the sages appointed a time for prayer. But see following note.
8 . The Zuckermandel edition of the Tosefta has the word zeman here. However, the 
Tosefta appended to the standard editions of the Babylonian Talmud uses the term 
qeva‘ again instead of zeman. see Sefer ha-Mitsvot, ed. Heller, ad loc., n. 22. 
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Consistent with the above thesis, maimonides explains that the 
Rabbis appointed times for prayers to correspond with the daily burnt 
offerings. This was an entirely original contribution and one that, 
unlike the asmakhta of the shema, could not be traced to an allusion 
in the text. The Tosefta thus offers a comparison and a contrast. 
While both the recitation of the shema and daily prayers are rabbinic 
commandments, the former is based on an asmakhta and the latter is 
based on a reasoned argument. In short, this rambling presentation 
gives us a window onto maimonides’ own doubts with respect to the 
legal status of the shema recitation. 
The use of the participial form in the Halakhot may reflect 
maimonides’ continued ambivalence regarding the scriptural status 
of this commandment. Alternatively, it may reflect a fully settled 
position that qeriyat shema is not a mitsvat ‘aseh but simply a divre 
sofrim obligation. Regardless of how one understands the obligation, 
no change in praxis is implied. Towards the end of this chapter, I will 
attempt to demonstrate that there is indeed a difference between the 
views that qeriyat shema is de-oraita or mi-divre sofrim even according to 
those jurists who saw the latter as enjoying scriptural force.
p11. To lEARN ToRAH ANd To TEACH IT
What is noteworthy about the presentation of this commandment is 
not that it uses the participial form, which it does not, but rather that 
it lacks the typical declarative statement that accompanies positive 
commandments. In its place we find the following roundabout and 
atypically worded introduction: 
Women and slaves are exempt from the obligation of studying Torah. But 
a father is obligated [aviv hayav le-lamdo] to teach his young son Torah, 
as it is said, And ye shall teach them to your children, talking of them (deut. 
11:19). (Hilkhot Talmud Torah 1:1) 
maimonides begins by identifying everyone who is exempt from the 
obligation to study Torah, and then goes on to list those who are 
obligated to teach Torah and to whom: father to son, grandfather to 
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grandson and, lastly, teacher to disciples. Notably, neither teaching nor 
studying Torah is ever designated as a positive commandment.9 Note, 
too, that to convey the sense of obligation, maimonides chooses 
the term hayav, a commonly used rabbinic expression, instead of 
a verbal form of mitsvah, the scriptural designation for obligation. 
Finally, it should be noted that the introductory section only 
discusses teaching Torah — to one’s children, one’s grandchildren and 
one’s disciples — and supports this obligation with Torah passages. No 
mention is made of the obligation to study Torah until halakhah 8, where 
it is supported by a non-Torah passage: “But thou shalt meditate therein 
day and night” (Josh. 1:8).10 By way of contrast, in the enumerative 
works, both obligations are derived from the same proof text: “and ye 
shall teach them to your children, talking of them” (deut. 11:19).11 
All the peculiar features noted above suggest that in the Halakhot, 
maimonides does not subscribe to the idea that there is a scriptural 
basis for the commandments to study and teach Torah. And I would 
submit that the peshateh di-qera supports this thesis. Indeed, the 
context of deuteronomy 11:19, urging one to teach one’s children, does 
not appear to refer to the study of Torah, but rather to the proclamation 
of God’s unity and to the love that we must show for Him (vv. 5-6). 
Further support for this conjecture can be found in a statement that 
maimonides makes in Hilkhot Qeriyat Shema. After ruling that one must 
recite the shema twice each day, maimonides explains why one recites the 
passage beginning “Hear o Israel” (deut. 6:4-9) before those beginning 
9 . The failure to make a declaratory statement and the peculiar and absolutely atypical 
opening prompts the commentator RadBaZ to offer a justification: maimonides 
wanted to emphasize the fact that women and slaves are exempt from the obligation 
even though they are generally obligated to perform all positive commandments that 
have a fixed time. In any case, one can see that maimonides succeeded in diverting 
attention from the critical issue, namely, that he has not designated the study and 
teaching of Torah as a positive commandment. see RadBaZ, Sheelot u-Teshuvot ha-
RaDBaZ, vol. 8, siman 1. 
10 . By definition, prophetic passages cannot serve as valid proof texts for scriptural 
commandments.
11 . The Sifre comments that the Hebrew word ve-shinantam, here translated as “you shall 
teach them,” can also be understood as coming from the pi’el form of the verb shinen, 
“sharp.” The words of Torah shall be “sharp” in the mouth of the teacher, a fluency that 
implies prior study and familiarity.
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“And it shall come to pass” (deut. 11:13-21) and “The lord spoke” (Num. 
15:37-41). He writes: “The section beginning Hear o Israel is recited first, 
because it contains the unity of God, the [duty to] love Him [ve-ahavato] 
and [the duty to teach about] Him [ve-talmudo], because this is the 
great principle on which everything depends.”12 As maimonides details 
elsewhere, scripture commands the believer to cognize intellectually God’s 
oneness (p2; Hilkhot Yesode ha-Torah 1:7). Therefore, one may conclude 
that the passage “and thou shalt teach them diligently unto thy children” 
exhorts one to impart this knowledge to others. 
maimonides may have viewed the commandments to study and teach 
Torah as merely a rabbinic appropriation of scriptural advice, a classic 
example of divre sofrim.13 At least to maimonides’ way of thinking, this 
appropriation may have been justified by practical considerations: only the 
study of the law can lead to the proper performance of commandments.14 
As we saw, the introductory presentations of each of the commandments 
in the Halakhot contain a great deal of information about maimonides’ 
legal philosophy and classification. Given the revered standing that the 
study of Torah enjoyed among rabbinic students and the general public, 
it is not surprising that maimonides came to use subtle literary devices, 
such as formulaic variants, to hide his true opinion.
p12, p13. To BINd pHylACTERIEs  
oN THE HEAd ANd oN THE ARm
maimonides opens Hilkhot Tefillin in the following manner: 
12 . my translation. I take ahavato and talmudo as referring to God, while the words 
“because this is the great principle” (ki hu ha-iqqar ha-gadol), refer back to God’s unity. 
Hyamson translates the phrase as “studying His words,” an interpretative statement 
that follows the approach of most rabbinic commentators. 
13 . In Hilkhot Talmud Torah 1:2, maimonides states: “on traditional authority (mi-pi ha-
shemu’ah lamdu), the term ‘thy children’ includes disciples.” This tradition does not say 
that one ought to teach one’s children Torah; it simply says that scripture uses the 
word “children” to include disciples.
14 . see Hilkhot Talmud Torah 1:3 on the importance of study for the performance of 
commandments. Alternatively, the study of the law settles a person’s mind (meyashvim 
da’atam shel adam tehillah) and allows him to embark on the true goal of the scriptural 
commandment: metaphysical contemplation. See Hilkhot Yesode ha-Torah 4:13.
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The following four passages…are the ones that are written by themselves 
[or “individually,” bi-fne ’atsmam]; they are wrapped in leather and are 
called tefillin. They are to be placed [u-manihin otam] on the head and 
they are tied [ve-qoshrin otam] on the arm.15 (Hilkhot Tefillin 1:1)
Because tefillin are not explicitly defined (or mentioned by that name) 
in scripture,16 maimonides logically chooses to describe the objects 
with which one is to perform the commandment before he declares 
and explains the nature of the commandment. It is only immediately 
after this description that the difficulties become apparent: “They are 
to be placed [u-manihin otam] on the head and they are tied [ve-qoshrin 
otam] on the arm.” Why does maimonides use the participial form, 
rather than declaring clearly and unequivocally that it is a positive 
commandment to place these tefillin on the head and tie them on the 
arm? And why does he fail to support this practice with the appropriate 
scriptural citation, as he did in the SE/ShM — and as he does in the 
presentation of nearly every commandment? 
similarly, in Hilkhot Tefillin 4:1-2, maimonides discusses the exact 
spot on which one should place these tefillin. yet he not only omits the 
scriptural verse that supports this identification, but he adds: “We learned 
the positioning of the tefillin on the arm and on the head from the oral 
tradition [mi-pi ha-shemu‘ah lamdu].” His resorting to tradition for this 
point implies that he does not think that the scriptural verse “And thou 
shalt bind them for a sign upon thy hand and they shall be for frontlets 
between thy eyes” is sufficiently revealing. moreover, as discussed in 
chapter 7, the expression mi-pi ha-shemu‘ah without an accompanying 
proof text generally signifies that we are in the presence of an ancient 
tradition rather than a scriptural law. lastly, nowhere does maimonides 
15 . In the continuation, maimonides states further that “according to the Torah, a mistake 
in the tip of only one of the letters in the four passages renders the whole unfit; they 
must be written perfectly as they are supposed to be.” He then rules that the same 
is true for passages written for the mezuzah and for the Torah scroll. These are laws 
that pertain to scribing any passages or sections of the Torah; they do not confer a 
scriptural status on the commandments of placing tefillin on the head and arm and 
mezuzot on doorposts. 
16 . “And thou shalt bind them for a sign upon thy hand, and they shall be for frontlets 
between thy eyes” (deut. 6:8).
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cite the midrashic play on the scriptural word totafot used to substantiate 
the idea that the phylacteries contain four passages.17 The impression we 
get is that maimonides was both troubled by the correspondence between 
the praxis and the plain meaning of the commands to place a “sign” (ot) 
and a “remembrance” (zikaron/totafot)18 on one’s arm and head and by the 
philological genuineness of the midrash on the word totafot.19 
Throughout history, several interpreters have suggested that these 
verses should be understood in a metaphoric sense. Aqila, Theodotion, 
and some manuscripts of the septuagint read the verses as exhorting 
one to be aware constantly of God’s teachings. In the middle Ages, the 
Karaites also stressed the metaphoric view. In his long commentary to 
Exodus 13:9, Ibn Ezra, repeating the familiar refrain ein miqra yotse mi-
yede peshuto (“a scriptural verse never loses its peshat sense”) rejects the 
metaphoric views of totafot offered by the Karaites because the literal 
interpretation is plausible in context.20 By even citing and engaging 
such a view, he seems to show a certain degree of sympathy for the 
figurative interpretation. RasHBam also writes that according to the 
“depth of the plain interpretation” (omeq peshuto), these words should 
be taken metaphorically.21 These disagreements among maimonides’ 
predecessors and contemporaries highlight the exegetical difficulties 
encountered with deuteronomy 6:8 and the so-called commandment 
17 . Cf. RasHI on deut. 6:8, based on BT Sanhedrin 4b.
18 . Zikaron in Exod. 13:9; totafot in Exod. 13:16, deut. 6:8, 11:18.
19 . Cf. BT Menahot 34b. R. Ishmael and R. Aqiba both parse the tris legomenon “totafot” to 
signal the quantity four, referring to the four sections inscribed on the parchments, but 
without explicating the term. The far-fetched etymological explanations in the Talmud 
all imply that totafot is only an allusion (remez) to tefillin, which is another way of saying 
that tefillin are not explicitly discussed in scripture. Accordingly, at least part of the 
commandment of tefillin should be seen as mi-divre sofrim, like all precepts informed by 
tradition and only tenuously linked to the text. see chapter 7, note 10 above.
20 . After equating peshat with literalism, Ibn Ezra says that one should be willing to 
accept literalism as long as it makes good sense. Interestingly, he rejects a philological 
interpretation based on the way similar expressions are used in proverbs (1:9, 6:21), 
because proverbs, unlike the Torah, is a book of parables. Clearly, his appreciation of 
peshat is quite different than the one I ascribe to maimonides, as is his belief that the 
Torah contains no parables. In his short commentary, Ibn Ezra also offers the metaphoric 
interpretation — before going on to reject it — but does not ascribe it to the Karaites.
21 . RasHBam, Perush ha-Torah on deut. 13:9. see The JPS Torah Commentary, Deuteronomy, 
Excursus 11.
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of tefillin. The view that the commandment of tefillin is not a mitsvah 
de-oraita would have surely shocked the Jewish community. The use of 
the participial hid this opinion from the masses by simply not having 
to state explicitly that the obligation to wear them is mi-divre sofrim. It 
is also possible, however, that the participial form may have genuinely 
expressed a more ambivalent stand on the matter. 
p15. To AFFIX A mEZuZAH 
much of what was said about tefillin can be said about the commandment 
to affix a mezuzah. maimonides opens Hilkhot Mezuzah (Hilkhot Tefillin 
u-Mezuzah ve-Sefer Torah 5:1) by describing the mezuzah and the process 
of its production: “How is the mezuzah to be written [ketsad kotvin, lit., 
“how do they write the mezuzah”]? one writes two passages … in a single 
column on a piece of parchment.”22 most of the first chapter is devoted to 
explaining how to write the mezuzah. In 5:10, maimonides rules that “all are 
obligated [ha-kol hayavin] to affix mezuzot, even women and slaves,” without 
designating this obligation a positive commandment. Instead, we note here 
too, as with the study of Torah, the use of the common rabbinic term for 
obligation, hayav (here hayavin). maimonides misses the last opportunity to 
designate the writing and placing of a mezuzah as a positive commandment 
in 6:12, when he explains where the mezuzah is to be affixed. once again, 
he makes use of the participial form: “Where is the mezuzah to be affixed 
[ve-hekhan qovin et ha-mezuzah]?” Furthermore, nowhere in Hilkhot Mezuzah 
does maimonides cite the traditional evidence for this commandment claim, 
as he did in the enumerative works: “And thou shalt write them upon the 
doorposts of thy house, and upon thy gates” (deut. 6:9).23
I suggest that, here again, maimonides reads the scriptural 
pericope in a manner consistent with the context, in this case giving 
22 . Note that the verse speaks about writing the words “upon the doorposts of thy house,” 
and that it is only via an inference from similar words (gezerah shavah) that the rabbis 
interpreted the passage to say that the pentateuchal sections should be written on 
parchment. see BT Menahot 34a. As we saw earlier, maimonides deems derivations 
using hermeneutic rules like gezerah shavah to be mi-divre sofrim.
23 . He does cite part of this verse in connection with a detail of the law: “Granaries, 
barns, lumber rooms, and storehouses are exempt from mezuzah, since it says, of thy 
house [deut. 6:9].”
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it a figurative meaning. since the subject of the larger passage is God’s 
unity, this knowledge is what should always envelop each person; the 
doorposts are as much a sign of constancy, immediacy and nearness as 
one’s forehead and arms.24 maimonides’ formulaic deviation, the lack 
of a declaratory statement25 and the failure to adduce textual evidence 
for the commandment to write or affix a mezuzah, as well as his use of 
the participial form and the rabbinic term for obligation, suggest, at the 
very least, an extraordinary ambivalence about the scriptural status of 
this commandment. I posit that maimonides’ exegetical sense would not 
allow him to accept the sages’ traditional reading of deuteronomy 6:4-9, 
a passage that contains the fundaments of the religion. Through various 
literary means and through the use of the participial form, maimonides 
either hinted that the commandment to affix a mezuzah is a mitsvah 
mi-divre sofrim or simply expressed doubt regarding the scriptural status 
of the commandment. Regardless, there would be no impact on praxis; 
maimonides made sure to uphold every detail of the traditional rabbinic 
interpretation when explicating the practice in the Halakhot. 
p17/p18. THAT THE KING sHAll WRITE A sCRoll  
oF THE ToRAH FoR HImsElF (p18 IN THE sE  
ANd p17 IN THE sHm ENumERATIoN)
While the command that the king shall write a scroll of the Torah for 
himself has a scriptural basis, maimonides does not designate it as a 
24 . maimonides does not approve of the objectification of the “great duty” to affirm God’s 
unity, love, and worship. The commandment of belief is condensed into an object 
that could become an amulet for personal interests, in the hands of fools. Writing 
about those who inscribe the mezuzah with the names of angels, holy names, or other 
such protective mantras, maimonides says: “For these fools not only fail to fulfill the 
duty [bittlu ha-mitsvah] but made a great duty [mitsvah gedolah], namely the unity of 
the Name of God, His love and His worship, as it were an amulet to promote their 
own personal interests” (Hilkhot Mezuzah 5:4). Note the expression bittlu ha-mitsvah 
instead of the phrase that one might expect, bittlu mitsvat ‘aseh. 
25 . maimonides also fails to designate the commandment as a mitsvat ‘aseh in the rest of 
Hilkhot Mezuzah, even when he points out how one is liable if one fails to fulfill the 
command. We note that at 5:4, he uses the expression bittlu ha-mitsvah instead of the 
expected bittlu mitsvat ‘aseh. see the note 24 above.
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positive commandment in the Halakhot.26 oddly enough, although 
maimonides discusses the king’s obligation to write a sefer torah in two 
separate places, Hilkhot Sefer Torah (7:2) and Hilkhot Melakhim (3:1), 
the obligation is listed only under the Headings to Hilkhot Sefer Torah 
and not under the Headings to Hilkhot Melakhim. 
The two formulations are substantively similar, with one exception: 
in Hilkhot Sefer Torah, maimonides writes: “The king is obligated 
[metsuveh]27 to write one scroll of law for himself, for the sake of the 
king, an additional scroll to the one he had while still a commoner” [emphasis 
added]. maimonides here refers to the commandment that everyone is 
obligated to write a scroll of the Torah (p17). In Hilkhot Melakhim, on 
the other hand, maimonides writes that “the king writes for himself a 
scroll of law in addition to the scroll that his forefathers had left him” 
[emphasis added]. This is based on a baraita quoted in BT Sanhedrin 21b: 
“And he must not take credit [lit. “adorn himself”] for the one belonging 
to his ancestors.” A few sentences later, maimonides acknowledges the 
obligation on each person to write a scroll of the Torah, when he says that 
“one [of the scrolls], the writing of which is obligatory upon every Jew, he 
places in his treasure-house.”28 In neither of these sections, however, does 
maimonides designate this royal obligation a positive commandment, 
despite the clear proof text: “And it shall be, when he sitteth upon the 
throne of the kingdom, that he shall write him a copy of this law in a 
book, out of which is before the priests the levites ” (deut. 17:18). 
I argue here that maimonides’ failure to declare a positive 
commandment is supported by a peshateh di-qera reading of the 
scriptural passage. The idea that the king must write two scrolls of 
law, one as a commoner and one as a king, comes from reading mishneh 
as “double” and then abstracting the phrase from its context, so it is 
interpreted that he must write to himself a double torah, that is, two 
torot.29 Taking the context into account, however, the plain sense of 
26 . Not so with regard to the average man’s obligation to write a sefer torah. There he clearly 
states that it is a positive commandment to write one. see Hilkhot Sefer Torah 7:1.
27 . see RaMBaM Meduyaq, ed. shailat, Hilkhot Sefer Torah 7:2, n. 7�
28 . The phrase used is “bet genazav.” Compare Ezra 5:17; 6:1.
29 . The talmudic exegesis (BT Sanhedrin 21b), “he writes for his own sake [lishmo] two 
torot” likely means that he writes two scrolls when he accedes to the throne, not that 
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the text calls for a different reading; namely, the king must write a 
double, i.e., a copy, of this torah, which is in the hands of the levites 
(“from in front of the levite priests). In the Halakhot, maimonides 
renders “mishneh” in a manner to reflect this plain sense (and as the 
targumic interpreter did), specifically, a copy of the Torah. 
The king must copy for himself the Torah (probably working from 
the one lodged in the Temple), which he shall keep about him at all 
times. It does not mean that he has to write for himself a second scroll.30 
Thus the king is only obligated to write one scroll of the Torah, the same 
obligation incumbent on every Jew. Furthermore, the requirement that 
the king store one scroll in his treasure house is rabbinic: scripture refers 
only to the one he must write, saying, “and it shall be with him, and he 
shall read therein all the days of his life” (deut. 17:19). yet, to uphold 
an ancient tradition that the king must place a scroll in his treasure 
house, maimonides has the king write an extra scroll of law while placing 
the one that he wrote as a commoner in the treasure-house (“one, the 
writing of which is obligatory upon every Jew, he places in his treasure 
house”).31 Thus all of the regulations requiring a king to write a second 
scroll are rabbinic, not scriptural.
To reiterate: the Halakhot adopts the plain sense of the verse 
that the king must write one copy of the Torah for himself — the 
very same obligation incumbent upon every commoner, as stated 
in Hilkhot Sefer Torah 7:1. In light of this, it is the king’s obligation 
to write a scroll of the law is not a separate positive commandment. 
This also explains why maimonides officially positioned this detail 
of the commandment in Hilkhot Sefer Torah, rather than in Hilkhot 
he writes one upon accession to complement a previously inherited scroll. see PhM, M 
Sanhedrin 2:5. Note that this reading differs from the ones presented in the Halakhot 
and would constitute a third position. 
30 . see onqelos, ad loc.
31 . Karo (Kesef Mishneh, Hilkhot Melakhim 3:1) correctly sensed that maimonides 
obligates the king to write only one scroll, noting that this contradicts the plain sense 
of the passage in BT Sanhedrin 21b. Karo acknowledged that his attempt to reconcile 
maimonides’ ruling with the passage is forced. According to my interpretation, 
maimonides’ philological understanding of the term mishneh does indeed reject the 
talmudic passage; even this one extra scroll is a concession to a rabbinic ordinance.
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Melakhim:32 the commandment to the king is only a detail of the general 
commandment that every Jew must write a scroll of law. maimonides 
labels the general commandment a mitsvat ‘aseh, but omits such a 
designation for the command that the king write a scroll of law, since, 
from a scriptural point of view, no such special commandment exists.33 
p127-p130. To sET AsIdE VARIous TITHEs
As interpreted by the oral law, leviticus 27, Numbers 18, and 
deuteronomy 14 describe the tithes that were incumbent on the 
Israelites upon entering the land of Israel, three of which were to rest 
on the Israelites and the fourth on the levites. The first tithe was to 
be given to the levites, and the oral law stipulates that everything 
growing from the land would be subject to the tithe. The second tithe 
prescribed by scripture was to be consumed by the owner in Jerusalem, 
while a third tithe would be levied for the benefit of the poor. In the 
Halakhot, maimonides fails to designate any of these tithes as positive 
commandments. Additionally, he makes heavy use of the participial 
form — in this case, the terms “mafrish” and ”mafrishin,” from the root 
“to set aside” or “to separate” — throughout his discussion of the tithes, 
both in Hilkhot Matnot ‘Aniyim and Hilkhot Ma‘aser.
maimonides introduces the first tithe (ma‘aser rishon) in the 
following manner: “After one has set aside the great heave offering 
[terumah gedolah], he sets aside [mafrish] one-tenth of what is left. This 
is what is called first tithe” (Hilkhot Ma‘aser 1:1). Contrast this with the 
way he presents the commandment (p126 in the ShM) to separate the 
great heave offering (terumah gedolah) for the priest: “All human food 
32 . one might well ask: according to maimonides, what is the novelty of the king’s 
command? I suggest that the novelty lies in the king’s obligation to carry the scroll 
with him wherever he goes, reading from it all the days of his life, as per the proof 
text: “And it shall be with him, and he shall read therein all the days of his life” (deut. 
17:19), an obligation not required of a commoner.
33 . From a hermeneutic point of view, however, the commandment that the king must 
write a scroll for himself provides the basis for the general commandment that every 
Jew must write his own scroll. This is the reason that the ShM enumerated the king’s 
commandment before the general one, following BT Sanhedrin 21b. see the earlier 
discussion of p17 in chapter 5, note 52.
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that is watched over and that grows out of the soil is subject to the 
heave offering. It is a positive commandment to separate from it the 
first fruits for the priest” (Hilkhot Terumot 2:1). 
The second tithe (ma‘aser sheni) follows the form of the first: 
After the first tithe has been set aside each year, one must set aside 
[mafrishin] also the second tithe … In the third and sixth years of 
each septennate, the poor man’s tithe [ma‘aser ‘ani] must be set aside 
[mafrishin] instead of the second tithe as we have explained. (Hilkhot 
Ma‘aser Sheni 1:1) 
The briefly-mentioned third tithe, ma‘aser ‘ani, is described in greater 
detail in the sixth chapter of Hilkhot Matnot ‘Aniyim, which also details 
five types of gifts that one gives to the poor from the produce of the 
land: peah (lit., “corner of the field”), gleanings of grapes, gleanings of 
olives, the forgotten sheaf, and the defective grape clusters. Ma‘aser 
‘ani is introduced there as “a sixth gift.” The fourth tithe, incumbent 
on the levites and given to the priest (terumat ma‘aser), is discussed 
in Hilkhot Terumot (3:12) because of its affinity to the great heave 
offering.34 maimonides refers to this requirement as mitsvat terumat 
ma‘aser, though he still fails to designate it a mitsvat ‘aseh.35 
I have not yet found a totally satisfactory solution to this unusual 
presentation. perla offers a promising approach, observing that 
scriptural evidence for the obligatory nature of the tithe commandments 
is ambiguous. He suggests that the exegeses underpinning the tithe 
of cattle (which I have not analyzed here), the first tithe, and the 
poor man’s tithe are merely asmakhta be-alma and derashot be-alma,36 
34 . since this tithe is particular to the levites, it does not form part of the ordinary order 
of tithes.
35 . The expression mitsvat terumat ma‘aser should be rendered as “the proper way to 
perform terumat ma‘aser” and it is used deliberately as a contrast with a second and 
less desirable way to fulfill this requirement. The halakhah reads as follows: “The 
commandment of heave offering of the tithe applies to the levite, who must set it 
aside out of his tithe…. An Israelite, however, may set it aside and give it to the priest, 
and then give the balance of the tithe to the levite, after he has set aside the latter’s 
heave offering, which is the tithe from the tithe” (Hilkhot Terumot 3:12). 
36 . In these formulations, be-alma means “merely” or “only,” and the expressions may be 
translated as “merely an asmakhta” and “merely a derashah.” These creative exegeses 
----------------------------------  THE pARTICIpIAl FoRm ANd oTHER pECulIARITIEs  ---------------------------------
— 259 —
rabbinic ordinances supported by scriptural verses. As a result, perla 
argues that sa’adiah was correct to list these three tithes in the 
indicative rather than the imperative mode.37 Through a peshateh di-
qera lens, one could argue that these tithing commandments, or at 
least some of them, could be classified as mitsvot mi-divre sofrim, thus 
justifying maimonides’ use of the participial form when describing 
these commandments. 
scripture’s indeterminacy may even extend to the second tithe. 
In the ShM, maimonides quotes the Sifre, which, commenting on the 
words “Thou shalt surely tithe all the increase of thy seed” (deut. 14:22) 
writes: “I would only know this about the second tithe, regarding which 
Scripture speaks” (emphasis added).38 This comment helps maimonides 
prove that the second tithe represents a scriptural obligation. 
maimonides’ reliance on the oral tradition is confirmed in the SE: “To 
set apart the second tithe to be eaten by its owner in Jerusalem, as it 
is said, Thou shalt surely tithe [deut. 14:22]. They learnt from tradition 
[mi-pi ha-shemu‘ah lamdu] that this refers to the second tithe.” This is 
one of the five instances occurring in the SE (noted earlier in chapter 7) 
in which maimonides resorts to the oral tradition rather than relying 
directly on the text to substantiate a commandment claim. yet, it 
appears that he harbored some doubts after all with respect to this 
reading, because he does not cite it in the Halakhot. While reversals from 
previously held opinions are not rare in maimonides’ works, I could 
find no other instance in the Halakhot in which maimonides fails to 
make use of a traditional reading on which he had previously depended 
for the elucidation of the same scriptural proof text.39 perhaps by the 
do not represent veritable sources of the law; rather, they constitute supports or 
mnemonics for an existing law that was already known from tradition.
37 . perla, Sefer ha-Mitsvot le-RaSaG, vol. 1, 612b-c. With respect to at least one of these 
three tithes, the tithe of cattle, we find that maimonides upholds the scriptural basis 
of the commandment and designates it as such.
38 . Sifre Deuteronomy 105 (164). For an explanation of the rabbinic exegesis that underpins 
this tradition, see Epstein, Torah Temimah, deut. 14:22, n. 38. Ibn Ezra, deut. 14:28, s. 
v. “miqtseh,” cites an opinion of the “heretics” (i.e., Karaites), stating that the passage 
commencing with “Thou shalt surely tithe” refers to the first tithe, not the second. does 
he believe that their interpretation is plausible according to the peshat? 
39 . see the discussion of “mi-pi ha-shemu‘ah lamdu” in chapter 7. 
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time he wrote the Halakhot, maimonides had come to question the 
authoritativeness of the tradition, which in turn forced him to change 
his opinion about the scriptural status of the second tithe. 
There is even some evidence that maimonides equivocated 
regarding the exegetical basis for the first and second tithes. In the 
various versions of the ShM, we find three separate probatory texts 
substantiating the first tithe (p127): two of the explanations use 
their own proof texts, while a third one conflates both proof texts.40 
Contrary to maimonides’ assertion, the leviticus 27:30 proof text used 
in one version is contradicted by rabbinic opinion, which maintains 
that it refers to the second tithe, rather than to the first.41 This or 
perhaps some other reason may have led maimonides to offer a second 
proof text, found in a second version preserved by one of the Arabic 
manuscripts: “For the tithe of the children of Israel, which they set 
apart as a gift unto the lord” (Num. 18:24). The Numbers proof text 
does not denote an obligation, however, nor can it easily be identified 
with the first tithe (ma‘aser rishon) of the tithing cycle.42 
In sum, the participial form may well reflect maimonides’ 
ambivalent stance on the scriptural status of tithes, a stance that can 
be attributed to the lack of exegetical clarity found in talmudic and 
midrashic sources. It is also possible that maimonides had not been 
ambivalent after all, and the use of the participial may reflect a view 
that tithing laws represent only correct practices — and therefore ought 
to be categorized as mitsvot mi-divre sofrim and not as mitsvot de-oraita. 
40 . In the Arabic manuscript (and in the Halakhot), maimonides quotes the verse “for it 
is the tithes set aside by the Israelites as a gift to the lord [that I give to the levites 
as their share]” (Num. 18:24) to indicate “that this tithe belongs to the levites.” 
In Nahmanides’ version of the ShM, Ibn Ayub’s translation, and the SE, however, 
maimonides instead quotes the verse “And all the tithe of the land, whether of the 
seed of the land or of the fruit of the tree [shall be the lord’s]” (lev. 27:30). MnT’s 
translation presents both proof texts, conflating the two versions. It is reasonable to 
conclude that the Numbers 18:24 proof text forms part of the latest version, since it 
is the proof text ultimately quoted in the Halakhot.
41 . see RasHI’s commentary to the pentateuch, ad loc.; Nahmanides, Hasagot to Rule 12, 190.
42 . Cf. Sefer ha-Mitsvot, ed. Heller, ad loc., n. 5, who alerts the reader to the textual 
confusion. see also Henshke, “le-Toldot parshanutan shel parashiyyot ma‘aser,” 97-
101, who arrives at a similar conclusion.
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p168. To dWEll IN BooTHs sEVEN dAys
The presentation of this commandment in the Halakhot exhibits a 
number of peculiar elements. First, the chapter that discusses the duty 
to dwell in a booth (sukkah), chapter 6 of Hilkhot Sukkah, begins by 
listing those who are exempted from dwelling in the booth — “women, 
slaves, and minors” — rather than declaring that there is a positive 
commandment for men to dwell in a sukkah. Note that the form of this 
opening presentation parallels almost exactly the one used in Hilkhot 
Talmud Torah for the commandment to study and teach Torah. In my 
discussion of that commandment, I demonstrated that, at a minimum, 
maimonides was ambivalent about its scriptural status. Accordingly, 
this presentation might suggest a similar concern. 
Additional peculiarities may be cited. The proof text does not 
appear until halakhah 5, and then only to describe the manner in which 
the duty should be performed — not to substantiate the basic obligation 
to dwell in booths during those seven days: 
How is the commandment to dwell in a booth [mitsvat ha-yeshivah ba-
sukkah] to be observed? one should eat, drink, and reside in the booth 
day and night throughout the whole of the seven days of the festival, 
exactly as one resides in his house during the rest of the year. during 
these seven days one should regard his house as a temporary home and 
the booth as his permanent home, in accordance with the verse, Ye shall 
dwell [teshvu, lit., “sit”] in booths seven days [lev. 23:42]. 
The imperative form is notably absent from halakhah 6, and in its stead, 
the participial is used heavily: “Both by day and by night, one eats, 
drinks and sleeps [okhlin ve-shotin ve-yeshenim, lit., “they are eating, 
drinking, and sleeping”] in the booth throughout the whole of the 
seven days.” Finally, in halakhah 7, when maimonides at last declares 
that there is an obligation to eat in the sukkah on the first night of the 
festival, he states: 
It is obligatory [hovah] to eat in the booth on the first night of the festival. 
Even if one eats as little as an olive’s bulk of bread, he has fulfilled his 
duty. Thereafter the matter is optional: If one wishes to eat a regular 
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meal, he must eat it in the booth, but if he prefers to eat only fruit or 
parched ears outside of the booth during the remainder of the seven days 
he may do so. This is thus analogous to the law concerning the eating of 
unleavened bread during passover. 
For “obligation,” maimonides uses the rabbinic term hovah, not the 
expected phrase mitsvat ‘aseh. Contrast this formulation with the way 
he describes the obligation to observe the passover festival: “It is a 
positive commandment from the Torah to eat unleavened bread on the 
night of the fifteenth of Nissan, as it says, At even ye shall eat unleavened 
bread [Exod. 12:18].” 
These general literary considerations suggest that maimonides may 
have viewed the commandment to dwell in a sukkah as non-scriptural. 
moreover, maimonides’ use of the more neutral participial form that 
I hypothesize indicates correct practices, strengthens my suspicion 
that he categorizes this commandment as a mitsvah mi-divre sofrim. I 
suggest that the rituals of sukkot are not based in scriptural law — they 
appear to be purely a construct of the oral law. my demonstration 
rests on three separate but complementary arguments: the historical 
analogue; the hovah, or obligation to eat in the sukkah the first night 
of the festival; and the laws of the sukkah.
The historical analogue
scripture declares: “ye shall dwell in sukkot seven days…. that your 
generation may know that I made the children of Israel to dwell in 
sukkot, when I brought them out of the land of Egypt” (lev. 23:42-43). 
despite this explanation, the scriptural narrative of the Israelites 
does not recount their dwelling in sukkot anytime during their journey 
in the wilderness. What, then, were these sukkot in which “the children 
of Israel dwelt when they were brought out of Egypt”? Tannaim are 
divided on this question. R. Eliezer43 maintains that sukkot were booths, 
43 . Based on Sifra Emor 17:11 (103b). The printed editions of the Babylonian Talmud, 
BT Sukkah 11b, reverse the attributions. Jeffrey l. Rubenstein offers persuasive 
arguments for considering the sifra’s version of the attributions to be the more 
reliable one. see Rubenstein, The History of Sukkot in the Second Temple and Rabbinic 
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dwellings used by the sojourners to protect them from the inhospitable 
desert climate. R. Akiva maintains that the word “sukkot” alludes to the 
“clouds of the glory” (anane ha-kavod) that surrounded the Israelites 
during their travels through the desert, providing them with multiple 
types of protection, including shade against the searing sun. If, as is the 
norm in legal matters, one follows R. Akiva’s opinion, then the word 
“sukkot” refers to heavenly clouds rather than manmade booths. We 
might then wish to interpret the injunction “ye shall dwell in sukkot 
seven days” figuratively: you shall live under my protection for seven 
days, as you did in the days of old. We are left with the question: how 
does one live under God’s protection for seven days? It would appear 
then that only the oral law can resolve this question.
The hovah or obligation to eat in a sukkah the first night of the festival
The practice of eating the minimum equivalent of an olive’s bulk of bread 
in a sukkah on the night of the fifteenth of Tishre appears to be a mitsvah 
mi-divre sofrim and not a mitsvah de-oraita. While eating unleavened bread 
on the night of the fifteenth of Nissan is scripturally prescribed, the Torah 
does not mention eating in the sukkah on the night of the fifteenth day of 
Tishre. The talmudic sages (BT Sukkah 27a) derive this obligation through 
a gezerah shavah, a hermeneutic method based on linguistic analogies. The 
common term that connects the two festivals is “fifteenth.” Just as one 
is obligated to eat (unleavened) bread on the fifteenth day of Nissan, so 
must one eat bread on the fifteenth of Tishre. since the gezerah shavah 
is one of the thirteen hermeneutic rules, the resultant obligation can 
only be mi-divre sofrim according to maimonides (as per his Rule 2). This 
understanding would readily explain maimonides’ use of the rabbinic 
term hovah to convey that night’s obligation. 
The laws of sukkah
The details of who must dwell in a sukkah and who is exempted from 
it, as well as all the physical details of the sukkah — its roof, walls, and 
Periods, 239n1. 
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materials — are dictated by tradition. maimonides uses this series of 
laws in his introduction to the PhM, illustrating the authoritative role 
of oral law in the interpretation of written law and the inextricable 
relationship between the two. This analysis corroborates our suspicion 
that maimonides considered the scriptural sukkah commandment to be 
a textual riddle. As he writes: 
An example. God said to him [moses]: Ye shall dwell in sukkot seven 
days� He, the exalted one, also informed him that the sukkah obligation 
is incumbent on males and not on females, and that the sick and the 
traveler are exempted from this obligation. one must roof the sukkah 
only with material that grows from the land; one may not roof it with 
wool, silk or utensils [kelim], even those that grow from the land, like 
mats and clothes. Eating, drinking and sleeping must take place in it 
all seven days. Its living space must not be smaller than seven by seven 
tefahim, and it must not be lower than ten tefahim� 
The specifics of the laws of sukkah are thoroughly a construct of oral 
law. At best, the scriptural reference to sukkot is an asmakhta for the 
immensely complex set of rules that define all aspects of the sukkah’s 
construction and the holiday’s obligation.
I conclude that maimonides lacked sufficient evidence to treat the 
laws of dwelling in a sukkah as a mitsvat ‘aseh de-oraita. From a peshateh di-
qera perspective, the obligation to dwell in a specially constructed booth 
for seven days did not seem to be scripturally commanded. maimonides 
indicates this doubt through the use of a number of literary artifices, 
among them (but not limited to) the peculiar opening statement and the 
use of the participial form in which he couched the obligation. 
p169. lulAV
In chapter 6, I noted the lack of a declarative statement in the commandment 
of taking the four species on sukkot. I suggested that maimonides may 
have thought it more appropriate to subsume this obligation under the 
commandment to rejoice on the festivals (p54). In other words, I treated 
his unusual presentation as a case of revised individuation. I also noted 
his use of a passive infinitive to describe the command to take the lulav: 
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“mitsvat lulav [that is, the combination of the four species] is to be taken 
[le-hinatel] on the first day of the festival only — anywhere and at any time, 
even if this happens to be a sabbath” (Hilkhot Lulav 7:13).
I now offer an alternative solution, based on the analysis of 
maimonides’ peshateh di-qera hermeneutics. The scriptural text does not 
specify the types of species (minim) that one must take on the festival 
of sukkot. The verse “And ye shall take you on the first day the fruit 
of goodly trees, branches of palm trees, and boughs of thick trees, and 
willows of the brook” (lev. 23:40) forms the basis of the commandment 
to take branches of a palm tree, a citron (etrog), branches of myrtle, and 
branches of willows of the brook. While tradition interprets the “fruit 
of goodly trees” and the “boughs of thick trees” as citrons and myrtle 
branches, respectively, the identification of these particular species cannot 
be derived from the text alone.44 Various midrashim attempt to justify 
the traditional identification of the four species,45 but, as maimonides 
describes these midrashim, “they are not meant to bring out the meaning 
of the text in question.”46 maimonides posits that taking these four 
species commemorates the “joy and gladness” that the Israelites felt when 
leaving the barren desert “for places in which there were fruit-bearing 
trees and rivers.” He suggests that the choice of the four specific species 
was discretionary; the traditional interpretation satisfies a number of 
criteria, such as the availability of the species in the land of Israel, special 
fragrance, and guaranteed freshness for seven days.47 
44 . Translating peri ets hadar as the “boughs of majestic trees” allows the generalization of 
the three species that follow in the text and eliminates the notion of a single species. 
similarly, anaf ets avot, the branches of a leafy tree, is also a non-specific category, 
difficult to reconcile with the myrtle. see milgrom, Leviticus, 2065. In fact, the anaf ets 
avot and the leaves of the myrtle (hadas) are listed as two separate species in Nehemiah 
8:15. see the comments of Ibn Ezra on leviticus 23:40 and his defense of the rabbinic 
tradition against Karaite attacks.
45 . see maimonides’ discussion of this point in his introduction to the mishnah 
(Haqdamot ha-RaMBaM la-Mishnah, ed. shailat, 38-39). maimonides notes that while 
the identification of “fruit of goodly trees” with an etrog comes from the oral tradition, 
it is not considered a halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai, because hints in the verse allude to 
the etrog. see our discussion of halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai in chapter 7, note 10. 
46 . GP III:43: 573.
47 . Ibid., 574. An element of practical discretion may also be detected in the words that 
maimonides uses in Hilkhot Lulav 7:4 to support the identification of the four species: 
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The laws of the four species parallel those of tefillin: observances for 
which the rabbis find creative but philologically untenable links between 
the underlying text and traditional practice. Because the peshateh di-
qera does not indicate particular species, maimonides does not classify 
the commandments as scriptural. In this instance, however, because 
maimonides does not use the participial form indicating customary 
practice, my conclusions are more tentative. Nevertheless, the rare 
passive infinitive form coupled with the lack of a declarative statement 
suggests that maimonides is alerting the careful reader to a change in 
the commandment’s classification: the taking of the four species is not, 
properly speaking, a mitsvat ‘aseh de-oraita. 
In this analysis, I have shown how maimonides reclassified some of 
the most colorful and idiosyncratic practices of the Jewish faith from 
scriptural to non-scriptural status. This reclassification proceeds from 
the ultimate implications of maimonides’ hermeneutics of peshateh 
di-qera, which he dramatically postulates in the second Rule of the 
ShM. Certain subtle rhetorical hints signal this change: the lack of a 
declarative statement that the practice is a positive commandment; the 
absence of scriptural proof texts supporting the commandment; and the 
use of the participial form to describe the obligation.
To close this chapter, I offer a final point of clarification on the 
distinction between mitsvot de-oraita and mitsvot mi-divre sofrim. I 
noted above that maimonides uses a participial form to indicate the 
level of obligation of several ostensibly scriptural commandments. 
maimonides views these commandments as removed from the plain 
sense of scripture; the practices associated with these commandments 
appear to originate in rabbinically-sanctioned customs and traditions, 
rooted in some unspecified past. By implication, these practices ought 
to be classified as mitsvot mi-divre sofrim instead of mitsvot de-oraita. 
The very absurdity of such a proposition, which runs contrary both 
to centuries-old commonplace notions and to a substantial body of legal 
“all these things [the identification of the four species] come down by tradition [mi-pi 
ha-shemuah] and were so explained [nitparshu] by moses.” This formulation deviates 
from the more usual “taught by tradition” [mi-pi ha-shemuah lamdu]. The difference 
between “taught” and “explained” may carry some significance. 
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scholarship, throws doubt on such a radical proposition. For example, to 
call tefillin or sukkah a mitsvah mi-divre sofrim instead of a mitsvah de-
oraita would certainly be dismissed without any further consideration 
in any respected bet midrash. yet this counterintuitive notion does seem 
to flow naturally from the peshateh di-qera doctrine of Rule 2. moreover, 
in the Halakhot themselves, one finds support for the idea that 
commandments based on tradition, rabbinic interpretations, or analogic 
derivations from scriptural passages do not share the legal standing 
of explicit scriptural commandments, even if they impose the same 
practical sense of unconditional obligation as de-oraita commandments. 
In chapter 7, I made brief reference to the ongoing controversy 
regarding the nature of mitsvot divre sofrim: should they be considered 
rabbinic both in origin and in force, or should they be considered 
rabbinic in origin but scriptural in force? proponents for each of 
these views can be found among the most prominent medieval and 
modern scholars; the matter remains open. I have noted that I am 
not prepared to take a stand on this controversy.48 Nevertheless, I do 
not think that it is unrealistic to suggest that resistance to viewing 
mitsvot like tefillin as mitsvot mi-divre sofrim begins to diminish when 
one assumes that mitsvot mi-divre sofrim carry the force of mitsvot de-
oraita. Nevertheless, a larger question remains: if mitsvot mi-divre sofrim 
do carry the force of Torah law, why would maimonides bother to make 
this distinction — even using the language of customary practice?
Following Hilkhot Mamrim 2:1, one might want to posit that a 
significant distinction between a mitsvah de-oraita and a mitsvah mi-
divre sofrim is that only the latter type could be annulled by a court. on 
closer reading, however, one notes that maimonides only applies this 
rule to laws derived hermeneutically through the thirteen principles, 
not to any mitsvah mi-divre sofrim. This legal distinction would not 
hold for cases of correct practices, since the latter appear to stem from 
traditions, perhaps halakhot mi-pi ha-qabbalah. maimonides posits no 
mechanism for setting such types of laws aside. 
The question stands: if these types of mitsvot mi-divre sofrim possess 
the same immutable characteristics as mitsvot de-oraita, what is the 
48 . see in particular chapter 7, notes 11-13. 
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difference between these two categories? In what follows, I point to a 
small number of meaningful differences. A more thorough study may 
find additional examples.
In the treatise discussing transgressions incurred in error (Hilkhot 
Shegagot), maimonides draws a distinction between scriptural laws 
explicitly found in the text and those that are not (though they still 
enjoy scriptural force). In the case of “the bullock offered for the 
unconscious transgression of the congregation,” maimonides rules that: 
If the court erred and gave a ruling such as would uproot some main principle 
of the law [guf mi-gufe torah], and all the people acted on their authority, the 
court are exempt and everyone who so acted is liable to a fixed sin offering 
… The court never becomes liable unless they so rule as partly to annul and 
partly to sustain matters not explicit and plainly stated in the Law, whereupon 
the court becomes liable for the offering and they who act on their authority 
are not liable. (Hilkhot Shegagot 14:1-2, emphasis added) 
Explicitly stated laws are laws that even the sadducees, a prominent 
sectarian group who rejected the oral law, accepted; the Talmud (BT 
Horayot 4b) describes them as laws that any child would recognize. 
Erring with regard to such laws indicates forgetfulness rather than 
errors in judgment. Because the court was only liable for errors in 
judgment, they would not be liable for uprooting such laws. 
In this analysis, maimonides clearly distinguishes between explicitly 
formulated commandments and laws that derive their authority from 
tradition. The continuation of the halakhah makes this distinction clear: it 
contrasts carrying “a burden on the sabbath from one domain to another” 
(an explicit scriptural law) with throwing or passing a burden from one 
domain to another (learned by tradition). similarly, if the court uproots 
“one of the primary acts of work” on shabbat, the court is liable because 
the laws relating to the primary acts of work are not stated explicitly in 
scripture. maimonides provides other examples of the distinct status of 
explicitly formulated laws in connection with the determination of the 
court’s culpability when it has committed errors in judgment. 
A similar distinction can be found in Hilkhot Biat ha-Miqdash 1:3, 
where maimonides forbids an intoxicated individual from offering a 
legal decision unless the decision relates to “matters that are so explicit 
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in the Torah that even the sadducees know them.” once again, we see 
that explicitly stated laws, those recognizable by a fundamentalist 
literalist sect, enjoy a different standing than those not explicitly stated, 
which come under the heading of “teachings.” The distinction between 
mitsvot de-oraita and mitsvot mi-divre sofrim that I am attempting to 
make would only work, of course, if we can assume that “teachings” are 
the functional equivalents of mitsvot mi-divre sofrim.
In this section, I have argued that in his rulings, maimonides does 
consider explicitly-stated scriptural laws to be more authentically 
“scriptural” than the law derived from tradition, although I recognize 
that this pair of contrasting categories may not represent an exact 
parallel to the mitsvah de-oraita/mitsvah mi-divre sofrim pair. moreover, 
I have assumed that the term “explicitly-stated” is equivalent to “the 
plain sense of scripture,” though I admit that “literal” might be a closer 
synonym. This distinction is evident in Hilkhot Shehitah 5:3, where 
maimonides discusses the eight classes of trefot, animals unfit to eat, 
categorizing them as halakhot le-Moshe mi-Sinai� As we pointed out in 
chapter 7, laws of this type are considered by maimonides to be mitsvot 
mi-divre sofrim. Crucially, maimonides draws a legal distinction between 
the unfitness of the “torn” (derusah) animal and the seven other types 
of unfit animals, on the basis that the former is explicitly stipulated 
while the latter are only known by tradition.49 
While I do not claim to have exhausted this complex subject, I 
believe that I have shown that there are meaningful differences between 
mitsvot de-oraita and mitsvot mi-divre sofrim, even on the assumption 
that the latter have the force of Torah law. Juristic precision would 
thus demand that maimonides demarcate clearly between correct 
practices, or mitsvot mi-divre sofrim, and mitsvot de-oraita (in this case, 
mitsvot ‘aseh). 
We can only speculate as to why maimonides qua legal theorist 
chose not to state explicitly that the given commandments were mitsvot 
mi-divre sofrim. one reason may be a fear of appearing to espouse 
49 . The distinction is applicable to punishments in the presence of a doubtful infringement 
of the prohibition to eat such trefot. For an interesting take on this matter, see the 
comments of Kelz, Maggid Mishneh, ad loc.
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heretical, Karaite views by prioritizing scriptural readings. A second, 
perhaps less likely reason may have to do with genuine doubts that he 
may have harbored about the full ramifications of his peshateh di-qera 
hermeneutics. Recall that in Rule 2, maimonides eliminates derivations 
obtained via the thirteen rules of interpretation. We inferred from his 
discussion that all traditional interpretations, not just hermeneutic 
derivations, that do not stand textually on their own would also fall 
outside of the category of scriptural law. on this particular point, he 
may not have been all that certain. The use of the participial form 
would therefore reflect this ambivalent stance. With it, maimonides 
neither acknowledges the commandment’s scriptural status nor its 
non-scriptural one. He simply records the obligation without having to 
take a definitive stand.
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--------------------------------- CHApTER IX  ---------------------------------
WHEN MITSvAH sTANds 
AloNE
In chapter 8, I presented a group of claims that had been enumerated as 
mitsvot ‘aseh in the SE and ShM and yet had not been designated as positive 
commandments in the Halakhot. I noted that they lacked supporting proof 
texts and that they were formulated in the participial form, rather than with 
the standard lamed-infinitive. This led me to characterize them as “correct 
practices” (in daube’s words) rather than as scriptural commandments, 
and, consequently, to posit that maimonides had categorized them as 
mitsvot mi-divre sofrim. I allowed for the possibility that maimonides 
avoided the de-oraita designation because of interpretative misgivings; 
without confidence in their scriptural roots, he affirmed their obligatory 
character by using language that implied correct practice. 
I now look at another group of claims in the MT that also do not 
follow the characteristic declarative formula. They differ from the first 
group, however, in that maimonides calls their performance simply a 
mitsvah (rather than a mitsvat ‘aseh). To complicate matters, in these 
instances, he does quote the proof texts that had supported the original 
claims in the ShM. In this chapter, I attempt to explain the meaning and 
use of the solo term mitsvah in connection with this special group of 
commandments. I begin by investigating how the term mitsvah is used 
throughout the Halakhot outside of the small number of instances in 
which it is used in connection with commandments proper.
 
THE TERm MITSvAH IN THE HALAKHoT 
It is worth noting that in the introduction to the MT, maimonides 
defines mitsvah as being a perush, or explanation of the written law. 
He says: 
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All the precepts which moses received on sinai were given together 
with their interpretation, as it is said, And I will give unto thee the tables 
of stone, and the law, and the commandment [Exod. 24:12]. The law [ha-
torah] refers to the written law; and the commandment [ha-mitsvah] to its 
interpretation.
maimonides refers to this explanation in Hilkhot Shehitah (1:4) when 
discussing the laws of ritual slaughter. The numerous and complex 
details that regulate ritual slaughter are not stated explicitly in 
scripture. Instead, scripture states, “as then shalt thou kill of thy herd 
and thy flock as I have commanded thee [ka-asher tsivitikha]” (deut. 
12:21), which maimonides understands as an allusion to the oral 
law’s interpretations (as per BT Hullin 28a). He interprets the phrase 
“as I have commanded thee” to mean “that moses was commanded 
concerning all these matters orally, as in the case of the rest of the oral 
law, which is referred to as a commandment.” In this verse, scripture 
seemingly alludes to an earlier instance in which the slaughtering 
rituals had been explicated to moses. since such explications cannot be 
found in scripture, maimonides, following the Talmud, assumes that 
these explications were given orally. As a result, he concludes that the 
root “command” (ts�v�h) and thus the word “commandment” (mitsvah) 
refer to the oral explications of the written law. 
since the term mitsvah is also used in the Halakhot in connection 
with rabbinic laws, I posit that maimonides’ definition of mitsvah was 
included here to make a theological point: the written law — which of 
course includes the 613 commandments — must be parsed in light of 
the oral tradition. While this passage illuminates maimonides’ theology, 
we still need to understand how maimonides used the term mitsvah in 
a purely juristic context.
In the Halakhot, the term mitsvah is highly nuanced, its 
meaning generally referring to shades of “recommended” or 
“commendable” — certainly lacking the force of obligation. I note 
in chapter 2 that in talmudic literature, mitsvah could loosely mean 
“preferred,” “commendable,” “praiseworthy,” or simply “a good 
deed.” These usages were not systematized; a reader would generally 
recognize the particular meaning by its context. Nevertheless, in 
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rabbinic literature, hovah and mitsvah were clearly differentiated, hovah 
representing an absolute obligation and mitsvah a desideratum. It is 
interesting to note that Islamic legal theory after shāfi’ī (d. 820), itself 
likely under the influence of rabbinic law, recognized five values or 
categories with which all legal acts must be designated. These were: 
the obligatory (wajib), the recommended (mandub), the permissible 
(mubah), the prohibited (haram), and the reprehensible or repugnant 
(makrub). They correspond to the rabbinic designations hovah, mitsvah, 
reshut, asur, and meguneh. maimonides appears to be under the influence 
of this system of classification in some areas of law, as one understands 
from his comments to M Avot 1:16. on that occasion, maimonides 
uses five terms — ha-metsuveh bo, u-muzhar ’alav, u-meruhaq, ve-ratsui, 
u-reshut — with the third and fourth terms clearly representing softer 
forms of prohibitions and obligations.1 
A better way to understand the lone term mitsvah is to contrast 
it with the familiar term mitsvat ‘aseh� Whereas a mitsvat ‘aseh is a 
commandment that one must strive to fulfill, a mitsvah carries less 
weight: one ought to fulfill a mitsvah but one is not obligated to do 
so. Another way of viewing this contrast is to think of the former 
as representing an obligation and the latter as merely a suggestion. 
Alternatively, while a mitsvat ‘aseh represents an absolute obligation, a 
mitsvah represents a non-absolute obligation. Note that a divre sofrim 
law can also be categorized as a mitsvat ‘aseh, a rabbinic commandment 
that one must strive to fulfill. There are some rabbinic commandments 
that maimonides describes as mitsvot ‘aseh mi-divre sofrim, as, for 
example, the reading of the megillah (Hilkhot Megillah ve-Hanukah 1:1).2
1 . Note that these terms are translations from the Arabic; while they do not quite match 
the rabbinic designations given earlier, they are synonymous with the rabbinic ones. 
I have used Kafih’s translation of M Avot 1:16. Kafih slightly changes the rendition 
of these terms when he translates maimonides’ commentary to M Sanhedrin 7:4. 
There, maimonides uses only four legal categories, this time with respect to sexual 
behavior: asur, meguneh, ratsui/ahuv,and mutar, the exact equivalents of the last four 
terms given in M Avot. on rabbinic influence, see Romney-Wegner, “Islamic and 
Talmudic Jurisprudence.” on the halakhic categories, see deVreis, “Ha-Categoriyot 
ha-Hilkhatiyot.” 
2 . similarly, mitsvat ‘aseh shel divrehem, as in Hilkhot Avel, in connection with the duties 
of gemilut hasadim� In Hilkhot Megillah ve-Hanukah 3:3, in connection with the lighting 
M Sv  s  l
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In many locations, maimonides uses the term mitsvah to indicate a 
preference or recommendation rather than an obligation. Hilkhot Sefer 
Torah 10:10 uses the term mitsvah to describe the advisability of singling 
out a place to keep a scroll of law; Hilkhot Milah 1:8, to describe the 
advisability of performing circumcision early in the day, following the 
rabbinic principle that the zealous fulfill their religious obligations at the 
earliest possible time; Hilkhot Ishut 3:19, to characterize the advisability of 
betrothing a woman in person (instead of through an agent), also in line 
with a rabbinic principle that personal effort is to be commended. None of 
these advisories have the force of a scriptural command: failure to perform 
as recommended does not abrogate any positive commandment. one could 
find many more examples that fall largely or totally into this category: 
a non-scriptural obligation that one need not strive to fulfill and that 
consequently carries a connotation of desirability and praiseworthiness.
A closely-related usage of the term mitsvah is as a worthy deed, such 
as attending a rabbinic sermon, teaching a profession to a son (Hilkhot 
Shabbat 24:5), or welcoming a teacher or friend who has just come from 
a journey (Hilkhot ‘Eruvin 6:6). Another example can be found in Hilkhot 
Melakhim 2:5, where maimonides stipulates that while the High priest 
neither needs to come to the king nor rise for him, it is a mitsvah for the 
High priest to show respect to the king when the king comes to him, to 
stand when he enters and to help him sit. Mitsvah here is understood 
as something desirable although clearly beyond the strictly legal 
requirement. Note that in none of these examples does maimonides use 
a scriptural proof text, clearly indicating that these recommendations are 
rabbinic in nature. They are generally grounded on some rabbinic principle 
or may have as their object the attainment of a particular desirable goal. 
on certain occasions, however, we do note that the term mitsvah is linked 
with a scriptural proof text. I posit that on those occasions, maimonides 
wishes to signal the presence of a scriptural recommendation rather than 
a commandment. In those cases, the use of the solo term mitsvah, when 
of the Hanukah candles, he is just slightly less than precise and uses the expression 
mitsvah mi-divre sofrim, leaving out the second half of the compound term. Nevertheless, 
we note that maimonides also adds to the Hanukah formulation the words “like the 
reading of the megillah,” leaving no doubt with regard to its obligatory nature.
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accompanied by a scriptural proof text, is a clue to read those particular 
Torah passages much as one might read the book of proverbs: as wise and 
useful instructions rather than as commandments, suggestions rather 
than as obligations. I further posit that behind this determination lies 
some particular hermeneutic difficulty that precludes the interpreter from 
characterizing the scriptural passage as a commandment. The scriptural 
verse may lack the formal characteristics typical of commandments: it 
may not be specific enough, it may not convey the desired message in an 
explicit manner, it may need to be read out of context to yield the desired 
message, and so on. 
The contrasting usage of mitsvat ‘aseh and mitsvah can be quite 
informative, as for example in Hilkhot Hamets u-Matsah 7:1-2. In 7:1, 
maimonides writes that it is an absolute obligation (mitsvat ‘aseh) to 
“recount on the night preceding the fifteenth day of Nissan the great 
miracles and wonders that were performed for our forefathers in Egypt.” 
The proof text is “Remember this day in which ye came out of Egypt, out 
of the house of bondage,” (Exod. 13:3) to which maimonides adds: “even 
though he has no son.” In 7:2, he writes: “it is a mitsvah to inform his 
children, even though they did not ask, as it says And thou shalt tell thy son 
in that day [Exod. 13:8].” While one can fulfill the scriptural obligation by 
telling one’s son about the events of the exodus, it is clear that it is not 
a requirement to tell one’s child in particular. The proof text supports 
the absolute and unconditional obligation to recount those miraculous 
events, regardless of whether one has a son. once one has fulfilled the 
basic obligation to recount the events, one has no deeper responsibility 
to teach about the events of the fifteenth of Nissan — even to one’s own 
son. There is a secondary mitsvah, however, which we might understand 
as a recommendation rather than as an absolute obligation. As per 7:2, 
the father performs a mitsvah (not a mitsvat ‘aseh), a commendable deed, 
when he instructs his son. As maimonides sees it, this is what scripture 
means by “and thou shalt tell thy son in that day”: it recommends that a 
father should engage his son to explain to him, on the son’s own terms, 
the miraculous events of the night of passover.3
3 . I cannot determine whether, on maimonides’ account, this mitsvah, this scriptural 
recommendation, is categorized as a rabbinic obligation, or whether it stays in a 
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For the sake of completeness, I add that on occasion, mitsvah refers 
to a positive commandment, but only after the commandment has 
already been identified as a mitsvat ‘aseh, as in Hilkhot De‘ot 6:24 and 
Hilkhot Hamets u-Matsah 6:1.5 And finally, as we have seen a number 
of times, the term mitsvah in the construct form, as in mitsvat terumat 
ma’aser (Hilkhot Terumot 3:12), simply represents a correct or proper 
form of performing a duty, presumably in accordance with the dictates 
of oral law. In sum, I contend that for maimonides, the solo term 
mitsvah, when accompanied by a scriptural proof text, points to a 
recommendation, or perhaps even to a goal. Just as the rabbis, in their 
own legal system, drew a clear differentiation between mitsvah and 
hovah, one describing a recommendation and the other an obligation, 
so too, I argue, and in the same manner, the Halakhot draw a clear 
differentiation between mitsvah and mitsvat ‘aseh.
Even if we understand a mitsvat ‘aseh as an absolute obligation and 
mitsvah as a non-absolute obligation, we still need to fully understand 
the legal consequences of this differentiation. I submit that there is 
one important difference: absolute scriptural obligations are legally 
enforceable, while non-absolute scriptural obligations (or, for that 
matter, absolute rabbinic obligations) are not. We find in the Talmud 
the principle that the courts can whip a person to force him to fulfill 
a mitsvat ‘aseh.6 maimonides finds this principle important enough 
separate category of scriptural recommendations that maimonides crafted into a law. 
I lean towards the latter interpretation. This is the same question at play in p3, p4, 
and p8, as I discuss later in this chapter. It is in fact possible that maimonides viewed 
himself as an independent exegete-jurist with the authority to mine scriptural passages 
for commandments, a task that was normally assumed by the Talmudic rabbis. In fact, 
hundreds of rabbinic laws are based on such scriptural indications, as I showed earlier. 
4 . In Hilkhot De’ot 6:3, maimonides appears to commit an error, calling the duty to love 
one’s neighbor a mitsvah instead of a mitsvat ‘aseh. Note, however, that he corrects 
himself in 6:4, when discussing the commandment to love the stranger, and says that 
one who loves the stranger fulfills two mitsvot ‘aseh, to love one’s neighbor and to love 
a stranger.
5 . In Hilkhot Berakhot 11:2, the context makes the commandment’s identity obvious. 
But see my comments in chapter 6 regarding the impropriety of examining these 
particular halakhot for the purposes of drawing terminologically valid conclusions.
6 . “But in the case of positive commandments, as for instance, if a man is told ‘make a 
sukkah’ and he does not make it [or, ‘perform the commandment of] lulav, and he does 
not perform it, he is whipped until his soul leaves him” (BT Ketubbot 86b and BT Hullin 
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to mention it in the ShM, which he does towards the end of Rule 
14, after noting that he will mention the pertinent punishment for 
violating each commandment along with its explanation. With only a 
few exceptions, these punishments are associated with violations of 
negative commandments: 
but, as regards all positive commandments, if the time of the performance 
is still applicable, we are to whip with a strap he who refuses to do it 
until he dies or performs [the commandment], or until such time 
as the obligation [mitsvah] passes, for he who violates the positive 
commandment of dwelling in a tabernacle is not to be whipped for his 
sin after [the passing of the festival of] Tabernacles. Know this principle. 
While the principle has a number of qualifications — for example, it is 
not applicable where the Torah provides for an explicit reward7 — its 
import is clear: the law means to enforce positive commandments, 
absolute obligations. Nothing of this sort is said or implied with respect 
to non-absolute mitsvot, and I would suggest that therein lies the legal 
difference between the two types of commandments.8 
132b). In the post-talmudic literature, the principle is referred to as kofin al ha-mitsvah, 
literally, “they coerce one to perform a mitsvah.”
7 . see BT Hullin 110b. see also Hilkhot Matnot ‘Aniyim 7:10 and the extensive bibliography 
cited by Sefer ha-Mafteah, ad loc. Note that in this passage, maimonides betrays the 
variegated typologies with which he characterized positive commandments in the ShM. 
The reason is simple: the courts cannot force one to perform any of the procedure-
commandments, such as “to decide in cases of annulment of vows according to the 
rules set forth by the Torah” (p95), or, more problematically, any of the descriptive 
positive commandments, such as “that anyone who touches the carcass of a beast that 
died of itself shall be unclean” (p96). It is clear that the sages only intended the class 
of positive commandments that are absolutely obligatory, such as the ones they gave 
as examples. Note also that maimonides changed the example given in the Talmud: 
instead of the positive commandment to build a sukkah, which he did not enumerate 
in the ShM, maimonides offered the positive commandment of dwelling in a sukkah. 
The latter commandment (p168) is one of the 60 unconditional obligations. Also see 
the discussion of the commandment to dwell in a sukkah in chapter 8. 
8 . There is a punishment for violating rabbinic prohibitions (makkat mardut), but I am 
not aware of courts enforcing rabbinic precepts. Nevertheless, even if we group the 
mitsvot ‘aseh mi-divre sofrim like megillah and Hanukah into the category of enforceable 
obligations, non-absolute obligations — which also constitute the great majority of 
rabbinic law — remain unenforceable. Indeed, megillah and Hanukah are unusual 
commandments in that they were made absolutely obligatory.
M Sv  s  l
---------------------------------------------------------------------------  Chapter IX  --------------------------------------------------------------------------
— 278 —
one final point: in the previous chapter, I proposed that 
maimonides treats “correct practices” as mitsvot mi-divre sofrim. I am 
not quite as certain, however, about the legal category for commands 
described solely as mitsvot. I lean toward the view that maimonides 
maintains that these commands are genuinely mi-de-oraita, unlike 
“correct practices,” but that they differ from mitsvot ‘aseh with regard 
to the force of the command, as we extensively discussed. Implicit in 
this tentative distinction between “correct practices” and mitsvot is that 
the former can be annulled or reinterpreted by a qualified court,9 while 
the latter may not. However, mitsvot do not enjoy legal force and are 
not enforceable, while “correct practices” may be, as we saw earlier.
We now move to examine the handful of commandments that 
maimonides determined should be labeled mitsvot rather than mitsvot 
‘aseh� Earlier on we had summarily suggested a number of reasons 
for his determination. We now hope to discuss these reasons in some 
greater detail.
p3. To loVE God 
The scriptural source for this commandment in all of maimonides’ legal 
works is the verse “And thou shalt love the lord thy God” (deut. 6:5). 
Although the verse makes it clear that one is enjoined to love God, we 
are left wondering: what specifically must one do to perform this duty? 
Furthermore, how is love dependent on one’s conscious will? Finally, 
to quote one of the classical super-commentators on RasHI: “how can 
the command to love God apply to something a man has not seen or 
never recognized?”10 
one way to infuse meaning into the command is to assume that 
what is meant is not love in the literal sense but rather total and absolute 
devotion and loyalty. Thus the continuation of this verse, “with all thy 
heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy might,” indeed demands an 
action: the sacrifice of one’s life and possessions for God, what the rabbis 
9 . see Hilkhot Mamrim 2:1-2.
10 . Eliyahu mizrahi, super-commentary on RasHi, Parashat va-Et-hanan, ad loc., in otsar 
Pirushim al ha-Torah–Mizrahi� 
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call qiddush ha-Shem. such sacrifice would be necessitated if one were to 
be asked to transgress one of the most stringent commandments, such 
as the prohibition against worshipping other gods.11
maimonides, however, appears to insist on the more literal meaning 
of love, citing a fascinating rabbinic midrash that relates to above 
rhetorical questions. The Sifre, commenting on this verse, asks: “how 
does one love the omnipresent?”12 and answers: “scripture therefore 
says: And these words that I command thee this day, shall be upon thy heart 
[deut. 6:6]; for through this [i.e. the acceptance of God’s words] you will 
learn to discern He who spoke13 and the universe came into existence.”14 
The authors of the Sifre believe that one can indeed come to love God, 
specifically by studying and accepting God’s words, the words of Torah. 
The implication of this midrash is that the command to love God is not 
a new commandment, but simply another way of saying that one ought 
to contemplate and accept upon oneself the words of Torah, and that 
love will ensue from this contemplation. 
Though the Sifre does not explain how this love comes about, the 
presumption is that the authors of the midrash believe that the words 
of Torah, which exude wisdom and purpose, will move the faithful to 
admire and love the divine lawgiver.15 maimonides quotes this midrash 
in the ShM with an unusual and highly original twist: 
11 . perla speculates that sa‘adiah must have understood it thus. see perla, Sefer ha-Mitsvot 
le-RaSaG, vol. 1, 65. It is interesting to note that comparative Ancient Near Eastern 
studies have suggested that, rather than being used to denote an emotion, the term 
“love” was often used as a technical term of ancient vassal treaties in which the vassal 
is urged to “love” — to be absolutely loyal to — his overlord. The technical term would 
then convey the idea that the Israelites must be absolutely loyal to God by worshipping 
only Him. see moran, “The Ancient Near Eastern Background of the love of God in 
deuteronomy,” 77-87. 
12 . «Ketzad ohev et ha-Maqom»? Chavel’s translation, “how is one to manifest his love for 
the lord?” may not capture the sense of what is intended, i.e. what one needs to do to 
love the omnipresent.
13 . Amar, “said.” see M Avot 5:1, “By ten sayings was the world created.” There are ten 
instances of “and God said” in the creation story: Gen. 1:3, 6, 9, 11, 14, 20, 24, 26, 29, 
and 2:18.
14 . our version of the Sifre reads, “for through this you recognize the Holy one Blessed 
be He and become attached to His Ways.” But see note 22 below. 
15 . It is worth noting that RasHi’s ad loc. paraphrase of the midrash, “you will recognize 
the Holy one Blessed be He,” entirely misses this potential allusion.
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We are commanded to love God; that is to say, to dwell upon and 
contemplate His commandments, His decrees16 and His works, so that we 
may obtain a conception of Him, and in conceiving Him attain ultimate 
joy. This is the love that is commanded.17 
love of God will come about not only if “we dwell upon and contemplate” 
His commandments and His decrees,18 but also, and crucially, if we do 
so with regard to His works. maimonides’ interpretation may have 
been inspired by the words of the midrash, “He who spoke and the 
universe came into existence,” which draw one’s attention to the words 
spoken at the time of Creation. Those words represent the mechanics 
and the works of the created universe. maimonides notes that proper 
contemplation will enable us to attain an undefined “ultimate joy,” 
which he says is equivalent to the love that is commanded. A little 
further on in his gloss to the commandment, maimonides nuances the 
joy-love relation slightly differently and explains that one will attain 
“that stage of joy in which love of Him will follow of necessity” (emphasis 
added).19 To summarize the view of the ShM: knowledge of God’s laws 
and works leads to a conception of God that yields ultimate joy, which, 
in turn, inevitably leads to love. 
This reading of the midrash takes a further turn in the Halakhot. No 
longer do “these words” refer to commandments and decrees; now they 
refer exclusively to the study of the natural and divine sciences (physics 
and metaphysics). In Hilkhot Yesode ha-Torah 2:2, maimonides writes: 
16 . Maamarav, lit., “sayings.” These words are found in Ibn Ayub’s and in the Arabic 
manuscripts in Heller’s possession. MnT has “His commandments and His works 
(mitsvotav u-pe’ulotav).” see Heller, ad loc., n. 16. Chavel: “His injunctions,” based on 
Kafih’s tsivuyav.
17 . so MnT, and so too Bloch’s Arabic ms. on the other hand, Kafih has “This is the ultimate 
[Ar. ghaya; Heb. takhlit] love that is commanded.” Chavel incorrectly translates “This 
is the goal of the love that is commanded,” taking takhlit to mean “goal” instead of 
“ultimate” and distorting the meaning. I am indebted to Haggai ben-shammai for his 
kind help in showing me the various nuances of the Arabic term ghaya�
18 . Note that the Sefer ha-Hinukh, no. 411, which elaborates on the ShM, goes so far as 
to say that the Sifre’s words “with this act of contemplation” really stand for “upon 
reflecting on the Torah.”
19 . slightly but noticeably reformulated in the Halakhot, where the initial step, that of the 
attainment of ultimate joy, is omitted. see below.
-----------------------------------------------------   WHEN mITsVAH sTANds AloNE  -----------------------------------------------------
— 281 —
And what is the way that will lead to the love of Him and the fear of Him? 
When a person contemplates His great and wondrous works [ma’asav] 
and creatures [beru’av] and from them obtains a glimpse of His wisdom 
which is incomparable and infinite, he will straightaway love Him, praise 
Him, glorify Him, and long with an exceeding longing to know His great 
name…. In harmony with these sentiments, I shall explain some large, 
general aspects of the Works of the sovereign of the universe,20 that they 
may serve the intelligent individual as a door to the love of God, even as 
our sages have remarked in connection with the theme of love of God: 
“For through this [she-mitokh kakh] you will realize He who spoke and the 
universe came into existence.” 
Clearly, the intended objects of contemplation are not His 
commandments but rather His works — which include the heavenly 
spheres, stars, planets, and the sub-lunar elements — and His 
creatures — which include the intelligences that guide the spheres and 
the sub-lunar elements and inhabitants. maimonides describes these 
works and creatures in the balance of chapter 2 and in chapters 3 and 
4 of Hilkhot Yesode ha-Torah. The descriptions of creatures and works, 
respectively, constitute the highly esoteric “Account of the divine 
Chariot” (ma’aseh merkavah) — metaphysics — and the slightly less 
esoteric “Works of Creation” (ma’aseh bereshit) — physics and natural 
sciences.21 The last allusion leaves little doubt that maimonides was 
basing his remarks on the earlier-referenced Sifre.22
20 . The first four chapters of Hilkhot Yesode ha-Torah offer a brief survey of the science and 
metaphysics of the day, the “Works of the sovereign of the universe.”
21 . see Hilkhot Yesode ha-Torah 2:11 and 4:10-11.
22 . I note that maimonides cites what appears to be another rabbinic proof text in his 
Responsa (no. 150), where it is said in the name of Rabbi meir: “look at His works, 
because through this you will learn to discern He who spoke and the universe came 
into existence.” In note 2, Blau indicates that the source of this dictum, in particular 
the words “look at His works,” has not been located. The responsum seems to have 
been signed in the year 1177, very close to the time maimonides completed the MT 
(Iggerot, ed. shailat, vol. 1, 198) and probably 10 years or more after he completed 
the ShM, since the ShM was written before he commenced writing of the MT, as he 
himself acknowledges (see responsum to Tsur on the matter of the enumeration of 
the commandments, Iggerot, ed. shailat, vol. 1, 223). The significance of this is that 
maimonides may have found a version of the Sifre that did explicitly state the object 
of the contemplation. However, there also remains the possibility that maimonides 
was paraphrasing the midrash according to his interpretation. 
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While it is not absolutely clear that the midrash did not intend 
the phrase “these words” to imply contemplation of metaphysical and 
physical beings and works, it does seem quite clear that the midrash 
understood “these words” to refer to the Torah, as indicated by the proof 
text. By eliminating the words of Torah from the category of objects of 
contemplation, maimonides has radically altered the midrash.23 
We also see that in the Halakhot, maimonides introduces another 
significant change from what he had posited in the ShM, this time with 
reference to the nature of the love demanded. In the Halakhot, the 
ultimate objective of contemplation is passionate longing; the search 
for undefined ultimate joy is abandoned, with love now becoming 
both the first consequence of proper contemplation and the first step 
towards a powerful, mystical-intellectual experience of longing. A well-
known halakhah in Hilkhot Teshuvah 10:5 corroborates maimonides’ 
new emphasis on passionate love: 
What is the love of God that is befitting? It is to love the Eternal with a 
great and exceeding love, so strong that one’s soul shall be knit up with 
the love of God, and one should be continually enraptured by it, like 
a love-sick individual, whose mind is at no time free from his passion 
23 . Basing himself on a comment by R. Eliyahu mizrahi, Hananiah Kazis (in “Qinat sofrim,” 
ad loc.) offers to read the ShM’s definition sequentially. He suggests that the faithful 
are inspired to contemplate nature and God’s wondrous acts by the performance of the 
commandments. The reading is unconvincing, and this sequence is totally lacking from 
the Halakhot, which mentions only works and creatures. more recently, in an attempt 
to reconcile the ShM and the Halakhot, A. Feintuch (in Sefer ha-Mitsvot im Perush Pequde 
Yesharim, 126-128) has argued that in the Halakhot, the two types of contemplations 
are discussed in two separate sections. In Hilkhot Yesode ha-Torah 2:2, maimonides 
discusses the contemplation of His works, while in Hilkhot Talmud Torah, maimonides 
discusses the study of Torah, which includes pardes, the natural and divine sciences (also 
covered in the first four chapters of Hilkhot Yesode ha-Torah, as per 4:13) as he states 
in Hilkhot Talmud Torah 1:12. moreover, in Hilkhot Yesode ha-Torah 4:13, maimonides 
makes it clear that pardes must be preceded by the study of the commandments. Thus, 
argues Feintuch, the two aspects covered by the ShM are also covered by the Halakhot. 
In a second attempt to reconcile the ShM and the Halakhot, Feintuch argues that by the 
term “His commandments,” the ShM refers only to the first two commandments (His 
existence and His oneness), which are included in divine science, while the term “His 
works” refers to natural science. Thus, in Feintuch’s opinion, the ShM covers essentially 
the same topics as the Halakhot. I believe that these attempts do not capture the true 
philosophical spirit of maimonides’ appropriation of the midrash. 
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for a particular woman, the thought of her filling his heart at all times, 
when sitting down or rising up, when he is eating or drinking. Even more 
intense should be the love of God in the hearts of those who love Him.
We must not, however, believe that this love is beyond the reach of plain 
human beings. At the very end of Sefer ha-Madda’ (Hilkhot Teshuvah 
10:10), maimonides writes: 
A person ought therefore to devote himself to the understanding and 
comprehension of those sciences and studies which will inform him 
concerning his master, as far as it lies in human faculties to understand 
and comprehend — as indeed we have explained in Hilkhot Yesode ha-Torah 
[emphasis added]. 
The quality of the mitsvah stands in direct relation to the depth of 
intellectual effort. 
To sum up what we have seen so far: in the Halakhot, the command 
to love God is seen as too vague to be accorded the status of a 
commandment. In effect, one does not know how to love Him, one is 
not capable of manipulating one’s emotions to love Him, and one does 
not understand the object of this love sufficiently to be able to say that 
one has fallen in love. The midrash halakhah confirms this sentiment 
and offers maimonides a solution: the command to love God is not a 
direct command to love Him, but a call to learn about Him so that one 
may come to love Him. In fact, the command to love God may not be a 
commandment, but rather a consequence of doing what is demanded of 
every faithful believer: to study the commandments and to take them 
to heart. In many respects, the command to love God may be compared 
to the exhortations that maimonides cites in the discussion of Rule 4 
and which he disqualifies from making the grade of commandment, 
statements such as “ye shall keep my statutes” (lev. 19:19), “mine 
ordinances ye shall do” (lev. 18:4), “ye shall be holy” (lev. 19:2), and 
others. As he argues there, these statements represent general charges: 
they do not relate to any specific duty. 
maimonides accepts the basic tenor of the midrash that the verse 
to love God does not directly mandate love and thus cannot be a 
commandment. As we have seen, different commentators view the 
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verse as an exhortation to contemplation, each with his own idea of 
what type of contemplation can lead to love of God. The Sifre maintains 
that the commandments will lead to love, either through developing an 
admiration for their wise legislator or simply through obeying. In the 
Halakhot, by contrast, maimonides states that man will come to love God 
through acquiring a deepening knowledge of Him. This can only come 
via the study of physics and metaphysics. To love God cannot qualify as 
a mitsvat ‘aseh because the command to love entails no specific action. 
We do not know what specifically is being commanded. yet loving God 
does appear to be the pinnacle of all religious activity — clearly a worthy 
and desirable goal. 
We are finally in a position to understand maimonides’ puzzling 
presentation of this commandment in the Halakhot: 
This God, honored and revered, it is a mitsvah to love Him and to fear 
Him, as it says, And thou shalt love the Lord thy God [deut. 6:5] and it says 
Thou shalt fear the Lord, thy God [deut. 10:20].
The obvious problem is that there is no mention of these two commands 
being positive commandments.24 The answer is that to love God (and to 
fear Him, as I will discuss next), are not positive commandments in the 
formal sense of absolute obligations, but simply suggested goals. These 
commandments cannot be mandated, given their esoteric nature and 
the particular degree of preparation required to fulfilling them. To love 
God is first and foremost a call to study the sciences. Consequently, 
24 . As discussed in chapter 6, few scholars throughout history have noticed the general 
problem of maimonides’ failure to designate. one exception was Tsvi Elimelekh shapira 
(in Sifre me-HaRTSa mi-Dinov, vol. 2, 52), who noticed that maimonides calls the love of 
God (and the fear of Him) a mitsvah, rather than a mitsvat ‘aseh, which he uses for the 
commandments to recognize God’s existence (Hilkhot Yesode ha-Torah, 1:6) and His unity 
(1:7). unfortunately, shapira’s failure to systematically investigate maimonides’ use of 
the term mitsvat ‘aseh led him to the wrong conclusion. His answer attempts to justify 
the use of the term mitsvat ‘aseh with respect to these last two commandments, rather 
than the use of the term mitsvah for the former. His explanation, that maimonides 
was prompted to write mitsvat ‘aseh for the commandments to recognize His existence 
and unity because scripture does not formulate them in the imperative (unlike And 
thou shalt love the Lord thy God), misses the scores of commandments that maimonides 
designates as mitsvot ‘aseh even though they are formulated in the imperative.
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maimonides understood that scripture cannot impose this obligation 
on everyone. In no way then does the statement “it is a mitsvah to 
love Him and to fear Him” represent a failure to designate. Rather, it 
should be seen as a delicate attempt to guide, instruct and motivate 
the faithful to achieve these ambitious and noble goals. No command 
is thereby implied. 
* * *
It is worth noting that the Halakhot entirely omit an aspect of this 
commandment to which the ShM gives considerable space and thought. 
After explaining that intellectual contemplation brings joy, which in 
turn brings love of God, the ShM continues: 
The sages say that this commandment also includes an obligation to call 
upon all mankind to serve Him, and to have faith in Him. For just as you 
praise and extol anybody whom you love, and call upon others also to 
love him, so, if you love the lord to the extent of the conception of His 
true nature to which you have attained, you will undoubtedly call upon 
the foolish and ignorant to seek knowledge of the Truth which you have 
already acquired.
maimonides bases this understanding on the Sifre: “And thou shalt love 
the Lord thy God: this means that you should make Him beloved of man 
as Abraham your father did, as it is said, And the souls they had gotten in 
Haran [Gen. 12:5].”25 
In this passage, maimonides does not discuss how one attains this 
feeling of love, but rather discusses the outcome of this love. To “call 
upon mankind to serve Him and to have faith in Him” is the natural 
result of loving God, in much the same way as one would “extol and 
praise” anybody whom one loves. This desire to exhort others to 
follow Him is thus included in the obligation to love God. Why then 
does maimonides omit this complementary aspect from the Halakhot? 
The type of exhortation proposed might itself suggest a solution. 
maimonides explains that the one who has attained this degree of 
25 . Sifre Deuteronomy 32 (54).
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love must not only exhort mankind, more specifically, the “foolish and 
ignorant,” to serve Him and to have faith in Him, but he must also 
exhort them to seek His love. on maimonides’ account, this implies 
that the foolish and ignorant must be directed to study the sciences. It 
occurs to me that this is a seriously impractical undertaking. 
I suggest, therefore, that the practical difficulties, even the futility, 
that would be faced by the one who attempted to arouse the foolish and 
the ignorant to study the sciences and attain contemplative bliss is what 
caused maimonides to omit the requirement to “call upon all mankind” 
from the Halakhot. This impracticality would not have deterred the 
maimonides of the ShM from mentioning this aspect, however, since the 
ShM is a rhetorical composition, which uses every opportunity to offer 
noble didactic messages and bold political views, and not a practical work.26 
p4. To FEAR God
The verse “Thou shalt fear the lord thy God” (deut. 6:13) also appears 
to be a non-specific injunction, a simple exhortation to perform all His 
commandments. As maimonides stated in Rule 4, the words “ye shall 
be holy” (lev. 19:2) and other similar expressions cannot constitute a 
separate commandment “since there is nothing specific in them outside 
of what we know already.” As Ibn Ezra comments on this verse: 
And I found one verse that embodies all the commandments, namely, 
Thou shalt fear the Lord thy God, and Him thou shalt serve [deut� 6:13]. 
Now, Thou shalt fear includes all negative commandments, carried out 
with the heart, lips and deeds. It is the first step that one takes in the 
ascent to the service of the Glorious God.27 
26 . Howard Kreisel (in Maimonides’ Political Thought, 230) has argued that the absence 
of this public aspect from the Halakhot stems from “pedagogical concerns. There 
he attempts to underscore the notion that love itself follows from intellectual 
apprehension. No additional idea that may blur this point is included in his formulation 
of the commandment.” I do not disagree with this last point, but I do disagree with 
his larger point that maimonides omitted it in the Halakhot because of pedagogical 
concerns. While a code of law always risks blurring the main point, it still cannot shy 
away from providing even potentially blurring minute details. 
27 . Ibn Ezra, Yesod Mora, sha’ar 7, 144. 
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Notwithstanding the seeming generality of this command, maimonides 
finds a rabbinic indication to provide specific content to the verse. using 
this indication, he substantiates a commandment claim ostensibly 
grounded on this verse.28 The proof that is offered in the ShM is more 
important for what it does not establish than for what it does.
maimonides bases his discussion on an analysis of a talmudic 
passage. proceeding in dialectic fashion, BT Sanhedrin 56a hypothesizes 
that the verse “he that blasphemeth the name of the lord, he shall surely 
be put to death” (lev. 24:16) does not refer to a blasphemer, but simply 
to a person who pronounces the name of the lord (noqev may also 
mean pronounce), and for such a crime, he is to be executed. Because 
of the well-known talmudic maxim that one does not punish unless 
one first admonishes, the sages seek to find an explicit admonition for 
this crime. The talmudic redactor of the passage first suggests and then 
rejects a number of potential scriptural proof texts. His final suggestion 
is the verse “Thou shalt fear the lord thy God,” arguing that he who 
pronounces the name of the lord has abandoned the fear of the lord, an 
offense that merits death. In rejecting the proof text, the Talmud states: 
The admonition that you cite is in the form of a positive admonition 
[azharat ‘aseh] and it is a principle that positive admonitions are not valid 
admonitions. 
The redactor’s argument for rejecting this possibility provides 
maimonides with his proof. He explains: 
That is to say, your suggestion that a prohibition against the mere 
pronouncing of the name of God can be derived from the verse Thou 
shalt fear the Lord thy God is inadmissible because the verse is a positive 
commandment, and a prohibition cannot be based upon a positive 
commandment.
28 . maimonides is reticent about drawing halakhic inferences from the “give and take” 
dialectics of the Talmud. see, for example, Responsa (ed. Blau) no. 345, where he 
repeats three times that, in adjudicating law, he would not abandon the apodictic 
statements of the Talmud and decide on the basis of inferences drawn from dialectics. 
It is surprising that he is willing to do so here.
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maimonides leads us to believe here that the Talmud considers the 
verse “Thou shalt fear the lord thy God” to be a positive commandment. 
I note, in contrast, that the Talmud does not state that the verse 
represents a mitsvat ‘aseh; it merely states that the prohibition is derived 
from an ‘aseh, a positive statement. since rabbinic convention is that 
admonitions follow the form “do not do X” or “you shall not do X,” the 
Talmud argues that this positively-phrased statement cannot be used 
as an admonition. However, maimonides’ claim that “Thou shalt fear 
the lord thy God” is a positive commandment seems unwarranted.29 
Equally problematic is how maimonides uses this talmudic 
passage. In the passage, the Talmud is interested in finding an explicit 
prohibition against blasphemy. It posits that the positively-worded 
verse that admonishes one not to take God’s name in vain can be used 
as such a proof text. maimonides wants to use this verse to prove 
the commandment to fear God — to fear His prompt and fulminating 
punishment. However, the Talmud rejects this understanding when it 
considers the word yirah to mean reverence; one avoids taking God’s 
name in vain because doing so is irreverent, not because one fears 
punishment. The Talmud looks for ways that one could actively express 
29 . Azharat ‘aseh is an extremely rare expression in talmudic literature. A search of the 
Bar-Ilan database reveals that this expression appears only twice throughout the 
Talmud, BT Sanhedrin 56a and BT Temurah 4a. In both instances, the expression is 
used for the same purpose, that of refuting the validity of the verse “Thou shalt fear 
the lord thy God” from serving as an admonition, since it is an azharat ‘aseh. Note, 
however, that the term azharat ‘aseh signifies the same thing as lav ha-ba mikhlal ‘aseh, 
an admonition inferred from a positive statement (discussed in ch. 2). perla (Sefer 
ha-Mitsvot, vol. 1, 700) points out that this hermeneutic can yield either a positive 
commandment or a negative commandment — but not both. If our verse were to yield 
a positive commandment to fear God, as maimonides claims, then one should not be 
able to derive from the verse an additional prohibition against not fearing God (which 
one might transgress by pronouncing His name in vain, for example). The most that 
one could say is that by pronouncing His name in vain, one fails to uphold the positive 
commandment. Furthermore, lav ha-ba mikhlal ‘aseh is used throughout the Talmud 
as a hermeneutic formula to derive a prohibition: it thus should not be adduced to 
establish a positive commandment. I presume that this was the reason maimonides 
abandoned this hermeneutic formula for supporting positive commandment claims. 
see chapter 2, note 11. For those who tried to justify maimonides’ use of the lav ha-ba 
mikhlal ‘aseh formula in his hermeneutics, see Kazis, “Qinat sofrim,” comments to p38, 
231, and Bacher, Divre Emet, sixth quntrus�
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this reverence, determining that one way to do so is to use God’s name 
sparingly and effectively.
This is how maimonides describes the commandment to fear God in 
the ShM: “We are commanded to believe30 in the fear and awe of God, 
and not to be at ease and self-confident but to anticipate His punishment 
at all times.” Though the sentence is awkward (how does one believe 
in fear?), the meaning is clear. one must believe in the inevitability of 
divine punishment as retribution for transgressing His commandments: 
the fear of God follows from this belief.31 I note that elsewhere in the 
Halakhot, maimonides criticizes those who perform mitsvot because of 
fear of retribution. As he writes in Hilkhot Teshuvah 10:1: 
let not a man say: “I … will abstain from transgressions against which 
the Torah warns, so that I may be saved from the curses written in the 
Torah, or that I may not be cut off from life in the world to come.” It is 
not right to serve God after this fashion for whoever does so, serves Him 
out of fear. This is not the standard set by the prophets and sages. only 
those who are illiterate, women or children whom one trains to serve out 
of fear, serve God in this way, till their knowledge shall have increased 
when they will serve out of love. 
If maimonides still held that fear of punishment was a positive 
commandment when he wrote the Halakhot, it is strange that he would 
relegate the practice of the commandment only to those “who are 
illiterate, women, or children.” 
A close reading of the discussion of this commandment in the 
Halakhot supports our suspicions that maimonides had either 
changed his mind or, at the very least, added a new dimension to this 
exhortation� As I quoted above, Hilkhot Yesode ha-Torah 2:1 opens: 
30 . Arab., itikad. Kafih translates “to establish in our mind.” see chapter 5, note 112.
31 . one may be inclined to contrast this commandment with maimonides’ comment 
in the Guide (III:28:512) that God’s anger is only a necessary belief “for the sake of 
political welfare” with the corollary that believing in God acting to punish misdeeds 
is also part of this necessary belief. In an oral exchange, marc shapiro quite correctly 
pointed out that one would be overreaching in drawing this conclusion. maimonides 
was not here discussing the issue of punishment but rather the issue of God’s anger. 
God does not get angry because of His unchanging essence; punishment may indeed 
follow, although not out of anger. 
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“This God, honored and revered, it is a mitsvah to love Him and to fear 
Him, as it says And thou shalt love the Lord thy God [deut. 6:5] and it 
says Thou shalt fear the Lord, thy God [deut. 10:20].” Calling it a mitsvah 
rather than a mitsvat ‘aseh, maimonides uses the shortened language 
to indicate that the fear of God is not an obligation but rather a worthy 
goal. He explains the way to achieve this goal: 
And what is the way that will lead to the love of Him and the fear of 
Him? When a person contemplates His great and wondrous works and 
creatures and from them obtains a glimpse of His wisdom which is 
incomparable and infinite, he will straightaway love Him, praise Him, 
glorify Him, and long with an exceeding longing to know His great 
Name…. And when he ponders these matters, he will recoil affrighted, and 
realize that he is a small creature, lowly and obscure, endowed with slight 
and slender intelligence, standing in the presence of Him who is perfect 
in knowledge. (Hilkhot Yesode ha-Torah 2:1-2; emphasis added) 
The term “fear” here does not refer to fear of punishment, as we saw in the 
ShM, but rather to the fear that comes from feeling small and insignificant 
in the presence of an awesome Being. Rather than being part of the legal 
material, the verse lends itself to a philosophic interpretation. 
some commentators32 have noticed this change and suggested that 
maimonides is redefining the commandment as yirat ha-romemut, fear 
of His exalted presence or fear of His majesty, idiomatically referred to 
32 . This is a relatively popular view. see, among others, Krakovsky, ‘Avodat ha-Melekh, on 
Hilkhot Yesode ha-Torah 2:2; Babad, Minhat Hinnukh, on mitsvah 432; and Kazis, “Qinat 
sofrim,” on p4. Insisting that maimonides maintained his views from the ShM (that fear 
of God was equivalent to fear of punishment), see Kafih, MT, Hilkhot Yesode ha-Torah, 
chapter 2, note 2, and Hilkhot Teshuvah, chapter 10, note 5. These comments reverse 
his earlier view that in the Halakhot, maimonides believes that fear is the equivalent of 
yirat ha-romemut (see Kafih’s notes to the ShM, 60n25). Eliyahu Nagar (in “Fear of God 
in maimonides’ Teaching”) sees two definitions of fear in the ShM: the popular one, the 
simple fear of punishment, and the philosophic one, where the enlightened individual 
fears the loss of divine providence and his consequent exposure to the vagaries of chance 
through the “estrangement” of sin. I fail to see, however, how one can read this into the 
ShM. Nagar cannot find yirat ha-romemut in the ShM (which I believe is correct), but then 
derives from this absence that maimonides never meant to describe this type of fear/
reverence, even in the MT. This derivation is methodologically flawed; the MT reversed 
and changed the nature of the claims and definitions of the ShM on scores of occasions.
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as “awe,” as distinguished from yirat ha-onesh, the fear of punishment. 
unlike love, which leads to an intense desire to acquire wisdom in divine 
matters, this cosmic fear or “awe” does not appear to lead to any greater 
goal; yet maimonides seems to allude to some sort of connection by 
juxtaposing these two exhortations.33 It is therefore reasonable to 
suppose that love and fear complement each other. perhaps it may 
be said that fear acts to restrain love, to place bounds on the infinite 
longing to know the ineffable. As Kreisel puts it:
the fear that maimonides describes in [Hilkhot Yesode ha-Torah] designates 
a type of humbleness of spirit that belongs to the intellect…. despite 
the fact that maimonides treats love and fear of God as two sides of the 
same coin, it is important to note the essential distinction between these 
commands. The former focuses directly on God. The latter command 
too focuses on God, but involves self-focus. love always seeks union. 
The ultimate desire of the lover is to unite with the beloved, to become 
one. love of God, if left unchecked, leads to the pursuit of unio mystica, 
which is an impossibility for maimonides. Fear serves to preserve the gap 
between the individual and the object of fear.34 
The goal of feeling worthless in the “presence of He who is perfect” 
is to force restraint on the headlong dive to achieve union with God, 
“to preserve,” as Kreisel so delicately puts it, “the gap between the 
individual and the object of fear.” 
support for this view can be found in GP I:5. maimonides ascribes 
to “the chief of the philosophers” (i.e. Aristotle)35 the idea that man 
33 . The anonymous commentary (perush) to the MT interprets maimonides’ remarks 
in light of the pedagogic remarks he makes in Hilkhot Teshuvah 10:1, cited above, 
arguing that “love can only come after fear.” yet by explicitly placing love ahead of 
fear in his formulation, maimonides clearly rejects this type of interpretation. The 
curious but meaningful syntax has already been noted by a number of aharonim. see 
Sefer ha-Mafteah on Yesode ha-Torah 2:2. Kreisel notes: “It is clear from maimonides’ 
approach in the Mishneh Torah that he posits different types of fear…For the most 
part he treats fear as antithetical to love. At best it serves as a means to attain love.” 
Kreisel, Maimonides’ Political Thought, 259. 
34 . Kreisel, Maimonides’ Political Thought, 265-266. He acknowledges dr. Alan Flashman 
for this “perceptive interpretation.”
35 . pines identifies the Aristotelian observation with a passage from De Caelo ii.12.291b24 
ff. see GP I:5:29, n.1.
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should not hasten to reach conclusions in “great and sublime” matters 
without first undergoing extensive training in the sciences (among 
other things). After he has achieved the requisite knowledge, he should 
be careful not to make 
categoric affirmations in favor of the first opinion that occurs to him 
and should not, from the outset, strain and impel his thoughts towards 
the apprehension of the deity; he rather should feel awe and refrain and 
hold back until he gradually elevates himself. It is in this sense that it is 
said, And Moses hid his face, for he was afraid to look upon God [Exod. 3:6] … 
moses was commended for this; and God, may He be exalted, let overflow 
upon him so much of His goodness that it became necessary to say of 
him: And the figure of the Lord shall he look upon [Num. 12:8]. The sages, 
may their memory be blessed, have stated that this is a reward for his 
having at first hidden his face so as not to look upon God. 
It is precisely this type of humility to which maimonides alludes when he says: 
And when he ponders these matters, he will recoil affrighted, and realize that 
he is a small creature, lowly and obscure, endowed with slight and slender 
intelligence, standing in the presence of Him who is perfect in knowledge. 
In the Halakhot, fear of God has been transformed from a commandment 
to be constantly aware of the inevitability of divine retribution for 
transgressions into a counsel on how to seek metaphysical knowledge. 
Fear must accompany the love of God, the great longing to know His 
name, lest one come to erroneous conclusions. 
To summarize: “Thou shalt fear the lord thy God” presents a 
hermeneutic difficulty. Being a non-specific verse, it cannot qualify as 
a positive commandment. As a result, in the Halakhot, maimonides 
designates it as simply a mitsvah, a suggested goal, one that can only 
be attained through immersing oneself in metaphysical contemplation. 
* * *
The theme that to love and to fear God simply constitute goals which 
can only be mandated indirectly returns in the GP:
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As for the opinions that the Torah teaches us — namely, the apprehension 
of His being and His unity, may He be exalted — these opinions teach us 
love, as we have explained several times … For these two ends, namely, 
love and fear, are achieved through two things: love through the opinions 
taught by the law, which includes the apprehension of His being as 
He, may He be exalted, is in truth; while fear is achieved by means of 
all actions prescribed by the law, as we have explained. understand this 
summary. (GP III:52:630) 
I note that while the goals of loving and fearing God are “achieved 
through” other actions, in the GP, fear is consequent upon obedience 
to the law and not upon the feelings of cosmic worthlessness that 
comes from observing the awesomeness of God and His creation. 
moreover, fear no longer acts as a restraint against a premature 
dive into the secrets of metaphysics, but as a restraint on the basest 
needs of humans, personal sexual conduct. “Know,” says maimonides, 
that “when perfect men understand this [that God’s presence is felt 
everywhere], they achieve such humility, such awe and fear of God, 
such reverence and such shame before Him…that their secret conduct 
with their wives and in latrines is like their public conduct with other 
people” GP (III:52:629). 
I also note that, with regard to love, maimonides returns to a 
more literal reading of the Sifre and reminds us that the idea that “the 
apprehension of His being as He, may He be exalted, is in truth,” exists 
in scripture. maimonides no longer needs to posit that the love of God 
that comes “when a person contemplates His great and wondrous works 
and creatures” (the core truths of science and metaphysics) is a truth 
that exists outside of what scripture prescribes, as he appears to have 
done in the Halakhot. In the GP, “the apprehension of His being as He 
is in truth” is seen as an opinion taught by divine scriptural law. In this 
evolved theology, by taking note and studying the Torah’s opinions, one 
can reach the desired goal of loving God. 
I must admit, however, that I am not entirely convinced that a 
change has indeed taken place in the GP� Chapter 52 of the GP may 
simply be describing the perfect man, the man who has diligently 
pursued metaphysical knowledge and moral refinement and thus 
has reached a new stage in his development. The opinions found 
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in scripture, apodictic statements on the quiddity and nature of 
the divine (“the apprehension of His being as He is in truth”), have 
already been subjected to demonstration and assimilated by the 
perfect man. such a perfect man will constantly feel the presence 
of God and fear transgressing His prohibitions. It may well be that, 
in the hands of maimonides, the non-legal, wisdom nature of these 
passages lend themselves to a variety of interpretations, each to a 
different audience. 
p8. To ImITATE HIs Good ANd upRIGHT WAys 
maimonides draws scriptural support for this claim from the words 
“And thou shalt walk in His ways” (deut. 28:9). yet this directive, like 
many similar ones, appears to lack specific content: what exactly can 
one do to walk in His ways other than obey His commandments? This 
question was asked of Abraham maimonides (maimuni) by a reader 
who was familiar with the Rules of the ShM. This reader called “and 
thou shalt walk in His ways” “a commandment that included the entire 
Torah,” and referred to the strictures of Rule 4. In his reply, maimuni 
insisted that tradition, manifested in the rabbinic warrant cited in the 
ShM, infused the verse with specific content.36 As we shall see, this 
assumption is not definitive.
36 . Abraham maimonides, “Teshuvot Rabbenu Abraham ben ha-RamBam,” 218. 
maimuni’s second answer is as interesting as it is original. He argued that the phrase 
that immediately precedes “and walk in His ways,” namely, “if thou shalt keep the 
commandments of the lord” (deut. 28:9), is indeed a general, non-specific command, 
one that encompasses all of the commandments. However, the subsequent phrase, 
“and walk in His ways,” focuses exclusively on the improvement of traits, and thus is 
quite specific. maimuni argued that the Torah felt it necessary to spell this out since “it 
would be possible to think that it [this command] is not obligatory like the [obligatory 
nature] of the commandments, because commandments are performative [maasiyot] 
and the going in His ways are things that depend on moral virtues, as explained by the 
tradition ‘just as the Holy one, blessed be He, is called merciful, etc.,’ even though the 
goal of these moral virtues is also actions.” maimuni was addressing an issue that still 
concerned Jewish theologians: does the Torah command virtues, correct notions, and 
correct character dispositions, as it commands physical actions? Recall that maimonides 
proves that the Torah does command the correct notions of the existence of God, as 
proved by an explicit rabbinic warrant. see our discussion in chapter 5.
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The ShM formulates the commandment as stating that we are “to be 
like God (praised be He) as far as it is in our power.” In his argument, 
maimonides notes that in addition to “And thou shalt walk in His ways” 
(deut. 28:9), the commandment is repeated in two other ways: “to walk 
in all His ways” (deut. 10:12 and 11:22) and “After the lord your God 
shall ye walk” (deut. 13:5). 
maimonides cites the following midrash on the verse “to walk in all 
His ways”: 
Just as the Holy one, blessed be He, is called merciful [rahum], so shouldst 
thou be merciful; just as He is called Gracious [hanun], so shouldst thou 
be gracious; just as He is called Righteous [tsadiq], so shouldst thou be 
righteous; just as He is called saintly [hasid] so shouldst thou be saintly.37 
He also alludes to a second aggadah (BT Sotah 14a), this one on the 
verse “After the lord your God shall ye walk,” which he summarizes:
we are to imitate the good deeds and honorable [MnT: hashuvot, 
“distinguished”] attributes [middot] by which the lord (exalted be He) 
is described in a figurative way — He being indeed immeasurably exalted 
above all such descriptions.
To better understand maimonides’ summation, I quote the entire 
aggadah in its original context:
R. Hama son of R. Hanina further said: What does this text mean: Ye 
shall walk after the Lord your God? Is it, then, possible for a human being 
to walk after the shekhinah; for has it not been said: for the Lord thy God 
is a devouring fire? But [the meaning is] to walk after the attributes of the 
Holy one, blessed be He. As He clothes the naked, for it is written: And 
the Lord God made for Adam and for his wife coats of skin, and clothed them 
[Gen. 3:21], so do thou also clothe the naked. The Holy one, blessed be 
He, visited the sick, for it is written: And the Lord appeared unto him by the 
37 . Sifre Deuteronomy 49 (114), with only minor variants. some printed editions lack 
the phrase “just as He is called Righteous, so shouldst thou be righteous.” see Sefer 
ha-Mitsvot, ed. Heller, ad loc., n. 18. When quoting this dictum in Hilkhot De‘ot 1:6, 
maimonides omits any reference to “righteous” and “saintly,” substituting “holy” 
(qadosh) in their place�
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oaks of Mamre [Gen. 18:1], so do thou also visit the sick. The Holy one, 
blessed be He, comforted mourners, for it is written: And it came to pass 
after the death of Abraham, that God blessed Isaac his son [Gen. 25:11], so 
do thou also comfort mourners. The Holy one, blessed be He, buried the 
dead, for it is written: And He buried him in the valley [deut. 34:6], so do 
thou also bury the dead.38 
Following a strictly literal reading, the aggadah attributes to God a number 
of acts of kindness and offers them as examples for man to imitate. 
In the ShM, maimonides maintains that to be like God is “to imitate the 
good deeds and honorable attributes by which the lord is described.” While 
the phrase “good deeds” clearly refers to the benevolent acts described in 
the Talmudic aggadah, “honorable attributes” has no specific referent and 
leaves the full meaning imprecise. I read “honorable attributes” as parallel 
to “good deeds,” both phrases referring to the generally accepted meanings 
of these terms. The simple understanding of this pair of phrases, “good 
deeds” and “honorable attributes,” is that the former refers to gemilut 
hasadim, the kinds of good deeds that were traditionally praised by the 
sages, and the latter to attributes generally considered honorable, such as 
compassion, mercy and righteousness: in sum, both represent different 
but overlapping aspects of moral excellence.39 The talmudic aggadah to 
which maimonides alluded makes this point well. 
38 . Qayyara’s entry pq32 reads “to go in His ways,” and it is immediately followed by “to clothe 
the naked, to bury the dead, to console the mourner, and to visit the sick.” It is not clear if 
Qayyara intended these special acts of benevolence to represent separate commandments, 
as maimonides understood, or if — as is more likely — these attributes explain the general 
command to “go in His ways,” just as the above midrash does. For a useful survey of the 
issues, see Hildesheimer, Haqdamat Sefer Halakhot Gedolot, nn. 329-330.
39 . An interesting and illuminating example can be found in Midrash Zutta (Shir ha-Shirim), 
ed. Buber, sec. 1, no. 15, where God’s kind deeds are actually ascribed to His honorable 
attributes of compassion (rahum) and mercy (hanun), showing that in the popular and 
rabbinic mind, these attributes had been understood in the same sense as (and indeed as the 
drivers of) good deeds. some scholars see these “honorable attributes” as referring to the 
doctrine of the middle way espoused by maimonides in the MT. For example, Würzburger 
correctly notes that, in the Halakhot, maimonides abandons the idea (proposed in the ShM) 
of imitating God’s deeds and “felt constrained to limit the scope of the commandment Thou 
shalt walk in His ways exclusively to the cultivation of virtues.” Würzburger understands 
the shm’s expression “honorable attributes” to be identical with the concept of the mean 
that lies between the extremes of all character dispositions. Würzburger, “Imitatio dei in 
maimonides’ sefer ha-mitsvot and the mishneh Torah.” But this is not self-evident. 
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An important change takes place in the Halakhot, a change that 
was already adumbrated in maimonides’ discussion of Rule 9. There 
he states that “the Torah commands us to conduct ourselves in certain 
qualities of character, such as the command to act with kindness, 
mercy, pity and love, this being contained in the verse And thou shalt 
love thy neighbor as thyself�” In this brief discussion, maimonides does 
not categorize acts of kindness under the heading of “and thou shalt 
walk in His ways.” This comment already foreshadows the manner in 
which maimonides treats these obligations in the Halakhot.40
In the Halakhot, practicing moral excellence through the benevolent 
deeds described in the talmudic aggadah is placed in the category of 
positive commandments ordained by the rabbis (mitsvat ‘aseh shel 
divrehem), and the discussion of these rabbinic commandments is 
moved to Hilkhot Avel (14:1).41 The standard that we are bidden to 
40 . This again raises questions with regard to the chronological sequence in which 
maimonides wrote the SE, ShM, and the Rules. see also chapter 5, notes 19 and 52.
41 . Three out of the four acts mentioned in the midrash above are discussed there: to visit 
the sick, to comfort the mourners, and to bury the dead. maimonides specifies that the 
fourth benevolent act, to clothe the naked, is part of the positive commandment of 
charity (Hilkhot ‘Aniyim 7:3) and is directly covered by the verse “[and thou shalt surely 
lend him] sufficient for his need [in that which he wanteth]” (deut. 15:8). He had 
already suggested in the ShM (Rule 1) that to clothe the naked falls under the purview 
of this verse and attacked Qayyara for listing the obligation to clothe the naked as a 
separate commandment when it is part of the broader obligation of charity. strangely, 
maimonides was not willing to view Qayyara’s claims “to clothe the naked, to bury the 
dead, to console the mourner, and to visit the sick” — which follow in Qayyara’s list 
immediately after “to go in His ways” — as simply details of this scriptural command, 
just as the aggadah had suggested. see note 38 above. maimonides’ criticism reveals 
a certain incongruity in his own work. To explicate the commandment “to go in His 
ways,” p8, maimonides refers to an aggadah that lists a number of good deeds. one 
of these good deeds is to clothe the naked. yet in Rule 1, in addition to castigating 
Qayyara for listing this deed as a separate entry, maimonides wonders what might 
have been Qayyara’s source for this claim. He writes: “it is [this point] which has eluded 
someone [i.e. Qayyara], and for that reason he counted the clothing of the naked 
[among the commandments] because he found in Isaiah: When thou seest the naked, 
thou shalt cover him (Isa. 58:7).” He appears to shows no awareness of the aggadah to 
which he himself refers in p8. We might posit that the Rules, or at least Rule 1, may 
have been written quite a bit earlier; it was only at a later date, when maimonides was 
writing the short glosses on each commandment, that he first became aware of this 
aggadah. An alternative explanation is that he may have known about the aggadah 
when he criticized Qayyara but temporarily forgot it in the heat of the polemic. A more 
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imitate is no longer moral excellence, but rather virtue, an Aristotelian 
concept explicated in the Nicomachean Ethics�42 
Virtue (Gr. arete), sometimes translated as excellence, is that trait 
that makes an object or person good at being what they are. so, for 
example, the virtue of a knife is what makes the knife durable and 
sharp; the “virtue of eyes,” says Aristotle, “makes the eyes and their 
functioning excellent, because it makes us see well.” Aristotle concludes 
that “the virtue of a human being will likewise be the state that makes a 
human being good and makes him perform his functions well.”43 When 
interesting possibility is that maimonides wrote the Rules after he wrote the glosses 
on each commandment — by which time he no longer thought that the aggadah 
represented a valid source for these obligations, since his understanding of imitatio 
dei had taken a dramatic turn away from the idea of imitating God’s good deeds. Thus, 
judging Qayyara generously, maimonides suggested that Qayyara relied on a prophetic 
passage rather than a homiletic aggadah. until we know more about the order of the 
writing of various sections and compositions of maimonides’ works, we cannot fully 
understand his train of thought. I want to thank my dear son-in-law, Avi Horowitz, 
not only for helping me clarify some of these issues but also for making some very 
insightful and helpful observations throughout the discussion of this commandment.
42 . some enumerators, like the author of the Sefer ha-Hinukh (No. 611), seem to have 
conflated the views of the ShM and the Halakhot. In the beginning of his discussion, 
the author of that work paraphrases the ShM as he normally does, appearing to 
emphasize the need to practice moral excellence (“one must lean towards the ways 
of kindness and compassion”). later on, however, in his practical discussion, he 
recommends that one should adopt the middle way and never move to either of the 
extremes, in line with the Halakhot. Hanna Kasher is also of the opinion that both 
views are similar, although she posits one difference between the definitions proposed 
in the ShM and those in the MT: the former, being a more popular work, provides 
actual examples of good deeds, while the latter, standing on a more sophisticated level, 
provides abstract principles. Note, however, that the ShM only alludes to a talmudic 
passage: it does not provide actual examples, which would be more fitting if it were 
trying to reach an unsophisticated audience. Also, the MT gives detailed examples of 
the types of moral dispositions (Kasher, “does ‘ought’ Imply ‘Can’ in maimonides?” 
27.) As I already stated, I maintain that in the ShM, maimonides discusses general 
concepts of moral excellence, rather than the doctrine of the mean. schwarzchild, too, 
argues that “maimonides, conspicuously … makes no reference at all to the doctrine of 
the mean in defining the commandment of imitation. on the contrary, he places heavy 
emphasis on the infinite, unattainable, radical character of imitatio dei.” Here he refers 
to the closing statement in maimonides’ discussion of p8 in the ShM, where the good 
deeds and honorable attributes are “described in a figurative way — He being indeed 
immeasurably exalted above all such descriptions.” schwarzchild, “moral Radicalism 
and ‘middlingness’ in the Ethics of maimonides,” 65-94.
43 . Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, II:6, 42-46.
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it comes to human character, Aristotle maintains that excess and 
deficiency are the characteristics of vice, while balance, maintaining the 
mean, is the characteristic of virtue. In essence, this is the doctrine of 
the middle way, a doctrine that took on near-canonical stature, making 
its way into the minds and writings of all the greatest Islamic medieval 
thinkers. maimonides was no exception.
After a thorough discussion of human traits and dispositions at the 
beginning of Hilkhot De‘ot, maimonides states, 
The right way [in moral dispositions] is the mean in each group of 
dispositions common to humanity; namely that disposition which is 
equally distant from the two extremes in its class, not being nearer to the 
one than to the other. Hence, our ancient sages [hakhamim ha-rishonim] 
exhorted us that a person should always evaluate his dispositions and 
so adjust them that they shall be as the mean between the extremes…
whoever observes in his disposition the mean is termed wise.44 
Following a long introduction, spanning five halakhot, maimonides 
finally cites the scriptural text that governs this commandment. He 
writes: “we are bidden to walk in the middle paths which are the right 
and proper ways, as it is said, and thou shalt walk in His ways (deut. 
28:9).” Here he introduces the Aristotelian concept of virtue as an 
axiom and equates it with God’s ways, making no effort to relate 
the verse specifically to this ethical claim. The notion that this is an 
established truth that needs no proof gains further strength from what 
maimonides writes in the next few lines: 
In explanation of this mitsvah, the sages taught, “even as God is called 
gracious, so be thou gracious; even as He is called merciful, so be thou 
merciful; even as He is called Holy, so be thou holy.” similarly [ve-al derekh 
zo], the prophets described the Almighty by all the various attributes 
[kinuyim] “long-suffering and abounding in kindness, righteous and 
upright, perfect, mighty and powerful,” and so forth to teach us that 
44 . Hilkhot De‘ot 1:4. Hyamson rendered hakhamim ha-rishonim as “our ancient sages” 
(emphasis added). The correct translation is “the ancient sages,” which raises the 
question as to whom maimonides was referring. one possibility may be Aristotle and 
the Islamic philosophers who followed him. But see note 47 below. 
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these qualities are good and right and that a human being should cultivate 
them, and to imitate45 [God], as far as he can. (Hilkhot De‘ot 1:6) 
As we already saw, these divine attributes of graciousness, mercifulness, 
and holiness likely refer to moral excellence. There is no indication in 
the rabbinic dictum that the sages intended to refer to the way of the 
mean.46 Nevertheless, maimonides posits that the sages bid one “to 
walk in the middle paths which are the right and proper ways.” As 
marvin Fox noted, maimonides treats this theory “as an established 
truth to which one need only refer but which does not require any 
evidence to support it.”47 
In sum, in the Halakhot, although maimonides uses the same Sifre 
that he cited in the ShM, he effectively voids the terms describing 
God’s attributes of their plain meaning, instead infusing them with 
45 . U-le-hidamot. Hyamson’s “thus imitate God” is interpretive.
46 . The closest we come to this idea of the mean is the verse and exposition quoted by 
maimonides in the introduction to M Avot, end of ch. 4: “If a man continually weighs 
his actions and aims at the mean, he is the highest of human ranks … The sages … 
referred to this goal, commenting on it, and said: Everyone who appraises his paths 
merits and sees the salvation of the Holy one, blessed be He� As it is said: ‘And to him 
who sets his way aright will I show the salvation of God�’ Do not read vesam derekh, but 
vesham derekh. (B moed Qatan 5a). Shuma means ‘assessing’ and ‘appraising,’ and this 
is precisely the meaning that we have explained in this entire chapter.” Ethical Writings 
of Maimonides, ed. Weiss and Butterworth, 74.
47 . Fox, “The doctrine of the mean in Aristotle and maimonides,” 112. He further notes 
that if one accepts the plausible view that maimonides is referring to the sages of 
Israel in this quotation, “then we have the remarkable situation of maimonides telling 
us that the principle that the middle way is good is known as an independent truth, 
and that because it is known to be true, the Jewish religious authorities accepted it as 
their rule of conduct and character development.” so, too, writes Herbert davidson in 
“The middle Way in maimonides’ Ethics,” 64. Raymond l. Weiss, on the other hand, 
posits that maimonides here proposes an imitatio dei based on moral excellence 
since “[t]he qualities of holiness and mercy certainly do not lie in the middle … Being 
gracious, like being abundant in loving-kindness, which is also among the ways of 
God that a Jew must imitate, supplements the essentially self-centered orientation 
of philosophic ethics.” Weiss reasons that since the exegesis does not follow from the 
verse, maimonides could not have intended to refer to the middle way. see further 
Hilkhot De‘ot 1:7, where maimonides insists that these attributes are equivalent with 
the middle path. Weiss is stating the obvious, but his reading runs counter to what 
maimonides unequivocally declares in halakhot 5-7. Weiss, Maimonides’ Ethics, 134.
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philosophic ethics48 that appear to have no counterpart in rabbinic 
writings. Concretely, the idea of imitating God expressed in the Halakhot 
does not require emulating His lofty attributes by cultivating good moral 
traits, but rather evaluating one’s traits and adjusting them so “that they 
shall be as the mean between the extremes.” maimonides has skillfully 
and naturally woven Aristotelian ethics into the rabbinic exposition. 
By the time he wrote his commentary to the mishnah, maimonides 
had already shown himself to be under the intellectual spell of 
Aristotelian ethics. since he lacked a fitting scriptural proof text to 
support an ethical rule of conduct based on virtue, in his introduction 
to M Avot, popularly called Shemonah Peraqim (SP), maimonides offers 
a rationale for the commandments wholly grounded on philosophic 
ethics. After stating that “The law did not lay down its prohibitions or 
enjoin its commandments except for just this purpose, namely that by 
its disciplinary effect we may persistently maintain the proper distance 
from either extreme,” he continues at length to demonstrate that wide 
sections of the laws of the Torah are designed with this goal in mind. In 
his words: “If you consider most of the commandments in this way, you 
will find that all of them discipline the powers of the soul.”49 According 
to the SP, the ethical absoluteness of the middle way is implicit in the 
divine commandments. Nevertheless, no single scriptural proof text 
commands one to follow the middle way. 
In the Halakhot (probably a later text than the commentary on the 
mishnah, even as the latter was continuously revised), maimonides 
connects the task of balancing one’s character traits to the command of 
imitating God. In Fox’s words, “while Aristotle construes moral virtue 
as a case of art imitating nature, maimonides teaches that the model 
of human virtue is the standard provided by the ideal of the imitation 
of God.”50
48 . Term coined by Raymond l. Weiss. see Weiss, “The Adaptation of philosophic Ethics 
to a Religious Community.” 
49 . Ethical Writings of Maimonides, ed. Weiss and Butterworth, 71-72.
50 . Fox, “The doctrine of the mean,” 115. menachem mendel schneerson, the rebbe from 
lubavitch, expounds on this point. He suggests that just as God acts dispassionately, 
so too must man act dispassionately to imitate God. Citing GP I:54:126, schneerson 
writes that man “should be merciful and gracious, not out of mere compassion and 
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While the commandments are designed to help a person achieve 
this ethical goal, as emphasized in the SP, they may not be sufficient. 
In Hilkhot De‘ot, maimonides suggests direct exercises: 
How shall a man train himself in these dispositions, so that they become 
ingrained? let him practice again and again the actions prompted by 
those dispositions which are the mean between the extremes, and repeat 
them continually till they become easy and are no longer irksome to him, 
and so the corresponding dispositions will become a fixed part of his 
character. (Hilkhot De‘ot 1:7)
There is no mention of practicing commandments as exercises in this 
section. Either maimonides changed his mind with respect to the 
character-changing potential of performing the commandments, or 
more likely, he felt that the duty of imitatio dei necessitated a special 
effort of will apart from keeping the commandments.
I now return to the problem posed to Abraham maimonides: 
because the verse “And thou shalt walk in His ways” is a command that 
includes the entire Torah, classifying it as a commandment violates 
the strictures of Rule 4. In his reply, maimuni concedes that this 
objection may be correct, but insists that tradition provides specific 
content, as elaborated by the Sifre. my analysis indicates, however, 
that the rabbinic exhortation “Just as the Holy one, blessed be He, 
is called merciful (rahum), so shouldst thou be merciful” can be read 
in two ways. Its simple meaning is in prodding the faithful towards 
moral excellence and thus towards acts of beneficence, as explicated in 
the ShM; a less likely interpretation urges one to balance one’s traits 
towards the mean and thus be virtuous in the philosophical-ethical 
pity, but in accordance with what is fitting.” Likkutei Sichos, vol. 34, 153. Absent imitatio 
dei, one might come to adopt an ethic based on moral excellence. Along similar lines, 
Herbert davidson suggests that ultimately, maimonides advocates metaphysically-
discovered ethics that lead to dispassionate actions. maimonides dismisses an ethic 
based on the perfection of moral qualities, “the perfection consisting in intermediate 
psychological characteristics.” God’s ways, he says, are “the acts emanating from 
Him,” not characteristics of His soul. The person that walks in His ways “will not … be 
merciful, gracious or vengeful, in the sense that he fosters mercy, graciousness, and 
anger, in his soul. As far as humanly possible, he will perform merciful or vengeful acts 
dispassionately, as God does.” davidson, “The middle Way in maimonides’ Ethic,” 66.
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sense — an idea that seemed foreign to the rabbinic mind. The rabbinic 
warrant is inconclusive. If the commandment requires moral excellence, 
then “and thou shalt walk in His ways” is a redundant proof text, since 
this requirement could be learned from the verse “thou shalt love thy 
neighbor as thyself,” as detailed in maimonides’ later writings. If, 
however, the commandment requires balancing one’s traits towards the 
mean, then the verse “and thou shalt walk in His ways” would indeed 
contain specific content that could justify a mitsvat ‘aseh designation. 
since maimonides must have been aware that the sages were unlikely 
to have intended the doctrine of the mean in their aggadah, he could 
not elevate the verse to the category of a positive commandment. As 
a result, he resigned himself in the Halakhot to stating that the verse’s 
statement of philosophic ethics represents a counsel of wisdom rather 
than a scriptural obligation. 
The language and structure of the first chapter of Hilkhot 
De‘ot confirm this assessment. In the Halakhot, maimonides never 
designates balancing one’s traits towards the mean or imitating God 
to be a positive commandment, even as he brings a scriptural proof 
text. In Hilkhot De‘ot 1:5 he merely states: “we are bidden [u-metsuvin, 
a participle of the root ts�v�h] to walk in the middle paths which are 
the right and proper ways, as it is said, and thou shalt walk in His ways 
(deut. 28:9).” In 1:6, he writes: “in explanation of this mitsvah, the 
sages taught,” again avoiding the term mitsvat ‘aseh. The less-forceful 
character of this command can also be seen in other remarks from the 
first chapter of Hilkhot De‘ot� He states, for example, that “to cultivate 
either extreme in any class of dispositions is not the proper course for 
any person [ein ra’ui lo le-adam] to follow or to teach to oneself” (1:3). 
If following the middle way were an absolute obligation, one would 
have expected the more severe expression “it is forbidden” rather than 
the phrase “not the proper course.” Even when maimonides uses the 
strong term hayav (he is obliged), as in 1:6, he tempers it with the 
qualifier “as far as he can.” 
structural considerations also confirm that we are in the presence 
of a counsel of wisdom. In 1:4, after explaining the properties 
of the “right way,” maimonides adds: “hence, our ancient sages 
[emphasis added] exhorted us that a person should always evaluate 
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his dispositions and so adjust them that they shall be at the mean 
between the extremes.” To support his description of the right way, 
he cites verses from the wisdom literature, psalms and proverbs. 
significantly, he expounds this law before introducing any scriptural 
proof text.51 
In sum, imitatio dei is characterized as a mitsvah in the Halakhot, 
a commendable goal, a suggestion rather than an order. It is never 
explicitly designated as a positive commandment. It is worth noting 
that in Hilkhot De‘ot 1:7, maimonides traces the philosophic ethics back 
to Abraham: 
This path is called the way of God and this is what the patriarch Abraham 
taught his children as it says for I love him, because he will charge his 
children and his household after him, that they may keep the way of the Lord 
[Gen. 18:19].52 
moreover, the way of the mean is the path to earthly happiness: 
“Whoever walks in this way secures for himself happiness and blessing, 
as the text continues, In order that the Lord might bring upon Abraham 
that which He spoke concerning him�” Were the way of the mean to 
be a commandment, one would expect happiness and blessing as a 
reward in the world to come.53 Because no timeframe is stipulated for 
happiness and blessing, one assumes that these benefits are natural 
outcomes of following a wise counsel in this earthly world.54 
51 . dov septimus also notes some of these peculiarities and posits that the first few 
halakhot of Hilkhot De‘ot reflect normative, not prescriptive, language. I disagree with 
his assertion that a commandment is what follows this normative introduction. In an 
attempt to reconcile the literary difficulty, he argues that maimonides meant to write 
that the Torah commanded these practices because they are inherently good. As I 
argue above, I believe that maimonides never considered “and thou shalt walk in His 
ways” to be a positive commandment. He certainly did not designate it as such in the 
Halakhot. septimus, “mivneh ve-ti’un be-sefer ha-madda,” 226-227. 
52 . This dichotomy between the Abrahamic and mosaic approaches in maimonidean 
writings has been intriguingly explored in diamond, Maimonides and the Hermeneutics 
of Concealment� 
53 . see Hilkhot Teshuvah 9:1.
54 . Tradition knows of a few types of good deeds that garner divine reward in both worlds, 
but never in only one. see BT Qiddushin 40a. As an aside, see maimonides’ interesting 
comments to M Peah 1:1 on the benefits of reciprocity when performing kind deeds. 
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The way of the mean is a tenet of wisdom rather than a stipulation 
of the law. maimonides identifies it with the “way of God,” tracing it 
back to the patriarch Abraham and promising that whoever practices it 
“secures for himself happiness and blessings.” 
As I have argued, maimonides asserts that the so-called 
commandments to love God, to fear Him, and to imitate His ways are 
not mitsvot ‘aseh, orders that one must strive to fulfill, but rather mitsvot, 
suggestions or commendable goals. I would like to suggest that the 
mitsvot just reviewed not only play an important role in maimonides’ 
jurisprudence, but also, in at least one respect, they move maimonides’ 
system closer to a modern conception of the law. In analyzing the ShM, 
Hanina Ben-menahem argues that maimonides clings to an imperative 
model of law: maimonides thought that the faithful were ordered to 
fulfill all of the 248 positive commandments. Though one might argue 
with this conclusion — and I have brought some evidence to show 
that many of the positive commandments in the ShM cannot be seen 
as orders, such as the commandments related to uncleanness (p99-
107) — Ben-menahem does make an interesting observation: 
The thesis advanced by Hart, that the law should be individuated so as 
to reflect the fact that it directs and guides, not only through commands 
and prohibitions, but also by outlining the means for achieving desired 
ends, is not upheld by maimonides [emphasis added].55 
If my reading of the way in which the Halakhot presents these 
so-called commandments is correct, we find that, at least in the 
Halakhot, the law is individuated so that it does indeed “[direct and 
guide], not only through commands and prohibitions, but also by 
outlining the means for achieving desired ends.” In effect, the three 
commandments reviewed in this chapter suggest ways by which 
one can come to achieve a highly meaningful mystical-intellectual 
experience (by loving and fearing God) as well as ways by which one 
can grow toward the personal excellence that promises to secure 
“happiness and blessing.” 
55 . Ben-menahem, “maimonides’ Fourteen Roots,” 28-29.
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p34. THAT WHEN THE ARK Is CARRIEd,  
IT sHould BE CARRIEd oN THE sHouldER 
Hilkhot Kele ha-Miqdash 2:12 reads: 
When the ark is being transported [be-et she-molikhin] from one place 
to another, it is not transported [ein molikhin] on a beast and not on a 
wagon. And because david forgot [the law] and carried it on wagons, a 
bursting-out burst out on uzza [based on 1 Chr. 13:11.]. It is therefore a 
mitsvah to carry it on one’s shoulder, as it says, because the service of holy 
things belonged unto them: they bore them upon their shoulders [Num. 7:9].
The commandment that the ark must be carried on the shoulders of its 
bearers is not called a mitsvat ‘aseh, but simply termed a mitsvah. As if 
to dispel any lingering doubts, maimonides repeats this assessment at 
the close of the halakhah: “It is therefore a mitsvah to carry it on one’s 
shoulder.” of further interest is the peculiar structure of the halakhah. 
Rather than opening with the actions that constitute the mitsvah, 
maimonides begins by cautioning that the ark “is not transported [ein 
molikhin] on a beast and not on a wagon.” This peculiar arrangement 
shifts the emphasis from the positive aspects of the command — to make 
a deliberate attempt to “exalt” the ark56 — to a simple warning that the 
ark may not be treated disrespectfully. These difficulties fall away when 
we evaluate the pentateuchal proof text in context. In effect, Numbers 
7:9 simply states that the sons of Kehat did not receive carts and oxen 
because their service dealt with the sacred objects, and that “they bore 
them upon their shoulders.” This is a statement of fact: no command is 
represented by these words. Indeed, there is no indication that there 
ever was a divine command to this effect. I infer that the manner of 
porterage was a decision made by the levitical leaders and/or the porters 
themselves, clearly in deference to the sacredness of the objects. The 
matter-of-fact statement leaves little doubt that the decision met with 
the approval of God and moses. Nevertheless, while this action was 
taken in recognition of the exalted nature of the sacred objects, it better 
fits our new definition of mitsvah as a desirable or praiseworthy action. 
56 . Cf. GP III:45:580�
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I also note that the david and uzza story (told in 2 samuel 6:3-8 and 
1 Chronicles 13:7-10) appears to say, at least according to maimonides, 
that the immediate cause of God’s anger was the manner by which 
the ark was transported, namely “on wagons.” Except perhaps by 
implication, there is no hint in this story that the ark ought to have been 
carried on the porters’ shoulders. According to maimonides’ reading, 
the most important lesson learned from this story is that the ark may 
not be carried on wagons or beasts. This perhaps explains maimonides’ 
surprising emphasis on the negative aspects of the transport of the ark, 
the warning that the ark “is not transported [ein molikhin] on a beast 
and not on a wagon.”57 
In conclusion: the designation mitsvah is fully consistent with 
the context of the proof text. In the pentateuchal text, no command 
appears to have been given to transport the ark on the shoulders of the 
porters. more likely, this means of transport was a felicitous decision 
made by those involved in the transport of the ark, in deference 
to the sacredness of the object. The prohibition to carry the ark on 
wagons can be deduced by God’s displeasure and reaction in the david 
and uzza story. When linked exegetically, the passage from Numbers 
and the implications of the david and uzza story from samuel and 
Chronicles can indeed yield a so-called command that the ark must be 
carried on the porters’ shoulders. But that exercise lies well outside of 
maimonides’ legal hermeneutics and his peshateh di qera approach. 
 
p173. To AppoINT A KING 
In the ShM, maimonides writes that “we are commanded to appoint 
a king over ourselves that is an Israelite [mi-yisrael, lit., from Israel],” 
implying that the commandment is to appoint an Israelite as king, if 
57 . maimonides tells us that “david forgot,” causing a divine “bursting-out,” but it is not 
at all clear what it was that david forgot. perhaps he forgot that the porters of the 
wilderness had chosen to carry the ark on their shoulders, but, as we pointed out 
above, this was not a commandment but simply a desirable way of dealing with sacred 
objects. It is noteworthy that maimonides leaves out the object of “forgot,” supplied 
by the translator in brackets. maimonides well knows that what david forgot was not 
a halakhah or a law but simply a praiseworthy idea.
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and when the Israelites choose to appoint a king�58 Interestingly, this 
is also the way the commandment is formulated in the Headings to 
Hilkhot Melakhim, prompting Abarbanel to conclude that there is no 
particular obligation (mitsvat ‘aseh) to appoint a king.59 To complicate 
matters, the SE lists the commandment as “to appoint a king” without 
any qualifiers, leaving little doubt that, at least in the SE, maimonides 
intended to convey that there is an obligation to appoint a king. since 
the SE is probably sandwiched chronologically60 between the ShM and 
the Headings, it is difficult to believe that maimonides began with the 
idea that there is no obligation to appoint a king (just an obligation 
to ensure that he is an Israelite), moved in the SE to the notion that 
there is an obligation to appoint a king, and reversed course again when 
he composed the Headings. It is more likely that the ShM was later 
corrected on the basis of the Headings, perhaps even by maimonides 
himself, after he had concluded that there was no absolute obligation, 
no mitsvat ‘aseh, to appoint a king. This thesis can be substantiated 
by a simple fact: the argument in the ShM moves unequivocally in the 
direction of proving that there is an obligation to appoint a king.
If this thesis is correct, we can establish that maimonides originally 
maintained that there was an absolute obligation to appoint a king. 
This is seen in the SE and in some versions of the ShM. By the time 
maimonides wrote the Headings, he had reversed course and no longer 
maintained that position. By adding the phrase “that is an Israelite” 
58 . The term “that is an Israelite” (mi-yisrael) is missing in some printed versions. see 
Sefer ha-Mitsvot im Hasagot ha-RaMBaN, ed. Chavel, based on the first printing in 
Constantinople, 1516; see also Sefer ha-Mitsvot, ed. Heller, where an asterisk informs 
the reader that the word mi-yisrael was missing in one of the ms. that Heller used as 
a base.
59 . see Abarbanel’s comments to deuteronomy 17:14 and I samuel 8:5. perla, Sefer ha-
Mitsvot, vol. 3, 230, s. v. “ve-raiti,” quotes Abarbanel on deuteronomy 17:14 and 
discusses this understanding of maimonides’ position. The correct formula in the 
heading is “from Israel,” as reflected in all the good manuscripts, and not “in Israel,” 
as some printed editions have it, though it is not impossible that maimonides himself 
was responsible for the change in formulation. For the variants, see “yalqut shinuye 
Nushaot,” Mishneh Torah, ed. s. Frankel,“Hilkhot Melakhim,” Perate ha-Mitsvot. For an 
understanding of the issues involved, see the discussion that follows in this chapter.
60 . A matter which I have alluded to a number of times in this work but, admittedly, have 
not demonstrated. I hope to do so in a future work.
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(mi-yisrael) to his formulation, maimonides effected a radical change in 
the claim: the only obligation is to ensure that any king chosen would 
be an Israelite. Indeed, in the Halakhot, maimonides did not treat the 
appointment of a king as an obligation but rather as a mitsvah. 
I will now show some evidence for the reversal and the possible 
reasons behind it. The scriptural source for the commandment of the 
king is found in deuteronomy 17:14-15:
When thou art come unto the land which the lord thy God giveth thee, 
and shall possess it, and shalt dwell therein; and shalt say: ‘I will set a 
king over me, like all the nations that are round about me’; thou shalt in 
any wise set him king over thee, whom the lord thy God shall choose; 
one from among thy brethren shalt thou set king over thee; thou mayest 
not put a foreigner over thee, who is not thy brother.
The interpretation of these verses was the subject of a tannaitic dispute. 
While there are very significant variants in the sources,61 the gist of 
the dispute is clear. In all of the sources, R. Nehorai argues that these 
verses do not mandate the appointment of a king. Rather, these verses 
were “spoken only in anticipation of their future murmurings” (BT 
Sanhedrin 20b): they represent a prophecy. The incident to which these 
verses allude is found in 1 samuel 8:5, where it is recounted that the 
Israelites demanded that the prophet samuel appoint a king “to govern 
us like all other nations.” In response to this demand, God tells samuel 
to heed the demands of the people. sensing samuel’s displeasure and 
hurt, God says to samuel: “For it is not you that they have rejected; it 
is me that they have rejected as their king.” R. Nehorai adds that this 
section conveyed “a disgrace for Israel” (Sifre). In the Sifre’s passage, R. 
Judah views this section as commanding the appointment of a king, 
in accordance with what he had already stated earlier (Re’eh, piska 67): 
“Three commandments were given to Israel when they entered the 
land: [i] to appoint a king, [ii] to cut off the seed of ’Amaleq, and [iii] 
to build themselves the chosen house.” By R. Judah’s logic, why would 
God have shown displeasure? R. Judah answers62 that it was because 
61 . BT Sanhedrin 20b, T Sanhedrin 4:3, and Sifre Deuteronomy 156 (208).
62 . Reading T Sanhedrin 4:3, one cannot be completely certain that R. Judah is the author 
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they rushed the events.63 In sum, one mishnaic sage believes that the 
passage from deuteronomy does not mandate the appointment of a 
king, but instead prophetically anticipates a concession to an unlawful 
demand that would occur many centuries later. A second sage believes 
that the passage does command the Israelites to appoint a king, in 
accord with the threefold command given to them upon entering the 
land: to appoint a king, to cut off the seed of ‘Amaleq, and to build the 
Temple. As an aside, medieval exegetes known for their predilection for 
reading scripture according to the plain sense did see these passages as 
permitting the appointment of a king — as a dispensation rather than 
as an obligation to do so.64 This sense stems from the fact that verse 15 
does not stand by itself but comes in response to a request for a king. 
In the ShM, maimonides cites R. Judah’s dictum (without 
attribution) as proof for the claim that there is an obligation to 
appoint a king. He further cites another unattributed exposition found 
in the same Sifre passage65 which comments on the verse “Thou shalt 
in any wise set him king over thee,” explaining: “This is a positive 
commandment (mitsvat ‘aseh).” maimonides continues that the Sifre 
explains this statement as meaning that “he must be held in awe.” 
If maimonides’ text of the Sifre is the same as ours, this last 
interpretive twist is not entirely persuasive. In the midrash, the 
comment that appointing a king is a positive commandment is the 
second of two opinions, introduced by the common formula “another 
interpretation” (davar aher). The midrash’s concern pivots on the 
unusually strong infinitive-imperative language used by scripture, som 
tasim, translated here as “thou shalt at any wise set him king over thee.” 
of this comment; the question and answer may well have been posed by the editor of 
the baraita. In the Sifre’s version, however, R. Judah explicitly asks and answers the 
said question.
63 . “They rushed the events” seems to be the simple meaning of the phrase le-fi she-
hiqdimu ‘al yadan. The other rationale for God’s displeasure, offered by R. Elazar b. R. 
Jose, is that the elders made an eminently proper request, asking for a king to serve as 
a judge and help quash rebellious elements, but the multitudes ruined the request by 
asking for a king to lead them into war “like all the nations.” see RasHI, BT Sanhedrin 
20b, s. v. “amei ha-arets qilqelu.”
64 . see the commentaries of Ibn Ezra and sa‘adiah Gaon on deuteronomy 17:15.
65 . Sifre Deuteronomy 157 (209).
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These two midrashic readings seem to be mutually exclusive, with the 
davar aher offering an alternative interpretation. It may be possible 
that maimonides’ version of the Sifre differed from ours and the two 
comments were merged (without the davar aher intervening gloss). I 
do note, however, that both the baraita quoted in the Talmud and the 
Tosefta show that R. Judah interprets the verse “thou shalt at any wise 
set him king over thee” as meaning “that his fear should lord over you,” 
while both tannaitic sources omit the comment that “this is a positive 
commandment.” It would appear from these sources that R. Judah did 
not agree with the positive commandment thesis. 
In sum, in the ShM, maimonides attempts to prove that appointing 
a king is a positive commandment, a claim that suffers from a number 
of hermeneutic weaknesses. Chief among them is that the scriptural 
command appears to come as a dispensation responding to a request, 
rather than as an independent commandment. second, on close 
analysis, rabbinic interpretation of the critical scriptural passage is 
ambiguous at best. Crucially, the extant tannaitic sources show no 
consensus among tannaim that the words “thou shalt at any wise set 
him king over thee” mandate the appointment of a king, consensus 
being the sine qua non condition for a positive commandment. 
As we move to the Halakhot, our initial doubts gain strength. 
maimonides opens Hilkhot Melakhim as follows: 
Three commandments [mitsvot] to be carried out on entering [the land 
of] Israel were enjoined upon the Israelite nation: to appoint a king as it 
is said: Thou shalt in any wise set him king over thee … to destroy the seed 
of ‘Amaleq … and to build the sanctuary.
In halakhah 2, maimonides continues: 
The appointment of a king was to precede the war with ‘Amaleq, as it is 
written: The Lord sent me to anoint thee to be king over His people … Now go 
and smite ‘Amaleq [1 sam. 15:1, 3]. The destruction of the seed of ‘Amaleq 
was to precede the erection of a sanctuary, as it is written: And it came 
to pass, when the king dwelt in his home…. [2 sam. 7:1-2]. seeing that the 
setting up of a king was a commandment [mitsvah], why did the Holy one, 
blessed be He, look with disfavor upon the request [made by the people] of 
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samuel for a king? Because they asked in a querulous spirit. Their request 
was prompted not by a desire to fulfill the commandment [ha-mitsvah] 
but by a desire to rid themselves of samuel the prophet, as it is written: for 
they have not rejected thee, but they have rejected Me [1 sam. 8:7].
maimonides’ introductory remarks alert the sensitized reader to a subtle 
change from what had been posited in the enumerative works. What 
stands out is his failure to declare that appointing a king is a mitsvat 
‘aseh. At the same time, it is clear that he describes some sort of desired 
action, since he uses the term mitsvah three times in these two halakhot� 
similarly puzzling, one wonders why maimonides cites R. Judah’s dictum 
in the first two halakhot of Hilkhot Melakhim that the Israelites were given 
three commandments upon entering the land, instead of simply citing 
the scriptural proof text from deuteronomy 17:15. 
I believe that the answer lies in R. Judah’s remark that the need 
to appoint a king was only made apparent after the Israelites received 
a special revelation on their way into the land. The prophetic oracle 
revealed that the national goals of exterminating ‘Amaleq and of 
building God’s abode should be preceded by the appointment of a king. 
While the oracle’s remarks may have been understood as an order or 
as a suggestion, it is this oracle that I believe forms the basis for the 
mitsvah that he describes, and it is the reason why maimonides spends 
time documenting the commandment.66 
By contrast, the verses at deuteronomy 17:14-15 only refer to an 
historical incident that was to take place many centuries later. As R. 
Nehorai put it, the verses were “spoken only in anticipation of their 
future murmurings.” Collating the various tannaitic sources, one might 
come to conclude that R. Judah, too, agrees that the verses refer to a 
future event. While it is true that in the opening halakhah of Hilkhot 
66 . Both the commentators Kesef Mishneh on 1:1 and Lehem Mishneh on 1:2 wonder why 
maimonides does not cite the pentateuchal proof texts offered in the Babylonian 
Talmud and in the Sifre. The latter argues that maimonides chose the prophetic texts 
because they were more compelling than the pentateuchal ones and notes that this 
practice is common in the Halakhot whenever the new exegesis does not contain 
halakhic implications. This is clearly not applicable in this case; extra-pentateuchal 
proof texts can hardly serve as proof texts for mosaic law. As I see it, maimonides’ 
choice fits well with our notion that the command was extra-pentateuchal.
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Melakhim, maimonides resorts to deuteronomy 17:14-15 in support 
of the mitsvah, we must consider the possibility that this maneuver 
represents merely an elegant midrashic flourish that post factum exploits 
the latent polyvalence of Torah, since the fusing of the scriptural passage 
and R. Judah’ s tradition is incompatible with maimonides’ peshateh di-
qera hermeneutics. As a result, maimonides can cite deuteronomy 17:15 
as the basis for the mitsvah, but he does not assign to the command the 
force of a positive commandment. For maimonides, the command to 
appoint a king remains no more than a mitsvah, a piece of good advice. 
p172. To HEEd THE CAll oF EVERy pRopHET IN 
EACH GENERATIoN, pRoVIdEd THAT HE NEITHER 
Adds To NoR TAKEs AWAy FRom THE ToRAH
The law is discussed at great length and in great detail in Hilkhot 
Yesode ha-Torah 7:7, 8:2, 9:2 and 9:3. Throughout the discussion of this 
commandment, maimonides repeatedly uses the term mitsvah rather 
than the expected mitsvat ‘aseh, even though the commandment had 
been identified as a mitsvat ‘aseh in the ShM. To discover why, I turn to 
Hilkhot Sanhedrin, where maimonides lists all the scriptural violations 
and their punishments. In 19:3 we read: 
[A] priest who performs service without having washed his hands and feet, 
though he incurs thereby the penalty of death [by divine intervention], is 
not flogged, because this is a positive commandment [mitsvat ‘aseh]. so 
too, a prophet who suppresses his prophecy, a prophet who acts contrary 
to his own words, and one who disregards the words of a prophet, are 
not liable to flogging — though these three offenders incur the penalty of 
death [by divine intervention] — the prohibition they transgress is derived 
by implication from a positive command, as it is said Unto him ye shall 
hearken [deut. 18:15], and a negative command derived by implication 
from a positive command is treated as a positive command [ke-‘aseh], the 
violation of which does not entail the penalty of flogging [my emphasis].
 maimonides makes it abundantly clear that while the verse “unto 
him ye shall hearken” (deut. 18:15) is to be treated as a positive 
commandment, it is actually an inferred prohibition derived from 
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a positive statement, since the verse essentially prohibits one from 
disobeying a prophet.67 As I discussed earlier, in the ShM, maimonides 
uses this hermeneutic device to prove that a given commandment is 
a mitsvat ‘aseh.68 once maimonides’ criteria for determining positive 
commandments changed to require an absolute obligation — as I argue 
they did in the Halakhot — statements that infer a prohibition could 
no longer be treated as positive commandments. maimonides confirms 
this shift away from using this Talmudic principle by ever so subtly 
changing the talmudic formulation: he adds the preposition kof in front 
of the word ‘aseh to read “it is like an ‘aseh” (though not an ‘aseh).69 
since the injunction “unto him ye shall hearken” (deut. 18:15) is 
used in the Talmud to convey a prohibition against ignoring the words 
of a true prophet, the positive statement can only convey a desideratum, 
not an absolute obligation.70 In other words, scripture desires that the 
Israelites obey their true prophets; it lets us know this by threatening 
those who disobey their messages with divine punishment.71 As we have 
seen, a desideratum is best described with the solo term mitsvah.
67 . This is how the Lehem Mishneh commentary to Hilkhot Yesode ha-Torah 9:2-3 understands 
the verse, arguing that the command ought to be read as denoting a prohibition, as if to 
say “do not violate the prophet’s words [de-inyano lav hu, lo taavor al divre ha-navi].”
68 . see chapter 2. The appearance of p172 on the list of the 60 unconditional obligations 
is quite puzzling, however; even if maimonides thought it proper to enumerate this 
commandment in the ShM on the basis of the Talmudic principle that says that a 
prohibition derived by implication from a positive statement is considered a positive 
commandment, he could not have seen the verse as an absolute obligation. moreover, if 
maimonides follows the prominent rabbinic tradition that prophecy was abolished after 
the destruction of the Temple, how can p172 be an active commandment in the modern 
period, appropriate for inclusion on the abbreviated list of obligations? The most likely 
answer to the first problem is that maimonides initially read the verse “unto him ye 
shall hearken” as a positive commandment; only later, at the time of the composition 
of the MT, did he change his mind and view the verse as an inferred prohibition. see 
note 67 above. on this topic, see J. levinger’s interesting distinction between prophetic 
legislation and prophetic advice. levinger, Ha-RaMBaM ke-filosof, 84-87. 
69 . But like an ‘aseh, he means to say that, just like the non-performance of an ‘aseh is not 
liable to lashes, so too, the transgression of this prohibition does not attract lashes.
70 . For the logic of this statement, see above, note 29. 
71 . As maimonides makes clear, had this injunction been phrased in the negative form, it 
would have required the courts to administer lashes to the violator. perhaps the logic 
is not as convoluted as it would appear at first. scripture may have preferred to keep 
the courts out of having to pass judgment on hard-to-read matters of the heart.
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p178. THAT oNE WHo possEssEs  
EVIdENCE sHAll TEsTIFy IN CouRT 
This commandment was discussed at some length in chapter 5. Here I 
discuss maimonides’ formulation of the commandment in the Halakhot� 
In Hilkhot ‘Edut 1:1, he writes: “The witness is commanded (metsuveh)72 
to provide in Court any testimony he may have…as it says, he being a 
witness, whether he hath seen or known, if he do not utter it, then he shall bear 
his iniquity�” Note that while maimonides cites the expected proof text, 
he fails to declare that providing testimony is a positive commandment. 
In the discussion of this commandment in chapter 5, I noted that 
scripture provides no explicit command urging one who possesses 
evidence to come to court. Commentators attempt to find some 
scriptural basis for this commandment, but these solutions do not 
follow the grammatical sense of the text. only an explicit scriptural 
imperative could convey an absolute obligation and, with it, a mitsvat 
‘aseh� By stating instead that someone who does not appear as witness 
will “bear his iniquity,” scripture hints, so to speak, about the desirability 
of appearing in court if and when one is in possession of evidence. This 
desirability is fully and richly conveyed by the term mitsvah. 
p201.THAT THE HIREd lABoRER EAT [oF THE 
pRoduCE HE Is REApING] WHIlE HE Is EmployEd 
In my examination of this commandment in chapter 5, I discussed how 
the ShM defines this commandment as applicable to the worker: he is 
72 . This term is ambiguous. There are instances where the term metsuveh clearly stands for 
a scriptural obligation. see, for example, Hilkhot Talmud Torah 5:1: “Just as a person is 
commanded [metsuveh] regarding the honor of his father and the fear of him, so is he 
obligated [hayav] with regard to the honor and fear of his teacher …” In this instance 
we know that metsuveh means “scripturally obligated,” because in Hilkhot Mamrim 6:1 
maimonides declares that to honor and fear one’s parents is a mitsvat ‘aseh. Note the 
interesting terminological shift in this halakah: one is metsuveh with regard to one’s father, 
but one is hayav with regard to one’s teacher. maimonides was drawing a difference between 
the obligations — the former is scriptural, the latter merely rabbinic. see our discussion of 
p209 later in this chapter. At any rate, what is certainly missing is a categorical statement 
declaring that it is a mitsvat ‘aseh for one who possesses evidence to testify in court.
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permitted to eat the produce while he reaps. We see a different law in 
Hilkhot Sekhirut 12:1: 
Behold, it is a mitsvah on the employer that he allow them [the 
laborers] to eat from [the produce] with which they are working, as it 
says When thou comest into thy neighbor’s vineyard, etc. [deut. 23:25] 
and it says When thou comest into the standing corn of thy neighbor, etc. 
[deut. 23:26].
Note the change of focus: in contrast to how he describes this 
commandment in the ShM, the SE, and even the Headings, which define 
it in terms of the rights of the worker, here maimonides places the 
emphasis on the landowner. “It is,” he writes, “a mitsvah on the employer 
that he allow them [the laborers] to eat from [the produce] with which 
they are working.” since only absolute obligations can be labeled as 
positive commandments, it is unsurprising that the Halakhot omits any 
reference to this right being a positive commandment. It is of interest, 
however, that maimonides enjoins the landowner to perform a mitsvah 
by allowing the worker to exercise his right. Whence this designation? 
I believe that the answer lies in maimonides’ unique understanding of 
scripture’s intention. 
We are familiar with the right that scripture grants workers to eat 
from the produce that they farm. problematically, this is a law that 
does not seem to consider the wide gamut of social realities. Quite 
conceivably, these rights might be denied under certain circumstances, 
as in situations where workers exercise very weak economic bargaining 
power. Thus, as maimonides may have reasoned, scripture’s true ethical 
intention is not merely to grant the worker what might be a nominal 
right, but, more importantly, to enjoin the landowner to exercise 
economic self-restraint: it attempts to shape the ethical conscience 
of the landowner. There is no scriptural injunction that obligates 
the landowner to allow the worker to eat from his produce. Instead, 
maimonides reads scripture as advising the landowner to permit the 
worker to exercise his rights. Here again we see the principle that 
law, as maimonides states, can “direct and guide, not only through 
commands and prohibitions.” 
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p205 To REBuKE THE sINNER 
In the ShM, the commandment is formulated as follows: 
To rebuke one who is sinning or is disposed to sin, to admonish him 
verbally against sinning73 and to reprove him ... This injunction is 
contained in His words, exalted be He, Thou shalt surely rebuke thy 
neighbor [lev. 19:17]. 
Immediately thereafter, maimonides adds: 
Included in this commandment is [the obligation] on anyone who is injured 
by another to rebuke him, and not to bear him a grudge or entertain any 
evil thought of him. We are commanded to rebuke [the offender] aloud, so 
that no [ill-feeling] against him shall be left in our heart. 
Though maimonides does not cite direct rabbinic evidence for either 
the primary meaning (to rebuke a sinner) or the secondary meaning 
(to rebuke one who has injured you), it is reasonably clear from his 
sources that he believes that the sages understand the term rebuke 
(hokhahah) as referring to rebuking one who sins. This is indicated by 
his explanation, following a talmudic passage that discusses rebuking 
a sinner: 
That this commandment is binding upon every person, so that even an 
inferior is under obligation to rebuke a man of high rank, and even if 
he is met with curses and insults, he may not desist or cease rebuking 
him until he is beaten — as explained by those who handed down the 
tradition: they said “to the point of suffering blows.”
Compare this explanation with the following passage found in BT 
‘Arakhin 16b: 
Whence do we know that if a man sees something unseemly in his 
neighbour, he is obliged to reprove him? Because it is said: Thou shalt 
surely rebuke. If he rebuked him and he did not accept it, whence do we 
73 . or, following MnT, “to restrain him verbally.”
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know that he must rebuke him again? The text states: surely rebuke all 
ways. one might assume [this to be obligatory] even though his face 
blanched, therefore the text states: Thou shalt not bear sin because of him.
Further proof that maimonides has this Talmudic passage in mind is 
gathered from his formulation: “As explained by those who handed 
down the tradition: they said ‘to the point of suffering blows.’” 
maimonides here alludes to the Talmudic sage Rav, quoted near the 
end of the passage, who responds to the question “How far shall reproof 
be administered?” with “until he [the reprover] be beaten.” maimonides 
uses a midrash halakhah to further support his idea that one must not 
desist from rebuking until the message is accepted: 
How do we know that even if one has rebuked the offender four or five 
times, he must still rebuke him again and again? Because scripture says 
Thou shalt surely rebuke thy neighbor [lev. 19:17] — even a thousand times. 
one might think that in rebuking him you may cause him shame [and 
should therefore refrain]: scripture therefore says, Thou shalt not bear sin 
because of him. (Sifra Qedoshim 4:8 (89a))
In rabbinic literature, the term hokhahah often has the connotation of 
admonishing to impose discipline or to change wayward behavior, and it is 
in this sense that it is used in BT ‘Arakhin 16b. This also appears to be what 
the Sifra intends repeated admonitions to achieve: to change behavior. 
maimonides’ second interpretation has a distinctly different flavor, 
however. In this second type of admonition, the hurt party informs his 
offender that he has been hurt so that he will not harbor further ill will 
towards his offender. In this case, the rebuke is of therapeutic benefit 
to the rebuker. This, I believe, is clearly the intention of his words: “We 
are commanded to rebuke [the offender] aloud, so that no [ill-feeling] 
against him shall be left in our heart.” In the Halakhot, maimonides is 
even clearer: “But it is his duty to inform [mitsvah ‘alav le-hodi‘o] the 
offender and say to him ‘Why did you do this to me? Why did you sin 
against me in this matter?’” Note that one informs the offender: one does 
not rebuke him. That maimonides believes this to be the plain sense of 
the verse is evident from his comment at N303. After explaining that 
the sages indicated that one must rebuke the sinner repeatedly but 
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stop just before he suffers shame — hence the source for the prohibition 
against shaming a person — maimonides says: “The plain sense of the 
verse, however, is that we are forbidden to retain any thought of his sin 
or to remember it.” Rebuking a sinner does little to erase the memory of 
the sin. If the sin is an offense done against another person, however, 
rebuking the offender does help the aggrieved to dismiss the incident.
Two further observations: maimonides’ second interpretation is as 
psychologically valid and textually sensitive as it is original. He brings 
no sources for this view, although commentators have put forth one 
possible rabbinic source.74 I assume that maimonides had not seen this 
source, or he would have cited it to substantiate his case. second, it is 
interesting to note that while maimonides considered the novel and 
original interpretation secondary, he did think that it was “included in 
this commandment.” This points to an ambiguity in the scriptural text: 
it apparently expresses two totally unrelated thoughts. 
In the Halakhot, maimonides changes direction. He presents both 
claims side by side, without indicating which of the claims is linked to 
the primary meaning of the verse and which to the secondary one. Just 
as importantly, he reverses the order from how he had presented the 
commandment in ShM, implying that the interpretation that is closer 
to the plain sense is actually the primary commandment. In Hilkhot 
De‘ot 6:5, he rules that “[w]hoever entertains in his heart hatred of 
any Israelite, transgresses a prohibition, as it is said Thou shalt not hate 
thy brother in thy heart.” This is followed in halakhah 6 by its natural 
correlative: 
When a man sins against another, the injured party should not hate the 
offender and keep silent, as it is said concerning the wicked And Absalom 
spake to Amnon neither good nor evil, for Absalom hated Amnon [2 sam. 
13:22]. But it is his duty [mitsvah] to inform the offender and say to him 
“Why did you do this to me? Why did you sin against me in this matter?” 
And thus it is said Thou shalt surely rebuke thy neighbor [lev. 19:17].
74 . “R. Elazar b. matia said: If there is a matter [davar] between him and yourself, tell 
him and do not be a sinner about it [bo]. This is the meaning of Thou shalt not hate thy 
brother in thy heart, etc. and not bear sin because of him.” Seder Eliyahu Rabah ve-Seder 
Eliyahu Zuta, ed. Ish shalom, ch. 18, 109. see also Yalqut Shimoni, ad loc.
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maimonides sees this text as enjoining an injured party to tell his 
offender that he has been injured, which accords with the plain meaning 
of the words and with the context of the verse. This interpretation 
places the utility of the commandment on healing the injured party, 
lest he come to hate his offender. 
It is only in halakhah 7 that maimonides discusses the commandment 
as he had in the ShM: 
If one observes that a person committed a sin or walks in a way that is 
not good, it is proper [mitsvah] to bring the erring man back to the right 
path and point out to him that he is wronging himself by his evil courses, 
as it is said Thou shalt surely rebuke thy neighbor. 
 The use of the term mitsvah instead of mitsvat ‘aseh in both halakhot 
calls for an explanation. I contend that these designations are a direct 
function of how maimonides read the words “thou shalt surely rebuke 
thy neighbor.” It seems reasonable to conclude that at the time of writing 
the Halakhot, maimonides had come to see these words as direct and 
natural complements to the first half of the verse, “thou shalt not hate 
thy brother in thy heart.” By rebuking one’s neighbor — by informing the 
neighbor of what the neighbor had done to him — the offended party 
would release some of his pain and thus not transgress the prohibition 
to hate his brother. This constituted for maimonides the plain reading of 
the text.75 As he understood it, “thou shalt surely rebuke they neighbor” 
is simply a scriptural recommendation, a piece of good advice. Thus, the 
designation mitsvah for this interpretation is fully justified.76 
By this measure, any other interpretation of “thou shalt surely 
rebuke they neighbor” takes the words out of context. This is the case 
75 . In N303, maimonides offered this interpretation under the method of peshat, or zahir 
(in Arabic). At present, I am working on a study to show that zahir was a valid and 
authoritative hermeneutic, one which gained increasing prominence in maimonides’ 
later writings, contra m. Cohen, who maintains that zahir al-nass connotes at times 
“the apparent sense — which is ultimately incorrect.” Cohen, A Talmudist’s Halakhic 
Hermeneutics, Appendix A, 69 and n. 292.
76 . It is worth noting that maimonides did not list this commandment among the sixty 
unconditional obligations (mitsvot hekhrehiyot), a sign perhaps that even at an early 
stage, he did not consider it as an absolute, unconditional obligation.
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with the rabbinic midrash, which, by understanding hokhahah to mean 
the reproof of sinful behavior, leaves the sentence logically unattached 
to the first part of the verse. since maimonides views allusively-driven 
interpretations as no more than rabbinic homilies, he also labels this 
interpretation as a piece of good advice, a mitsvah.
p209. To HoNoR THE WIsE
In the SE, maimonides supports this claim by citing the first half of 
leviticus 19:32, “Thou shalt rise before the hoary head.” In the ShM, he 
cites the entire verse to make an additional point: “to respect scholars 
and to rise before them in order to do them honor. It is contained in 
His words Thou shalt rise up before the hoary head, and honor the face of 
the old man.” In support of this reading, maimonides quotes a passage 
from the Sifra77 that connects the two adjoining verbs in the proof text 
to produce a meaning of “rising in the manner of manifesting honor.” 
In the ShM, maimonides does not tell us what prompts him to read 
“wise” into the verse, rather than the literal “old man,” though it is clear 
that the interpretation that he adopts does not follow the plain sense 
of the text. This alerts us to the possibility that “to respect scholars 
and to rise before them in order to do them honor” is a non-scriptural 
commandment. As we shall see below, there are good grounds to believe 
that this is indeed the case. 
A baraita cited in BT Qiddushin 32b reports a three-way tannaitic 
controversy on the interpretation of our verse:
our Rabbis taught: Thou shalt rise up before the hoary head; I might think, 
even before an aged sinner [zaqen ashamai]; therefore it is said, and 
honor the face of a zaqen, and zaqen can only refer to a sage, for it is said: 
Gather unto me seventy men of the elders of Israel [Num. 11:16]. R. yose the 
Galilean said: Zaqen means only he who has acquired wisdom,78 for it is 
said: The Lord possessed me [sc. wisdom personified] [qanani, lit., acquired 
77 . The midrash cannot be found in our edition of the Sifra, but see ShM, ed. Heller, note 10.
78 . R. yose the Galilean defines zaqen as “one who acquired wisdom” by means of a word 
play: ZaQeN=Zeh she-QaNah hokhmah. The same root q�n�h� appears in the adduced 
proof text from prov. 8:22, demonstrating that wisdom is acquired. 
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me] as the beginning of his way [prov. 8:22]….Issi b. Judah said: Thou shalt 
rise up before the hoary head implies even any hoary head. [Even a gentile 
and a sinner!] 
[Gemara:] But is not R. yose the Galilean identical with the first 
tanna? — They differ in respect to a young sage: the first tanna holds 
that a young sage is not [included in the precept], whereas R. yose the 
Galilean holds that he is. 
Issi b. Judah said: Thou shalt rise up before the hoary head implies even 
any hoary head.” R. yohanan said: The law is as Issi b. Judah. R. yohanan 
used to rise before the heathen aged, saying: “How many troubles have 
passed over these!” Raba would not rise up, yet he showed them respect. 
Abaye used to give his hand to the aged. Raba sent his messengers.
With the exception of Issi b. Judah, the tannaim in this passage exhibit 
a strong tendency to stray from the literal and plain sense. Even Issi b. 
Judah’s position is qualified by the later sages, who refuse to grant the 
heathen aged a full measure of honor. one might reasonably conclude 
from the above passage that with their far-fetched interpretations, the 
tannaim went out of their way to reject the verse’s literal sense. stretching 
this idea, one could further reason that the authoritative interpreters of 
scripture, the rabbinic sages, had concluded that the verse’s literal sense 
of honoring the old should be taken as a counsel of wisdom rather than as 
an obligation. In Hilkhot Talmud Torah 6:9, maimonides appears to assume 
this conclusion when he states that “one rises before an old man” (using 
the participle), rather than ruling that one must stand up before him: 
one rises [omdin le-fanav] before an old man, advanced in years, even 
if he is not a sage. Even a learned man who is young rises up before an 
old man of advanced age. He is not obliged however to rise to his full 
height but need only raise himself sufficiently to indicate courtesy. Even 
a gentile who is aged should be shown courtesy in speech [mehadrin oto 
bi-devarim]; and one should extend a hand to support him, as it is said 
Thou shalt rise up before the hoary head, and honor the face of the old man, 
without qualification.79 
79 . maimonides here follows the opinions of R. yohanan, Raba and Abaye, who qualify 
Issi b. Judah’s position. see Karo, Kesef Mishneh, ad loc. Qarqovsky, ‘Avodat ha-
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 Following this line of thought, I further suggest that the two tannaim 
that remove the word zaqen from its plain meaning are not intending a 
literal reading of scripture; rather, they are using the scriptural verse as 
an asmakhta, a support for their ruling concerning honoring the sages. 
This reading understands honoring the sages to be a non-scriptural or 
rabbinic precept80 and justifies maimonides’ use of the term mitsvah in 
describing this commandment: “It is a mitsvah to honor every scholar, 
even if he is not one’s teacher, as it is said, Thou shalt rise up before 
the hoary head, and honor the face of the old man [zaqen]. Zaqen, he who 
acquired wisdom.”
maimonides goes out of his way to explain that zaqen is not to be 
understood here in its usual sense of “old,” but in the sense of one who 
acquires wisdom. The purpose of this gloss is not to inform us that he 
follows R. yose the Galilean’s interpretation (which he appears to do), but 
to explain why he does not treat the commandment to honor a sage as 
a mitsvat ‘aseh� In sum, to render zaqen as “one who acquires wisdom” 
instead of the philologically attested “old man” not only signals a departure 
from peshateh di-qera, it also suggests an exegesis that is characteristic of 
rabbinic asmakhta. By labeling the commandment to honor a scholar a 
mitsvah, maimonides treats it as a commendable practice.81 
While for the purpose of our analysis, the use of the solo term 
mitsvah might be a sufficient warrant to claim that the commandment 
to honor the wise/scholar is not an absolute scriptural obligation, 
I believe that I have found a subtle confirmation of this view in the 
peculiar arrangement of chapters 5 and 6 of the Halakhot. In his lengthy 
comments on this commandment in the ShM, maimonides digresses 
Melekh, citing an earlier authority, wonders why maimonides does not enumerate the 
commandment to honor any old man, as per 6:9. see his discussion to the Heading of 
Hilkhot Talmud Torah. Note the use of the participle ‘omdin, an indication that we are 
dealing with a correct practice or a good counsel rather than an obligation.
80 . see chapter 7, n. 10.
81 . maimonides utilizes consensual oral traditions on a few occasions, even as they 
differed somewhat from the plain sense of the text, and introduces them as lamdu 
mi-pi ha-shemu‘ah (see chapter 7). one might wonder if the Talmudic traditions here 
could serve this purpose. But on the contrary, in this case, the lack of consensus in the 
oral tradition over the meaning of this verse takes the Talmudic statements out of the 
category of authoritative traditions.
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from the original claim to include a more detailed application of the 
particular duty to honor one’s teacher: 
While this commandment to respect scholars is a duty incumbent on all 
alike … it is especially and in a large measure obligatory on a disciple, who 
owes much greater respect to his teacher than to any other scholar, and 
has the duty of fearing him as well, since the sages state clearly that one’s 
duty to one’s teacher is greater than one’s duty to one’s father, whom one 
is enjoined to honor and to fear.
maimonides proceeds to prove, in midrashic style, that showing 
disrespect towards one’s teacher is like showing disrespect towards 
God. He concludes: “All the foregoing is deduced from the scriptural 
injunction to honor scholars and parents, as is clear from the language of 
the Talmud, not that this82 should be an independent commandment.” 
These comments make clear that the special obligation to honor one’s 
teacher is subsumed under the general obligation to honor a scholar. yet, 
in the Halakhot, maimonides places the laws relating to honoring one’s 
teacher in the chapter immediately preceding the one relating to honoring 
the wise/scholar. moreover, he completely detaches the commandment to 
honor one’s teacher from that of honoring a scholar, and instead makes it 
dependent on the commandment to honor and fear one’s father: “Just as a 
person is commanded [metsuveh] regarding the honor of his father and the 
fear of him, so is he obligated [hayav] with regard to the honor and fear of 
his teacher” (Hilkhot Talmud Torah 5:1).
Why this change? I believe that this literary arrangement reveals 
maimonides’ new appreciation of the commandment under review. 
seeing that no explicit references can be found in scripture for the duty 
to honor and fear one’s teacher, maimonides attempts to anchor this 
important notion in a scriptural commandment. In the ShM, maimonides 
divides this duty into two: he anchors the duty to fear one’s teacher 
on the commandment to fear one’s father, and the duty to honor one’s 
teacher on the commandment to honor scholars in general. Because 
82 . Chavel adds in brackets “[and the fear of one’s teacher]” to indicate that maimonides 
was discussing the command to fear the teacher. But this need not be so; maimonides 
could be referring to both fear and honor or just referring to honor.
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in the Halakhot, maimonides relegates the duty to honor scholars to a 
simple mitsvah instead of a mitsvat ‘aseh, he could no longer anchor the 
duty to honor one’s teacher in the duty to honor scholars. This would 
explain the Halakhot’s strategic repositioning of the duty to honor and 
fear one’s teacher, making it totally dependent on the commandment to 
honor one’s father, which is an acknowledged mitsvat ‘aseh� 
At the conclusion of chapter 6, I noted that in order to explain 
the 27 remaining commandments that were not designated as mitsvot 
‘aseh in the Halakhot, one must examine maimonides’ approach to the 
reading of the legal material in scripture. Based on the implications of 
the legal/exegetical principles discussed in chapter 7, I proposed two 
novel ideas to explain the remaining failures to designate. In chapter 
8, I argued that maimonides had, for all practical purposes, reclassified 
a number of formerly-designated scriptural commandments as mitsvot 
mi-divre sofrim. In this chapter, I have analyzed a number of occurrences 
in the Halakhot in which maimonides applies the solo term mitsvah to 
commands that had previously been identified in the ShM as mitsvot 
‘aseh. I argued that although attached to scriptural texts, these mitsvot 
lack the formal properties of scriptural commandments. Broadly 
speaking, I found that the commands in question suffer hermeneutically 
from one of the following deficiencies: they lack specificity; they do 
not convey the sense of an obligation in their pentateuchal proof texts; 
they are derived from inferences in the text; or the traditional meaning 
attributed to them does not conform to the plain sense of the text. In 
these cases, maimonides prefers to label the commands as mitsvot or as 
non-absolute obligations, avoiding the language of mitsvat ‘aseh� 
According to this reading, maimonides’ special hermeneutics of 
peshateh di qera, which we extracted from his comments to Rule 2, are 
seen to have a profound impact on the way he interprets scriptural law. 
To state its general conclusions, a necessary (though not necessarily 
sufficient) condition for a scriptural commandment is that the command 
be issued in a clear and explicit form. In this chapter, however, I have 
suggested that forms that do not fulfill this condition nonetheless 
retain legal standing in maimonidean theory. Rather than as absolute 
obligations, they are to be seen in a softer light, as suggestions, 
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recommendations, or pieces of advice. I suggest that in maimonides’ 
jurisprudence, scriptural legal theory resembles rabbinic legal theory in 
at least one very important respect: it distinguishes between absolute 
obligations on the one hand and recommendations on the other, much 
as rabbinic legal theory clearly and explicitly distinguishes between 
hovah and mitsvah. 
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---------------------------------- CHApTER X  ----------------------------------
summARy ANd 
CoNClusIoN
scholars have ascribed far too much importance to maimonides’ 
enumeration of the commandments and far too little to the motivations 
that lay behind his appropriation of R. simlai’s aggadah as the basis for 
the enumeration and to the significance that maimonides attached to 
this aggadah. The proximate reason for creating an enumeration was his 
need to have a reasoned and methodical outline of all Torah legislation 
in front of him, a reminder of topics to guide his preparation of the 
upcoming code of law, a massive and unique undertaking. Thus we find 
him saying in the introduction to the ShM:
All this [I would do] in order to guard against omitting any topic [emphasis 
added] from discussion, for only by including them in the enumeration 
of the commandments [heading the various treatises] would I insure 
against such omission. 
This sense is reinforced by some of the Rules, especially Rules 
7 and 10-14, which are essentially taxonomic rules rather than 
definitions of what constitutes a mitsvah. I posited that the logically 
unnecessary identification of this outline with R. simlai’s count of 
613 commandments owed its existence to maimonides’ desire to 
incorporate the two fundamental beliefs of the Jewish faith, God’s 
existence and His oneness, into the legal realm, and thus transform their 
intellection into obligations, a dramatic departure from the preceding 
geonic paradigm. I inferred this conclusion from a dispassionate and 
unapologetic assessment of the mitsvah count. maimonides stretched 
the meaning of mitsvat ‘aseh well beyond its common rabbinic usage, 
relying uncharacteristically on an aggadah of questionable legal worth, 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------  Chapter X  ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
— 328 —
a homiletic creation with didactic aims and no pretensions of being 
precise, and resorted to a contrived and hardly compelling logic to 
arrive at the numerical target, likely fully aware of the variant results 
that could be legitimately obtained. 
The enumeration, qua a reasoned list of commandments, has 
diverted the attention of the countless students of his works ever 
since the ShM left his hands. But I posit that it was not R. simlai’s 
dictum that 613 commandments were given to moses at sinai that 
was significant, but rather R. Hamnuna’s accompanying exegesis. 
maimonides used R. Hamnuna’s midrashic exegesis that the verses 
I am the Lord thy God and Thou shalt have no other God before Me 
specifically formed part of the count of 613 commandments to prove 
that to intellect the existence of God and His oneness constituted 
a positive, performative obligation. The credibility of R. Hamnuna’s 
exegesis was even more firmly established when maimonides inferred 
from its language what he believed was a theological truth: the nature 
of the commandments to believe in the existence of God and to 
believe in His oneness was categorically distinct from the nature and 
motivation underlying the rest of the commandments. He explained 
this distinction by averring that the former were philosophically 
demonstrable truths, capable of being apprehended without the 
medium of revelation, while the latter were only conventions, 
necessitating the mediation of a lawgiver and prophet. 
The two articles of faith occupy the most prominent position in 
the MT, appearing in the opening lines of the Sefer ha-Madda’. In a 
letter to his disciple,  yoseph b. yehudah, maimonides wrote that 
he undertook to compile a code of law in his zeal for the glory of 
God, “in seeing a nation bereft of a truly comprehensive book (diwan) 
of law, and bereft of clear and correct [theological] notions.”1 only 
the inclusion of these two beliefs in the canon of law could have 
satisfied the requirements of “a truly comprehensive book (diwan)” 
containing “correct theological notions.” In sum, the unequivocal and 
unique statement found in R. simlai’s aggadah, that the beliefs in 
God’s existence and His oneness constituted positive obligations, led 
1 . Iggerot ha-Rambam, ed. shailat, vol. 1, 301.
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maimonides to appropriate the aggadah, adopt its numerical value 
of 613, and conflate it with the outline that he was preparing — all 
despite the constraints that it imposed. 
In the second half of the book, I turned my attention to the sub-
section of positive commandments and drew some conclusions from 
the way they are described and defined in the Halakhot. While my 
readings hinged on what maimonides actually wrote, I recognized 
that, being human, maimonides was bound to make the occasional 
mistake. That said, the exceptional (but more than occasional) omission 
of the formulaic phrase “X is a mitsvat ‘aseh” at the start of a topical 
discussion held my special attention because of the implausibility of 
it being forgotten: the phrase is rich, bold, highly informative, and 
consistent with maimonides’ sustained interest for making categorical 
distinctions. Additionally, and just as importantly, my readings focused 
on how maimonides expressed himself. The rhetoric, the literary 
presentation of his ideas, and the logic of composition mattered as much 
to me as the slight inferences one could arrive at by noting the absence 
or presence of a particular term, elements which have constituted the 
more traditional way of studying his works. 
I began this book’s second section by noting that in the Halakhot, 
maimonides moves away from the contrived artificiality adopted in the 
ShM of using the term mitsvat ‘aseh to designate all types of legal themes: 
here he applies the term to a very specific case, that of an absolute and 
unconditional obligation. Combing scriptural and rabbinic sources, 
maimonides searches for clear indications of unconditional commands 
and imperatives to perform well-defined acts. These he designates boldly 
and prominently at the commencement of each topical discussion, with 
a formulaic phrase that states that the directive at hand is a mitsvat ‘aseh. 
Where maimonides withholds the mitsvat ‘aseh designation, I theorized 
that he must have done so because the scriptural and/or rabbinic 
evidence was insufficient to make such a determination. I tested for 
this evidentiary insufficiency, and when confirmed, I theorized further 
that under the influence of reigning Islamic legal theory (which was 
also heavily if not wholly influenced by rabbinic thinking), maimonides 
opts for a softer definition. As a result, certain scriptural directives 
are categorized as recommendations rather than orders, wise pieces of 
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advice rather than commands. supporting these with scriptural proof 
texts, he labels them with the solo term mitsvah, a label that he also uses 
to designate rabbinical directives. The scriptural mitsvot include such 
prominent directives as to love and fear God, to imitate Him, to appoint 
a king, to heed the call of a prophet, to rebuke the sinner, to honor the 
wise, to testify in court, and a few others.
I conjectured further that maimonides deliberately withheld the 
scriptural designation from certain commandments that had been 
labeled as scriptural in the ShM when the plain reading of the scriptural 
text did not appear to provide sufficient evidence for them, even when 
rabbinic interpretation suggested otherwise. To this end, he chose 
an artful but somewhat concealed literary device to designate them 
as such, the participle of correct practice. This is the case with such 
prominent practices as the recitation of the shema, the binding of the 
tefillin, the writing and placing of the mezuzah and the study of Torah.
In the heavily politicized atmosphere of Cairo, where Rabbanites 
were both assiduously courted and continuously attacked by sectarian 
groups (largely Karaites) over the role of the oral law in interpreting 
scripture, maimonides chose to keep his radical opinions hidden 
yet recoverable. When applied to the legal sections of the Torah, 
maimonides’ peshateh di-qera hermeneutics would likely raise hackles 
among his own co-religionists and, worse yet, give comfort to the 
deniers of the oral law. His carefully planted literary cues could lead 
the reader who is familiar with rabbinic terminology and unburdened 
by popular and superficial conclusions to discover the master’s true 
opinion, or at the very least sense his ambivalence. 
maimonides was informed by a hermeneutics of peshateh di-qera 
that was firmly and demonstrably anchored in the Andalusian tradition. 
His insistence on presumed philological validity, however, left him 
uneasily placed, uncomfortably close to sectarian investigation and 
interpretation. Ironically, this led him at times to mount a struggling 
defense of his own traditional Rabbanite views, well aware that the plain 
sense of scripture did not lend convincing support for such a stance.2 
2 . see, for example, Hilkhot Hovel u-Maziq 1:1-6, Hilkhot Temidin u-Musafin 7:11, and 
p153 in the ShM. on another occasion, I plan to show that maimonides adopted 
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Consciously or unconsciously, maimonides navigated his legal 
system between the Rabbanites and the Karaites, upholding the 
former’s respect for authoritative tradition and the latter’s insistence 
on relying only on philologically informed readings. maimonides’ 
extraordinarily novel application of peshateh di-qera to the halakhic 
corpus threatened the very foundations of a Rabbanism, one that was 
intimately intertwined with the Talmud and its authority. Nahmanides 
understood this all too well when he criticized Rule 2: 
[F]or this book of the master, its content is delightful, full of love [based 
on song 5:16] except for this principle, which uproots great mountains 
of the Talmud and throws down fortified walls of the Gemara. For the 
students of the Gemara, this notion is evil and bitter. let it be forgotten 
and not said.3 
of course, maimonides would not have conceded this point: he would 
have maintained that his paradigm flowed quite naturally from the 
pages of the Talmud. did not the Talmud’s quest for peshateh di-qera 
support the distinction between divine and man-made law? did not the 
rabbis of the Talmud acknowledge that explicitly stipulated scriptural 
laws enjoyed an epistemic advantage over and a distinction from man-
made laws? To maimonides the answer to these two questions was a 
resounding yes. 
Thanks to his remarkable codification, maimonides left an 
indelible mark on Jewish law. unfortunately, an important part of 
his jurisprudence, the exquisitely fine distinctions he made between 
divine and human law and between command and advice, was never 
fully appreciated, perhaps because of its radical import — or perhaps 
because maimonides, for his own good reasons, hid many of these 
contributions behind formulaic omissions, terminological nuances, and 
subtle literary devices. It is this rich and layered nuancing that, in some 
modest way, I have tried to recover.
purely polemical positions in some of these instances.
3 . Hasagot to Rule 2.
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EXCuRsus
An estimate of the number of entries that Maimonides  
omitted from Qayyara’s list of positive commandments  
and possible reasons for these omissions
This exursus is a speculative exercise. In the methodological section (Rules) 
of his Sefer ha-Mitsvot, maimonides provides a number of examples of the 
erroneous enumerations proposed by Qayyara and his followers. These 
examples only yield a partial list of disqualifications. one might think that 
a careful comparison of Qayyara’s and maimonides’ lists would give a full 
account of the omissions. unfortunately, as I have explained in this work, 
Qayyara’s entries are terse and often vaguely worded, and the entries 
require careful interpretation. As in most subjective exercises, the range 
of meanings is quite wide: Qayyara’s interpreters, often driven by both 
intuition and imagination, differed a great deal in their readings. Their 
differing analyses, in turn, have a meaningful impact on our conclusions. 
matters are further complicated by the existence of a number of recensions 
of this list, each containing important variants. since we have no way to 
identify which version maimonides saw and critiqued, our conclusions 
must remain tentative, at best. Finally, all the lists suffer from the crucial 
inconvenience of lacking punctuation; where one commandment ends 
and a new one begins is itself a matter of interpretation. most of these 
problems have been highlighted by Naftali Tsvi Hildesheimer.1 
In the list below, I have identified entries in Qayyara’s list of positive 
Commandments (pq) that the Rules appear to disqualify. Where 
relevant, I have noted maimonides’ reason for the disqualification. For 
simplicity’s sake, I have adopted Hildesheimer’s version of the list2 
1 . Hildeshimer, Haqdamat, 18-24.
2 . Hildesheimer, Haqdamat, based on ms. oxford Genizah, c18. In Hildesheimer’s 
opinion, this version is similar in many respects to the B version and to ms. Ambrosiano 
(milan) # sup. C116.
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and his parsing of the commandments. Hildesheimer’s notes on the 
individual commandments provide a brief but informative survey 
of commentators’ interpretations and are helpful in choosing the 
meaning that comes closest to the plain sense of the entry. 
This exercise can be said to be highly conjectural, though I believe that 
regardless of the particular text, interpretation, and application of Rules 
that one might use, the conclusion would not vary greatly. maimonides 
reduced Qayyara’s count of positive commandments by approximately 60, 
and the total count (not dealt with here) by as many as 100.
Pq #  Description      Eliminated by Rule 
203  “the hides of the most consecrated offerings”   12
214  “that which is raised from thanksgiving offering”  12
224  “the breast and thigh (of the peace offering)  12 
27  “one-hundred blessings each day”     1
335  “to clothe the naked”      1
345  “to bury the dead”       1
355  “to console the mourner”     1
365  “to visit the sick”      1
376  “the love of peace”      1
387  “righteousness”       1 
398  “faith”       1 
49  “joy of sabbath”      1
3 . pq 20. In V (Venice edition), but missing in B (Berlin edition). maimonides makes it 
part of the commandment outlining the procedure of the burnt offering (p 63).
4 . pq 21-22. maimonides makes it part of the commandment outlining the procedure of 
the burnt offering (p 66). 
5 . pq 33-36. These entries follow pq 32 “to walk in His ways.” maimonides understood 
that each of these entries represented a separate commandment (Cf. Rule 1). Arguably, 
these four entries could represent details of pq 32, in accordance with the talmudic 
tradition, and not separate commandments. see chapter 9, note 38. 
6 . pq 37. my explanation is conjectural and is based on understanding this entry as 
enjoining peace with other members of society. see the baraita cited in BT shabbat 
127a. It appears to me that maimonides excluded this entry because, like other 
rabbinic commandments, it lacked an explicit scriptural proof text. It is not clear, 
however, what Qayyara meant here; moreover, we find a number of significant variants 
in the various recensions. see Hildesheimer, Haqdamat, n. 333.
7 . pq 38. Rabbinic commandment? see previous note. Alternatively, Rule 4, for being 
nonspecific. see also Hildesheimer, Haqdamat, n. 334.
8 . pq 39. “Faith,” as in dealing with honesty (nasata be-emunah), a rabbinic precept. 
see chapter 5. V has here “truth.” Hildesheimer, Haqdamat, equates this entry with 
religious faith and finds its correlate in maimonides’ p1 and p2. 
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Pq #  Description      Eliminated by Rule 
509  “its pleasure”       1 
8010  “to keep it [passover] seven days”    Redundant 
83-9011  “kiddush eight days”     1 
103-121  “18 days and one night to recite the full Hallel”   1
134-13812  “the five [restitutions of] one fifth”    7 
139  “the sabbath candle”     1
140  “the Hanukah candle”     1
14113  “to give the carcass of an animal (nevelah) to a ger toshav”  7
14314  “to uphold [the righteousness of] judgement”   1
14515  “to be whole”      4 
14716  “to pursue justice”     7
14817  “to do (or repay) kindness”    2
155  “to fear the sages”      2
9 . pq 50. To delight in sabbath is a mitsvah mi-divre sofrim (MT Hilkhot Shabbat 30:1). 
10 . pq 80. This entry has puzzled commentators, who offer a variety of interpretations. 
According to Eliezer ben shmuel me-mitz, Sefer Yereim, it is a general commandment 
that covers all the injunctions of the passover, in accordance with “Thou shalt therefore 
keep this ordinance in its season from year to year” (Exod. 13:10). As such, it can be 
considered redundant. For other possibilities, see Hildesheimer, Haqdamat, n. 361.
11 . pq 83-90. Refers here to the recitation of the kiddush that introduces the sabbath 
and the seven festival days (A. s. Traub). According to maimonides, only the sabbath 
kiddush is scriptural. maimonides would therefore be eliminating here seven entries 
out of eight. For other interpretations, see Hildesheimer, Haqdamat, n. 364. 
12 . pq 134-138. Five commandments, following A. s. Traub, see Hildesheimer, Haqdamat, 
84n376. maimonides enumerates three of these under p 118 (see  Hurewitz, Yad ha-
Levi, ad loc.); the other two should not be enumerated since they would constitute 
details of “holy things,” as mentioned in Rule 7.
13 . pq 141. detail of p 195, the obligation to give charity (so Nahmanides’ additions to the 
positive commandments, #16). Ibn Ezra (Abraham ibn Ezra, Yesod Mora, second Gate, 
105) and simeon duran (duran, Zohar ha-Raqia, positive commandments, siman 77) 
consider the verse reshut and not a hovah. This rationale, however, cannot be adduced 
in favor of maimonides’ omission in view of the broad typology of commandments 
claimed in the SE/ShM enumerations. 
14 . pq 143. A number of commentators have understood it as the rabbinic precept urging 
one to accept divine judgement (tsidduq ha-din). If taken instead in a juridical context, 
pq 143 would be subsumed under p 177. see Hildesheimer, Haqdamat, n. 382. 
15 . pq 145. Not specific. This probably refers to various forms of witchcraft (so Megillat 
Esther, on Nahmanides’ additions to the positive commandments, #8).
16 . pq 147. meaning uncertain. possibly subsumed under p 177.
17 . pq 148. At any rate, maimonides notes (Rule 2) that this obligation is subsumed 
under the scriptural commandment to love one’s neighbor as oneself (p 206). see 
Hildesheimer, Haqdamat, n. 329. 
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Pq #  Description      Eliminated by Rule 
16418  “you shall sanctify yourself and you shall be holy”  4 
16519  “be lowly in spirit”     1 
18120  “pourings (yetsiqot)”     12 
182  “minglings (belilot)”     12 
183  “crumblings (petitot)”     12 
185  “liftings (tenufot)”      12
186  “the bringing near (hagashot)”    12
187  “fist-fulls (qemitsot)”     12 
188  “the offerings of incense (haqtarot)”    12
18921  “slaughterings”      12 
19022  “nipping off (meliqot)”     12 
19123  “receiving [the blood]”     12 
19224  “sprinkling [the blood]”     12 
20025  “reading the megillah”     1 
The above deletions total 64.
18 . pq 164. Based on leviticus 11:44. In his discussion of Rule 4, maimonides criticizes 
those who counted a similar injunction based on a slightly different verse (lev. 19:2). 
19 . pq 165. m Avot 4:4. This is possibly subsumed under p8, the commandment to imitate 
God.
20 . pq 181-188. This lists various steps in the preparation of the meal offerings. 
maimonides refers to these in his discussion of Rule 12 and points out the error in 
enumerating them as separate commandments rather than as parts of bringing a meal 
offering. I have omitted “saltings (melihot)” from this list because maimonides also 
enumerates “salting,” though in connection with all offerings (p 62). 
21 . pq 189. maimonides would make this procedure a part of bringing the various 
offerings (p 63-66).
22 . pq 190. maimonides would make this procedure a part of bringing various bird 
offerings included in p 63 and p 64.
23 . pq 191. see note on pq 189, above.
24 . pq 192. see note on pq 189, above.
25 . pq 200. A rabbinic precept (Rule 1).
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posTsCRIpT
Readers of chapter 7 of this book will be aware that maimonides uses 
two technical terms in the Sefer ha-Mitsvot when referring to the plain 
meaning (peshat) of scripture: the Aramaic peshateh di-qera as well as 
its equivalent, gufeh di qera, and the Arabic zahir al-nass. At the time of 
writing the dissertation, and through the subsequent period of revising 
it for publication, I maintained the intention to return to this matter, 
since I felt that a precise definition and the relation between these 
terms had eluded me (see footnote 30, chapter 7). Just as this book 
goes to print, I have had the opportunity to read the recently published 
(and anxiously anticipated; see chapter 7, footnote 26) monograph 
opening the Gates of Interpretation: Maimonides’ Biblical Hermeneutics 
in Light of His Geonic-Andalusian Heritage and Muslim Milieu (leiden: 
Brill, 2011), by mordechai Cohen, in which he tries to shed light on this 
question. Cohen has the great merit of having noticed and investigated 
the precise contours of these two terms by which maimonides describes 
the plain sense of the text. In fact, to the best of my knowledge, he may 
be the first maimonidean scholar ever to have done so. space and time 
considerations allow me neither to detail his arguments nor to offer my 
rebuttal and my own views in more than a summarizing fashion; these 
will have to await a future article. still, the main conclusions are worth 
presenting as they bear on what is discussed in the second half of this 
book. I beg the reader to review the analysis conducted in chapter 7 
before reading this postscript, as I plan to allude or briefly refer to, but 
not to repeat, some of the evidence drawn from the Sefer ha-Mitsvot.   
Cohen begins by distinguishing between the meaning of a term, 
i.e., its strict definition, and its use, that is, “the specific connotations 
it conveys in a particular context.” He concludes that peshateh di-qera, 
meaning an “unfolding of the text,” simply represents the plain and 
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straightforward sense of the verse, much as sarah Kamin describes 
its Hebrew equivalent, peshuto shel miqra. Concerning the use of the 
term, Cohen argues that maimonides reserves it for halakhically 
authoritative readings, even when these readings depart from the 
philological contextual sense of the verse. Peshateh di-qera, then, is a 
marker for peshat as sanctioned by the oral sinaitic tradition. Zahir al-
nass, on the other hand, denoting that which becomes visible, i.e., the 
external sense, has generally been understood as the literal sense by 
maimonides’ Andalusian predecessors. But maimonides uses it, pace 
Cohen, in a number of ways, sometimes to express the manifestly 
correct sense or the obvious sense of the text, and sometimes, by 
contrast, to denote the apparent sense of the text. The latter somewhat 
negative judgment of zahir al-nass — “apparent,” with the connotation 
of insufficient or essentially incorrect — is primarily driven by the fact 
that maimonides in the Guide faults zahir al-nass for the mistaken 
conceptions of God that unsophisticated readers acquire on reading 
anthropomorphic passages in the Bible (open the Gates, 105). To be sure, 
Cohen maintains that “the term zahir in the Sefer ha-Mitsvot generally 
connotes the contextual-philological interpretation,” a statement with 
which one can whole-heartedly concur, but then adds, in line with his 
thesis, that zahir may represent the apparent sense, “which would be 
correct if not for an opposing authoritative rabbinic interpretation” 
(opening the Gates, 118). That is, zahir is a marker for a rejected view. 
Peshateh di-qera and zahir al-nass are close enough equivalents that 
both Ibn Tibbon and Kafih, the two main translators of the Sefer ha-
Mitsvot, rendered these terms simply as peshat. Cohen acknowledges 
this very close connection when he says that “maimonides regarded 
zahir al-nass as a key component in determining the correct meaning 
of peshateh di-qera, and he did not ignore the close relation between the 
two concepts, notwithstanding the distinction he made between them 
in the Book of Commandments. In fact, in his Hebrew writings … he 
at times does use the term peshat in the sense of Arabic zahir, which 
further indicates the link between the two concepts in his view” 
(opening the Gates, 436 n.12). The “distinction he made between 
them” is more imagined than real, as we find only one case, N165, 
in which maimonides contrasts, and then only indirectly, these two 
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hermeneutics. In his summary of the nine instances in which peshateh 
di-qera appears in the Sefer ha-Mitsvot, Cohen admits that in as many 
as seven instances, peshateh di-qera adheres to zahir al-nass, while in 
two other instances it does not (opening the Gates, 331-334). What 
Cohen sees as divergence from zahir al-nass is based on a subjective 
appreciation of what the contextual meaning of the verse should convey, 
hardly a solid basis for such a determination. A methodological caution 
is in order with respect to other writings since it is entirely possible that 
maimonides used these terms differently throughout his literary career 
and therefore they may not shed useful light on their usage in the Sefer 
ha-Mitsvot — despite Cohen’s valiant efforts. For example, in the Guide 
maimonides may have taken zahir al-nass to refer simply to the literal 
sense of words, as opposed to their figurative or philosophical sense, in 
the same way saadia and some of his other predecessors did, and much 
as modern scholarship has understood it.  
I remain unconvinced of Cohen’s precisions, as I have adumbrated 
in footnote 30 of chapter 7, particularly with respect to maimonides’ 
use, though not the meaning, of the terms. Nevertheless, Cohen’s 
thorough analysis and my own recent research on zahir al-nass as used 
in the Guide have led me to make a slight and important correction 
in the definition of these two terms. In my revised opinion, peshateh 
di-qera stands for the straightforward sense of a verse, one that results 
from being able to explain all the grammatical components of the 
sentence as they are commonly used and applying to the verse the 
minimum amount of force. In the Sefer ha-Mitsvot, maimonides uses 
peshateh di-qera specifically to reject the fanciful, homiletic alternative 
interpretations that the Talmudic rabbis offer for certain verses, i.e., 
derashot, which, in his view, do not represent scripture’s true intention. 
Therefore, these interpretations cannot be said to attain the status 
of scriptural law. significantly, the context in which the verses are 
presented plays no role in this exegesis. 
These criteria are mostly or wholly consistent with the nine 
appearances of peshateh di-qera in the Sefer ha-Mitsvot. The atomistic 
reading of Exodus 18:20 (see Rule 2) and deuteronomy 23:24 (p94) 
proposed by some midrashim and cited by maimonides as invalid 
interpretations of scriptural laws because they chop the various parts of 
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the verse into unintelligible utterances, are good examples of derashot 
that violate peshateh di-qera (see my chapter 7, pages 249-250). Along 
similar objections, the rabbinic derashah to deuteronomy 14:1 (cited 
by maimonides at N45) that forbids the dividing of people and causing 
strife works by uprooting the words lo titgodedu from the rest of the 
verse and must therefore be rejected as an interpretation that does not 
follow gufeh di-qera (the equivalent to peshateh di-qera). Again, by the 
same token, the prohibition against eating filthy or repulsive things 
derived by the rabbis homiletically from the words “ye shall not make 
yourselves detestable” (leviticus 11:43) works only by reading this 
sentence in isolation from the rest of the verse. As maimonides avers, 
peshateh di-qera, a look at the entire verse, reveals that the prohibition 
concerns itself only with creeping things (sherets). In Rule 3, maimonides 
places peshateh di-qera in apposition to a textual intimation (remez) and 
reveals a similar criterion. The short passage reads as follows: “Now 
although (the rabbis) do say: ‘An intimation against stealing a holy 
vessel (is found in the verse) “And they shall not go in to see as they 
dismantle (or ruin)  (kevalla‘) the holy…”’ — it is sufficient that they 
labeled it [i.e., this derashah] an intimation (remez); the peshateh di-
qera does not carry this sense.” The short clause containing the difficult 
kevalla‘ is homiletically read as a warning against stealing or hiding 
holy vessels (see Rashi, bsanhedrin 81b). However, the entire verse, 
governed by the predicate “go in to see” as well as the sense provided 
by the immediately prior verse to which this verse is connected via the 
conjunctive vav, makes it clear that the straightforward sense is about 
the prohibition against levites seeing the holy vessels as the sanctuary 
is being dismantled and moved to another location. 
The historical explanation that maimonides gives, in the name of 
peshateh di-qera, to harmonize the plain sense of Exodus 20:24 with 
normative halakhah rather than to adopt the forced midrash of Rabbi 
yishmael (at p20), is proof evident of the high regard maimonides has 
for peshateh di-qera (p20). In effect, the midrash succeeds in reconciling 
the text with halakhah only by assuming an unlikely and unexpected 
ellipsis in a perfectly readable text and by supplying the elided term. This 
type of violence to the text is inimical to peshateh di-qera hermeneutics. 
And yet it is worth noting that the derashah carries the day, and it is so 
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codified in MT, Hilkhot Bet ha-Behirah 1:13. Here, then, peshateh di-qera 
is not necessarily the authoritative interpretation that Cohen makes it 
out to be.   
one might be tempted to question maimonides’ use of peshateh 
di-qera in connection with leviticus 19:14 at N299 in light of the fact 
that he adopts a figurative rather than a simpler and more literal sense 
for the verse. We should note, however, that peshateh di-qera does not 
necessitate literal readings; a figurative interpretation can also do, 
as long as the interpretation “fits” the entire verse, and in this case, 
as the cited sifra makes clear, it unquestionably does. maimonides’ 
preference for the figurative over the literal sense on this occasion may 
be a function of such things as the belief that the physical sense has 
already been covered by a different proof-text (see the immediately 
preceding N298), the unexpected appearance of the word “give” (titen) 
where one might have expected “put” (tasim) if a physical obstacle was 
being planted, or simply aesthetic considerations. The point is that the 
choice between literal and figurative, all else being equal, is a matter of 
subjective preference rather than the application of the hermeneutics of 
an “unfolding of the text.” moreover, maimonides uses peshateh di-qera 
on this occasion not to reject the literal sense but, as always, to reject 
the multiple rabbinic interpretations — some of which he cites — that 
are appended to this verse. 
In connection with Exodus 20:20, Cohen argues that maimonides 
adopts the peshateh di-qera (as substantiated by Mekhilta) that reads 
the verse as a prohibition to make graven images even for non-worship 
purposes, in opposition, so he argues, to the philological-contextual 
construal (zahir al-nass), which sees the verse as a prohibition to 
make graven images, i.e. idols, for the purposes of worship. In his 
words, “In this case, the rabbinic commentary [referring to Mekhilta’s 
interpretation] is an authoritative ‘transmitted interpretation’ that 
overrides zahir al-nass … that would have been correct otherwise.” 
Besides committing the error of subjective preference discussed earlier, 
Cohen fails perhaps to appreciate Mekhilta’s close reading of the verse 
and all its parts, in this case the play on the preposition-plus-plural-
pronoun lakhem, for yourselves, which follows the verb “to make” and 
yields “to make for yourselves,” i.e. for your pleasure and benefit. As 
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usual, the peshateh di qera comes to disavow the reader from other 
far-fetched derashot, as Cohen correctly points out, “maimonides here 
invokes the rule of peshat to choose the rabbinic interpretation that is 
more reasonable … as opposed to other laws attached to the text by way 
of derash” (opening the Gates, 318).
The use of gufeh di-qera (equivalent to peshateh di-qera) at N165 
requires a short introduction because the discarded view is not as 
obvious as those we have examined earlier. The commandment that 
forbids priests to leave the sanctuary while ministering is based on two 
verses. The first verse addresses the common priest with the words, 
“you shall not go out from the door of the tent of meeting” (leviticus 
10:7), while the second refers to the High priest and says, “He shall not 
go outside the sanctuary and he shall not profane the sanctuary of his 
God” (leviticus 21:12). In Rule 5 of the Sefer ha-Mitsvot, maimonides 
deals with motive clauses framed in the form of negative injunctions, 
and states that these clauses are not to be enumerated as independent 
commandments. one of the examples he provides is leviticus 21:12. He 
points out that the sentence “and he shall not profane the sanctuary” 
must be understood as a motive clause explaining why the High priest 
is prohibited from going out: the High priest must not go out of the 
sanctuary lest he profane the sanctuary. This, he argues, is the correct 
way of reading the verse; the negative injunction must not be read 
out of context to support a second and independent prohibition, to 
wit, that the High priest must not profane the sanctuary, as other 
enumerators of the commandments seem to have done. It follows that 
the prohibition to go out of the sanctuary is effective only when the 
opportunity to profane the sanctuary presents itself, that is, while the 
High priest is ministering. maimonides, with the help of sifra, extends 
this rationale to all priests, thus the prohibition for priests to go out 
of the sanctuary while ministering. At any rate, through the correct, or 
straightforward, way of reading the “second” prohibition, maimonides 
manages to add an important qualification to the prohibition against 
priests leaving the sanctuary. Hence maimonides is justified in saying 
that gufeh di-qera supports his reading of the verse. 
In sum, peshateh di-qera in the Sefer ha-Mitsvot stands for a method 
of interpreting scripture that features the straightforward, plain sense 
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reading of texts, one that requires the least amount of grammatical 
and syntactical manipulation and that takes special care in reading 
the verse as a whole; words or groups of words may not be taken out 
of context. The interpretative unit in which peshateh di-qera operates, 
however, is the individual verse and not the larger passage in which the 
verse is embedded. Peshateh di-qera makes its appearance in the Sefer 
ha-Mitsvot wherever fanciful and forced interpretations or derashot are 
mentioned, referred to or alluded to, and it is used as a categorical foil 
to these derashot.         
Zahir al-nass is a creative hermeneutic with an illustrious Andalusian 
pedigree, as Cohen demonstrates, that follows philologically sound 
principles and takes into account both context and the logic of an entire 
passage. Zahir al-nass reflects the intention of the author and therefore, 
contra Cohen, is deemed to reflect the correct sense of scripture. 
This is so in the Guide, as I have recently argued in “maimonides on 
Anthropomorphism: should scripture be Read philosophically?” (As 
a Perennial Spring: A festschrift Honoring Rabbi Dr� Norman Lamm, ed. 
Bentsi Cohen, david B. Greenberg [Ny: 2013]), and this is true also in 
the Sefer ha-Mitsvot. Cohen tries to show that zahir al-nass in the Sefer 
ha-Mitsvot is trumped by tradition in N46, proving therefore that it 
yields an incorrect, non-authoritative meaning (opening the Gates, 118-
120). However, puzzlingly, maimonides appears to contradict here his 
own Rule 8, which states that the determination of whether a negative 
particle stands for a prohibition or a negation can be made only by 
the logic of the passage and not by tradition. In maimonides’ words, 
“there is no clear-cut rule for distinguishing a negative statement 
from an admonition, except by the purport of the statement.” Cohen 
appears to overlook this point and therefore regards zahir al-nass here 
as “incorrect.” (Tantalizingly, maimonides may in fact be protesting the 
rabbinic tradition!) 
This is not to deny that zahir al-nass may in fact be trumped by a 
received tradition, as maimonides suggests in Rule 9 with respect to 
otiose scriptural passages, where these redundancies are expected to be 
taken as stylistic variations or for the purpose of emphasis. As Cohen 
notes, “… where the rabbis attribute a new meaning to the seemingly 
redundant verse, their interpretive tradition, in his opinion, is ‘most 
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correct’ and overrides the zahir, which would otherwise have been more 
reasonable” (opening the Gates, 121). As we saw earlier, this is also true 
for peshateh di-qera. 
In this book, I have shown that maimonides minimizes the 
number of traditional interpretations that are not compatible with 
plain meaning and makes strong efforts to make the traditional 
interpretation conform to the plain sense of the text. my argument is 
not that zahir must at times take a backseat to tradition, but rather that 
maimonides will not cite a zahir interpretation in the Sefer ha-Mitsvot 
in the sense of “apparent meaning” for the purpose of rejecting it.   
As we saw earlier, maimonides applies (at N165) peshateh di-qera to 
leviticus 10:7 in support of a general scriptural claim that priests are 
forbidden to go out of the sanctuary while ministering. In that same 
comment to N165, maimonides applies a zahir al-nass interpretation to 
the parallel passage (leviticus 21:12), which refers, as we saw earlier, 
to the High priest and determines that the High priest is forbidden to 
accompany the bier of a near relative (M Sanhedrin 2:1 attributes this 
opinion to R. Judah). The exegesis is based on the fact that the verse 
appears in a section discussing the manner in which the High priest 
should behave when one of his relatives dies. The context is therefore 
critical to this interpretation. The subsequent Talmudic discussion 
attributes R. Judah’s view not to a contextual reading of the verse 
but to rabbinic concerns that the grieving High priest may come to 
defile himself by touching the corpse during the funeral procession. 
At the same time, maimonides does not enumerate this prohibition 
in his count of the 613 scriptural commandments. on this evidence, 
Cohen deduces that zahir al-nass does not represent the authoritative 
interpretation of the verse and therefore zahir al-nass can only be said 
here to be the apparent sense of scripture (but see opening the Gates, 
127 and footnote 132, where Cohen seems to waver), in glaring contrast 
with peshateh di-qera, which, as we saw, yields a scriptural law. This 
conclusion is unwarranted in my view. maimonides’ comments in the 
Sefer ha-Mitsvot seem to indicate quite clearly that he holds the zahir 
al-nass interpretation to be genuine and scriptural in nature, rather 
than the product of a rabbinic precautionary decree, but that it would 
not affect the enumeration of commandments because of a principle 
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enunciated in Rule 9, namely, that two verses that repeat the same 
law, as in this case, must not be counted separately. moreover, in his 
comment to that same mishnah, maimonides states that the halakhah 
follows R. Judah’s view, suggesting that at least at an earlier stage he 
adhered to the zahir al-nass (maimonides’ opinion with respect to the 
scriptural status of R. Judah’s law may have changed in the later MT; 
but see Kafih, Sefer ha-Mitsvot, N165 n. 17, and see Hilkhot Biat ha-
Miqdash 2:6, which seems to presuppose this exegesis).
At N181, maimonides clearly endorses zahir al-nass and adopts it 
as the primary meaning of Exodus 22:30. Cohen’s explanation for the 
reason maimonides calls this construal zahir al-nass rather than peshateh 
di-qera as he should, in view of the fact that the latter term denotes 
authoritative meaning, is highly convoluted and must be rejected. 
Cohen wavers with respect to leviticus 19:17 (at N303), where 
maimonides registers, “somewhat surprisingly” in Cohen’s words, 
“his understanding of zahir al-nass.” on the one hand, Cohen renders 
zahir al-nass in this gloss as “the apparent sense of the text,” meaning 
the incorrect or superficial sense, but on the other he suggests that 
“maimonides does not seem to relinquish the contextual (meaning), 
and states that it appears to have influenced his halakhic thinking, as 
implied by his formulation of p205” (123-124). I have already shown 
in my book (see pages 318-320) that maimonides in the MT treats the 
zahir al-nass reading as fully authoritative. 
In conclusion, zahir al-nass in the Sefer ha-Mitsvot is a philological-
contextual reading of the scriptural text that maimonides attempts to 
incorporate into the body of scriptural law even absent an oral tradition 
to this effect. Peshateh di-qera and zahir al-nass are two distinct peshat 
tools that operate tangentially to each other in maimonides’ legal 
scriptural hermeneutics and that accomplish different objectives. 
In broad strokes, maimonides uses the former as a bulwark against 
fanciful interpretations, and he uses the latter as a way to plumb 
the true intentions of the law. None of these serve as markers of 
authoritativeness or lack thereof as Cohen has strenuously but 
unsuccessfully, in my opinion, argued. 
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